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"Mutual understanding in the strong sense […] is not required for the undertaking of 
joint projects."  
– Robert Brandom1 
 
 
 
"Politics involves the clash that emerges when appraisive concepts are shared widely 
but imperfectly, when mutual understanding and interpretation is possible but in a 
partial and limited way […]."  
– William Connolly2 
 
 
 
"We can live together without agreeing on what the values are that make it good to 
live together; we can agree about what to do in most cases, without agreeing about 
why it is right."  
– Kwame Anthony Appiah3 
 
 
 
                                                
1 "[M]utual understanding in the strong sense Habermas is insisting upon is not required for 
the undertaking of joint projects." Brandom 2000, 363. 
2 "Politics involves the clash that emerges when appraisive concepts are shared widely but 
imperfectly, when mutual understanding and interpretation is possible but in a partial and 
limited way, when reasoned argument and coercive pressure commingle precariously in the 
endless process of defining and resolving issues." Connolly 1993, 40.  
3 "Appiah 2006, 71.  
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1 Introduction4 
 
1.1 An outsider's view of our world's legislation 
 
A fledgling diplomat from Pluto, posted on her first mission to Earth, would 
no doubt be surprised by the way in which legislation on this planet is 
negotiated and adopted. On civilized planets like Pluto, a global legislature 
passes all the laws that Plutonians can more or less all agree on, regardless of 
their varying beliefs, values and other fundamental commitments. The stuff 
that gets left over is negotiated and adopted by subsets of the Plutonian 
population who live together, work together, or otherwise interact with each 
other on a regular basis and have to figure out how to get along and 
undertake joint projects, even though their beliefs, values and other 
fundamental commitments also differ from each other's – albeit usually not 
by quite as much as in the Plutonian population as a whole. Within these 
subsets of the population, even smaller and less diverse sub-subsets pass even 
more particularistic laws that they more or less all agree on – laws that may 
differ considerably from the laws adopted by other subsets and sub-subsets. 
This recursive process trickles down to the tiniest groups of the Plutonian 
population, say individual neighborhoods or businesses or religious 
communities or families, and the aspects of Plutonian existence that are not 
governed by any of these groups, great or small, are left to the individual 
Plutonian citizens to decide for themselves. Plutonians call this legislative 
practice "law as pluralism." 
 
On Earth, the origin of laws is very different. At the global level, almost 
nothing is legislated directly. Instead, roughly 200 entities called "states" act 
like little worlds of their own, passing laws as they see fit. These laws don't 
necessarily have to meet with the support of their respective state's 
population – in some states, the laws correspond rather well to the beliefs, 
values and other fundamental commitments of the particular subset of 
Earthlings they govern; in other states, they don't. How laws are generated in 
these states is more often than not determined by sets of procedural rules and 
substantive constraints called "constitutions," which usually consist of a 
single, relatively short document, and volumes and volumes of commentaries 
and interpretations by institutions such as legislatures and courts created by 
those same constitutions, along with even more commentaries and 
interpretations by law professors and other proclaimed or self-proclaimed 
experts. The origin of these constitutions is frequently uncertain and rooted in 
                                                
4 I would like to thank the following people for their generous insights, feedback, support, 
and patience: my advisor Prof. Dr. Urs Marti; my second reviewer Prof. em. Dr. Georg 
Kohler; Prof. Dr. Axel Tschentscher, Ass.-Prof. Dr. Martino Mona, Prof. Dr. Thomas 
Kesselring, and Prof. Dr. Wolf Linder of the legal philosophy round at the University of Bern; 
Damiano Sguaitamatti, Urs Wickli, Jörg Mirtl, Antoinette Scherz, Marco Toscano, Angelo 
Maiolino and the other participants in the thesis colloquium in political philosophy at the 
University of Zurich; Prof. Kristen Boon of Seton Hall Law School; the late Prof. Thomas 
Franck of New York University School of Law; Ambassador Claudia Fritsche of the 
Principality of Liechtenstein to the United States of America; Ambassador Christian 
Wenaweser of the Principality of Liechtenstein to the United Nations; Meggan Madden of the 
University of Toronto; François Hada; Michael Knecht-Rink; Roman Padrutt; Barbara 
Brunner Roth; and last but certainly not least, Kerstin Appel-Huston, Ella Huston, Pamela 
Straub-Huston, Michael Huston, Christa and Josef Appel, and Maude Falkner. 
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the state's mythological past,5 although they often are said to have been 
legitimized by the explicit or at least tacit consent of some of the local 
population who were alive and deemed worthy of voting at the time the 
constitution was adopted. In some states, constitutions are followed more or 
less religiously, with all that religious fervor entails; in others, the 
constitutions are hardly worth the paper they are written on, but are used as a 
foil for calling rivals' political proposals and personal conduct 
"unconstitutional."6 
 
Constitutions of states may proclaim that "the buck stops here" in the 
legislative process, i.e., that all laws of any importance are to be passed at the 
level of the state, while other constitutions provide that some laws of 
generally secondary or tertiary importance can be negotiated and adopted at 
the level of political subdivisions or local authorities. What is intriguing about 
these "states" and their political subdivisions and local authorities is that, even 
though they are called upon to determine the laws that bind their respective 
populations, their territories came about through historically contingent facts 
and events, such as mountain ranges, rivers, dialects, slight physical 
differences of their populations, aristocratic whims, military conflicts, and 
peace treaties. At the dawn of the third millennium, which is when our 
Plutonian diplomat arrives on Earth, the jurisdictions of these entities do not 
often coincide with populations that are homogeneous in terms of beliefs, 
values and other fundamental commitments. At one point, long ago, perhaps 
they did at least in theory or by fiat, but nowadays, the increasing 
fragmentation of religions, philosophies, ethics and other systems of 
fundamental commitments have heterogenized populations to the extent that 
territorial boundaries often bear only a vague and increasingly blurry relation 
to boundaries between worldviews.7 This process has been aggravated by 
mobility and migration – as humans hop around from one territory to 
another, working and settling temporarily or permanently in places other 
than where they were born, for economic, social, cultural, political, climatic or 
familial reasons, they bring their fundamental commitments with them and 
further jumble up the populations of legislative jurisdictions which, due to 
                                                
5 Even the proceedings of the state ratification conventions of the paradigmatic modern 
constitution, the U.S. Constitution of 1787/89, are largely shrouded in mystery. See Rakove 
1996, 17. Many of the origins of the largely unwritten British "constitution," including the 
Magna Carta (1215), the Petition of Right (1628), and the Bill of Rights (1689), along with 
numerous Acts of Parliament, and "constitutional conventions," are even more mythological. 
See generally Waluchow 2008. 
6 This is especially true where mechanisms for enforcing constitutionally enumerated rights 
are lacking. See, e.g., the Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of 1977, especially 
Chapter 7, as a notorious example. But certain provisions of otherwise judicially enforceable 
constitutions may also qualify, such as arguably the Tenth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution. See United States v. Darby: "[The Tenth Amendment] states but a truism that all 
is retained which has not been surrendered. There is nothing in the history of its adoption to 
suggest that it was more than declaratory of the relationship between the national and state 
governments as it had been established by the Constitution before the amendment or that its 
purpose was other than to allay fears that the new national government might seek to 
exercise powers not granted, and that the states might not be able to exercise fully their 
reserved powers." But cf. New York v. United States, Printz v. United States, and Virginia v. 
Sebelius. 
7 This discrepancy between national boundaries and homogenous populations is particularly 
striking in the case of the colonial and post-colonial drawing of boundaries, especially in Sub-
Saharan Africa, South Asia, and the Middle East. 
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their historical contingencies, are still expected by their populations and the 
rest of the world to be governed by a coherent body of law.8 
 
The way in which laws are negotiated and adopted at the levels above that of 
the state is even more astonishing to our outside observer: no constitution 
lays down the rules by which these laws are negotiated, and instead an 
amalgam of "charters," "treaties," "statutes," "jus cogens norms," "obligations 
erga omnes" and other ominous sounding constructs create ad hoc institutions, 
forums, and diplomatic conferences where generally unelected 
representatives of states get together to agree on laws that govern the 
interactions among their states and, more rarely, among the citizens of 
different states and between states and their citizens.9 Most of these laws only 
become binding when they are approved back home by the legislatures and 
courts of the respective states, which may throw unexpected wrenches into 
the process or interpret the original intent of the global negotiators to death or 
at least to endless uncertainty and litigation. 
 
As a first assignment, our Plutonian diplomat has been asked by her10 foreign 
office to write a dissertation-length memorandum or paper with the goal of 
subtly interfering in the internal affairs of Earthlings by nudging them in the 
direction of Plutonian civilization's conception of law as pluralism. In order to 
do this, she must attempt to understand what it is human legislators do and 
what they can do when negotiating and adopting legislation. 
 
 
1.2 Normative goal 
 
Under utopian circumstances, the normative goal of the paper would be 
pursued by defining rules for the negotiation and adoption of laws so that the 
laws would be adequate to the potentially conflicting fundamental 
commitments of the members of the entire world's population. But barring world 
war or revolution, which are beyond the scope of this paper, the 
establishment of a global legislature with the competence to pass binding and 
enforceable global laws is not in the offing – and even less so a global 
constitution that would set out the parameters for the negotiation, 
                                                
8 For instance, approximately 12.5% of the current U.S. population was born in a foreign 
country; this is true of even 20.4% of the population of New York State and 26.2% of the 
population of California. See United States Census Bureau 2010. 
9 At the global level, the body of law with direct effect on individuals is fairly small, but 
growing. Several resolutions of the United Nations Security Council entail direct obligations 
on individuals, most notably the sanctions regimes such as those established under United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 1267 (1999). The Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the Statute of 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and other statutes of ad hoc tribunals likewise 
bind individuals directly. Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations and the respective 
statutes provide direct enforcement mechanisms in case of breach. Otherwise, global treaties 
with effect on individuals are generally only indirectly binding and enforceable, via the 
respective states parties. See, e.g., Articles III-VI of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. For a theoretical consideration of the increasingly direct 
effect of international law on individuals, see Franck 1999, especially 196-254, and Broomhall 
2003, especially 7-62. 
10 Or his: Plutonians are gender-neutral, as are the other generic persons referred to in this 
paper. 
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interpretation, and conditions of validity of global legislation. Hence, a less 
ambitious formulation of this paper's goal is the following: 
 
to define rules for the negotiation and adoption of laws so that, in each 
legislative jurisdiction, the laws are adequate to the potentially 
conflicting fundamental commitments of the members of the 
population in that legislative jurisdiction.11 
 
The utopian goal can be seen as the asymptotic case of this less ambitious 
goal: if mechanisms can be found to ensure that legislation is adequate to the 
fundamental commitments of a given population, those mechanisms could in 
theory be extended to cover the world's population. Conversely, the less 
ambitious goal can be seen as a manageable subset of the utopian goal, 
ranging over the population of a specific, historically contingent state or 
political subdivision thereof, rather than over the population of the entire 
planet.  
 
As this paper strives to achieve its less ambitious goal, the utopian goal 
should nevertheless always be kept in mind as the asymptotic case. 
International legal theory deals with something resembling the utopian goal, 
but given the practical constraints within which international law operates, 
and as the etymology of "international" indicates, it generally restricts itself to 
considerations that presuppose the existence of sovereign states and the 
limited availability and effectiveness of supranational institutions.12 In this 
sense, the utopian aspect of this paper is an exercise in international legal 
theory, without the constraint of having to deal with pre-existing, historically 
                                                
11 At the heart of this goal is the problem of pluralism as applied to legal philosophy where 
only a thin basis for consensus exists, if at all. For similarly motivated attempts, see generally 
Rosenfeld 1998 (developing a substantive normative conception of "comprehensive 
pluralism," which distinguishes between first-order and second-order norms, to bridge the 
gap between self and other), Rosenfeld 2010 (distinguishing between singular, plural, and 
universal constitutional subjects in order to construct a pluralistic conception of constitutional 
identity), Connolly 2005 (developing a substantive normative conception of "deep pluralism," 
based on a "bicameral structure of commitments" that allows tolerance of ambiguities in 
politics and law), Kekes 1993 (expressing skepticism that agreement on overriding 
substantive or procedural values can or should be found, advocating instead for facilitation of 
the widest possible plurality of values, both substantive and procedural), Rescher 1993 (a 
critique of neo-contractarian theory espoused by the likes of Jürgen Habermas and John 
Rawls, arguing instead for an incremental, pragmatic approach to law that eschews 
consensus), Kymlicka 1995 (arguing for the compatibility of collective rights for minorities 
and liberal theory), Kymlicka 2007 (expanding this analysis, with a greater focus on 
international law and relations), Shachar 2001 (developing a "joint governance" approach to 
protect minorities while protecting the rights of individuals within minorities), and Swaine 
2005 (arguing for an expanded conception of liberalism to allow for the partial autonomy of 
theocratic communities). This attempt differs from e.g. Habermas 1996, who argues that the 
structure of language and justification itself provides a consensual basis for negotiating and 
adopting universally binding norms, and Rawls 2005, who argues that an overlapping 
consensus of comprehensive worldviews provides a sufficient basis for agreement on (at 
least) matters of constitutional essentials and basic justice. Like many liberal theorists, 
Habermas and Rawls presuppose or argue for a thicker basis of consensus than presupposed 
or argued for by the aforementioned writers or in this paper. On this basic distinction 
between thin and thick conceptions of agreement, see Walzer 1994. 
12 The existence of the European Union and its state-like institutions and legislation blurs the 
distinction between national and international somewhat; for the purposes of this paper, the 
European Union should be treated like a state when it acts like a state, and it should be 
treated like an international institution when it acts like an international institution. 
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contingent international institutions and mechanisms. What remains 
historically contingent even in this paper's consideration of the utopian goal is 
the plurality of actually existing, conflicting beliefs, values, and other 
fundamental commitments among the world's population. This paper is not 
an exercise in interplanetary, interspecies or universal legal theory, but rather 
an exercise in legal theory applicable to the human beings who actually 
inhabit this particular planet at the dawn of the third millennium. The 
theoretical bent of the utopian goal is thus mitigated by the practical 
contingency of the population to which it aspires to apply.  
 
Constitutional theory deals with something resembling the less ambitious 
goal, but often applies to a given, historically contingent constitutional 
system, perhaps with the aspiration of tweaking that system to bring it in line 
with theoretical considerations of what that given constitutional system 
should look like. Comparative constitutional theory looks at the less 
ambitious goal as applied to a more-or-less wide range of historically 
contingent constitutional systems, with the objective of understanding their 
similarities, differences, and underlying principles, and perhaps with the 
aspiration of bringing their similarities, differences, and principles in line with 
theoretical considerations of what any constitutional system should look like. 
In this sense, the less ambitious goal of this paper is an exercise in 
comparative constitutional theory. However, this paper's goal takes a broader 
view, in that it looks down upon constitutional systems from a global perch: 
given the aspirations of the utopian goal, how can actually existing 
constitutional systems be brought in line with the theoretical considerations 
of what mechanisms under the utopian goal would look like? 
 
This paper thus touches on issues raised by both international and 
constitutional theory, but it is not about the "internationalization of 
constitutional law"13 or the "constitutionalization of international law."14 
Instead, it seeks to develop a way of thinking about the negotiation and 
adoption of legislation, given the plurality of conflicting beliefs, values, and 
other fundamental commitments prevalent within a given population, 
regardless of whether that population covers the territory of a state, a political 
subdivision, or the entire planet. It is thus an exercise at the interface of legal 
philosophy and political philosophy: it examines the ways in which human 
beings get together to negotiate and adopt laws that bind them, and it 
suggests ways to do this better, given the plurality of fundamental 
commitments.15 While primarily a theoretical exercise, it provides tools that 
can be used for a practical critique of existing mechanisms for the negotiation 
and adoption of legislation under conditions of conflicting fundamental 
commitments. 
 
 
                                                
13 See generally Schwartz 2003. 
14 See generally Klabbers, Peters and Ulfstein 2009. 
15 On this normative connection between legal philosophy and political philosophy in 
general, but with a more historicist emphasis, see Waldron 2002. 
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1.3 Key terminology 
1.3.1 Legislation, legislatures, and lawmaking 
 
This paper focuses on legislation, so a few remarks are in order about what is 
meant by that term and related terms. Given that the utopian goal of this 
paper is simply the asymptotic case of the less ambitious goal, terms such as 
"legislature," "legislator," "legislation," "constitution" and so on should not be 
read as limited to the case of states and political subdivisions thereof as we 
are accustomed to, i.e., they should not be read as limited to the less 
ambitious goal, but should be extended to include a (theoretical) "legislature," 
"legislator," "legislation," "constitution" and so on at the global level, i.e., for 
purposes of the utopian goal. 
 
The term "legislation" itself is ambiguous: on the one hand, it may refer to the 
product of the legislative process, namely a statute or a law. But it may also 
refer to the legislative process itself, namely the negotiation and adoption of 
legislation.16 In this paper, "legislation" will always refer to the product, and 
"legislative process" or simply "legislating" or "lawmaking" will always refer 
to the process of negotiating and adopting legislation. As defined here, 
"legislation" always refers to enactments that are binding on a population or a 
subset of a population and are enforceable with respect to that population or 
subset; mere recommendatory pronouncements are not considered 
"legislation." Legislation is negotiated and adopted by legislatures; for the 
purposes of this paper, "legislature" means any body capable of negotiating 
and adopting legislation that binds a population or a subset of a population in 
a given legislative jurisdiction. This includes classical legislatures such as 
parliaments, but also quasi-legislative bodies of supranational and 
international institutions, as long as they have the legal competence to bind 
members of a population, as well as other public or private bodies with the 
legal competence to bind. "A law" or "laws" will refer to any provisions 
adopted by a legislature as defined above, regardless of the rank of those 
provisions in the legal system (e.g., "merely" statutory, constitutional, or the 
like). A binding resolution by a supranational or private body with the legal 
competence to bind members of a population will thus also be referred to as 
"a law." "A law" may refer to an individual statute or the like, provisions 
thereof, or several statutes or the like with the same subject matter. 
 
In this context, it should be noted that the terms "negotiation" and "negotiate" 
are not meant to prejudice what precisely legislators do when they submit, 
discuss, argue for and against, reach compromises on, or horse-trade in 
relation to legislative proposals and the like, i.e., when they engage in the 
practice of giving and asking for reasons as part of the legislative process. The 
terms do not imply anything about what is going on in legislators' minds 
when they engage in the legislative process, what attitudes they adopt toward 
the legislative process and conflicting proposals, and so on. Specifically, 
                                                
16 This is analogous to the ing/ed ambiguity explicated by Wilfrid Sellars. See, e.g., Sellars 
1969, 65: "[The term 'thought'] is also ambiguous, sometimes referring to what is thought, 
sometimes to the thinking of it." Analogously, the term "legislation" sometimes refers to what 
is legislated, sometimes to the legislating of it. The parallels between legislation and thought 
(or more precisely language as the discursive expression of thought) will be a key focus of this 
paper. 
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nothing is implied by the choice of "negotiation" as opposed to, say, 
"deliberation."17 For the purposes of this paper, "negotiation" and "negotiate" 
simply mean what goes on when legislators consider and talk about 
legislative proposals, with a view to adopting legislation. 
 
1.3.2 Fundamental commitments 
 
Two terms do most of the theoretical work in the formulation of this paper's 
goals, as well as in the title of this paper: "fundamental commitments" and 
"adequate." Defining these two terms and their relationship with each other 
constitutes the bulk of this paper; to get started, the following rough 
definitions shall suffice: 
 
"Fundamental commitments" are the bedrock, non-negotiable beliefs, values, 
convictions, revelations, intuitions, and so on, that a given person or group of 
persons holds in relation to the way the world is and the way it ought to be. 
They are where one's "spade is turned,"18 or one's matters of "ultimate 
concern,"19 the pillars of one's (or one's group's) personal sense of meaning 
and destiny (or lack thereof) – pillars that one is not willing to dismantle, 
renovate or exchange without a desperate or even violent fight. Fundamental 
commitments are often linked together within a more-or-less coherent system 
of commitments called a worldview,20 "comprehensive doctrine,"21 or the like, 
                                                
17 For an overview and analysis of the theoretical distinctions between negotiation and 
deliberation, see Mansbridge 2009. Cf. also Gaus 2003, 148: "The metaphor of 'negotiation' is 
appropriate when interests or mere preferences are at stake; but not in discussions at getting 
things right or to the truth." Although more is at stake in law as pluralism than interests or 
mere preferences (namely, fundamental commitments), law as pluralism does not aim at 
"getting to the truth"; this will be discussed in more detail in subsection 2.2.2 on 
"Achievability, truth, and validity." Law as pluralism does, however, aim at "getting things 
right," in the sense of finding a way to generate laws that are adequate and enforceable, given 
conflicting fundamental commitments held by a population. So although this only 
imperfectly meets Gaus's criteria for the term "negotiation," "negotiation" is still used in part 
because it is less of a theoretically occupied term than, say, "deliberation." 
18 See Wittgenstein 2008, 85: "If I have exhausted the justifications, I have reached bedrock and 
my spade is turned." Cf. also Putnam 1987, 85: "Recognizing that there are certain places 
where one's spade is turned; recognizing, with Wittgenstein, that there are places where our 
explanations run out, isn't saying that any particular place is permanently fated to be one of 
these places, or that any particular belief is forever immune from criticism. This is where my 
spade is turned now. This is where my justifications and explanations stop now." 
19 See Tillich 1957, 1: "[M]an, in contrast to other living beings, has spiritual concerns – 
cognitive, aesthetic, social, political. Some of them are urgent, often extremely urgent, and 
each of them… can claim ultimacy for a human life or the life of a social group. If it claims 
ultimacy it demands the total surrender of him who accepts this claim, and it promises total 
fulfillment even if all other claims have to be subject to it or rejected in its name." 
20 See Ishii, Klopf, and Cooke 2006, 32, citing Samovar, Porter, and Stefani 1998: "Worldview is 
culture's orientation toward God, humanity, nature, questions of existence, the universe and 
cosmos, life, death, sickness, and other philosophical issues that influence how its members 
see the world." 
21 See e.g. Rawls 2005, 13: "A moral conception is general if it applies to a wide range of 
subjects, and in the limit to all subjects universally. It is comprehensive when it includes 
conceptions of what is of value in human life, and ideals of personal character, as well as 
ideals of friendship and of familial and associational relationships, and much else that is to 
inform our conduct, and in the limit to our life as a whole. A conception is fully 
comprehensive if it covers all recognized values and virtues within one rather precisely 
articulated system; whereas a conception is only partially comprehensive when it comprises a 
number of, but by no means all, nonpolitical values and virtues and is rather loosely 
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which may be of a religious, secular, philosophical, ethical, moral, or similar 
nature. Fundamental commitments, and the worldviews of which they may 
be part, may conflict with the fundamental commitments and worldviews of 
others; two fundamental commitments conflict when one cannot be true or 
valid if the other is true or valid.22 
 
Fundamental commitments are a type of doxastic commitment.23 A doxastic 
commitment, in contrast to a practical commitment,24 is an "epistemic claim" as 
opposed to a "practical project";25 it expresses a belief or judgment as opposed 
to an intention to do something.26 Doxastic commitments are articulated 
inferentially, i.e., they are assertible and they play an inferential role in the 
discursive social practice of "giving and asking for reasons."27 In theoretical 
(discursive) reasoning, doxastic commitments in general play the role of both 
premises and conclusions; in practical reasoning, they play the role only of 
premises.28 What marks fundamental commitments as a special type of 
doxastic commitment is that they serve only as premises even in theoretical, 
discursive reasoning: a fundamental commitment may serve as a reason for 
other doxastic commitments, but (from the perspective of the person who 
holds the fundamental commitment) it does not stand in need of reasons 
itself. From the standpoint of the person who holds the commitment, it simply 
is true or valid. 
 
Why bother speaking of fundamental commitments, let alone doxastic 
commitments, when it would be easier to speak simply of "fundamental 
beliefs," "values," and so on? As Robert Brandom remarks, 
 
'Assertion', 'claim', 'judgment', and 'belief' are all systematically ambiguous 
expressions – and not merely by coincidence. The sort of pragmatism adopted 
here seeks to explain what is asserted by appeal to features of assertings, what 
is claimed in terms of claimings, what is judged by judgings, and what is 
believed by the role of believings (indeed, what is expressed by expressings of 
it) – in general, the content by the act, rather than the other way around.29 
 
Regardless of what one thinks of this pragmatist approach as applied to 
philosophy of language or epistemology, this focus on the act of believing, 
valuing, and asserting – as opposed to what is believed, valued, asserted – fits 
naturally with the problem of legislating under conditions of pluralism. The 
problem of pluralism is about how to engage in the process of justifying 
disparate commitments and bringing them together as part of a legislative 
project; it is not primarily about what the contents of those disparate 
                                                
articulated. Many religious and philosophical doctrines aspire to be both general and 
comprehensive." 
22 The notions of truth and validity will be discussed in more detail in subsection 2.2.2 below. 
See generally Finlayson 2005, Habermas 2004. 
23 See Brandom 1994, 157-159. 
24 See Brandom 1994, 238-243. 
25 Habermas 2000, 349. 
26 See Brandom 2000b, 370-371. 
27 Sellars 1956/1997. See also Brandom 1994, 142: "Their inferential articulation, in virtue of 
which they deserve to be understood as propositionally contentful, consists in consequential 
relations among the particular doxastic commitments and entitlements – the ways in which 
one claim can commit or entitle one to others (for which it accordingly can serve as a reason)."  
28 See Brandom 2000b, 366. 
29 Brandom 2000a, 4. 
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commitments are.30 Within the legislative process, beliefs and values are 
asserted as justifications for legislative proposals; laws emerge from the 
legislative process through the discursive legislative practice of "giving and 
asking for reasons." Of course, the nature of law lies in its content: laws 
without content are empty.31 The pragmatist32 approach pursued here does 
not deny the central importance of legal content as opposed to process; it aims 
simply to show how the content of legislation is and can be derived from the 
process of legislating, which is primary, especially under conditions of 
conflicting fundamental commitments.33 
 
1.3.3 Adequacy 
 
What does it now mean for legislation to be "adequate" to the plurality of 
conflicting fundamental commitments? Legislation is adequate to the plurality 
of the fundamental commitments of the population bound by that legislation 
if the negotiation of the legislation takes account of all the fundamental 
commitments identifiable within the population, to the extent achievable, and 
if the legislation actually adopted reflects (i.e., is compatible with and 
derivable from) all the identifiable fundamental commitments that can be 
                                                
30 This separation of the how from the what is at best blurry, and has been viciously critiqued 
in legal theory. See, e.g., Tribe 1980. But as a regulative ideal, a focus on process over 
substance is conducive to solving the problem of pluralism, in which the content of 
conflicting commitments is treated equally prima facie. See Habermas 1996, especially xl, 388-
446 and 463-490; Ely 1980, especially 73-104. 
31 Cf. Kant 1787, B75: "Thoughts without content are empty." 
32 While the author is sympathetic to recent attempts to apply "classical" pragmatism, 
especially as expounded by John Dewey, C. S. Peirce, William James and (specifically in the 
domain of legal theory) Oliver Wendell Holmes to political philosophy, the pragmatist 
approach pursued here is more akin to the "analytic pragmatism" developed by Robert 
Brandom. See, e.g., Brandom 2008, xii: "It is pragmatism pursued in an analytic spirit. By 
calling it 'pragmatism' I mean a view inspired by insights of the later Wittgenstein, which 
situates concern with the meaning of expressions in the broader context of concern with 
proprieties governing their use. It counsels us to start our thinking about the meanings 
expressed by various vocabularies to express those meanings. Pursuing those pragmatist 
ideas in an analytic spirit is rejecting the anti-theoretical, anti-systematic conclusions that are 
often drawn from them." For examples of the application of classical pragmatism to political 
philosophy, see generally Festenstein 1997 (providing a general overview of the topic, with 
an emphasis on the impact of John Dewey), Talisse 2005 (applying C. S. Peirce's conception of 
pragmatism to deliberative democracy), Tan 2004 (applying Dewey's pragmatism and 
Confucianism to democratic theory), Ferguson 2007 (emphasizing James's contributions to 
pluralism), Rorty 1989, Rorty 1998 and Rorty 2000 (drawing on Dewey to develop an 
"ethnocentric" conception of liberal democracy, while claiming to deny foundationalism of 
any sort), and Haack 2008 (applying Peirce and Holmes to legal theory). Cf. also Habermas 
1996 (amalgamating C. S. Peirce's pragmatism with his own foundationalist theory of 
discourse, which draws on John Searle and J. L. Austin, to arrive at a theory of deliberative 
democracy and law) and Coleman 2001 (drawing on Wilfrid Sellars, W. V. O. Quine, Donald 
Davidson and Hilary Putnam to illuminate his inclusive brand of legal positivism). 
33 This conceptual separation of the process of legislating (which determines what the law is) 
from the content of legislation (which makes it possible to judge what the law ought to be) 
makes law as pluralism a comfortable bedfellow of (exclusive) legal positivism and its central 
"separation thesis" or "separability thesis" as developed by, e.g., Hart 1994, Raz 1994 and 
Marmor 1997. For an overview of exclusive legal positivism, see Marmor 2002. But law as 
pluralism (and hence this paper) is not so interested in the analytical or conceptual question 
of what the law is, but rather in the normative question of what lawmaking ought to be under 
conditions of conflicting fundamental commitments. On normative vs. analytical approaches 
to legal philosophy, see West 2009 vs. Bix 2009. 
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reconciled with each other in the legislative jurisdiction in which the 
legislation is adopted. The bulk of this paper will examine what this 
reconciliation means in practice, and it will flesh out the idea of the legislative 
jurisdictions in which legislation is negotiated and adopted. Another way of 
looking at this is that the process of negotiating legislation for a given 
population must take all fundamental commitments held by members of that 
population as equal input to the process, to the extent achievable, and the 
output of the process must reflect that input, to the extent achievable, given 
the extent of the plurality of commitments within that population. In a 
population with homogeneous commitments, one would expect pretty much 
any legislation passing through such a process to be adequate to those 
commitments; the challenge of this paper is to examine how to negotiate and 
adopt adequate legislation where the commitments of a population are not 
homogeneous, and where such commitments conflict with each other. 
 
Put in terms of justification and the discursive legislative practice of giving 
and asking for reasons, a law is adequate to the conflicting fundamental 
commitments of a population if, to the extent achievable, all fundamental 
commitments are admitted to the legislative process as potential justifications 
for proposed laws, and if, to the extent achievable, the actual law adopted is 
justifiable in terms of all the fundamental commitments that have been 
admitted as potential justifications to the legislative process. There are thus 
two components to adequacy: a condition on the fundamental commitments 
admissible as potential justifications, and conditions on the use of those 
admitted fundamental commitments as justifications for laws actually 
adopted. 
 
The phrase "to the extent achievable" indicates that all fundamental 
commitments are treated equally prima facie, but that actually adopted laws 
may not end up being justifiable in terms of all fundamental commitments: 
there are theoretical and practical limits on the extent to which all 
fundamental commitments can be taken into account during the negotiation 
and adoption of legislation. Much of this paper will explicate what these 
limits are and how they should affect the admission and consideration of 
fundamental commitments. 
 
Adequacy, as thus defined, is a technical concept that says nothing directly 
about authority or legitimacy, and this paper does not make a claim that the 
output of the legislative process it proposes is authoritative or legitimate in 
any theoretically substantial sense.34 Adequacy provides a tool for critiquing 
legislation and the legislative process that is distinct from the tools of 
authority and legitimacy: it is a measure of the pluralism of legislation, not of the 
acceptability, reasonableness, or "goodness" of legislation from the 
perspective of any comprehensive or political conceptions other than the 
conception of pluralism developed here. 
 
                                                
34 In this sense, the project of this paper is orthogonal to the projects pursued by Raz 2009 and 
Habermas 1996, which deal primarily with authority and legitimacy. While adequacy may in 
practice often be linked to authority or legitimacy, these concepts can in principle be analyzed 
independently of each other: legislation may be adequate to the fundamental commitments of 
a population without being authoritative or legitimate, and vice-versa.  
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As a practical matter, however, the author does expect that legislation 
deemed adequate by a population would in many cases also be deemed 
legitimate by that population, perhaps with the proviso that the legislation 
must be efficacious in the sense of being capable of bringing about the 
intended purpose of the legislation. And even if a given piece of legislation is 
not deemed legitimate, one might still reasonably expect the process by which 
legislation is generated to be deemed legitimate as a whole, provided that the 
legislation outputted by that process is adequate.35 
 
 
1.4 Ground rules 
 
In order to go about pursuing the goals of this paper, some ground rules must 
be established first – ground rules in the sense of basic presuppositions that 
this paper largely takes for granted, without engaging in further argument to 
support them. 
 
1.4.1 Negotiation and adoption by legislators 
 
The first ground rule is that this paper is limited to the negotiation and 
adoption of legislation by legislators. Although it touches on consideration of 
public justification, public deliberation, and so on,36 it is primarily concerned 
with what legislators do when they legislate, not with what citizens do when 
they argue, deliberate, advocate, or even participate in public votes. This also 
means that while the paper takes a sideways glance at what it is courts do 
when interpreting legislation,37 it is primarily concerned with what the input 
to interpretation is that is generated by legislators, not with interpretation 
itself. As the products of this paper's goal become clearer, there will be certain 
consequences for the work of courts, given the work generated by legislatures 
engaged in negotiation under conditions of conflicting fundamental 
commitments; but this paper is not primarily about the work of courts – it is 
about the work of legislatures.38 
                                                
35 On this last point, see Martí Mármol 2005. 
36 Especially in section 4.3 on "Public justification," section 4.4 on "Justificatory constraint vs. 
public justification," and section 7.4 on "The public sphere as generator of popular 
commitments" below. 
37 Especially in subsection 7.3.2 on "Judicial review of law as pluralism" below. 
38 See Tuori 2002, 99: "It is a well-known fact that legal theory, as well as legal science in 
general, usually approaches the law from the perspective of the judge, and not from that of 
the legislator. The rationality of the law has been the central issue for legal theory, but this 
rationality has most often almost spontaneously been equated with the rationality of the 
judge and her decisions." Given the importance of judicial review to the constitutional 
systems of the United States, Germany, and other constitutional states from which many 
prominent legal philosophers come or to which they have academically emigrated (with the 
notable exception of the United Kingdom), legal philosophy is often obsessed with the role of 
courts. While early modern legal philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes, David Hume, Jeremy 
Bentham and John Austin focused on the work of legislatures or sovereigns, the court-
centered view of jurisprudence took over by the mid-20th century. See Green 2009. The 
emergence of the European Court of Human Rights, the European Court of Justice, and other 
supranational courts interpreting supranational "legislation" has provided additional fuel for 
this obsession. The bureaucratization of legislation at the national (and European) level has 
not helped regain a focus on legislatures: much legislation in many modern bureaucratic 
states – not to mention states and international institutions with democratic deficits – is 
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1.4.2 Representative legislatures 
 
The second ground rule, which is related to the first, is that this paper 
presupposes that laws intended to be binding on a population characterized 
by a plurality of fundamental commitments are best negotiated and adopted 
by legislators serving in more-or-less representative legislatures, rather than (a) 
evolved through the jurisprudence of courts (as may be the case, albeit 
increasingly less so, in common law jurisdictions),39 or (b) passed by the whim 
of a popular majority, at least where such a majority is not checked by other 
constitutional institutions,40 or (c) decreed by an executive or administrative 
body, at least where the laws concern conflicting fundamental commitments 
and are of substantial reach.41 In passing, this paper will point out why this 
presupposition is reasonable, but it will not make a sustained argument on 
behalf of the superiority of legislatures when it comes to laws intended to 
bind diverse populations. Instead, it presupposes that legislatures are a useful 
place to resolve these issues, and perhaps a more useful place than the 
alternatives. As a preliminary observation, it may be pointed out that at least 
larger political entities do in fact, as a rule, adopt laws by way of bodies that 
at least somewhat resemble legislatures, at least where no common 
agreement, shared history, or coercion makes room for other forms of 
lawmaking.42 Regardless of the relative merits of legislatures versus other 
forums for lawmaking, the tools developed in this paper are tailored to the 
negotiation of laws – an activity that presupposes a sufficiently large body of 
negotiators with more or less equal status but a wide range of different 
                                                
generated by the executive branch and modified only modestly by legislatures. See 
Richardson 2002 and Beaud 2009. In some jurisdictions, such as Switzerland or at the state-
level in the United States, much of the interest in the legislative process is contaminated by an 
emphasis on direct democracy. Meanwhile, many theorists have been concerned with 
deliberative or participatory democracy, with a lesser emphasis on legislative process (see, 
e.g., Rousseau 1762, Cohen 1989, Elster 1998, Habermas 1996, Bohman and Rehg 1997, 
Bohman 1996, Gutmann and Thompson 2004, Barber 1984, Tushnet 1999, Kramer 2004, 
Marmor 2007) or have engaged in a similarly motivated, economically informed critique of 
democracy (see, e.g., Marti 2006, Sen 2009, Miller 2010). Comparatively little recent work has 
been done on legislative process and its relation to pluralism; notable exceptions are Waldron 
1999a and Waldron 1999b, Wintgens 2002, Wintgens 2005, and Wintgens 2007, Bauman and 
Kahana 2006, and – to a lesser extent – Marmor 2007, especially 39-56 and 89-121. For a 
practice-oriented discussion of related challenges in the legislative process, see McLeod 2009. 
39 More sustained arguments on behalf of this claim can be found in Waldron 1999a, Waldron 
1999b, Tushnet 1999, Kramer 2004, and Marmor 2007. 
40 The better suitability to pluralism of representative democracy than of direct or "pure" 
democracy was James Madison's central point in The Federalist No. 10. For other views on 
direct democracy, see Baldassare and Katz 2008 and, generally, Switzerland. 
41 See Richardson 2002, for an argument against unrepresentative administrative autonomy in 
the formulation of laws; while Richardson focuses on popular deliberation rather than 
legislative deliberation as a remedy, he does argue for a key role to be played by 
representative legislatures. See especially 193-202.  
42 Even in pluralistic countries with a strong tradition of judicial review, such as the United 
States, all parts of the political spectrum regularly criticize the courts when they do trammel 
representative decision-making. As examples on both sides, see Citizens United v. Federal 
Election Commission (campaign financing) and Roe v. Wade (abortion). While judicial review is 
widely (though not universally, see n. 366 on p. 187 below) considered an important 
mechanism for protecting rights of minorities (loosely defined), representative legislatures at 
the federal and state levels are almost universally considered the default mechanisms for 
crafting laws in the face of conflicting fundamental commitments. 
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standpoints who have the opportunity to interact with each other directly. 
This is not generally something one finds in courts, the people at large, or 
administrative agencies. 
 
Not all representative legislatures are equal, however. Some legislatures 
simply serve as a way of legitimating edicts issued by a government's 
executive branch, by rubber-stamping laws drafted in ministries and 
administrative agencies, perhaps after consultation with interest groups and 
other "stakeholders," political parties, civil society, and so on.43 This way of 
doing legislative business has become increasingly common: very little 
negotiation and deliberation is done in many modern legislatures, and the 
scope of action of such legislatures is often limited to a simple up-or-down 
vote, perhaps subject to minor adjustments. This is to some extent an obvious 
consequence of the complexity of modern legislation (especially in pluralistic 
societies that rely on enacted as opposed to common law) and the emergence 
of the bureaucratic state, as well as the often limited resources available to 
individual legislators. At the same time, the role of political parties and the 
manner in which legislators are appointed or elected may contribute to this 
development: in legislatures where political parties play an important role in 
ensuring election and in determining the relationship with the government's 
executive branch, deliberation by legislators may be replaced by backroom 
deals struck by the leaderships of political parties.44 
 
This paper abstracts away from these complications and harkens back to the 
simpler idealization of legislatures as deliberative bodies where the content of 
legislative proposals is discussed, negotiated, and amended by individual 
legislators, perhaps grouped together on a case-by-case basis into like-minded 
factions, who consider these proposals on their merits, with a certain degree 
of autonomy from the coercion of political parties and the executive branch.45 
Vestiges of this idealized type of legislature still exist, perhaps most distinctly 
where the influence of political parties and the executive branch is minor.46 It 
                                                
43 See Beaud 2009, 53, who claims that analyses of the respective merits of legislatures and 
courts must take this fact into account (here, in regard to Jeremy Waldron's privileging of 
legislatures): "Waldron's attempt to weigh the respective merits of judicial and legislative 
decision-making must take into account the fact that, increasingly, legislatures do not make 
the law; rather, they ratify it, after the groundwork is laid in the offices of ministers and 
cabinet members." 
44 A recent example in the United States is the Middle Class Tax Relief Act of 2010, the key 
elements of which were agreed between the executive branch and the leaders of the political 
parties in Congress. Contrast this with the extensive legislative negotiations on the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 
2009. Then decide what's better. 
45 See, e.g., The Federalist No. 70 (Hamilton): "In the legislature, promptitude of decision is 
oftener an evil than a benefit. The differences of opinion, and the jarring of parties in that 
department of the government, though they may sometimes obstruct salutary plans, yet often 
promote deliberation and circumspection, and serve to check excesses in the majority." See 
also Nedelsky 2006 (considering the legislature as an idealized locus of collective deliberation 
about the common good, and the legislature as a participant in the ongoing definition of 
contested constitutional values). 
46 Along with the legislatures of a handful of states (a paradigmatic but turbulent historical 
example being the Parliament of the French Third Republic, see Lehning 2001 and Mayeur 
and Rebirioux 1988), certain local and regional legislatures (such as the nominally 
nonpartisan legislatures of Nebraska, the Northwest Territories, Nunavut and the City of 
Toronto) as well as the quasi-legislative organs of some international organizations come to 
mind. The negotiating dynamics of bodies such as the General Assembly of the United 
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remains an open question to what extent this idealization can still be grafted 
onto actually existing legislatures, but this paper suggests that something 
resembling this idealized conception of legislatures as deliberative bodies is 
conducive to the negotiation and adoption of legislation adequate to the 
plurality of conflicting fundamental commitments held by members of a 
diverse population. 
 
1.4.3 No presupposition of political conceptions 
 
The third ground rule, and perhaps the most problematic and the most liable 
to being broken, is that this paper does not presuppose a commitment to any 
normative political conceptions, including political liberalism or even 
democracy, other than the commitment to pluralism.47 The author's personal 
commitment to democracy and some form of liberalism will no doubt shine 
through the cracks in the paper's logic, but the author will nevertheless try to 
make a distinction between a commitment to democracy, liberalism, and 
other political conceptions on the one hand, and a commitment to pluralism 
on the other hand – commitments which admittedly often go hand in hand in 
practice.48 This paper aims to describe a way of negotiating and adopting 
legislation in societies (or worlds) committed to pluralism, in the sense of 
accepting the irreducible plurality of fundamental commitments and 
worldviews within a population and of granting prima facie equal validity to 
all such commitments and worldviews brought to the negotiating chamber – 
even where such commitments and worldviews are incompatible with 
democracy, liberalism, and similar commitments (distinct from pluralism) 
concerning how political and social life should be ordered. This notion of 
pluralism will be discussed in considerably more detail below, and 
establishing this distinction between pluralism and other forms of political 
commitment is a crucial lemma for constructing this paper's overarching 
theory. 
 
There is a tension between the second and third of these ground rules. The 
second ground rule presupposes that legislation in a pluralistic society is best 
                                                
Nations, for instance, come strikingly close to this idealized conception of the deliberative 
nature of legislatures, despite obvious deficits in other respects. 
47 On political conceptions of justice and persons, see Rawls 2005, 11-15 and 29-35. According 
to Rawls 2005, 11, "[A political conception] is, of course, a moral conception, it is a moral 
conception worked out for a specific kind of subject, namely, for political, social and 
economic institutions [internal citation omitted]." In the associated footnote 11, Rawls 
expounds what he means by "moral:" "In saying that a conception is moral, I mean, among 
other things, that its content is given by certain ideals, principles and standards; and that 
these norms articulate certain values, in this case political values." Political conceptions are 
thus inextricably caught up in the fundamental commitments that motivated them; to say 
here that law of pluralism does not presuppose any political conceptions means that the 
commitment to pluralism aspires to be the only fundamental commitment grounding law as 
pluralism. 
48 Though not always: Kekes 1993 (with a more positive spin) and Gray 2000 (with a more 
negative spin) explicitly dissociate pluralism from liberalism, and the critiques of liberalism 
by Carter 1993 and Eberle 2002 amount to an endorsement of pluralism over liberalism. 
Communitarians such as Charles Taylor (e.g., Taylor 2007) and Alasdair MacIntyre (e.g., 
MacIntyre 2007), who generally endorse the coexistence of only partially overlapping 
communities shaped by their common histories and worldviews, arguably likewise endorse 
pluralism over liberalism where the two conflict. 
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negotiated and adopted by representative legislatures; the third ground rule 
appears to imply that commitments to democracy and liberalism should be 
cast aside when designing a mechanism for negotiating and adopting laws in 
a pluralistic society. But doesn't the notion of a representative legislature 
presuppose democracy and liberalism? Not necessarily – and this paper tries 
to squeeze considerable mileage out of that qualification. For the purposes of 
this argument, "representative" means that the range of commitments and 
worldviews within the legislature is roughly reflective of the range of 
commitments and worldviews of the population bound by the laws 
negotiated and adopted by the legislature. It says nothing prima facie about 
the way the legislature is constituted or elected, or about how the legislature 
stands in relation to the rest of the political, economic or social system of the 
population in question. It merely means that, given a legislature with the 
power to pass laws that bind a population, the legislators should either, by 
and large, hold the same range of commitments as that population, or should 
be able, by and large, to represent that range of commitments during the 
negotiation and adoption of laws.49 
 
1.4.4 Fundamental commitments, not interests 
 
The fourth and last ground rule is that this paper is concerned not with the 
negotiation and adoption of legislation characterized by conflicting interests, 
but rather only by conflicting fundamental commitments. Even in a society (or 
world) where everyone, and in particular all legislators, shared the same 
beliefs, values, and other commitments, there would still be conflict over the 
general purposes and specific details of legislation due to differences in 
economic and social standing, gender, age, race, language, sexual orientation, 
family circumstances, and other contingent characteristics. This paper ignores 
conflicts arising from disparate interests where fundamental commitments 
are identical, or at least compatible. It is only interested in conflicts over 
legislation that would arise if persons – or, specifically, legislators – took a 
God's eye view of the legislation, so to speak, assessing it in terms of its 
adequateness to the fundamental commitments they hold, without regard to 
their other characteristics. A convenient way of looking at this is to invoke a 
modified sort of original position or veil of ignorance: this paper is interested 
in conflicts that arise when all characteristics of a person (or legislator) in the 
original position are ignored, except for the person's fundamental 
commitments, i.e., when the veil of ignorance is transparent only with regard 
to fundamental commitments. 50  
 
                                                
49 The partial success of "deliberative polling" in ostensibly undemocratic societies such as 
China indicates the possibility of representation without liberal democracy. See Fishkin, He, 
Luskin, and Siu 2010. For a general analysis of what it means for a legislature to be 
representative, and how a legislature should be representative, see Besson 2005. 
50 Cf. Rawls 1999a, 11: "Among the essential features of this situation is that no one knows his 
place in society, his class position or social status, nor does any one know his fortune in the 
distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength and the like. I shall even 
assume that the parties do not know their conceptions of the good or their special psychological 
propensities. The principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance [emphasis 
added]." The italicized phrase concerns fundamental commitments; the other characteristics 
enumerated by Rawls are contingent. 
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Naturally, contingent characteristics such as economic and social standing, 
race, gender, etc., have a substantial impact on the fundamental commitments 
held by the people characterized by these factors: sexual orientation likely 
influences whether someone believes gay marriage is a sin; gender likely 
influences whether someone values the freedom to have a legal abortion; and 
the size of someone's bank account and paycheck likely influences whether 
one believes progressive taxation is just. One may believe that conflicting 
commitments are in fact nothing other than veiled or coded interests, that 
there is no such thing as a commitment beyond an interest.  
 
Whether or not that belief is true, the belief itself is a fundamental 
commitment (or is derived from fundamental commitments) and is neither 
presupposed nor refuted by this paper. The paper assumes merely that there 
is some value in talking about fundamental commitments as if they exist and 
are relevant to decision-making (or that some members of the population may 
believe there is some such value), regardless of whether they are rooted in 
contingent characteristics such as someone's standing in life or whether they 
originate in a sacred text, revelation, moral intuition, or reason and logic. In 
this sense, it makes no difference to the argument presented here whether 
fundamental commitments have an independent existence or whether they 
are simply an abstraction or translation of other, contingent characteristics. 
This approach seems justified especially in light of the raging public debate 
on "religion and politics,"51 "values voters,"52 "Islamization"53 and so on, which 
indicates the importance that many people attach to their fundamental 
commitments (or the fear they have of other people's fundamental 
commitments) and the role those commitments should or should not play in 
the negotiation and adoption of legislation, regardless of where the 
commitments come from or what they stand for or turn out to be reducible to 
in the final analysis. Even if fundamental commitments should turn out to be 
reducible to or explainable in terms of contingent characteristics of the 
individuals who hold such commitments, fundamental commitments serve as 
reasons advanced for political and hence legislative positions in practice and 
will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. 
 
                                                
51 There are more recent books and articles on religion and politics than there are words in 
this paper. Some of the more perceptive, coming from diverse points of the political and 
religious spectrums, include Douglass and Mitchell 2000 (a collection of essays generally 
advocating a greater, but nuanced role for religion in public life), Drinan 2004 (considering 
religious freedom in the context of international law), Wallis 2005 (a leftist call to reclaim the 
moral high ground in politics), Danforth 2006 (an Episcopal priest and former Republican 
senator arguing for a pragmatic approach to faith and politics), Lilla 2007 (a historicist 
defense of the separation of a church and state), and Pottenger 2007 (an analysis of the 
contemporary international challenges to liberal democracy worldwide). Some of the less 
perceptive, but more successful commercially, include the "New Atheists" Harris 2004, 
Dawkins 2006 and Hitchens 2007. 
52 Values voters were widely blamed and/or applauded for the (re-)election of George W. 
Bush in 2004. But see Brooks 2004 for a critical analysis. Lest anyone doubt the role 
fundamental commitments are at least purported to play in contemporary politics, see 
http://www.valuevotersusa.com and http://www.valuesvotersummit.org. 
53 At the latest since September 11, 2001, Westerners have rediscovered their latent fear of 
Islam. This has given the world Geert Wilders and Heinz-Christian Strache, as well as more 
academic critiques such as Ibn Warraq 1995, Hirsi Ali 2006, and Mueller 2009, 116-135. For 
less apocalyptic views, see Abou El Fadl 2004, Cesari 2004, Ramadan 2004, Aslan 2005, Charfi 
2005, Feldman 2008, and Esposito 2010. 
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A related objection to the exclusive focus on fundamental commitments may 
be that one's economic and social standing, gender, etc., cannot possibly be 
abstracted away when considering legislation in the original position or from 
behind the veil of ignorance, i.e., that the very idea of the original position or 
similar device presupposes certain such characteristics of the participants 
therein, such as a white male conception of rationality. This is a point forcibly 
made by some feminist theorists and other critics of the original position and 
the like, and the point is well taken.54 This paper accordingly does not argue 
that the original position is a feasible or even useful device for thinking about 
the negotiation of legislation in practice; the paper merely puts a theoretical 
focus on the elements of conflicts involving legislation that arise due to 
disparities in the fundamental commitments of the legislators (or of the 
people the legislators represent) and leaves aside the elements of conflicts that 
arise due to disparities in social standing, gender, etc., whether or not such 
disparities can or should in fact be left aside during the negotiation and 
adoption of legislation. To the extent such disparities give rise to conflicting 
fundamental commitments, those disparities are taken into account even in 
the theoretical consideration. 
 
Given these theoretical distinctions between fundamental commitments and 
contingent characteristics such as interests, we can define more precisely what 
is meant by law as pluralism, implementation of which is the normative goal of 
this papers: Law as pluralism denotes written legislation negotiated and 
adopted by representative legislatures under conditions of conflicting 
fundamental commitments, where such legislation is adequate to those 
commitments. Law as pluralism can be distinguished from law as 
particularism, which denotes written legislation negotiated and adopted by 
representative legislatures where the fundamental commitments of the 
population bound by the legislation do not conflict or where such conflicts are 
irrelevant to the legislation, i.e., where conflicts arise exclusively over 
divergent contingent characteristics. At any given level of legislation, law 
may vacillate between law as particularism and law as pluralism or contain 
elements of both: where conflicts between fundamental commitments are 
irrelevant to the negotiation and adoption of legislation, legislation is law as 
particularism; where such conflicts are relevant, legislation is law as 
pluralism. Even within a given piece of legislation, some legislative 
provisions may be deemed law as particularism, while others may be deemed 
law as pluralism. Law as particularism and law as pluralism constitute two 
poles between which all legislation is spread out.  
 
 
1.5 Methodological premises 
 
Now that the paper's goals have been staked out, the key terms have been 
defined or at least outlined, and the ground rules have been established, we 
can take a brief look at the methodological premises adopted by this paper. 
These methodological premises are the basic tools the paper employs to 
achieve its goals. 
 
                                                
54 See, e.g., Matsuda 1986 and Okin 1989. 
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1.5.1 Lawmaking as a linguistic and discursive practice 
 
The first methodological premise is that lawmaking is discourse, and legislation 
is a written text.55 These are both manifestations of language.56 In order to 
understand what legislators do when they legislate, and in order to suggest 
improvements to what they do, we must first understand lawmaking as, in 
part, a linguistic practice.57 Legislators use language when they submit, 
consider, and discuss legislative proposals, and they use language when they 
draft the legislation that is adopted. More specifically, lawmaking is a 
discursive practice, in the sense that legislators give and ask for reasons when 
submitting, considering, and discussing legislative proposals.58 In order to 
understand what legislators do when they legislate, and in order to suggest 
improvements to what they do, we must understand the justifications that 
legislators produce while legislating, and we must decide whether some 
classes of justifications are more likely to lead to adequate legislation than 
others.  
 
For that purpose, this paper draws on the inferential model of discursive 
practice developed by Robert Brandom within the philosophy of language.59 
                                                
55 On the difficulties in bridging these two, see Cyrul 2007. 
56 The intimate connection between law and language has long interested legal philosophers, 
going back at least to Bentham 1776 and Bentham 1782/1970. See generally Endicott 2010. It 
has a strong tradition in legal positivism, most prominently Hart 1994 (especially the notion 
of "open texture," drawing on Friedrich Waismann and indirectly Ludwig Wittgenstein). 
Wittgenstein 2008 (especially on rule-following and family resemblances) has exerted a 
particular fascination, as has Kripke 1982, channeling Wittgenstein in his own way (on rule-
following). For recent applications of Wittgenstein and/or Kripke to law and critiques 
thereof, see Patterson 1996 and Patterson 2004, especially Bobbitt 2004 and Bix 2004. Despite 
the fertility of Wittgenstein for legal philosophy, Wittgenstein is notoriously prone to 
misinterpretation, as Kripke and/or his critics demonstrate. The approach taken by legal 
positivists has accordingly also been criticized in this regard, see, e.g., Dworkin 1977. 
Habermas 1984 and Habermas 1996 (drawing on the linguistic theories of C. S. Peirce, J. L. 
Austin, and John Searle) and Alexy 1989 (drawing on Wittgenstein, Austin, and Habermas) 
have shown how legal argumentation can be grounded in practical discourse. Other notable 
contributions to law and language include Bix 1993 (critically discussing Hart, Wittgenstein, 
Dworkin and Michael Moore), Fish 1989 (drawing parallels between literary and legal 
theory), and Hurley 1989 (using Wittgenstein and Donald Davidson to develop parallels 
between the structure of personality and the structure of society). 
57 For an overview of practice theory as applied to law, see Patterson 2009. The claim here is 
not that law is a linguistic practice, merely that lawmaking is (in part) a linguistic practice. See 
also Marmor 2008 (on the pragmatics of legal language in light of Paul Grice). 
58 Legislators do not always give and ask for reasons; in some cases, it may in fact be politically 
imprudent for them to do so. See Atienza 2005, 309. This paper analyzes what kinds of 
justifications should be given to the extent they are given, and it analyzes the adequacy of 
legislation in terms of justifications that could be given. For a critical consideration of what it 
means for legislatures to be discursive, see Cyrul 2005.  
59 This inferential account of discursive practice is articulated primarily in Brandom's 
magnum opus Making It Explicit (1994) and summarized in Articulating Reasons (2000a), which 
provides the best introduction to inferentialism. See Wanderer 2008 for a general overview of 
Brandom, and Weiss and Wanderer 2010 and Stekeler-Weithofer 2008 for critical discussions 
of his work. Brandom's social account of inferentialism is both Hegelian and pragmatic (as 
well as pragmatist) in spirit and builds primarily on Wilfrid Sellars, Michael Dummett, and 
Donald Davidson, as well as Ludwig Wittgenstein, Gottlob Frege, and Immanuel Kant. 
Others have made use of Brandom in legal philosophy, but generally with respect to 
interpretation, adjudication, and argumentation as opposed to lawmaking. For an overview of the 
inferentialist approach to interpretation and adjudication, see Canale and Tuzet 2007. 
Patterson 2009 also draws on Brandom for his practice theory of law. The most impressive 
work to date applying Brandom to legal interpretation and argumentation is Klatt 2008. 
 24 
The salient aspects of this model will be introduced as appropriate 
throughout the paper. Note that the paper takes no stance on the ontological 
status of Brandom's theory per se, i.e., whether it is a suitable or veridical 
representation of linguistic and discursive practice as such. The paper merely 
makes the claim that certain tools developed by Brandom lend themselves 
readily to an analysis of legislative practice, and in particular to lawmaking 
under conditions of conflicting fundamental commitments. 
 
This linguistic/discursive approach to the problem of negotiating legislation 
under conditions of conflicting fundamental commitments is closely related to 
the problem of public justification as limited to legislatures.60 It also entails 
looking at what legislatures do when negotiating and adopting legislation, not 
just what legislators do. Legislatures are likewise engaged in the linguistic, 
discursive project of generating legislative texts, above and beyond what 
individual legislators do as part of that project, and these texts stand in need 
of justification. The extent to which such justification is actually offered by 
legislators and legislatures, and the way in which it should be offered in 
relation to fundamental commitments, is a key issue considered by this 
paper.61 
 
1.5.2 Lawmaking as an algorithmic undertaking 
 
The second methodological premise is that lawmaking is, in part, an 
algorithmic undertaking, i.e., it is governed by rules that have been established 
to solve the problem of generating a legislative text as output given the inputs 
to the legislative process.62 The concern of this paper is with the rules that 
                                                
Habermas 2000 and Brandom 2000b offer a spirited debate on Brandom's pragmatic 
philosophy of language, with implications for legal and political philosophy. Brandom 
himself has not directly engaged in legal philosophy, but his work is replete with legal 
metaphors and examples, see especially "History, Reason, and Reality," in Brandom 2009, 78-
108. Brandom 2000b ends with the suggestion that his pragmatic theory of language might 
lend itself to applications in moral theory; this paper is an attempt to do just that in the field 
of lawmaking. 
60 The seminal work in this regard is Rawls 2005. Public justification will be discussed in more 
detail in sections 4.3 and 4.4 below; for a general overview, see D'Agostino 2008. 
61 A corollary of this methodological premise is the paper's focus on lawmaking as an actual 
linguistic practice, not some counterfactual or idealized version thereof. In particular, this 
paper is not concerned with "ideal speech situations" (see., e.g., Habermas 1973) or 
"pragmatic presuppositions" of communication (see, e.g., Habermas 2008). Crucially, there is 
no presupposition that legislators use the same linguistic expressions in the same way; this is 
the core of Brandom's critique of Habermas cited as this paper's first epigraph, see Brandom 
2000b, 363: "To begin with, mutual understanding in the strong sense Habermas is insisting 
upon is not required for the undertaking of joint projects. The perspectival theory of 
conceptual contents explains how the content of a genuinely shared aim, like that of a 
genuinely shared belief or concept, and even the content of a joint (and not merely shared) 
intention – what Sellars calls 'we'-intentions – can appropriately be subject to different 
specifications by the various individuals who nonetheless share it. The participants do not 
need all to be doing the same thing (sharing) in a narrow sense in order to be engaged in a 
joint enterprise, and in that broader sense to be doing the same thing (sharing)." What this 
paper does do, however, is exploit the algorithmic features of lawmaking, and in particular 
the possibility of using rules to constrain lawmaking, in order to idealize the actual discursive 
practice engaged in by legislators. Idealization is thus a goal, not a presupposition, of this 
paper.  
62 That rules constrain or purport to constrain lawmaking is trivial, in the form of rules of 
legislative procedure and constitutional rules that determine what legislators and legislatures 
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establish the legislative framework, and especially the rules governing a 
specific class of inputs to the legislative process, namely the fundamental 
commitments of the population to be bound by the legislation generated by 
the process.  
 
Where are the rules set out that govern the legislative process? Primarily, they 
are set out in the constitution that establishes and legitimizes the legislature in 
question, and secondarily in the rules of procedure of the legislature. While 
many, and probably the most important, of these constitutional rules and 
procedural rules are in writing, some of the rules may be oral or customary.63 
Moreover, some rules may be meta-constitutional, i.e., they govern the way 
constitutional rules (and procedural rules) are executed. What is important is 
that such rules exist in some form or other, and that, in order to improve the 
legislative process, they can be formalized as algorithms to achieve the goal of 
legislation that is adequate to conflicting fundamental commitments. 
 
Lawmaking is algorithmic only in part, however, because once the framework 
of the legislative process has been staked out by such rules, there is 
considerable leeway within that framework for legislators to behave in a 
potentially non-algorithmic manner when negotiating and adopting 
legislation.64 The second methodological premise does not deny that 
individual legislators have a mind of their own and thus that their behavior is 
not strictly rule-bound. The same applies to legislatures as legislators acting 
collectively: legislatures are "only human" and hence only partially 
susceptible to being told what to do. Legislators and legislatures are not 
computer programs that simply execute algorithms in a deterministic manner. 
                                                
can validly or legally or constitutionally do. The stronger claim here is that at least some of 
these rules can be formalized as algorithms, i.e., they could also be executed by automata – 
which legislators and legislatures at least trivially are not. This claim has been put to use in 
the field of artificial intelligence and law, the seminal work of which is McCarty 1977 
(applying automatization to corporate tax law). Broadly speaking, such algorithms attempt to 
formalize the rationality involved in lawmaking and legal interpretation. Recent discussions 
include Voermans 2002 (for assisting legislative drafting and legal problem solving), 
Wahlgren 2007 (on formalizing legislative techniques), and Moens 2007 (focusing on 
techniques for representation and search of legal norms). The motivation for many of these 
projects is to facilitate dealing with the sheer volume of legislative materials; in contrast, the 
present paper examines which aspects of legal justification under conditions of conflicting 
fundamental commitments can be formalized, so that they can in turn be incorporated into 
appropriate rules of legislative procedure, constitutional and meta-constitutional rules, and 
critical tools for assessing the adequacy of legislation. By following these formally defined 
rules, legislators and legislatures implement law as pluralism. 
63 At the level of international law, customary rules as opposed to written rules have 
traditionally been more common; the trend toward codification is comparatively recent, 
especially after the end of the Second World War and the establishment of the United 
Nations. Customary rules of this sort are also common in states without written constitutions, 
such as the United Kingdom, Israel and New Zealand – but here again, there has been a trend 
toward codification, as evidenced by adoption of the Human Rights Act 1998 in the UK and 
the Bill of Rights Act in New Zealand (see Erdos 2007). For purposes of simplification, the 
term "rules" in this paper will encompass meta-constitutional, constitutional, and procedural 
rules, whether written, oral or customary, as well as rules with similar functions at the global 
level. 
64 This makes room for creativity in lawmaking that goes beyond mere rule-following. On 
parallels in the creative development of practical abilities in general, see Brandom 2008, 86: 
"The way in which prior abilities are recruited by training in the service of developing new 
ones is in general unsystematic, not codifiable in rules or algorithms, and not predictable or 
explicable from first principles." 
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What the second methodological premise does mean is that certain rules set 
out in constitutions and rules of procedure constrain what legislators and 
legislatures can and should do in order to generate legislation – they serve as 
constraints on the legislative process.65 Understanding these rules and what 
they imply for the legislative texts generated is key to understanding what 
legislators do when negotiating and adopting legislation, and tweaking these 
rules to improve the adequacy of legislative texts in relation to the 
fundamental commitments held by the population bound by those texts is key 
to pursuing this paper's normative goal. Under this algorithmic conception, 
the legislative process is a function that takes fundamental commitments as 
input (along with other inputs such as interests and external circumstances) 
and generates legislative texts as output. This paper considers the rules that 
define that function and suggests how to debug it in respect of adequacy to 
fundamental commitments. 
 
To facilitate the formal definition of the rules constraining the legislative 
process, this paper will make heavy use of symbolic notation based on first-
order logic, as well as set theory and pseudocode. This does not imply that 
legal reasoning or legislative justification is strictly logical, and even less that 
there is one right, logical answer to any question of judgment or inference 
raised during the legislative process.66 Rather, the symbolic notion serves an 
expressive function, making the practices explicit that the legislature engages 
in when negotiating law as pluralism.67 Expressing the process of legislative 
justification in this way achieves clarity both for the purpose of explicating 
law as pluralism and for the purpose of defining the rules proposed for 
constraining the legislative process.68 
                                                
65 Why should such constraints even be necessary? Wouldn't it suffice to let legislators do as 
they please, and have them thrown out of office if they fail to perform adequately? This 
question predates this paper by several centuries; see, e.g., The Federalist No. 51 (Madison): 
"The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may 
be a reflection on human nature that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses 
of government. But what is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on human 
nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern 
men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a 
government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you 
must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to 
control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control of government; 
but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions." On the 
constrainability of legislatures (and legislators) in a modern context, see Schauer 2006. 
66 On the dangers of taking logic in law too seriously, see Haack 2007.  
67 This tracks Brandom's expressivist conception of logic, drawing on early Gottlob Frege and 
Wilfrid Sellars, and makes the practice of giving and asking for reasons explicit that is 
fundamental to the legislative process. See Brandom 2000a, 76: "In Sellars's characterization of 
expressive rationality, modal claims are assigned the expressive role of inference licenses, 
which make explicit a commitment that is implicit in the use of conceptual contents 
antecedently in play. Rules of this sort assert an authority over future practice, and answer 
for their entitlement both to the prior practice being codified and to concomitant inferential 
and doxastic commitments. In this way they may be likened to the principle formulated by 
judges at common law, intended both to codify prior practice, as represented by precedent, 
expressing explicitly as a rule what was implicit therein, and to have regulative authority for 
subsequent practice. The expressive task of making material inferential commitments explicit 
plays an essential role in the reflectively rational Socratic practice of harmonizing our 
commitments. For a commitment to become explicit is for it to be thrown into the game of 
giving and asking for reasons as something whose justification, in terms of other 
commitments and entitlements, is liable to question." 
68 The expressivist function of logical notation with regard to individual justifications and 
their relationships to each other fits smoothly with the expressivist function of algorithms 
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1.5.3 Lawmaking as a multi-level undertaking 
 
The third methodological premise is that the negotiation and adoption of 
legislation is a multi-level undertaking. This means that legislation and the 
legislative process must be looked at with reference to the population subject 
to the jurisdiction of the legislature in question, i.e., the population to be 
bound by the legislation generated by the legislature, where that population 
or a subset thereof may also be subject to the jurisdiction of other legislatures, 
i.e., may be bound by legislation generated by other legislatures. 
Traditionally, a given individual in a population is bound by legislation 
generated by distinct legislatures that stand in a hierarchical relationship to 
each other, or that have hierarchically defined scopes of competence, such as 
under federalism or the principle of subsidiarity.69 These hierarchical 
relationships are traditionally defined by constitutions. However, a given 
individual in a population may also be bound by legislation generated by 
distinct legislatures that stand in a non-hierarchical relationship with each 
other, such as in the case of diplomats posted in a foreign country, who may 
be subject to legislation adopted by their home legislature and at least some 
legislation adopted by their host legislature;70 common citizens of one country 
residing in another country, who may be subject to tax, military conscription, 
or other legislation adopted by the legislature of their country of origin and 
other such legislation adopted by their country of residence;71 and 
corporations and legal entities whose domiciles, places of business, and 
markets are spread out across numerous jurisdictions – the subject matter of 
conflicts of laws. More interesting for our purposes is when different sources 
                                                
with regard to the legislative process that makes use of those justifications. Cf. Brandom 2008, 
33: "What thinking about automata in this broad sense will do is to teach us that algorithmic 
elaboration of primitive abilities into complex ones plays the same role in pragmatic analysis 
that logic does in semantic analysis. Algorithmic elaboration is a kind of logic of practical 
abilities." 
69 More often than not, federal arrangements have come about through a confluence of 
historically contingent factors, such as where previously independent or quasi-autonomous 
states came together to form a federation or confederation (e.g., the United States, 
Switzerland, the European Union) or where ethnic differences or geographic extension made 
federalism the most practical administrative option (e.g., Belgium, Brazil, India, Ethiopia, 
Australia, Canada). Where federalism has in part been theoretically motivated, it has often 
been justified in terms of political checks and balances between the different levels of 
government; see, e.g., The Federalist No. 28 (Hamilton), No. 46 (Madison), and No. 51 
(Madison), Morton White 1987, 163-165, and Frey 2001. While the principle of subsidiarity has 
its roots in Catholic social thought (see von Nell-Breuning 1952), its most prominent 
contemporary manifestation (namely, as the structural principle of the European Union; see 
article 5(3) of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union and the Protocol on the 
Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality) is primarily economically and 
historically motivated, rather than by fundamental commitments. The present paper is only 
interested in federalism and other multi-level conceptions of lawmaking in relation to the 
conflicting fundamental commitments of a population, not historical contingencies. For a 
discussion of the relationship between federalism and fundamental commitments and its 
application to Germany, India, and the United States, see Everett 1997. For a more general 
analysis of religious diversity and federalism, see Elazar 2001. 
70 See articles 29-42 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. 
71 For instance, U.S. citizens residing outside the United States are subject to both U.S. and 
local tax laws. 
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of law apply to the same individual in light of that individual's fundamental 
commitments – most prominently, in light of his or her religious affiliation.72  
 
A brief terminological note in this regard: given that legislatures may be 
arranged hierarchically or non-hierarchically, it is not always strictly accurate 
to speak of legislative levels. While the term "level" will generally be used for 
the sake of simplicity, the expression "legislative jurisdiction" will sometimes 
be used as a more precise alternative. Either term refers to the population or 
subset of a population bound by a given legislature, whether the arrangement 
in which that legislature is situated is hierarchical or non-hierarchical, 
overlapping or non-overlapping, territorial or non-territorial, and so on. 
 
Pursuant to this methodological premise, legislation and lawmaking are 
considered to be fundamentally multi-level, and can only be fully understood 
when examined within a multi-level context. Legislation as negotiated and 
adopted by a single legislature at a single level, with universal application to 
all the members of a population, is the exception in both theory and practice. 
Especially where fundamental commitments are at stake, the level-specific 
bindingness of legislation must be taken into account. While the preliminary 
consideration of law as pluralism in chapters 2 to 5 of this paper adopts the 
common simplifying assumption of a single legislature negotiating and 
adopting universally binding laws, the multi-level nature of lawmaking and 
legislation should always be kept in the back of the reader's mind. In chapter 
6 on "Recursive pluralism," the treatment in the first few chapters will be 
explicitly expanded to include multiple levels arranged both hierarchically 
                                                
72 There has recently been a resurgence of interest in non-hierarchical and overlapping forms 
of legal organization and multiple sources of binding law, not just in the colonial and post-
colonial contexts that traditionally have been associated with these phenomena. This is in part 
due to economic and social globalization, and in part due to the challenges of accommodating 
religious minorities within immigrant societies – most conspicuously Muslims within the 
traditionally Judeo-Christian societies of North America and Western Europe. Examples of 
such non-hierarchical and overlapping jurisdictions are discussed in Frey 2001 (a proposal for 
"functional, overlapping, competing jurisdictions," primarily for economic purposes), 
Kucukcan 2003 (religious accommodation in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey), Swaine 2005 
(theocratic communities in liberal democracies), Williams 2008 (Islam in the West), and 
Rosenfeld 2008 (a general analysis of highly layered and segmented constitutional ordering). 
These projects fall under the general rubric of "legal pluralism." Law as pluralism is 
thematically related to legal pluralism, the paradigmatic discussion of which is Griffiths 1986, 
which distinguishes legal pluralism from the dominant paradigm of "legal centralism," 
according to which "law is and should be the law of the state, uniform for all persons, 
exclusive of all other law, and administered by a single set of state institutions. To the extent 
that other, lesser normative orderings, such as the church, the family, the voluntary 
association and the economic organization exist, they ought to be and in fact are 
hierarchically subordinate to the law and institutions of the state." In contrast, a "situation of 
legal pluralism… is one in which law and legal institutions are not all subsumable within one 
'system' but have their sources in the self-regulatory activities of all the multifarious social 
fields present…" One superficial difference between law as pluralism and legal pluralism à la 
Griffiths is that the former project is explicitly normative, while the latter is ostensibly 
descriptive. More crucially, law as pluralism abides by the key tenet of "legal centralism," 
namely that law is part of a single legal order rooted in the state (or, utopianly, the 
international legal order). While law as pluralism recognizes "other, lesser normative 
orderings" and does not presuppose that law should necessarily be "uniform for all persons," 
it does situate the diversity of legal norms within a single legal order. Chapter 6 on 
"Recursive pluralism" below expressly shows how pluralistic commitments across various 
legislative jurisdictions can be unified within such a single legal order. 
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and non-hierarchically, in accordance with the constellations of fundamental 
commitments at each level. 
 
 
1.6 Toward law as pluralism 
 
In light of these ground rules and methodological premises, the following 
chapters73 will flesh out the theoretical constructs and the practical tools 
necessary to pursue the normative goal of this paper: namely to define rules 
for the negotiation and adoption of laws so that, in each legislative 
jurisdiction, the laws are adequate to the potentially conflicting fundamental 
commitments of the members of the population in that legislative jurisdiction. 
 
These constructs and tools include a normative conception of pluralism (2.2) 
that can be committed to (2.3) for the achievement of this paper's normative 
goal; the distinctions between fundamental and subsidiary commitments 
(3.1), popular and legislative commitments (3.2), and prescriptive and 
descriptive commitments (3.3); the regulative ideal of law as pluralism (4.1); 
the justificatory constraint of law as pluralism (4.2 to 4.7); the 
decomposition (5.1) and synthesis (5.2 to 5.4) of commitments to bridge the 
gap between legislative input and legislative output; and the device of 
recursive pluralism (6), which makes use of the distinction between tight and 
loose consensus (6.2) and of termination conditions defined in terms of 
enforceability (6.7). 
 
The conclusion of this paper will consider the implementation of law as 
pluralism (7) – in particular, how to make justifications explicit (7.1), the 
formulation of appropriate rules of legislative procedure (7.2), constitutional 
rules, and meta-constitutional rules (7.3); the relationship between courts and 
legislatures under law as pluralism (7.3.2); the relationship between law as 
pluralism and the public sphere (7.4); international law as pluralism (7.5); and 
law as pluralism as a critical tool (7.6). The paper concludes with an 
Appendix (8) containing the formal algorithmic definition of law as pluralism 
and References (9). 
 
Using these constructs and tools, the conception of law as pluralism as set out 
in the first paragraph of this introduction can be restated more formally and 
more precisely as follows, thereby also summarizing the main arguments of 
this paper: 
 
Law as pluralism denotes legislation negotiated and adopted under 
conditions of conflicting fundamental commitments; these commitments 
may be either prescriptive or descriptive. Under the conception of pluralism 
put forward here, prima facie equal validity is accorded to all commitments 
held by a population, i.e., to all popular commitments, even where such 
commitments are incompatible with each other. Under the corollary 
regulative ideal of law as pluralism, laws – which express legislative 
commitments – should prima facie only bind members of the population 
whose fundamental commitments do not conflict with those legislative 
commitments – any deviation from this regulative ideal must be justified. This 
                                                
73 The paper is divided into nine chapters, including the Appendix and the References, each of 
which may be divided into sections, which in turn may be divided into subsections. 
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has consequences for the negotiation and adoption of legislation: while 
descriptive fundamental commitments held by members of the population or 
legislature may serve as justifications for positions taken during legislative 
negotiations and hence may serve indirectly as a basis for legislative output 
commitments, prescriptive fundamental commitments held by members of the 
population or legislature directly prejudice the content of legislative 
commitments and hence should not serve as justifications for positions taken 
during legislative negotiations if they conflict with other such prescriptive 
fundamental commitments. According to the justificatory constraint of law 
as pluralism, giving descriptive fundamental commitments as justifications is 
compatible with the regulative ideal of law as pluralism, while giving 
prescriptive fundamental commitments as justifications that conflict with 
other such prescriptive fundamental commitments is not. Controversial 
prescriptive commitments can be "smuggled into" the legislative process, 
however, by first decomposing them into descriptive commitments and 
uncontroversial prescriptive commitments, and then synthesizing them into 
legislative proposals. Using the device of recursive pluralism, legislation can 
be negotiated at multiple levels with the goal of achieving at least loose 
consensus at each level, according to which the laws adopted are adequate to 
the various fundamental commitments held by the population at a given 
level, even where those commitments are mutually incompatible. Legislation 
is negotiated at descending levels until tight consensus is reached at some 
level. Where legislation is adopted without achieving tight consensus or loose 
consensus at each level, legislation can be made explicit by giving 
justifications stated in terms of enforceability as to why a given legislative 
commitment should apply at a given legislative level despite the inability to 
achieve tight or loose consensus. Making justifications explicit is also 
recommended to ensure that law as pluralism honors the principle of 
integrity across laws generated from one legislative process to the next.  
 
Using these constructs and tools for the negotiation and adoption of laws, law 
as pluralism facilitates the undertaking of joint legislative projects even where 
mutual understanding is not achievable.  
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2 An adequate conception of pluralism 
 
2.1 The fact of pluralism 
 
If all human beings shared the same fundamental commitments and the same 
interests, there would be no need for law. The state of nature would be 
lawless yet harmonious: each one of us would, instinctively and rationally, act 
in a manner adequate to our own commitments and interests, as well as to the 
commitments and interests of everyone else.74 Workers would be happy to 
work for the owners of the means of production at the wages the owners saw 
fit, and owners would be happy to pay workers the wages the workers saw 
fit; fetuses would only be aborted, if at all, up to the time everyone agreed 
was both moral and convenient; and everyone would only marry the spouses 
everyone else approved of. We would all pay the taxes we all agreed were 
just and sufficient, without being reminded to fill out our tax returns 
accurately and completely and on time, or we would all pay-as-we-go for 
public services, to the extent any existed. Polluters would only pollute in a 
mutually agreed, sustainable manner, or no one would care that they were 
living in a world slowly choking on its own excesses; and war would be either 
a bloodless sport or a pastime for a population of masochists. 
 
Human beings do not always share the same fundamental commitments and 
the same interests, however. This is where law becomes necessary. Law 
mediates between conflicting interests and conflicting commitments – it 
coordinates our collective action by imposing norms on each of us individuals 
and groups of individuals. It provides incentives for us to comply with the 
socially negotiated norms, and it punishes us when we fail to comply. It 
tempts us, cajoles us, coerces us. We are called upon to accept the authority of 
law, even when the norms imposed by law conflict with the interests and 
commitments we hold dear as a consequence of our upbringing, education, 
life experiences, and religious, philosophical and ethical convictions. Law 
does violence to our interests and commitments, but if crafted well, it gives us 
something in return that we would otherwise be unable to enjoy in a world 
filled with interests and commitments that conflict with our own. 
 
In small, homogeneous populations with a common history, culture and 
religion, the conflicts mediated by law are predominantly conflicts arising 
from interests, not fundamental commitments. Even in homogeneous 
societies, there are still rich and poor, factory owner and worker, ruler and 
ruled. Law in such homogeneous, particularistic societies guides human 
behavior in such a way as to balance the disparate interests of the members of 
society who, by birth, choice or chance, are in different life situations giving 
rise to different, potentially conflicting interests. The employee wants to be 
paid more; the shareholder wants to generate a higher profit. The ruled wants 
the freedom to lead an autonomous life (or to be given reliable and 
predictable guidance on how to lead a heteronomous life); the ruler wants to 
exercise as unrestricted power as possible over his subjects and to enjoy the 
spoils of that power as undisturbed as possible. 
 
                                                
74 Pace Hobbes 1651. 
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Migration, economic and cultural globalization, the spread and acceleration of 
transportation and telecommunication technologies, and the resulting greater 
awareness of other ways of living have led to the dissolution, fragmentation, 
and intermixing of the small, homogeneous populations that have 
characterized much of human history and, hence, political philosophy. Such 
homogeneity may still exist in the occasional isolated Asian jungle, African 
savannah, American plain or European mountain valley – but homogeneity is 
rapidly joining the mammoth and the dodo bird in the graveyard of human-
facilitated evolutionary casualties. Particularism has been replaced by 
pluralism as the dominant narrative of our age. 
 
Some would argue that the emerging heterogeneity is primarily a 
heterogeneity of interests, not fundamental commitments – that in our 
disparate hearts, we all roughly believe and value the same things, but that 
our different positions in life lead us to express our divergent interests in the 
form of distinct, more-or-less comprehensive religious, philosophical, or 
ethical worldviews that emphasize commitments over interests, providing 
metaphysical cover for our pecuniary drives. This may very well be the case: 
it pays to be agnostic about such things, if only to avoid straying onto a 
metaphysical limb that could be sawed off at any time by the dialectics of 
false consciousness and public choice theory. Nevertheless: the language of 
fundamental commitments plays a domineering role in our pluralistic age, 
and we ignore it at our peril: even if it should turn out that everyone is, in a 
cognitively dissonant way, guided by brute interests, not lofty fundamental 
commitments, we all have an interest in believing and making others believe 
that we are guided by commitments instead of mere interests. Religions and 
philosophy departments have not succeeded by denying the central role 
values play in our self-image as human beings – they have succeeded by 
articulating fundamental visions that emphasize the distinctness and 
superiority of some worldviews in contrast with others.  
 
Pluralism of fundamental commitments and the worldviews they are part of 
is an unavoidable fact of our current human and social condition. This fact of 
pluralism in the contemporary world must be taken to include conflicting 
fundamental commitments, not just conflicting interests, if a solution is to be 
found to the problem of how law is to govern populations characterized by a 
plurality of conflicting fundamental commitments.  
 
The fact of pluralism we are interested in here is therefore a pluralism of 
fundamental commitments, not a pluralism of interests.75 This means that in a 
given population, there is a wide range of fundamental commitments held by 
different members of that population, and some or many of these 
fundamental commitments may conflict with each other. What it means for 
fundamental commitments to conflict with each other is that they cannot be 
held at the same time without contradiction, i.e., they are incompatible with 
each other: a fundamental commitment that "all humans are equal" is 
incompatible with the fundamental commitment that "blacks are inferior to 
                                                
75 Others have referred to this as value pluralism, notably Berlin 1959/2003, Raz 1988, Galston 
2002, and Crowder 2002. Note that what we are interested in here is the fact of pluralism as 
such, as opposed to the fact of reasonable pluralism; cf. Rawls 2005, 36. Law as pluralism 
makes no prima facie judgments concerning the reasonableness of fundamental 
commitments; reasonableness is not a criterion of adequacy. 
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Asians" or "men are inferior to women." The fact of pluralism expresses the 
incompatibility of fundamental commitments held by the members of a given 
population; the set of fundamental commitments held by that population is 
inconsistent. Conditions of conflicting fundamental commitments are thus 
conditions in which the set of fundamental commitments is inconsistent. 
 
 
2.2 A normative conception of pluralism 
 
The fact of pluralism is a descriptive fact about the world, independent of any 
value we may or may not attach to it. The fact of pluralism says nothing about 
whether pluralism is a good thing or a bad thing, or about how a population 
characterized by the fact of pluralism should be governed. In particular, the 
fact of pluralism says nothing about how legislation binding a population 
characterized by the fact of pluralism should be negotiated and adopted. 
 
To answer these questions, we must develop a conception of pluralism that 
attaches value to the fact of pluralism, that gives us a foundation for 
determining how laws ought to bind the members of a population 
characterized by the fact of pluralism. The conception of pluralism we need is 
therefore normative, not merely descriptive like the fact of pluralism itself. 
Without such a normative conception of pluralism, we would be leaving the 
fact of pluralism to its own devices, so to speak: we would be agnostic about 
how a pluralistic society should regulate its affairs, whether the battle 
between conflicting fundamental commitments should be waged by means of 
war, coercion, law, or chance. Since this paper aims to define rules governing 
the negotiation and adoption of legislation which ensure that the legislation is 
adequate to a population's plurality of fundamental commitments, we are 
interested in a conception of pluralism that lends itself to a resolution of such 
conflicts by way of law, and in particular by way of legislation that is 
adequate to a population's plurality of fundamental commitments. 
 
2.2.1 A conception of relativism? 
 
As a starting point for approaching the definition of a conception of 
pluralism, we might consider first what a conception of relativism would 
entail:76 a conception of relativism – or at least a conception of a maximalist 
                                                
76 On relevant distinctions between pluralism and relativism, see Kekes 1993, 31-34, and 
Connolly 2005, 38-49. Kekes 1993, 31, sums it up succinctly: "[R]elativists and pluralists 
disagree in their answers to the question of whether judgments of importance can be justified 
on context-independent grounds. Relativists deny this possibility, pluralists affirm it." This 
section develops the context-independent grounds under law as pluralism. Or as Rescher 
1993, 103, defines pluralism: "Relativism is predicated on an indifferentism which maintains 
that whenever various bases of judgement, different evidential/evaluative standpoints or 
perspectives exist, then all these are (at least roughly) equally acceptable, so that there is no 
rationally cogent basis for choosing one rather than another." And Rescher 1993, 109: "The 
step from a mere pluralism to an actual relativism can be taken only via an indifferentism that 
there is really 'nothing to choose' between that plurality of distinct positions." This section 
develops the "rationally cogent basis" for choosing one position over another within the 
limited domain of lawmaking. 
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form of relativism – would be entirely agnostic with respect to the truth77 of all 
the commitments held by all the members of a population. Under this 
maximalist conception of relativism, any of the commitments held by any 
member of the population could be considered true or at least potentially 
true, given the particular framework available to that member for 
determining the truth of her fundamental commitments. That framework 
would be specified by the member's particular upbringing, cultural 
belonging, personal convictions, and other contextual factors independent of 
the content of the commitment. Hence, the same commitment might be true in 
one framework and false in another. The conception of relativism would 
provide no criteria external to these contextual frameworks for assessing 
whether a given commitment is true or false; it would consider any 
commitment true or false only according to the particular framework of the 
person who holds the commitment.  
 
If the conception of relativism were taken as the basis for defining rules 
governing the negotiation and adoption of legislation, the output of the 
legislative process would threaten to be inconsistent for the following reasons. 
The input to the legislative process would consist of a set of mutually 
incompatible fundamental commitments – commitments that could not be 
held simultaneously without a contradiction. Since there would be no criteria 
for rejecting any of these fundamental commitments as a basis for the laws 
generated by the legislative process, the laws generated would themselves be 
in danger of being inconsistent. For instance: the conception of relativism 
would be agnostic as to whether the commitment "women ought to wear veils 
in public" or the (incompatible) commitment "women ought not to wear veils 
in public" – both of which would serve as input to the legislative process – is 
true or false. A law that would be agnostic regarding the truth of these two 
commitments would therefore hold that "women ought to wear veils in public 
and women ought not to wear veils in public," if it tries to reflect both of these 
commitments simultaneously, or it would hold that "women ought to wear 
veils in public or women ought not to wear veils in public," if it tries to reflect 
each of these commitments without excluding the other. In either case, the 
outcome would be a lot of very confused veiled and unveiled women walking 
the streets. 
 
The conception of relativism, taken as the basis for defining rules governing 
the negotiation and adoption of legislation, leads to legislative anarchy. One 
may argue whether this would be a good thing or bad thing, depending on 
one's fundamental commitments; but this paper's goal is to define rules 
governing the negotiation and adoption of binding and enforceable legislation, 
and it is difficult to see how any given law can be binding and enforceable if it 
is inconsistent. 
 
Nevertheless, the conception of relativism has a feature that is appealing 
when considering the problem of how to define rules governing the 
negotiation and adoption of legislation that is to be binding on a population 
whose members hold a plurality of fundamental commitments: the 
conception of relativism does not exclude any fundamental commitments 
                                                
77 Conceptions of truth and validity will be discussed in more detail in the following 
subsection on "Achievability, truth, and validity"; for now, an informal notion of truth is 
assumed. 
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solely on the basis of their content. This is a feature we would like to import to 
the extent achievable into the conception of pluralism: if the conception of 
pluralism were to prejudge the truth of fundamental commitments before 
they have the opportunity to compete in the legislative process, the 
conception of pluralism would itself be fundamentally prejudiced, i.e., it 
would presuppose the truth of fundamental commitments beyond the 
commitment to pluralism. The exercise of this paper is to avoid such 
presuppositions.78 
 
So the appealing feature of the conception of relativism for our purposes is 
that it gives every fundamental commitment the opportunity to compete in 
the legislative process – the problem is that under the conception of 
relativism, all fundamental commitments win. In practice, if legislation is to 
be consistent and binding and enforceable, some commitments must lose in 
the legislative process. The legislative process thus acts as a filter that 
separates out the losing commitments from the winning commitments, only 
the latter of which flow into the laws that are the output of the legislative 
process. 
 
2.2.2 Achievability, truth, and validity 
 
As defined in subsection 1.3.3 above, legislation is adequate to the plurality of 
fundamental commitments in a given population if it takes all fundamental 
commitments held by members of that population as equal input to the 
legislative process, to the extent achievable, and the output of the process 
reflects that input to the extent achievable. Under a conception of pluralism 
adequate to the plurality of fundamental commitments in a given population 
(i.e., adequate to the fundamental commitments of a population characterized 
by the fact of pluralism), the legislative process must give all fundamental 
commitments an equal chance to compete, regardless of their content – but it 
must then winnow out fundamental commitments in the attempt to generate 
laws as output that are consistent and enforceable.79 This process of 
winnowing out commitments implements the qualification "to the extent 
achievable." 
 
The difference between the conception of relativism and the conception of 
pluralism is therefore the qualification "to the extent achievable" attached to 
the latter, more specifically that the laws outputted by the legislative process 
under the conception of pluralism must be consistent and enforceable. This 
means that the legislative process treats all fundamental commitments 
equally prima facie, but it may disregard certain commitments in its quest to 
generate a consistent and enforceable output. While the conception of 
relativism treats all fundamental commitments equally simpliciter, the 
conception of pluralism treats all fundamental commitments equally only 
prima facie.  
                                                
78 This is important especially in light of the third ground rule, namely agnosticism with 
regard to various political conceptions. See subsection 1.4.3 above. 
79 As we shall see below, the winnowing process involves two stages: one at the entry point to 
the legislative process (the justificatory constraint of law as pluralism discussed in chapter 4), 
and one at the exit point from the legislative process (the termination conditions discussed in 
section 6.7). 
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But what does this entail for the truth of the fundamental commitments? If the 
legislative process under the conception of pluralism accepts certain 
commitments as input and rejects others in its attempt to generate consistent 
and enforceable laws as output, isn't this tantamount to a judgment 
concerning the truth or falsity of the fundamental commitments, thus 
violating the third ground rule set out in subsection 1.4.3? 
 
No. The legislative process under the conception of pluralism does not deal in 
truth. It deals in achievability or workability, given the constellation of 
fundamental commitments offered as input to the legislative process. The 
conception of pluralism is thus a pragmatic conception,80 concerned with the 
workability of the output as opposed to the truth of the input.81 
 
If the legislative process under the conception of pluralism does not make a 
judgment concerning the truth of the fundamental commitments offered as 
input to the legislative process, what aspect of those commitments does it 
make a judgment concerning? It makes a judgment concerning the ability of a 
commitment to contribute to the output of the legislative process, in light of 
the need for that output to be consistent and enforceable. In the following, we 
will call this ability the validity of the commitment:82 a commitment is valid 
relative to a legislative process if the output of that process reflects the 
commitment, i.e., if the output is compatible with the commitment and can be 
derived from it. Conversely, a commitment is invalid relative to a legislative 
                                                
80 And, indeed, a pragmatist conception, if pragmatism as a philosophical method is 
understood as being more interested in what truth does than in what truth is. See Finlayson 
2005, 328, comparing Brandom with Habermas: "Robert Brandom's semantic inferentialism – 
a combination of pragmatism, rationalism and logical expressivism – in which Habermas has 
taken a keen interest, sets out to replace the question of what truth 'is' by the question of what 
we do when we treat something as 'true'." Another way of understanding the pragmatist 
orientation of this paper is that the paper, and by extension law as pluralism, are more 
interested in justification than in truth – at least with regard to the restricted domain of 
lawmaking. Cf. Rorty 2000, 4: "There are many uses for the word 'true,' but the only one 
which could not be eliminated from our linguistic practice with relative ease is the cautionary 
use. That is the use we make of the word when we contrast justification and truth, and say 
that a belief may be justified but not true… We use it to remind ourselves that people in 
different circumstances – people facing future audiences – may not be able to justify the belief 
which we have triumphantly justified to all the audiences we have encountered [internal 
citation omitted]." Law as pluralism is interested in justifying commitments as the basis for 
laws that are binding and enforceable with respect to a pluralistic population; it is not 
interested in the truth of those commitments as such. 
81 Waldron 1999a, 111 n. 62, makes this point with respect to politics in general: "Although the 
idea of objective values is the idea of one view being right and the others wrong in a dispute 
about justice, it is an idea which has little utility in politics. As long as objective values fail to 
disclose themselves to us, in our consciences or from the skies, in ways that leave no room for 
further disagreement about their character, all we have on earth are opinions or beliefs about 
objective value. The friends of truth will insist stubbornly that there really is, still, a fact of the 
matter out there. Really. And maybe they are right. But it is surprising how little help this 
purely existential confidence is in dealing with our decision-problems in politics." 
82 "Validity" is not an unproblematic term: in logic, a statement is valid if it is true in all 
interpretations; the validity of a statement is generally the same as the logical truth of the 
statement. Moreover, the term "validity" has a somewhat different meaning in other political 
philosophies, notably in Habermas 2004, where it appears to subsume notions of (theoretical) 
"truth" and of (moral) "rightness"; see Finlayson 2005. Nevertheless, the definition of validity 
used in this paper bears useful and relevant similarities to these other definitions in that it is a 
pragmatic conception rather than a metaphysical conception. 
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process if the output of that process does not reflect the commitment, i.e., if the 
output is incompatible with the commitment and cannot be derived from it. 
 
This gives us a succinct way of defining the following normative conception 
of pluralism under law as pluralism:  
 
Under law as pluralism, prima facie equal validity ought to be 
accorded to all fundamental commitments offered as input to the 
legislative process, even where such commitments are incompatible 
with each other.  
 
As we have seen, however, this conception is only prima facie: the legislative 
output under the conception of pluralism reflects only those fundamental 
commitments that do not lead to an inconsistent or unenforceable output. 
Fundamental commitments reflected in the legislative output are actually 
valid relative to the legislative process, while fundamental commitments not 
reflected in the legislative output are only prima facie valid relative to the 
legislative process, but not actually. 
 
Nothing said so far indicates the criteria by which the actual validity or 
invalidity of specific fundamental commitments is determined relative to a 
legislative process; it is also not clear whether, given a certain set of 
fundamental commitments, only one consistent and enforceable legislative 
output is possible, or whether several distinct (and even mutually 
incompatible) outputs may be possible, each of which may or may not reflect 
a different set of fundamental commitments. These issues will be discussed in 
subsequent chapters; but first, we must consider what a commitment to this 
normative conception of pluralism entails. In the following, the unmodified 
term "pluralism" is meant to be read as "the normative conception of 
pluralism" outlined in this section. Where the (descriptive) fact of pluralism is 
intended, the full phrase "fact of pluralism" will be used. Similarly, "legislative 
process under the normative conception of pluralism" will now be referred to 
as "pluralistic legislative process" or simply "legislative process," where the 
reference to the conception of pluralism is clear. 
 
 
2.3 Committing to pluralism 
2.3.1 Everyone's a little bit racist 
 
(This normative conception of) pluralism is hard to commit to. Since 
pluralism accords prima facie validity to all fundamental commitments 
offered as input to the legislative process, it implies that any of our 
fundamental commitments – even those referring to our most deeply held 
beliefs and values – may end up being irrelevant to the laws actually adopted: 
fundamental commitments incompatible with mine may end up being 
deemed valid by the legislative process, while my own fundamental 
commitments may end up being deemed invalid – i.e., they may end up not 
being reflected by the laws outputted by the legislative process. But while the 
pluralistic legislative process winnows down the fundamental commitments 
that are ultimately reflected in the legislative output, the legislative process 
refuses to certify the truth of our commitments or the falsity of others' 
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commitments. Instead, the legislative process limits itself to determining the 
validity of such commitments with respect to that specific legislative process.83 
So even though I may, in some extra-legislative or metaphysical sense, be 
right, I may end up being bypassed. 
 
Since the pluralistic legislative process is agnostic with respect to the truth of 
fundamental commitments (other than the commitment to pluralism), it 
implies that forcing our beliefs and values down everyone else's throats as 
part of the legislative process is not an appropriate or effective way to coordinate 
social action, even if we're absolutely convinced we're right about those 
commitments. A commitment to pluralism implies taking a step back from 
our desire to change other people through legislation and make them more 
like us.84 
 
Committing to pluralism is especially hard given that "everyone's a little bit 
racist"85 or at least discriminatory: whether because of our genes, culture, 
upbringing, education, religion, ideology, peer group, evolutionary history, or 
our fundamental commitments regardless of their origin, we have the 
tendency to treat people who are different from us with skepticism, distrust, 
or disgust – whether on the basis of their "race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other 
status,"86 including their preferences, practices, and orientation relating to 
food, hygiene, dress, music, living arrangements, work, leisure activities, and 
perhaps most especially sexuality, and more specifically on the basis of their 
fundamental commitments that conflict with ours. Embracing or even just 
tolerating people who are unlike us does not always come naturally; neither 
does embracing or even just tolerating their fundamental commitments. 
 
When presented with the opportunity to control people's behavior and to 
make them more like us, it is tempting to seize it. When this opportunity is 
afforded through the exercise of legislative power, i.e., the ability to control 
people's behavior through binding, enforceable, legally sanctioned norms, the 
temptation may be even harder to resist. 
 
The commitment to pluralism reins in this temptation. Precisely because 
discrimination and the desire to ram our fundamental commitments down 
other people's throats is so tempting and so universal, the ability to effectively 
                                                
83 Ensuring the integrity of the legislative output of a legislature complicates this picture 
somewhat, since it requires looking at the validity of commitments across several distinct 
legislative processes leading to distinct legislative outputs, as opposed to just a single specific 
legislative process leading to single legislative output. This complication will be discussed in 
more detail in section 7.1 on "Making justifications explicit" below. 
84 A commitment to pluralism in the restricted sense developed here does not entail refusing 
to change other people at all; it merely excludes such aims from the legislative process, but 
leaves anyone free to pursue them outside the legislative process – e.g., in other forums in the 
public sphere. Appiah 2006, 72, expresses general skepticism about the ability to change 
minds through arguments, rather than through practice: "I don't say that we can't change 
minds, but the reasons we exchange in our conversations will seldom do much to persuade 
others who do not share our fundamental evaluative judgments already." If this is true of 
conversations in general, it is certainly true of conversations within the context of the 
legislative process. 
85 See Lopez and Marx 2002. 
86 Article 2(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and article 2(2) of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
 39 
coordinate collective action through legislation in a society characterized by 
the fact of pluralism depends on the restraint afforded by the commitment to 
pluralism. The commitment to pluralism acknowledges that others hold 
commitments that may conflict with the commitments we hold, and that we 
need to make room for those conflicting commitments in the legislative 
process even though we otherwise may prefer not to.87 The commitment to 
pluralism balances out our innate or acculturated desire to make others 
conform to our beliefs, values and lifestyle choices. The commitment to 
pluralism means that, at least when it comes to the negotiation and adoption 
of legislation, we commit ourselves – at least prima facie – to taking a step 
back from our desire to force others to be like us. In a theoretically pure, 
homogeneous society with a high degree of conformity of fundamental 
commitments, perhaps no commitment to pluralism would be necessary.88 
But in a society characterized by the fact of pluralism, the negotiation and 
adoption of legislation depends on a commitment to pluralism that keeps our 
discriminatory impulses in check.89 
 
2.3.2 Qualifying motives 
 
The desire to control other people's behavior through legislation is not 
always, however, motivated by racism or a similar desire to discriminate, or 
by some other emotionally overwhelming and perhaps irrational urge to 
make people conform to our fundamental commitments. There are at least 
four ostensibly justifiable motives why we may want to use legislation to 
control other people's behavior:  
 
1. we believe we are doing them a favor (the "missionary" motive);  
2. we are afraid that they may beat us to it and impose their own 
fundamental commitments on us (the motive from fear);  
3. by binding everyone, we bind ourselves, knowing that without 
external constraints, we may lapse into behavior we find objectionable 
or dangerous (the "precommitment" motive);90 and  
                                                
87 As Connolly 2005, 3, puts it in reference to a Marxist friend of the family whom he 
respected but with whom he disagreed: "I wanted Charlie to have a voice in the world, not to 
be its Voice." The commitment to pluralism gives people with conflicting commitments a 
voice, without making any one of them the Voice. 
88 Although the lack of such a commitment to pluralism would likely bar the development of 
a diversity of beliefs and values within society that makes social change possible in the first 
place. But it is of course a question of one's fundamental commitments whether such change 
is desirable. 
89 According to Rorty 1999, 237, this is all that is required under pluralism (which Rorty 
situates squarely within his minimalist conception of the liberal tradition): "It seems to me 
that the only homogenization which the liberal tradition requires is an agreement among 
groups to cooperate with one another in support of institutions which are dedicated to 
providing room for as much pluralism as possible." Connolly 2005, 41, puts a more militant 
spin on this: "A pluralist… is one who prizes cultural diversity along several dimensions and 
is ready to join others in militant action, when necessary, to support pluralism against 
counterdrives to unitarianism." The commitment to pluralism is thus stronger than mere 
toleration; it is an affirmative duty to combat and exclude commitments that undermine 
pluralism. 
90 A motive discussed paradigmatically by Elster 1984 and partially critiqued and refined by 
Elster 2000. See also Stephen Holmes 1988 and 1997 for a discussion of its application to 
democracy, and Waldron 1999a, 255-281, for a critique of precommitment as a justification for 
judicial review. 
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4. we believe the fundamental commitments held by others are so 
noxious to a pluralistic society that we feel we must curtail them by 
law (the "defense-of-pluralism" motive).91  
 
In the following, these four motives will be referred to as qualifying motives. 
 
Each of these qualifying motives is in tension with the commitment to 
pluralism: 
 
1. The missionary motive devalues the fundamental commitments of 
others, in that we believe that such commitments are hazardous to 
those who hold them and that we are justified in using legislation to 
ensure that the harm arising from such commitments is limited or 
eliminated. An example would be advocacy of legislation prohibiting 
"victimless" acts such as private narcotic drug use, suicide, and certain 
sexual practices. 
2. The motive from fear assumes that while we may be committed to 
pluralism, others may not be committed to pluralism; hence, we are 
justified in curtailing the fundamental commitments of others as a form 
of preemptive self-defense. An example would be advocacy of 
legislation prohibiting the wearing of burqas in public, motivated by 
the fear that otherwise, we might one day be forced to wear burqas 
ourselves. 
3. The precommitment motive privileges our desire to control our own 
behavior, and as a side-effect the behavior of others, over our 
commitment to pluralism. An example would be advocacy of 
legislation making it harder for us (and hence others) to divorce or 
become over-indebted. And  
4. the defense-of-pluralism motive suspends the commitment to 
pluralism where pluralism itself is at risk. An example would be 
advocacy of legislation prohibiting Holocaust denial, thereby making it 
a crime to express fundamental commitments that deny the 
fundamental commitments of others; another example would be 
advocacy of legislation prohibiting female genital mutilation/cutting, 
in the belief that such practices are imposed on women against their 
own fundamental commitments.92 
 
How do the qualifying motives impact the commitment to pluralism? To 
answer this, we must look at how a commitment to pluralism links up with 
the content of other commitments. How can an individual (and in particular 
an individual legislator) reconcile her commitment to pluralism with any 
other fundamental commitments that person (or legislator) might hold? It 
should be clear from the preceding discussion that the commitment to 
pluralism is in fact a fundamental commitment: it says something substantial 
                                                
91 Akin to Connolly's "militant" pluralism, see n. 89 above. 
92 To the extent such practices do not conflict with the fundamental commitments of the 
women undergoing them, advocacy of a ban would fall under the missionary motive. The 
distinction is complicated by the fact that the women undergoing such procedures are 
generally minors, so that determination of their fundamental commitments may be subject to 
counterfactuals (such as what their fundamental commitments would be when they're older 
and it's too late to undo what has been done). 
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about the ultimate beliefs and convictions of a person who holds it.93 For 
someone sincerely committed to pluralism, it is non-negotiable in the sense 
that it will not be traded in or abandoned without a fight. As a fundamental 
commitment, the commitment to pluralism may very well conflict with other 
fundamental commitments one holds. Most fundamental commitments do 
not have a commitment to pluralism "built in," and hence the conclusions one 
reaches on the basis of one's fundamental commitments alone (without the 
commitment to pluralism) may be very different from the conclusions one 
reaches on the basis of one's commitment to pluralism in conjunction with 
one's other fundamental commitments.  
 
For instance, let's say I believe: (a) that veils are a sign of discrimination 
against women; (b) that discrimination against women should be prohibited 
by law; and hence (c) that the wearing of veils should be prohibited by law. 
Without regard to my commitment to pluralism, these commitments taken 
together – let's call them my non-pluralistic commitments – lead me to take a 
legislative position in favor of prohibiting the wearing of veils.  
 
Adding a commitment to pluralism – without qualifying motives – to these 
non-pluralistic commitments complicates matters in several ways: in addition 
to causing me to abandon any attempt to change other people's fundamental 
commitments by means of the legislative process, such a commitment to 
pluralism may (a) cause me to call into question my commitment that veils 
really are a sign of discrimination against women, since I acknowledge that 
the contrary belief, namely that veils are not or are not always a sign of 
discrimination against women, may be true; (b) conflict with my commitment 
that discrimination against women should be prohibited by law, since the 
contrary commitment, namely that discrimination against women should not 
or should not always be prohibited by law, may be true; and (c) conflict with 
my commitment that the wearing of veils should be prohibited by law, since 
that commitment depends on my commitment that veils are a sign of 
discrimination against women, which may not be true, and since it conflicts 
with the commitment that prohibition against women should not or should 
not always be prohibited by law, which may be true. Taking my commitment 
to pluralism into account along with my other, non-pluralistic commitments, I 
may end up taking a legislative position in favor of not prohibiting the 
wearing of veils, contrary to the legislative position I would take according to 
my non-pluralistic commitments alone. Or I may just end up being hopelessly 
confused and unable to take any position at all. 
 
Qualifying my commitment to pluralism with any of the qualifying motives 
gives us an entirely different picture: the missionary motive may cause me to 
believe that prohibiting the wearing of a veil is for a woman's own good, even 
if she may voluntarily opt to wear one; the motive from fear may cause me to 
want to prohibit the wearing of veils so that the permission to wear a veil 
never slides down the slippery slope toward an obligation to wear a veil; the 
precommitment motive may cause me to advocate legislation prohibiting the 
wearing of veils so that I am never tempted to wear one myself (or cause my 
                                                
93 If the commitment to pluralism is embedded in the rules that constrain the legislative 
process, as opposed to being left to the individual (legislator), then the commitment to 
pluralism is held by those who design and agree to the constraints on the legislative process, 
but not necessarily by those who work within those constraints.  
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family members to wear one); and finally, the defense-of-pluralism motive 
may cause me to want to prohibit the wearing of veils because I believe that 
legislation condoning the wearing of veils suppresses the fundamental 
commitments of women coerced or cajoled by their family members or peers 
into wearing one. 
 
Honoring a commitment to pluralism without qualifying motives threatens to 
eviscerate an individual legislator's ability to take any legislative position that 
would lead to a law in conflict with the fundamental commitments of anyone 
else. If a legislator did take such a position during negotiations, and hence 
before the legislative process had run its course, the legislator would be 
denying prima facie validity to the fundamental commitments held (or 
represented) by other legislators, thus violating the legislator's commitment to 
pluralism. The only criterion consistent with the commitment to pluralism for 
denying the validity of another legislator's commitments would be if those 
other legislator's commitments led to an inconsistent legislative output; but 
the same criterion would then also apply to the legislator's own commitments 
if those commitments contributed to the inconsistency. Hence, a legislator 
committed to pluralism without qualifying motives would have to refrain 
from taking any positions that could lead to inconsistent legislation, given the 
positions held by others. If all legislators did this, no controversial positions 
would be taken during legislative negotiations at all, and hence only trivial 
legislation, if any, would be outputted by the legislative process. 
 
Conversely, holding a commitment to pluralism in conjunction with 
qualifying motives threatens to render the commitment to pluralism 
ineffective and superfluous: the qualifying motives could be used by an 
individual (legislator) to justify nearly any legislative position taken. The 
missionary motive could be used to justify slavery, the motive from fear could 
be used to justify genocide, the precommitment motive could be used to 
justify the establishment of a theocracy, and the defense-of-pluralism 
commitment could be used to justify the suppression of all antagonistic 
speech, none of which appear consistent with the normative conception of 
pluralism. 
 
Depending on whether a legislator's commitment to pluralism is 
supplemented by qualifying motives, either the commitment to pluralism 
threatens to lead to legislative paralysis, i.e., the inability to take any 
controversial positions during legislative negotiations, or the commitment to 
pluralism threatens to be inoperative. 
 
2.3.3 Perspectival, comprehensive, and deep pluralism 
 
Nicholas Rescher, Michel Rosenfeld and William Connolly have developed 
different but complementary ways to analyze and address this tension 
between the commitment to pluralism and other fundamental commitments, 
including the qualifying motives. According to Rescher, 
 
It is, in the eyes of some, a disadvantage of pluralism that it supposedly 
undermines one's commitment to one's own position. But this is simply 
fallacious. There is no good reason why a recognition that others, 
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circumstanced as they are, are rationally entitled in their circumstances to hold 
a position at variance with ours should be construed to mean that we, 
circumstanced as we are, need feel any rational obligation to abandon our 
position.94 
 
Rescher calls this "perspectival pluralism"95 or "pluralism without 
indifferentism,"96 which recognizes the different experiential and cognitive 
contexts in which different people develop their conflicting commitments, 
while holding fast to one's own. He expressly disavows the notion that a 
commitment to pluralism leads to inaction or paralysis when combined with 
other commitments: 
 
An experiential pluralism of cognitive orientations is thus no impediment to 
doctrinal commitment. There is no reason that the mere existence of different 
views and positions should leave us immobilized like the ass of Buridan 
between the alternatives. Nor are we left with the grey emptiness of 
egalitarianism that looks to all sides with neutrality and uncommitted 
indifference. […] An acknowledgement of pluralism is no invitation to 
abandoning one's dedication to one's own position.97 
 
Rescher claims that we (and by extension, legislators) accomplish this feat by 
distinguishing internal from external perspectives: 
 
[O]ne must distinguish between the standpoint of the individual and the 
standpoint of the group. Pluralistic diversity of opinion is a feature of the 
collective whole: it turns on the fact that different experiences engender 
different views. But from the standpoint of the individual this cuts no ice. We 
ourselves have to alternative to proceeding on the basis of what is available to 
us here and now. Granted, the group as a whole incorporates other 
alternatives, many or most of them incompatible with one's own. But the fact 
that the wider community as a whole contains other positions does nothing to 
render a firm and fervent commitment to one's own position somehow 
infeasible, let alone improper. We cannot rationally maintain a posture of 
indifference.98 
 
As rational creatures, we can never abandon our internal perspective on what 
is true and what is right; but as social creatures, we cannot disregard the fact 
that others with whom we must cooperate may have different internal 
perspectives, given their own experiences and cognitive orientations. The 
desire to cooperate requires that we take an external perspective alongside 
our internal perspective – thus engendering a tension that can never be fully 
resolved, but must be partially resolved in order to engage in joint projects 
with others. 
 
Rosenfeld formalizes these two distinct perspectives within the context of 
legal interpretation by developing a normative conception of 
"comprehensive" pluralism which acknowledges other commitments, but 
trumps them in the interest of its own survival: 
                                                
94 Rescher 1993, 119-120. 
95 Rescher 1993, 121. 
96 The theme of Rescher 1993, 98-126, which distinguishes indifferentist relativism from 
pluralism without indifferentism.  
97 Rescher 1993, 121-122. 
98 Rescher 1993, 120. 
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[T]he aim of comprehensive pluralism is to encompass, and to foster peaceful 
coexistence among, as many competing conceptions of the good as possible. 
Moreover, comprehensive pluralism must be prepared to accept the norms 
produced by other conceptions of the good, but only to the extent that such 
norms do not interfere with its encompassing design.99 
 
This normative conception of comprehensive pluralism distinguishes first-
order norms from second-order norms analogous to Rescher's internal and 
external perspectives: 
 
[T]he normative apparatus associated with comprehensive pluralism's 
integrating mission can be conceived as consisting of second-order norms 
that are distinguishable from first-order norms – that is, all the other norms 
associated with one or more of the remaining conceptions of the good. In 
short, comprehensive pluralism's principal aim is to negotiate the tension 
between first-order and second-order norms without thereby compromising 
the latter, all the while remaining as inclusive as possible with respect to the 
former.100 
 
The last sentence puts a useful gloss on what is intended by the goal of law as 
pluralism to achieve adequacy to conflicting fundamental commitments to the 
extent achievable: while law as pluralism is as inclusive as possible with respect 
to (potentially conflicting, first-order) fundamental commitments, it 
disregards them to the extent they cannot (in some, yet-to-be-determined 
way) be reconciled with each other and especially where they would 
compromise the (second-order) commitment to pluralism. And that second-
order commitment to pluralism, while a normative conception of the good 
itself, exists only for the purpose of reconciling the tensions among the first-
order commitments.101 This helps sharpen the distinction between the 
normative conception of pluralism we have developed and the conception of 
relativism we are trying to avoid: 
 
[C]omprehensive pluralism figures, in part, as a conception of the good that 
claims superiority over its rivals, but only for the limited purpose of 
minimizing exclusion of other conceptions of the good. Conversely, 
comprehensive pluralism's systematic leveling of conceptions of the good 
                                                
99 Rosenfeld 1999, 200. 
100 Rosenfeld 1999, 201. 
101 Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 93, explain this relationship between first-order 
commitments and second-order commitments as follows, in relation to public deliberation: 
"The aim of such a process [of public deliberation] is not necessarily to induce citizens to 
change their first-order moral beliefs. It is rather to encourage them to discover what aspects 
of those beliefs could be accepted as principles and politics by other citizens with whom they 
fundamentally disagree. Since it is this second-order agreement that citizens should seek, 
they do not have to trade off their personal moral views against public values. Deliberative 
reasoning is not correctly represented if it is described as giving more weight to the value of 
mutual respect or deliberation than (for example) to the sanctity of life. A citizen may still 
believe that the sanctity of life is more important, but recognize that under current conditions 
her understanding of the value is not yet sufficiently appreciated by her fellow citizens and 
therefore cannot yet become the basis of public policy that is justified from a reciprocal 
perspective." Audi 2000, 135, even claims that this second-order commitment is more-or-less 
universal: "A major second-order moral obligation that we all seem to have is to take (first-
order) moral obligations and principles seriously and to seek accommodation with those with 
whom we are obligated to live in peace despite our disagreements, whether they are outside 
our own religious tradition or within it." 
 45 
does introduce some measure of relativism, but it is a limited and narrowly 
targeted one, whose only aim is to undermine the pretensions to superiority 
of certain conceptions of the good. Strictly speaking, therefore, 
comprehensive pluralism is not relativistic as between conceptions of the 
good: it is merely skeptical concerning any claim to a hierarchy between 
them.102 
 
Succinctly put: "[P]rivileging comprehensive pluralism over other conceptions 
of the good boils down to affording second-order norms priority over first-
order norms since that is a prerequisite to achieving equality among first-
order norms."103 
 
Rosenfeld is primarily interested in legal interpretation as opposed to 
lawmaking. But this distinction between first-order commitments and second-
order commitments, and the resulting conception of pluralism he develops, 
might be applied to legislators engaged in the legislative process as well. The 
legislator's commitments would then be parceled into two distinct domains: 
the legislator's first-order fundamental commitments, grouped more or less 
coherently together into the legislator's overall worldview (or the worldviews 
the legislator represents), which the legislator would use as the basis for 
positions taken during legislative negotiations; and the legislator's second-
order commitment to pluralism, which would be manifested in the legislator's 
commitment to the pluralistic legislative process. Although it may happen 
that the legislator's first-order commitments might come to be modified by 
her second-order commitment to pluralism (and the second-order 
commitment to pluralism might in fact come to be integrated coherently into 
the legislator's set of first-order commitments, forming part of a more 
comprehensive worldview), the legislator's first-order commitments and her 
second-order commitment to pluralism need not be compatible with each 
other – i.e., the conclusions a legislator reaches on the basis of her non-
pluralistic commitments alone need not be compatible with the conclusions 
the legislator reaches on the basis of her non-pluralistic commitments in 
conjunction with her commitment to the pluralistic legislative process. 
 
But this, of course, requires considerable cognitive agility on the part of the 
legislator. Maintaining a commitment to perspectival pluralism or 
comprehensive pluralism, even as a regulative ideal, requires a "bicameral 
orientation to political life," as expounded by William Connolly in his related 
development of a "public ethos" of "deep pluralism:"104 
 
[A] bicameral orientation to political life does mean that you keep a foot in 
two worlds, straddling two or more perspectives to maintain tension between 
them. A bicameral orientation requires a tolerance of ambiguity in politics, 
the sort of tolerance that Theodor Adorno in his classic study says is lacking 
in 'the authoritarian personality.' [internal citation omitted]"105 
 
But it is precisely the fact that everyone, including legislators, has a "bit of an 
authoritarian personality," or at least a commitment to certain qualifying 
motives, that makes it so difficult to implement this bicameral orientation. As 
                                                
102 Rosenfeld 1999, 208. 
103 Rosenfeld 1999, 209. 
104 Connolly 2005, 65. 
105 Connolly 2005, 4. 
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Connolly puts it, "The bicameral orientation to citizenship requires a fair 
amount of self-cultivation and inter-consistency negotiation to fuel and 
sustain itself."106 It requires a constant calling-into-question of one's own first-
order commitments, in light of the pressure of conflicting first-order 
commitments one is forced to consider in light of one's second-order 
commitment to pluralism: "It is comparable to the double consciousness 
attained when people correct their perceptual sense that the sun rotates 
around the earth with second-order knowledge that the reality is the other 
way around."107 As Galileo and the Holy See would confirm, achieving this 
double consciousness is a tedious and time-consuming process.108 The fact 
that fundamental commitments are fundamental makes this process all the 
more demanding: 
 
Installation of a bicameral orientation to the relational dimension of your own 
faith is never entirely attained. When you pursue such a program, old flames 
of anathematization will periodically flare up again, and new and unexpected 
movements of faith by others will arise to pose the issue all over again in 
surprising terms. Such a double perspective is fostered by religious work, 
individual and collective. It juxtaposes exercises of the self to a positive 
version of the micropolitics by which we regularly work on each other. That 
is, it involves the essence of ethico-political life in a pluralistic society.109 
 
Installing this bicameral orientation – or a commitment to comprehensive 
pluralism, or a perspectival approach to one's own fundamental 
commitments and those of others – in micropolitics is a tall order, let alone in 
the macropolitics of lawmaking. Too tall, perhaps: a commitment to a 
bicameral orientation does not always make it easier to get (re-)elected, and 
even where nobly and self-sacrificially pursued, it may easily slide into a 
degenerate (and relativistic) form of tolerance that is an easy target for those 
not so committed. But Rescher, Rosenfeld, and Connolly are not specifically 
concerned with lawmaking: while Rosenfeld focuses on legal interpretation 
(paradigmatically by courts and lawyers), Rescher and Connolly are 
concerned with political culture, the social order, and by extension the entire 
public sphere. When applied to the legislative process – which, in comparison 
with the public sphere at large, has algorithmic aspects that can be formally 
defined and enforced – we would like to implement a conception of pluralism 
that captures the bicameral, dual-order approach of this trinity of 
perspectival/comprehensive/deep pluralism, but with fewer cognitive 
demands, less voluntarism, and more teeth.  
 
2.3.4 Embedding the commitment to pluralism in rules 
 
How can this be done? By absolving the individual legislator of the 
responsibility to directly reconcile her non-pluralistic commitments with the 
commitment to pluralism. In other words, by committing the legislature to 
                                                
106 Connolly 2005, 5. 
107 Connolly 2005, 32. 
108 359 years, to be exact: "Moving formally to rectify a wrong, Pope John Paul II 
acknowledged in a speech today that the Roman Catholic Church had erred in condemning 
Galileo 359 years ago for asserting that the Earth revolves around the Sun." See "Vatican 
Science Panel Told By Pope: Galileo Was Right" 1992. 
109 Connolly 2005, 33. 
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pluralism, rather than the individual legislator, by embedding the 
commitment to pluralism in the rules that constrain the legislative process. 
 
The cognitive dilemma outlined above is one argument in favor of this 
approach: if the rules constraining the legislative process take adequate 
account of the commitment to pluralism, and hence the legislative process 
itself is committed to pluralism, individual legislators may be relieved of the 
need to reconcile their non-pluralistic commitments with the commitment to 
pluralism. This would enable legislators to advance their original legislative 
stances without regard to the commitment to pluralism – e.g. that the wearing 
of veils should be prohibited by law – and trust that the legislative process 
itself will take adequate account of the commitment to pluralism. Since the 
pluralistic process only takes account of all input commitments to the extent 
achievable when generating legislative output, an individual legislator can 
trust that any legislative position, including her own, may be taken during 
negotiations, but it may not be reflected in the legislative output actually 
adopted. 
 
As will be argued later on, this does not entail that the justifications offered by 
legislators for their legislative positions during negotiations are without 
constraint. Quite the contrary: the freedom of legislators to take positions 
without first reconciling their non-pluralistic commitments with the 
commitment to pluralism is purchased at the cost of constraints on the 
reasons they may employ to justify their positions taken. 
 
If a commitment to pluralism is embedded in the rules that constrain the 
legislative process, then the individual legislator's commitment to pluralism 
would be manifested in the legislator's participation in a legislative process 
committed to pluralism. Beyond that, the legislator would be free to advocate 
any position during legislative negotiations that the legislator sees fit, subject 
to the justificatory constraints suggested in the preceding paragraph and 
developed in more detail below. With respect to specific positions taken 
during specific negotiations, the legislator would not be bound directly by the 
commitment to pluralism per se – only indirectly by way of the commitment 
to the pluralistic legislative process as embedded in the rules she is subject to 
as a legislator. The legislator's first-order commitments and second-order 
commitment to pluralism would coexist in two cognitively and procedurally 
separate domains as part of Connolly's bicameral structure of commitments: 
on the one side, the legislator's non-pluralistic commitments would determine 
the positions the legislator takes in legislative negotiations; on the other side, 
the legislator's commitment to pluralism would be realized by her compliance 
with the rules that constrain the legislative process. 
  
In particular, the legislator's qualifying motives would be treated the same 
way as any other commitments offered as a justification for legislative 
positions and proposals: they would be treated equally prima facie, but they 
might be disregarded in the end, just like any other commitment, in order to 
ensure that the legislation is adequate and enforceable. Subject to the 
justificatory constraints, the legislator would be free to offer any qualifying 
motive as a justification for a position taken or a proposal tabled during 
legislative negotiations. Qualifying motives offered as justifications would be 
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taken into account to the extent achievable, and they would be winnowed out 
during the legislative process. 
 
Without going into detail at this stage, it is clear that some qualifying motives 
might survive the pluralistic legislative process more readily than others, if 
the commitment to pluralism is itself embedded in the rules that constrain the 
legislative process. The requirement of adequacy to all fundamental 
commitments, to the extent achievable, goes some way toward assuring those 
motivated by fear or the desire to defend pluralism: although commitments 
incompatible with mine will be reflected by legislation to the extent 
achievable, so will my own commitments. To the extent there is agreement in 
a given legislative jurisdiction that precommitment is a good thing, for 
whatever reason, there is nothing about the commitment to pluralism that 
undermines the precommitment motive in that jurisdiction – although it may 
gut the precommitment motive in other jurisdictions.110 The missionary 
motive is the least likely class of commitment to survive the pluralistic 
legislative process: since the missionary motive explicitly devalues the 
fundamental commitments of others, and is thus explicitly incompatible with 
the commitment to pluralism, it is only likely to be reflected by legislation 
under law as pluralism if it can be offered as input to the legislative process as 
a different class of commitment.111 
 
Assuming that the commitment to pluralism is embedded in the rules that 
constrain the legislative process, rather than left to individual discretion, how 
can it be enforced with respect to individual legislators? In other words, how 
can it be ensured that the commitment to pluralism is actually a commitment 
as opposed to a regulative ideal, i.e., a desirable form of conduct that may be 
deviated from when trumped by actual commitments or contingencies? This 
will be discussed in more detail below in chapter 7 on "Implementing law as 
pluralism." The short answer for now is: by joining a legislature, a legislator 
commits herself to pluralism as embedded in the rules that constrain the 
legislative process, in the same way that the legislator commits herself to the 
other requirements of the job. Commitment to the pluralistic legislative 
process is a permanent criterion for membership in a pluralistic legislature 
and for the exercise of the rights and privileges attached to such membership. 
Positions taken in legislative negotiations – or more precisely, as will be 
discussed below, justifications of positions taken in legislative negotiations – 
that violate the rules embedding the commitment to pluralism are subject to 
sanction or invalidation by those rules, as well as by the constitutional 
mechanisms that determine the validity of legislation. 
 
By embedding the commitment to pluralism in the rules that constrain the 
legislative process, the difficulty of committing to pluralism discussed in the 
preceding subsections is reduced to the difficulty of designing a legislative 
process that is committed to pluralism. This will be done below in the form of 
constraints on legislative justification: both constraints on the justifications 
                                                
110 The level-specific nature of the validity of commitments (and hence of precommitments) 
will be analyzed in detail in chapter 6 on "Recursive pluralism" below.  
111 For instance, a commitment to prohibiting private narcotic drug use may turn out to be 
invalid if introduced in terms of the missionary motive; but it may turn out to be valid if 
introduced in terms of the precommitment motive or the motive from fear. These 
considerations will be developed in more detail in chapter 4 on "The justificatory constraint of 
law as pluralism" below. 
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available to individual legislators negotiating within a legislature, and 
constraints on the justifications available to the legislature itself acting as a 
collective body. The core of this project is the "justificatory constraint of law as 
pluralism" developed in chapter 4 below. But to do so, different types of 
"commitment" must first be classified, by means of the following three 
distinctions: the distinction between fundamental and subsidiary 
commitments, the distinction between popular and legislative commitments, 
and the distinction between descriptive and prescriptive commitments. These 
classifications will be the subject of the following chapter. 
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3 Classifying commitments 
 
3.1 Fundamental and subsidiary commitments 
 
The normative goal of this paper is to define rules for the negotiation and 
adoption of laws so that, in each legislative jurisdiction, the laws are adequate 
to the potentially conflicting fundamental commitments of the members of 
the population in that legislative jurisdiction.  
 
The Introduction provided a brief definition of fundamental commitments: 
fundamental commitments are the bedrock, non-negotiable beliefs, values, 
convictions, revelations, intuitions, and so on, that a given person or group of 
persons holds in relation to the way the world is and the way it ought to be. 
This section will flesh out this definition and show what role fundamental 
commitments may serve in the process of justification. 
 
In this paper, a person holds a commitment if that person has undertaken a 
commitment, i.e., the commitment can properly be attributed to that person. A 
person endorses a commitment if that person holds a commitment and 
acknowledges that commitment; this means that a person may hold a 
commitment without endorsing it, i.e., the person may have undertaken a 
commitment without being aware of it or without admitting it.112  
 
Symbolically, this will be represented as follows: 
 
Η (X, C) means that a person X holds a commitment C, i.e., has undertaken that 
commitment.113 
 
Where the context is clear, i.e., where it is clear (or irrelevant) that X is doing 
the holding, then Η (X, C) will be abbreviated simply as C. Furthermore, 
 
Ε (X, C) means that a person X endorses or has endorsed a commitment C.114 
 
A fundamental commitment may ground further, subsidiary commitments by 
providing a reason for them; i.e., fundamental commitments may serve as 
premises for subsidiary commitments. Fundamental commitments may do so 
                                                
112 This terminology largely follows Brandom 1994 and Brandom 2000a; but Brandom does 
not use the phrase "to hold a commitment" as a shortcut for "to have undertaken a 
commitment." On the difference between undertaking and acknowledging, see Wanderer 2008, 
42-43: "Crucially, undertaking a commitment differs from such acknowledgement. In 
attributing a score [i.e., the status of being committed] to oneself, one attributes those 
commitments that one acknowledges. In undertaking a commitment, one adds to one's score 
both the commitment itself and those commitments that are its committive consequences. It is 
possible (and likely) that one will not acknowledge all such consequences even though one 
should. In undertaking a commitment, unlike in acknowledging a commitment, one is binding 
oneself beyond that which one currently recognizes as the committive consequences of the 
undertaking."  
113 The Η ("holds") notation is equivalent to the Β notation in doxastic logic, in which Β stands 
for "believes." This paper follows Brandom's terminology and uses "believes" only informally 
as a less precise shortcut for "has undertaken (i.e., holds) the doxastic commitment that."  
114 Ε (X, C) is a shortcut for Η (X, C) & Η (X, Η (X, C)): X endorses a commitment C if X has 
undertaken C (i.e., X holds C), and X holds that X has undertaken C (i.e., X acknowledges C). 
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in two ways:115 by committing the person to a subsidiary commitment 
(committive inference), or by entitling the person to a subsidiary commitment 
(permissive inference).116 A person is committed to a subsidiary commitment if 
the fundamental commitment entails the subsidiary commitment, i.e., anyone 
committed to the fundamental commitment must also be committed to the 
subsidiary commitment. A person is entitled to a subsidiary commitment if the 
subsidiary commitment is not ruled out by the fundamental commitment, i.e., 
anyone committed to the fundamental commitment may also be committed to 
the subsidiary commitment.117 In either case, the subsidiary commitment is a 
conclusion of the fundamental commitment. These subsidiary commitments 
may in turn ground further (subsidiary) commitments through committive 
and permissive inferences. 
 
Two commitments are incompatible with each other if one commitment 
precludes entitlement to the other.118 A person is therefore entitled to a 
subsidiary commitment if the fundamental commitment does not entail a 
commitment that is incompatible with the subsidiary commitment. The 
negation of a commitment is always incompatible with that commitment, 
hence a person holding a given commitment is not entitled to hold the 
negation of that commitment. 
 
In this paper, the following symbolic notation will be used: 
 
C1 → C2 means that someone holding the commitment C1 is also committed to 
holding C2 (committive inference); 
                                                
115 There is also (at least) a third way, which is however not relevant to the analysis in this 
paper: in addition to the committive (commitment-preserving) and permissive (entitlement-
preserving) inferences identified by Brandom, there are also incompatibility entailments. See 
Brandom 2000a, 194. 
116 Note that we are talking about material inferences, not formal inferences. See Brandom 1994, 
97-105, and Sellars 1953. This tracks Brandom's expressivist conception of logic, as discussed 
above on p. 26 and in n. 67, and is appropriate to the nature of legislative justification, which 
does not follow formal rules of inference. Brandom 1994, 97-98, provides examples of 
material inference: "[C]onsider the inference from 'Pittsburgh is to the West of Philadelphia' 
to 'Philadelphia is to the East of Pittsburgh,' the inference from 'Today is Wednesday' to 
'Tomorrow will be Thursday,' and that from 'Lightning is seen now' to 'Thunder will be heard 
soon.' It is the contents of the concepts West and East that make the first a good inference, the 
contents of the concepts Wednesday, Thursday, today, and tomorrow that make the second 
inference correct, and the contents of the concepts lightning and thunder, as well as the 
temporal concepts, that underwrite the third. Endorsing these inferences is part of grasping 
or mastering those concepts, quite apart from any specifically logical competence." 
117 This is an informal way of defining entitlement; according to Brandom 1994, 160: "It does 
make sense to think of being committed to do something as not being entitled not to do it, but 
within the order of explanation pursued here, it would be a fundamental mistake to try to 
exploit this relation to define one deontic status in terms of the other. Doing so requires 
taking a formal notion of negation for granted. The strategy employed here is rather to use 
the relation between commitment and entitlement (which are not defined in terms of this 
relation) to get a grip on a material notion of negation, or better, incompatibility." Brandom 
refers to commitments and entitlements to commitments as deontic statuses; attributing and 
acknowledging these deontic statuses are what Brandom calls deontic attitudes. See Brandom 
1994, 648-650. Note that in practice, and especially in the legislative practice of interest here, it 
only makes sense to speak of entitlement if the conclusion bears some substantive relation to 
the premise; while a commitment to the claim that grass is green in some sense entitles one to 
the claim that snow is white, the type of material inference we are interested in here is where 
the commitment "the grass is green" entitles one to the commitment "the grass is still alive." 
118 See Brandom 1994, 160, and Brandom 2000a, 194. 
 52 
 
C3  C4 means that someone holding the commitment C3 is entitled to hold C4 
(permissive inference); 
 
C5 / C6 means that C5 is incompatible with C6 (i.e., someone holding the 
commitment C5 is precluded from the entitlement to hold C6 and vice-versa).  
 
For instance, if I hold the fundamental commitment C1 "only God may take 
life away," I am also committed to the subsidiary commitment C2 "only God 
may take my life away,"119 while if I hold the fundamental commitment C3 
"God made men and women equal," I am entitled to the subsidiary 
commitment C4 "men and women are still equal." Hence C1 → C2, while C3  
C4. But if I hold the fundamental commitment C5 "God created everything 
there is," I am precluded from holding the subsidiary commitment C6 "there 
are some things that God did not create." Hence C5 / C6. 
 
We will also use the following shorthand notation: 
 
*C means, for a given commitment C, that C / *C, i.e., *C is any commitment 
incompatible with C. The negation of C, expressed by ~C, is a special case of 
*C. 
 
In this paper, a commitment C2 reflects another commitment C1 if either C1 → 
C2 or C1  C2, i.e., the two commitments are compatible and C2 can be derived 
from C1 either by committive inference or by permissive inference. C1 then 
justifies C2 or serves as a justification for C2, while C2 is justified by or is justified in 
terms of C1. 
 
Note also that while a person endorsing a commitment necessarily holds that 
commitment, the converse is not necessarily true. In symbolic notation: 
 
Ε (X, C) → Η (X, C) but ~(Η (X, C) → Ε (X, C)). 
 
                                                
119 Technically, this is a first-order enthymeme lacking the major premise "my life is an 
instance of life in general." This paper will largely gloss over such niceties, especially since the 
inferences at issue are material, not formal (see Sellars 1953, 313, and n. 116 above), and since 
most of the inferences we are interested in are permissive (the genus of which logical induction 
is merely one species), rather than committive (the genus of which logical deduction is merely 
one species), so that the problem of enthymemes would not arise even in the case of formal 
inferences. See Brandom 1994, 168-169: "Inheritance of commitment (being committed to one 
claim as a consequence of commitment to another) is what will be called a committive, or 
commitment-preserving, inferential relation. Deductive, logically good inferences exploit 
relations of this genus. But so do materially good inferences, such as inferences of the form: A 
is to the West of B, so B is to the East of A; This monochromatic patch is green, so it is not red; 
Thunder now, so lightning earlier. Anyone committed to the premises of such inferences is 
committed thereby to the conclusions. Inheritance of entitlement (being entitled to one claim 
as a consequence of entitlement to another) is what will be called a permissive, or entitlement-
preserving inferential relation. Inductive empirical inferences exploit relationships of this 
genus. The premises of these inferences entitle one to commitment to their conclusions (in the 
absence of countervailing evidence) but do not compel such commitment. For the possibility 
of entitlement to commitments incompatible with the conclusion is left open. In this way the 
claim that this is a dry, well-made match can serve as a justification entitling someone to the 
claim that it will light if struck. But the premise does not commit one to the conclusion, for it 
is compatible with that premise that the match is at such a low temperature that friction will 
not succeed in igniting it." 
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And a person holding a commitment is entitled to endorse it if and only if the 
person holds no other commitment that is incompatible with that 
commitment: 
 
Η (X, C) & ~Η (X, *C)  Ε (X, C) and ~(Ε (X, C)  Η (X, *C)). 
 
Fundamental commitments are generally part and parcel of more or less 
comprehensive worldviews or doctrines,120 which may be religious or secular. 
Examples are "human life begins at viability of the fetus" and "marriage 
should only be between one adult man and one adult woman." Although 
most fundamental commitments are rooted in such socially shared, 
historically evolved, or divinely revealed comprehensive worldviews, some 
fundamental commitments may be specific to an individual or independent of 
any greater worldview, yet beyond question (from the perspective of that 
individual). Examples might be "I am a brain in a vat" or "FC Barcelona 
always ought to beat Real Madrid." 
 
Regardless of their origin, what makes a commitment fundamental is that the 
person who holds that commitment sees no need to justify it in terms of other 
commitments. The person may thus hold the commitment without necessarily 
being entitled to it in terms of other commitments. Fundamental commitments 
may serve as premises for subsidiary commitments, but they are not 
themselves conclusions of other commitments. The person holding a 
fundamental commitment does not care whether he or she is entitled to the 
commitment, or does not see a need to demonstrate that entitlement; the 
person holds the commitment anyway, entitlement be damned. As Brandom 
puts it with respect to the non-technical concept of "faith:"  
 
[T]here is nothing unintelligible about having beliefs for which we cannot 
give reasons. Faith – understood broadly as undertaking commitments 
without claiming corresponding entitlements – is surely not an incoherent 
concept. (Nor is it by any means the exclusive province of religion.)121 
 
A fundamental commitment for the purposes of this paper thus corresponds to 
this informal notion of "faith",122 but as Brandom points out, "faith" need not 
be restricted to the religious domain. Someone may hold the fundamental 
commitment "people should be treated equally regardless of race," even if it is 
not religiously motivated. 
 
In the eye of the holder, a fundamental commitment does not call out for 
justifications itself and is not subject to revision. If I believe that "all men are 
created equal" and that "they are endowed by their Creator with certain 
unalienable rights," I will be hard-pressed to supply reasons why I hold these 
truths to be self-evident. I simply believe them (or have come to believe 
them), and I use them as the basis of my personal political philosophy. No 
exercise of giving and asking for reasons will justify or undermine such 
fundamental commitments. I may in practice give reasons to explain my 
commitments, but these reasons are likely to be for the benefit of the 
                                                
120 See Rawls 2005, xviii. 
121 Brandom 2000a, 105. 
122 as "doxastic commitment" in Brandom's terminology corresponds to the informal notion of 
"belief" 
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audience, not an actual explanation of why I hold these commitments (for 
instance: "you wouldn't want your rights to be alienated, hence it's better to 
believe they're unalienable"). Given the lack of need for justification from the 
perspective of the person who holds fundamental commitments, they can be 
described as elements of what one considers to be of "ultimate concern,"123 or 
trumps that override other (contingent) considerations and interests.124  
 
Note that it matters not where fundamental commitments come from: even if 
one does not believe that any commitments are fundamentally fundamental, 
one may still find it useful to speak of commitments as if they were 
fundamental. According to Richard Rorty, an avowed non-foundationalist 
(channeling both Ludwig Wittgenstein and Martin Luther, not to mention 
Aristotle): 
 
From a pragmatist's point of view, the notion of 'inalienable human rights' is 
no better and no worse of a slogan than that of 'obedience to the will of God'. 
Either slogan, when invoked as an unmoved mover, is simply a way of 
saying that our spade is turned – that we have exhausted our argumentative 
resources. Talk of the will of God or of the rights of man, like talk of 'the 
honour of the family' or of 'the fatherland in danger' are not suitable targets 
for philosophical analysis and criticism. It is fruitless to look behind them. 
None of these notions should be analyzed, for they are all ways of saying, 
'Here I stand: I can do no other.' These are not reasons for action so much as 
announcements that one has thought the issue through and come to a 
decision.125 
 
Fundamental commitments thus play only a restricted role in the game of 
giving and asking for reasons: they may serve as justifications but, from the 
standpoint of the person who holds them, they do not stand in need of 
justifications.126 In the pursuit of this paper's normative goal, we will have to 
determine whether, given their status as potential premises but not as 
conclusions, fundamental commitments should be allowed to serve as input 
to the legislative process, and if so, to what extent. 
 
 
3.2 Popular commitments and legislative commitments 
 
The embedding of a "bicameral" or "dual-order" approach to commitments in 
the rules that govern the legislative process as discussed in the previous 
chapter – i.e., cognitively and procedurally separating out the commitment to 
pluralism from other, non-pluralistic commitments – has consequences for the 
relationship between commitments held by individual members of the 
population (and the legislators who represent them) and the commitments 
held by legislatures – commitments which, when adopted, are expressed as 
laws. 
 
Commitments held by members of the population (and the legislators who 
represent them), or popular commitments, are rooted in the religious, secular, 
                                                
123 See Tillich 1957, 1. 
124 Cf. Dworkin 1984. 
125 Rorty 1999, 83-84. 
126 They are thus analogous to the noninferential circumstances of application under Brandom's 
conception of strong inferentialism. See Brandom 2000a, 28. 
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philosophical, ethical, etc., worldviews, comprehensive doctrines, and loose 
constellations of beliefs and values held by individual members of the 
population and groups of such members. They may tell a story about the way 
the world is, or they may tell a story about how the world ought to be – this 
distinction will be made explicit in the following section on "Prescriptive and 
descriptive commitments." Popular commitments originate in sacred texts, 
customs and traditions, oral and written narratives, philosophical literature, 
revelations, profound contemplation of the mysteries of the universe, 
meditation and prayer, theoretical, practical, and communicative reason, 
evolutionary survival strategies and prejudices, family upbringing, private 
and public education, prenatal and childhood experiences, teenage traumas 
and adult struggles, conflicts between the id, ego, and superego, sublimated 
desires, peer pressure, economic incentives, false consciousness, brute 
necessity, intuition and insight, random patterns of neurons firing, hormonal 
imbalances, schizophrenia, epileptic seizures and hallucinations, peek 
experiences, or simply the word of God spoken by prophets, burning bushes, 
or God him- or herself, in whatever form. As we have seen above, popular 
commitments may be fundamental, in which case they may serve as premises 
in justifications but not as conclusions, or they may be subsidiary, in which 
case they may serve as both premises and conclusions.  
 
It makes little difference to the legislative process under law as pluralism 
whether a popular commitment, once offered as input to the legislative process, is 
fundamental or whether it is subsidiary, i.e., whether it can be reduced 
(solely) to more fundamental commitments or not. For this reason, the 
remainder of the paper will alternate freely between talk of adequacy to 
fundamental commitments and adequacy to (fundamental or subsidiary) 
popular commitments: if legislation is adequate to conflicting popular 
commitments, it is also adequate to the underlying conflicting fundamental 
commitments which correspond to those popular commitments or from 
which those popular commitments derive. 
 
Legislative commitments, as opposed to popular commitments, are held by 
legislatures, not individuals (whether members of a population or the 
legislators who represent them). What it means for a legislature to hold a 
commitment is that such a commitment may serve as a premise or conclusion 
or both for justifications expressed within a given legislative process. Where 
such commitments serve only as premises within a given legislative process 
but not as conclusions, they are input commitments of the legislative process.127 
Where they serve only as conclusions within a given legislative process but 
not as premises, they are output commitments of the legislative process.128 Such 
output commitments are expressed as laws.129 Where legislative commitments 
can serve as both premises and conclusions within the legislative process, 
                                                
127 Input commitments thus play an analogous role for legislatures that fundamental 
commitments play for persons. Within the legislative process, they are analogous to the 
noninferential circumstances of application under Brandom's conception of strong inferentialism. 
See Brandom 2000a, 28. 
128 These are analogous to the noninferential consequences of application under Brandom's 
conception of strong inferentialism. See Brandom 2000a, 28. 
129 Note that while output commitments serve only as consequences, not premises, within a 
given legislative process, they may very well serve as premises (and hence as input 
commitments) for a subsequent legislative process. This will become relevant in the discussion 
on the integrity of law as pluralism in section 7.1 on "Making justifications explicit" below. 
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they are intermediate commitments. Analogously to popular commitments, the 
legislature may be committed to a given legislative commitment in light of 
other commitments the legislature holds (by committive inference), or the 
legislature may be entitled to a given legislative commitment in light of other 
commitments the legislature holds (by permissive inference).  
 
To summarize: Popular commitments may be fundamental commitments or 
subsidiary commitments. Legislative commitments may be input commitments, 
intermediate commitments, or output commitments. Some legislative 
commitments may correspond to popular commitments, i.e., the content of the 
commitments may be identical or analogous. In particular, popular 
commitments may in principle serve as input commitments in the sense that 
the content of a popular commitment may enter the legislative process as the 
content of a (legislative) input commitment.130 But it is important to bear the 
distinction in mind of who or what holds the respective commitment: popular 
commitments are held by persons (whether members of the population or 
legislators), while legislative commitments are held by legislatures.131 
 
In this paper, the following symbolic notation will be used: 
 
Η (X, POP) means that a person X holds the popular commitment POP,132 and 
 
Η (L, LC) means that a legislature L holds the legislative commitment LC. 
 
Again, where the context is clear, Η (X, POP) will be abbreviated simply as 
POP, and Η (L, LC) will be abbreviated simply as LC. 
 
Since popular commitments may in principle serve as input commitments,133 
it is the case that, where X is a legislator and INP is a popular commitment 
POP that serves as an input commitment, 
 
Η (X, POP) → Η (L, INP), 
 
i.e., the legislature holds any popular commitment (that serves as an input 
commitment) held by any of its legislatures. This entails that input 
commitments may be incompatible with each other, given that mutually 
incompatible popular commitments may serve as input commitments. 
                                                
130 In the following, the shorthand terminology "popular commitments may serve as input 
commitments" will be used, bearing in mind that popular commitments are held by persons 
and input commitments are held by legislatures. Analogously, popular commitments may be 
offered as input commitments if they are proposed for inclusion as input commitments in the 
legislative process. Think of this as the population passing a torch to the legislature: the torch 
is the same, but the hands holding it are different. 
131 In section 5.2 on "Deriving output commitments from input commitments" below, a further 
complication will be discussed: while legislative commitments are held by legislatures, only 
individual legislators can express legislative commitments during the legislative process, e.g., by 
using them as justifications for proposed output commitments. Only once a legislative 
commitment has been adopted as a law – or otherwise explicitly endorsed by the legislature – 
can one properly speak of a legislature itself expressing a legislative commitment. 
132 Or, where X is a legislator, the members of the population represented by X hold the 
popular commitment POP. 
133 Chapter 4 on "The justificatory constraint of law as pluralism" will discuss which popular 
commitments may serve as input commitments. 
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Accordingly, intermediate commitments derived from these input 
commitments may likewise be mutually incompatible. But recall that the goal 
of law of pluralism (and of any coherent legislative process) is to generate 
laws expressing legislative commitments that are not mutually incompatible. 
This means that the legislative process must find a way to ensure the mutual 
compatibility of the output commitments generated by the legislative process. 
In other words, the legislative commitments endorsed by the legislature – 
paradigmatically by adopting the laws that express output commitments134 – 
must be mutually compatible. So, for any given popular commitment serving 
as an input commitment INP, any given intermediate commitment INT, and 
any given legislative output commitment OUT, the set of popular 
commitments serving as input commitments may include *INP, and the set of 
intermediate commitments may include *INT, but the set of output 
commitments may not include *OUT. Any set of legislative commitments 
merely undertaken or held by the legislature may be inconsistent, but the set of 
legislative commitments endorsed by the legislature should be consistent. 
Symbolically, for a legislature L and any legislative commitment LC, 
 
~(Η (L, LC) / Η (L, *LC)) but (Ε (L, LC) / Ε (L, *LC)). 
 
While output commitments may turn out to correspond to or reflect certain 
popular commitments, as legislative commitments they originate in one thing 
and one thing only: the pluralistic legislative process. They have nothing to 
say about the truth of popular commitments; they only have something to say 
about the validity of such popular commitments with respect to the legislative 
process at hand, given the particular constellation of popular commitments 
held by the members of the population to be bound by the laws in question. 
 
Of course, output commitments must bear some relation to the popular 
commitments of the members of the population the laws are to bind. This is 
what is captured by the notion of adequacy: laws expressing output 
commitments are adequate to the fundamental commitments of the 
population if and only if the process of negotiating legislation for a given 
population takes all fundamental commitments held by members of that 
population as equal input to the process, to the extent achievable, and the 
output of the process, i.e., the laws generated, reflects that input to the extent 
achievable, given the extent of the plurality of fundamental commitments 
within that population. But adequacy is a technical term: it says nothing about 
the way the world is or ought to be outside the restricted domain of the 
pluralistic legislative process. In particular, adequacy does not embody any 
first-order, non-pluralistic commitments; it embodies only the second-order 
commitment to pluralism. While popular commitments (with all the 
complexities of their pedigree) serve as inputs to the legislative process, the 
output commitments are not of the same nature as the popular commitments. 
In particular, legislative output commitments have no bearing on the sources 
of the popular commitments, and they say nothing meaningful about those 
sources or the commitments they give rise to. The relationship between 
legislative output commitments and the popular commitments they are 
                                                
134 There are ways for a legislature to endorse legislative commitments other than adopting 
laws that express them. This will be discussed in more detail in the section 7.1 on "Making 
justifications explicit." 
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adequate to135 is thus of a technical, procedural nature, rather than of a 
substantive nature.136 
 
Another way of putting this is: output commitments are not about the 
worldviews that give rise to popular commitments. The negotiation of laws is 
not about the popular commitments that serve as input to the legislative 
process.137 Rather, the negotiation of laws is about how to bind, in a consistent 
and enforceable manner, members of a population who hold a particular 
constellation of conflicting popular commitments.138 
 
Unlike popular commitments, output commitments are therefore pragmatic: 
while they are the way they are because of the popular commitments serving 
as input commitments and the commitment to pluralism that constrains the 
legislative process, they do not themselves embody beliefs, values, or other 
bedrock convictions rooted in worldviews, comprehensive doctrines, or the 
like. They are entirely contingent upon the particular constellation of 
fundamental commitments held by the population they bind, and they serve 
as a pragmatic way to structure the binding relationships between members 
of such a population holding diverse and potentially conflicting fundamental 
commitments.139 
 
This relationship under law as pluralism between (fundamental) popular 
commitments and (pragmatic) legislative commitments informally and 
imperfectly captures the secular intuition motivating the separation of church 
                                                
135 Or more precisely: "the relationship between laws expressing output commitments and the 
popular commitments those laws are adequate to"; the short-cut formulation is used in the 
body of the text for the sake of simplicity. 
136 Note that unlike adequacy, legitimacy is not (merely) a technical term: legitimacy has 
something to say about the way the content of output commitments links up with the content 
of popular commitments, and in particular whether the content of output commitments (as 
well as the way output commitments come about) can be supported by a population holding 
a certain constellation of popular commitments, even if (some of) those popular commitments 
may conflict with the output commitments in a particular case. But this paper limits itself to 
adequacy, not legitimacy: the author hopes that a solid conception of adequacy will make the 
legitimacy of adequate laws intuitive, but the paper does not argue in favor of that intuition.  
137 As Hollenbach 1993, 900, puts it: "I do not think it would be helpful for two judges, one a 
liberal Catholic and the other a conservative Protestant, to launch into epistemological and 
theological reasoning to explain why their responses to a piece of legislation regarding 
abortion are different. These theological and epistemological differences are better dealt with 
in the discussions that take place in the sphere I have called cultural, not that of the political 
sphere conceived narrowly as the judiciary or legislature." Garver 2006, 174, claims this is also 
a sound strategy for persuasion: "I want to be able to listen to a religiously based political 
argument without thinking that there is also a case concerning religious faith itself that I must 
somehow attend to. For you to persuade me about a political issue, I have to trust that you 
are not also trying to persuade me about a religious issue." 
138 The content of laws may of course influence the shape of the popular commitments that 
were taken into account (or not) during the legislative process. Someone holding a popular 
commitment may, for instance, feel that a law reflecting that popular commitment legitimates 
the popular commitment itself. Conversely, someone who holds a popular commitment that 
is not reflected in a law may feel that the law delegitimates the popular commitment. Laws 
may thus very well affect the substance and acceptance of popular commitments. But this is 
the collateral damage (or desirable side effect, depending on one's viewpoint) of the 
legislative process under law as pluralism – it is not its raison d'être.  
139 See Kekes 1993, 216: "According to pluralism, therefore, the state's advocacy of particular 
substantive values is restricted to particular circumstances and specific conflicts. As a result, 
the state could not become the advocate of any value in general; it could only become an 
advocate of particular conflict-resolutions." 
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and state, or the separation of religion and politics, according to which 
religious questions should be haggled over in the private (i.e., non-legislative) 
sphere, while questions of how to govern the relationships between members 
of a pluralistic society, regardless of their religious convictions, should be 
deliberated in a forum free from religious controversy.140 
 
But law as pluralism cuts across worldviews differently from the secular 
conception of separation of church and state, or from the liberal conception of 
separation of religious talk from political talk: under law as pluralism, all 
fundamental questions, whether religious, secular, philosophical, ethical or 
otherwise, should be haggled over in the non-legislative sphere, while 
questions of how to govern the relationships between members of a 
pluralistic society, regardless of their fundamental convictions (whether 
religious, secular, philosophical, ethical or otherwise), should be deliberated 
in a forum free from fundamental controversy. Unlike the secular notion of 
separation as church and state or the liberal notion of separation of religion 
and politics, law as pluralism makes no a priori distinction between secular 
commitments and religious commitments. This approach puts secular and 
religious commitments at eye level. Secular commitments are not privileged 
over religious commitments under law as pluralism: both types of 
fundamental commitment are treated equally prima facie by the pluralistic 
legislative process.141 
 
However, law as pluralism does not entail a free-for-all with respect to 
commitments and their admissibility as justifications; this would be law as 
relativism. It does draw a line between commitments that may serve as 
justifications for laws and those that may not. In particular, it draws a line 
between popular commitments that may serve as input commitments to the 
legislative process and those that may not – but this line is not the same as 
under secular liberalism. 
 
Where to draw this line is the subject matter of chapter 4 on "The justificatory 
constraint of law as pluralism." But before we can proceed, one final and 
crucial distinction is necessary: between prescriptive and descriptive 
commitments.  
 
  
3.3 Prescriptive and descriptive commitments 
 
So far, we have distinguished between popular commitments (which may be 
fundamental commitments or subsidiary commitments) and legislative 
                                                
140 See Rorty 1999, 170-171, on "Religion as Conversation-stopper" for a succinct expression of 
this intuition: "Contemporary liberal philosophers think that we shall not be able to keep a 
democratic political community going unless the religious believers remain willing to trade 
privatization for a guarantee of religious liberty […]." As Asad 2003 puts it, coming from a 
perspective more critical of this intuition: "From the point of view of secularism, religion has 
the option either of confining itself to private belief and worship or of engaging in public talk 
that makes no demands on life." 
141 On the relevant connection between liberal and secular views on the role of religion in 
politics, see Connolly 1999, 10: "Secularism and liberalism are connected, though neither is 
entirely reducible to the other. […] Liberalism draws your attention to questions of rights, 
justice, tolerance, and the role of the state, whereas secularism draws it to the character of 
public discourse, the role of religion and nonreligion in public life, and so on." 
 60 
commitments (which may be input commitments, intermediate commitments, 
or output commitments). We have also distinguished between commitments a 
person or legislature must be committed to in light of other commitments (by 
committive inference) and commitments one is entitled to in light of other 
commitments (by permissive inference). 
 
The distinction between popular commitments and legislative commitments 
brings into starker relief the difficulties packed into the notion of adequacy and 
allows us to formulate our normative goal in a way that pinpoints those 
difficulties more precisely: how can we define rules governing the negotiation 
and adoption of legislation which ensure that the legislative commitments 
outputted by the legislative process are adequate to the popular commitments 
that serve as input to the legislative process? And in pursuing that goal, how 
can we draw a line between popular commitments that may serve as input 
commitments to the legislative process and those that may not? Is there a 
distinction between different kinds of commitments that may help us draw 
that line? 
 
A consideration of the distinct characters of legislative commitments and 
popular commitments helps us take a first stab at that challenge: while 
legislative commitments outputted by the legislative process have a 
predominantly normative character, i.e., they make a claim about how the world 
ought to be, popular commitments potentially inputted to the legislative 
process may either have a normative character or a descriptive character, i.e., 
they may also make a claim about how the world is. Descriptive commitments 
correspond to the belief that a state of affairs obtains – i.e., they purport to 
state facts about the world. In contrast, normative commitments correspond to 
the belief that a state of affairs ought to obtain – i.e., they say something about 
how the world ought to be, whether it actually is that way or not. Descriptive 
commitments are factual statements; normative commitments may be 
counterfactual statements. 
 
The statement "men and women are equal" thus expresses a descriptive 
commitment; the statement "men and women should be treated equally" 
expresses a normative commitment. As seen in these examples, descriptive 
commitments are commonly expressed using the copula "is (not)," while 
normative commitments are commonly expressed using modal verbs 
indicating recommendation or obligation, such as "should (not)" or "ought 
(not)." When used more urgently as a command142, normative commitments 
are commonly expressed using the modal verb "shall (not)"; when used to 
grant or deny permission, the modal verb "may (not)" is commonly used.143  
 
A terminological blurriness relating to this distinction between descriptive 
and normative commitments should be addressed briefly before we proceed. 
Statements about the way the world is can be assigned a truth value, i.e., they 
                                                
142 in the second or third person 
143 Throughout this paper, the modal verb "ought (not)" will generally be used to express 
popular commitments and legislative commitments that are not output commitments (i.e., 
input commitments and intermediate commitments), while the modal verbs "shall (not)" and 
"may (not)" will generally be used to express legislative output commitments, i.e., legislative 
commitments that have been endorsed through adoption. This distinction reflects the legally 
binding nature of legislative output commitments, as opposed to the non-legally-binding 
nature of popular commitments and legislative input and intermediate commitments. 
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may be true or false. It is therefore intuitive to say that a descriptive 
commitment may be true or false. In contrast, it is not obvious that statements 
about the way the world ought to be can be assigned a truth value, i.e., it is not 
obvious that it makes sense to say they are true or false.144 Hence, it is not 
obvious that normative commitments can be said to be true or false, strictly 
speaking. For example, while the descriptive claim that "veils are a sign of 
discrimination against women" can be assigned a truth value (whatever that 
truth value may turn out to be), it is not obvious that the normative claim that 
"women ought to wear veils in public" can be assigned a truth value.145 
Assigning a truth value to normative commitments, i.e., saying that 
normative commitments are true or false, is particularly problematic if one 
does not believe that there are normative facts about the world, but rather only 
descriptive facts.146 This paper adopts a methodological agnosticism with 
respect to the existence of normative facts, and simply for purposes of 
simplicity and legibility will freely use the truth values true and false to refer 
to all statements expressing commitments, whether they are descriptive or 
normative.147 
 
In principle, the legislative commitments expressed by laws may be either 
descriptive or normative. Descriptive legislative commitments are often 
packed into the preambles of legislation, for instance, and the legislative 
history of adoptions is replete with statements not only about how the world 
ought to be, but also about how the world is (purported to be). Judicial 
opinions are often not only normative in nature, but also descriptive, and they 
may draw on the descriptive commitments explicit or implicit in the 
legislative (or constitutional) enactments upon which they are (purported to 
be) based. 
 
Nevertheless, there is something intrinsically normative as opposed to 
descriptive about most legislative output commitments, as reflected in the fact 
that we speak of legislation as expressing legal norms, not legal facts.148 While 
the descriptive commitments expressed in legislation and its history and 
interpretation may guide the specific application of laws, the function of 
legislation – in light of its origins and social role – is predominantly 
normative, not descriptive. This is in contrast to, say, the natural sciences, 
which at least purport to be descriptive, not normative. The normative 
commitments expressed by legislation may reflect certain descriptive 
commitments, but legislation is not generally about such descriptive 
                                                
144 See, e.g., Habermas 2004, in which Habermas proposes the concept of "rightness" as the 
equivalent of "truth" when referring to normative statements. According to Finlayson 2005, 
Habermas views "rightness" and "truth" as species within the overarching genus of "validity." 
145 This is related to the problem in the philosophy of language of whether normative 
statements are properly considered propositions. See Marmor 2008, 425: "It is an open 
question, and a rather controversial one at that, whether prescriptive utterances are basically 
propositions or not." 
146 By contrast, moral realists, for instance, are unlikely to have difficulties with the idea of 
normative facts. For a recent proponent of moral realism in the political context, see Harris 
2010.  
147 As already discussed in subsection 2.2.2 above, the terms valid and invalid will continue to 
be used in a technical sense to refer to popular commitments that are (not) reflected in 
legislative output commitments. 
148 See Marmor 2008, 425: "Legal utterances typically do not consist of descriptive statements. 
Legal norms prescribe modes of conduct, grant rights, impose obligations, and so on. In short, 
the content of the law is typically prescriptive." 
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commitments. Legislation only incidentally makes pronouncements about the 
way the world is; its primary function is to determine how the world ought to 
be. 
 
The slope between descriptive commitments and normative commitments is 
notoriously slippery, a slipperiness that we cannot neglect in our discussion 
of legislative commitments, either.149 Philosophers watchfully stand guard 
against the naturalistic fallacy of deriving moral facts from natural facts,150 
while in everyday speech, statements like "human life is worthy of protection" 
blur the distinction between descriptive and normative and raise 
controversial ontological questions.151 In the context of legislative 
negotiations, this slippery slope becomes particularly treacherous in light of 
the essentially contested concepts prevalent in politics.152 
 
Connolly shines a light on this ambiguity between descriptive and normative 
concepts by focusing on the appraisive aspect of such concepts: "Essentially 
contested concepts… are typically appraisive in that to call something a 'work 
                                                
149 The recognition of this slipperiness goes back at least to Hume 1739, book III, part I, section 
I: " In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark'd, that 
the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary ways of reasoning, and establishes the 
being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when all of a sudden I am 
surpriz'd to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet 
with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is 
imperceptible; but is however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, 
expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it shou'd be observ'd and 
explain'd; and at the same time that a reason should be given; for what seems altogether 
inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely 
different from it."  
150 See G. E. Moore 1903, Chapter 1 § 10: "It may be true that all things which are good are also 
something else, just as it is true that all things which are yellow produce a certain kind of 
vibration in the light. And it is a fact, that Ethics aims at discovering what are those other 
properties belonging to all things which are good. But far too many philosophers have 
thought that when they named those other properties they were actually defining good; that 
these properties, in fact, were simply not "other," but absolutely and entirely the same with 
goodness. This view I propose to call the "naturalistic fallacy" and of it I shall now endeavour 
to dispose." 
151 The statement can be unpacked as the normative commitment "human life ought to be 
protected," but if one posits the existence of moral facts, "worthy of protection" may be 
deemed as descriptive a property as "fleeting" or "sublunar." 
152 Gallie 1956, 171-172, establishes the paradigmatic conditions of the essential contestability 
of a concept as follows: "(I) it must be appraisive in the sense that it signifies or accredits some 
kind of valued achievement. (II) This achievement must be of an internally complex 
character, for all that its worth is attributed to it as a whole. (III) Any explanation of its worth 
must therefore include reference to the respective contributions of its various parts or 
features; yet prior to experimentation there is nothing absurd or contradictory in any one of a 
number of possible rival descriptions of its total worth […] In fine, the accredited 
achievement is initially variously describable. (IV) The accredited achievement must be of a 
kind that admits of considerable modification in the light of changing circumstances; and 
such modification cannot be prescribed or predicted in advance. […] (V) […] each party 
recognizes the fact that its own use of it is contested by those of other parties, and […] each 
party must have at least some appreciation of the different criteria in the light of which the 
other parties claim to be applying the concept in question." Essentially contested concepts 
cited by Gallie include "work of art," "democracy," and "Christian doctrine," but essentially 
contested concepts in politics cover all "loaded" terms such as "life," "liberty," "marriage," 
"property," and so on, to the extent these terms or the use thereof constitutes a valued (social, 
historical, cultural, theological) achievement. Note Gallie's reference to the contested "use" 
and "application" of a concept – this pragmatic (as opposed to merely semantic) approach to 
essential contestability will be relevant in the chapters that follow. 
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of art' or a 'democracy' is both to describe it and to ascribe a value to it or 
express a commitment with respect to it."153 Connolly is skeptical about the 
very idea of a value-free description: "[T]o describe is to characterize a 
situation from the vantage point of certain interests, purposes, or 
standards."154 He goes on to cite Julius Kovesi: "[W]e always describe from 
some point of view, never from a perspective we could call the 'descriptive 
point of view.'"155 
 
As Connolly points out, "[t]he connection within the concept itself of 
descriptive and normative dimensions helps to explain why such concepts are 
subject to intense and endless debate."156And further: "Not all concepts in 
politics are formed from a moral or, more broadly, normative point of view, 
but many are."157 Because of this prevalence of essentially contested concepts 
in politics – which often reflect mutually incompatible popular commitments 
– the conflation of descriptive and normative commitments into appraisive 
commitments will also complicate our analysis of different types of legislative 
commitments and their relationship to popular commitments.158 Despite the 
complications raised by Connolly, is there still a notion of descriptive versus 
normative commitments we can work with to help draw a line between 
popular commitments that may serve as input commitments to the legislative 
process and those that may not? 
 
Let's take a closer look at the normative function of legislation: laws are not 
generally about how the world ought to be, but more specifically about how 
human beings ought to be, or more precisely about how human beings ought 
to act. Although the subject matter of laws may ostensibly not be restricted to 
                                                
153 Connolly 1993, 22. Rescher 1993, 135, makes an analogous point: "Evaluative disagreement 
is basic to disagreement in general. Even factual disagreement generally roots in evaluative 
conflicts, arising when different parties apply different norms and standards to the evaluation 
of evidence, and thus bring different cognitive values to bear." 
154 Connolly 1993, 23, italics in the original omitted. 
155 Connolly 1993, 24-25, citing Kovesi 1967. 
156 Connolly 1993, 22. 
157 Connolly 1993, 27. Cf. the related remark in J. L. Austin 1975, 4 n. 2, in reference to the 
common confusion between descriptive (or, in Austin's terminology, "constative") utterances 
and "performative" utterances, which carry out the normative function of law: "Of all people, 
jurists should be best aware of the true state of affairs. Perhaps some now are. Yet they will 
succumb to their own timorous fiction, that a statement of 'the law' is a statement of fact." Cf. 
also Hart 1994, 57, and his analogy between the normative aspects of chess and the normative 
aspects of law: "Each not only moves the Queen in a certain way himself but 'has views' about 
the propriety of all moving the Queen in that way. These views are manifested in the 
criticism of others and demands for conformity made upon others when deviation is actual or 
threatened, and in the acknowledgement of the legitimacy of such criticism and demands 
when received from others. For the expression of such criticisms, demands, and 
acknowledgements a wide range of 'normative' language is used. 'I (You) ought not have to 
have moved the Queen like that', 'I (You) must do that', 'That is right', 'That is wrong'." Even 
in a restricted domain such as chess – let alone a restricted but enormously more expansive 
domain such as the law – the straightforward distinction between descriptive and normative 
collapses.  
158 Eng 2000 tackles this conflation head-on, calling for a "fusion" of descriptive and normative 
propositions in legal argumentation, in which descriptive and normative propositions are 
more or less tightly interwoven and "graduated" in terms of dimensions and degrees. From 
the perspective of law as pluralism, there is nothing objectionable in this semantic fusion for 
the purposes of legal argumentation and interpretation; but the following discussion 
nevertheless attempts to make a pragmatic distinction between descriptive and normative (or 
rather, prescriptive) commitments in order to screen out inadmissible input commitments for 
the purposes of lawmaking. 
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human beings, but may, for instance, cover animals, plants, viruses, 
corporations, emissions, the climate, forests, parks, outer space, collateralized 
debt obligations, currencies, territorial boundaries, natural resources, Internet 
protocols, communication frequencies, intellectual property, and so on, laws 
are simply dead letters on parchment (or dead pixels on screens) if they do 
not, explicitly or implicitly, tell human beings what to do. This is most 
obvious in the case of criminal law, which generally, though not always,159 is 
about constraining and punishing human conduct; but it is also true with 
respect to any of the subject matters of legislation. Laws cannot tell viruses, 
corporations, territorial boundaries, etc., what to do, other than directly or 
indirectly via the human beings who potentially have an effect on those non-
human entities. This obvious fact is often obscured by the passive 
formulations, ellipses, and abstractions of many or even most laws ("the right 
of trial by jury shall be preserved," "the interest rate shall not exceed 15% per 
annum," "the corporation shall be held liable for any breach of contract"), but 
ultimately, the acts of individual human beings are necessary to fulfill any of 
the norms set out in legislation (the right of trial by jury can only be preserved 
by law enforcement officers, prosecutors, and judges; interest rates can only 
be held at 15% or less by bank officers preparing, approving, and signing loan 
documents; and a corporation can only be held liable for breaches of contract 
if the members of its board of directors and its chief financial officer release 
the necessary funds, perhaps pursuant to an order issued by a judge). It 
would of course make no practical sense for all laws to be addressed explicitly 
and exclusively to human beings, as opposed to governments, interest rates, 
corporations, etc., but this should not make us forget that all laws are 
ultimately aimed at guiding the behavior of human beings and are impotent if 
they fail to do so. 
 
Legislative output commitments are therefore primarily expressed by norms 
for human conduct.160 These norms often have a constraining function: they 
guide human conduct by telling human beings what they must do or what 
they must not do, or else terrible consequences will ensue. But norms may 
also have an enabling function: they enable human beings to get married, 
conclude enforceable contracts, fly to the moon, and so on, by establishing the 
institutions, providing the incentives, and mobilizing the resources to get 
things done that would not be possible (or even conceivable) otherwise. 
Enabling norms often also have a constraining component: it is impossible to 
get married unless civil servants are legally obliged as well as empowered to 
perform marriages; it is impossible to conclude enforceable contracts unless 
                                                
159 Corporate criminal responsibility is a burgeoning field. 
160 A more conversational way of putting this would be "rules for human conduct," but this 
paper restricts the use of "rule" to the rules that guide legislators negotiating within 
legislatures. "Norms" guide the behavior of all human beings, not just legislators. This 
distinction between "norms" and "rules" corresponds roughly to the distinction made by Hart 
between "primary rules" and "secondary rules," at least as the latter relate to the conduct of 
legislators; see Hart 1994, 80-81: "It is true that the idea of a rule is by no means a simple one: 
we have already seen […] the need, if we are to do justice to the complexity of the legal 
system, to discriminate between two different though related types. Under rules of the one 
type, which may well be considered the basic or primary type, human beings are required to 
do or abstain from certain actions, whether they wish to or not. Rules of the other type are in 
a sense parasitic upon or secondary to the first; for they provide that human beings [and in 
this case, legislators] may by doing or saying certain things introduce new rules of the 
primary type, extinguish or modify old ones, or in various ways determine their incidence or 
control their operations." 
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breaches of contract are subject to the constraint of penalties; and it is 
impossible to fly to the moon unless the national treasury is required by law 
to cough up the necessary billions of dollars. Similarly, norms enabling the 
actions of some human beings constrain the actions of other human beings: 
enabling a married woman to freely choose to abort a fetus constrains the 
ability of her husband to have a (legitimate) child; enabling women to vote 
constrains the ability of men to choose their own rulers; enabling black 
families to live in whatever neighborhood they choose constrains the ability of 
white families to live among themselves. Constraining and enabling norms 
may occur separately or jointly, as two sides of the same coin; what is relevant 
to this analysis is that they both guide human conduct in a normative sense. 
 
The legislative output commitments that interest us for the purposes of this 
paper are therefore a restricted subset of commitments, namely normative 
commitments that guide human conduct. As discussed in the previous chapter, 
legislative commitments under law as pluralism are pragmatic, not 
fundamental. This is not the case under all conceptions of law: arguably, at 
least some laws under the doctrine of natural law are fundamental, and 
certainly laws derived from religious systems of belief and practice (such as 
from Canon, Shari'a, Talmudic law) have a fundamental component because 
of the intimate link between religion and law in those systems. But for the 
purposes of defining law as pluralism, the legislative output commitments we 
are interested in are pragmatic, normative commitments that guide human 
conduct. 
 
By substituting this restricted subset of legislative output commitments into 
the formulation of the paper's normative goal, we can now ask: how can we 
define rules governing the legislative process so that the pragmatic, normative 
output commitments that guide human conduct are adequate to the popular 
commitments serving as input commitments? 
 
This formulation leads to the following observation: the popular 
commitments serving as input commitments that are problematic with respect 
to the adequacy of laws (and the normative output commitments they 
express) are those popular commitments that purport to guide human conduct. 
This is where the clash between popular commitments serving as input to the 
legislative process and the legislative commitments outputted by that 
legislative process is most likely to occur – in other words, the area in which 
adequacy will be most difficult to attain when the relevant popular 
commitments conflict with each other. Other normative popular 
commitments serving as input commitments are less problematic because 
they do not link up with laws (and the output commitments they express) in 
the relevant way: an input commitment to making the world a better place or 
to saving the spotted owl from extinction cannot conflict with a law if the 
input commitment has nothing to say about human conduct. If I believe that 
the spotted owl ought to be saved, but I do not believe that guiding human 
conduct is relevant to achieving that goal (say instead that I believe spotted 
owls should voluntarily relocate to safer habitats), then no laws guiding 
human conduct can conflict with my belief that the spotted owl ought to be 
saved. 
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We will call normative commitments that purport to guide human conduct – 
i.e., commitments that purport to oblige or permit a human being to act in a 
certain way – prescriptive commitments.161 All other commitments are 
descriptive commitments.162 The notion of prescriptive commitments 
provides us with a more precise tool for separating out the prescriptive aspect 
of nominally descriptive commitments. For instance, while the statement 
"human life is worthy of protection" appears to be descriptive on the surface, 
it nevertheless has prescriptive force163 equivalent to the commitment "everyone 
ought to protect human life." (If it does not have such prescriptive force, i.e., if 
it is analogous to the commitment to the preservation of spotted owls without 
anything to say about human conduct, then it is a descriptive commitment.) 
 
How does this help us with Connolly's challenge of appraisive concepts? 
Does the threat of conflation of normative and descriptive concepts identified 
by Connolly also apply to the distinction between prescriptive and 
descriptive concepts? 
 
Both prescriptive commitments and descriptive commitments indeed have 
appraisive aspects. They both may have a point of view. The prescriptive 
commitment "everyone ought to protect human life" certainly is appraisive, 
but so is the descriptive commitment "that is a work of art." But even though 
both commitments are appraisive (i.e., they both have normative aspects, 
even though one is normative on the surface and the other is not), the first 
commitment purports to guide human conduct while the second commitment 
does not. So these prescriptive and descriptive commitments are conflated 
with respect to their appraisive and normative aspect, but not with respect to 
their prescriptive aspect. Determining whether a commitment has a 
prescriptive aspect or not suffices to classify it as a prescriptive or a 
descriptive commitment, regardless of whether it has an 
appraisive/normative aspect or not. 
 
What is relevant here is that prescriptive commitments are those that purport 
to guide human conduct, as opposed to those that actually guide human 
conduct. Any commitment is prescriptive if the intention behind that 
commitment is to guide human conduct – and that intention is an (appraisive) 
fact. By their nature, legislative output commitments purport to guide human 
conduct and are hence prescriptive. Some popular commitments likewise 
purport to guide human conduct and are thus prescriptive; while those that 
                                                
161 The term "prescriptive" follows Marmor 2008. A more precise alternative to "prescriptive" 
in this context would be the technical term "deontic," relating generically to obligation and 
permissibility, and most commonly used in reference to (deontic) logic and (deontological) 
ethics, both of which bear affinities with the deontic conception of legislation elaborated here. 
The term "deontic" used in this way also has an appealing ancestry in the relevant philosophy 
of language (Brandom 1994 is saturated with it) and in philosophy of law (cf., e.g., Ronald 
Moore 1973 and Kraus 2002). But no one in their right mind should be expected to know what 
"deontic" means. 
162 Descriptive commitments, for the purposes of this paper, thus include both descriptive 
commitments proper (such as "CO2 emissions cause global warming") and non-prescriptive 
normative commitments (such as "the average global temperature ought to be lower than it 
currently is"), which do not directly or indirectly provide a guide for human conduct. For 
most legislative purposes, the existence of such non-prescriptive normative commitments can 
safely be ignored, as it will be in the remainder of this paper.  
163 See Brandom 2000b, 366. 
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do not purport to guide human conduct are descriptive. But both may be an 
appraisive conflation of descriptive and normative.164 
 
Because both have prescriptive force, conflicts between popular commitments 
serving as input commitments and legislative output commitments – and the 
question of adequacy of output commitments to popular commitments – are 
most likely to arise between prescriptive popular commitments and output 
commitments (which, in light of the function of legislation, are also primarily 
prescriptive).  
 
The following chapter on "The justificatory constraint of law as pluralism" 
will take a closer look at the distinct features of these two types of popular 
commitments serving as input commitments with respect to the adequacy of 
laws. But first, we will examine a preliminary step on the way to that 
justificatory constraint: the regulative ideal of law as pluralism. 
 
                                                
164 The claim here is not it any way that descriptive commitments are more objective than 
prescriptive commitments. The analysis of objectivity in Brandom 1994, 495-613, for instance, 
would be equally applicable to descriptive commitments and to prescriptive commitments as 
defined here. Similarly, there is nothing more empirical about descriptive commitments than 
about prescriptive commitments. As Rescher 1993, 76-77, argues, it is in fact the empirical 
basis of descriptive commitments that entails pluralism: "[T]he empirical basis of our factual 
knowledge is bound to engender a variety of alternative cognitive positions through the 
variation of experience. For the cognitive exploitation of different bodies of experiences – let 
alone different sorts of experiences – is bound to lead rational enquirers to different results. 
Given the diversity of human experience, empiricism entails pluralism. The experiential 
diversity of differently situated rational inquirers must mean that they are destined to reach 
variant conclusions about the nature of things. In a human community of more than trivial 
size, dissensus rather than consensus is the normal condition." The claim in this paper is 
rather merely that a distinction between descriptive commitments and prescriptive 
commitments makes pragmatic sense with respect to the limited domain of lawmaking. 
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4 The justificatory constraint of law as pluralism 
 
4.1 The regulative ideal of law as pluralism 
4.1.1 Defining the regulative ideal 
 
Under the conception of pluralism put forward in section 2.2 above, prima 
facie equal validity ought to be accorded to all popular commitments offered 
as input commitments to the legislative process, even where such 
commitments are incompatible with each other. The purpose of the legislative 
process under law as pluralism is to ensure that the set of the laws generated 
by that process is not inconsistent or unenforceable, i.e., the legislative process 
is a procedure by which popular commitments offered as input commitments 
are winnowed out that would lead to an inconsistent or unenforceable output. 
Since all popular commitments offered as input commitments should be 
reflected in the legislative output to the extent no inconsistency or 
unenforceability arises, the output of the legislative process should, prima 
facie, reflect all popular commitments offered as input to the regulative 
process.  
 
Laws outputted by the legislative process express prescriptive commitments 
and, moreover, are intended to be binding and enforceable, not simply subject 
to voluntary compliance. They may thus conflict with prescriptive popular 
commitments that purport to guide the behavior of human beings in a 
manner incompatible with the prescriptive output commitment expressed by 
the law. But since the conception of pluralism requires that prima facie equal 
validity be accorded to all popular commitments offered as input 
commitments – including prescriptive popular commitments – this suggests a 
regulative ideal of law as pluralism as a corollary to the conception of 
pluralism:  
 
Under law as pluralism, laws – which express legislative output 
commitments – should prima facie only bind members of the 
population whose fundamental commitments do not conflict with the 
legislative output commitments expressed by those laws. 
 
Why is this a regulative ideal?165 It is regulative in the sense that it provides a 
guide for legislative action: it seeks to describe the kind of legislative action that 
would best implement the conception of pluralism. But it is an ideal rather 
than a rule, because it does not determinatively constrain the behavior of 
legislators. The justificatory constraint of law as pluralism developed in this 
chapter is the rule which aims to implement the regulative ideal of law as 
pluralism. 
 
                                                
165 Regulative ideals (as an often unattainable but desirable endpoint serving to orient human 
thought and action) have had a long tradition in philosophy, political and otherwise, since at 
least Kant 1787. Rawls 1999a, Rawls 2005, and Habermas 1996, for instance, are replete with 
them. C. S. Peirce's "community of investigators" grounding his pragmatic theory of truth is 
another prominent example, of which Habermas 1993, for instance, makes extensive use. 
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4.1.2 Internal and external obligations to follow a norm 
 
What does it mean for a law, as a kind of norm, to "bind" someone? Two 
senses of binding must be distinguished here: an internal obligation to follow 
a norm, and an external obligation to follow a norm. In the terminology 
developed in section 3.1 above, a person is under an internal obligation to 
follow a norm if she endorses the prescriptive commitment expressed by that 
norm or if she endorses a commitment that entails that prescriptive 
commitment by committive inference. This means that I acknowledge the 
commitment as my own, and I commit myself to the further commitments that 
follow from that commitment. For instance, if I endorse the commitment not 
to eat meat, I am under an internal obligation to say no when offered a pork 
chop for dinner at a friend's home, even if no one other than me enforces that 
commitment or monitors my performance of that obligation. An internal 
obligation to follow a norm is, in a Kantian sense, an expression of my 
autonomy as a person. Trivially, norms expressing commitments can bind 
only those who have endorsed those commitments or the commitments that 
entail them, if "bind" is taken to signify an internal obligation to follow a 
norm.166  
 
In that sense, laws – which generally express prescriptive commitments – can 
never themselves bind any individual member of a population in the sense of 
an internal obligation, since laws are always external to individuals: the 
commitments expressed by laws cannot be endorsed by anyone other than the 
legislature that adopts the laws, and hence they cannot be acknowledged by 
anyone other than the legislature as one's own. At most, commitments 
expressed by laws may correspond to commitments undertaken by individual 
members of a population, i.e., the content of the legislative commitment may 
be identical to the content of the popular commitment, even though the 
commitments themselves can only be undertaken separately by their 
respective authors (i.e., the legislature and the member of the population, 
respectively). For instance, a law intended to prohibit the consumption of 
meat may correspond to the commitment by individual members of the 
population not to eat meat. However, it is only the latter commitment, not the 
former commitment, that binds individual members of the population in the 
sense of an internal obligation. Simply put: norms expressing legislative 
commitments are always external obligations, while norms expressing 
commitments held by individual members of a population are always internal 
obligations.167 
                                                
166 On this relationship in Kant between autonomy and rule-following in the context of 
commitments and entitlements as applied here, see Brandom 2009, 15: "Earlier Enlightenment 
thinkers (for instance, in the social contract tradition of political thought, culminating in 
Rousseau) had already had the idea that normative statuses such as responsibility and 
authority (commitment and entitlement) are not independent of the normative attitudes of 
those who acknowledge such responsibility or authority. Kant radicalizes this idea into a 
criterion of demarcation of the normative – a way of distinguishing normative constraint 
from various sorts of non-normative compulsion – in terms of autonomy. One is genuinely 
normatively bound only by rules one has bound oneself by, concepts one has oneself applied in 
judging or acting." 
167 Kant 1796/2007, 26 n. 4, draws on this distinction in his definition of external (juridical) 
freedom: "It is the privilege to lend obedience to no external laws except those to which I 
could have given consent." External freedom is therefore where the content of the external 
obligation coincides with the (perhaps counterfactual) content of the internal obligation. 
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The sense of binding that is relevant to laws is therefore the external obligation 
to follow such norms, i.e., an obligation that is monitored and enforced by 
actors external to each individual member of the population on whom the 
norm is binding. The precise means by which external obligations are 
monitored and enforced and the incentives for compliance with such 
obligations are the subject matter of the authority of laws – authority may 
involve coercion or the treat of coercion,168 social and peer pressure, or a more 
nuanced form of authority that derives from the correspondence between 
external obligations and internal obligations, which in turn is related to the 
acceptance and legitimacy of laws.169 Again, however, this paper is concerned 
with the adequacy of laws, a concept orthogonal to the concepts of legitimacy, 
acceptance, and authority: for the purposes of this paper, we are solely 
interested in whether external obligations expressed by laws are adequate to 
the fundamental commitments of the population they bind, not whether they 
are legitimate or enjoy authority and acceptance.170 The notion of enforcement 
will however play an important role in law as pluralism, as will be explored 
below in chapter 6 on "Recursive pluralism," but questions of the legitimacy, 
acceptance, and authority of such enforcement are not relevant to law as 
pluralism. 
 
If "bind" is taken to signify an external obligation to follow a norm, legislative 
commitments expressed by laws may very well bind members of a 
population who have not undertaken those commitments, i.e., whose 
fundamental commitments conflict with the commitments outputted by the 
legislative process. As we have seen in section 3.2 on "Popular commitments 
and legislative commitments," the negotiation of laws (under law as 
pluralism) is not about the popular commitments that serve as input to the 
legislative process. Rather, the negotiation of laws is about how to bind, in a 
consistent manner, members of a population who hold a particular 
constellation of conflicting popular commitments. Legislative negotiations 
(under law as pluralism) therefore generate laws without in general 
modifying the fundamental commitments of legislators and the members of 
the population they represent: popular commitments are not bent into shape 
during the legislative process in order to make them correspond to the 
outputted legislative commitments.171 Laws emerging from a pluralistic 
                                                
168 The concept of law expounded by John Austin 1832 and critiqued by Hart 1994. 
169 For an influential discussion of this nuanced conception of the authority of legislation, see 
Raz 2009. Another important tool for understanding authority and acceptance is Wollheim's 
paradox (simply put, the paradox of how to accept a law of ø when one endorses a 
commitment of not-ø); see the discussion in Waldron 1999a, 246-249. 
170 Although, as pointed out in subsection 1.3.3 above, it is surmised that adequacy is one 
good basis for arguing legitimacy. 
171 Although this is what many liberal theorists in general and deliberative democrats in 
particular hope the political process will achieve. This hope underlies the classic conception 
of the "marketplace of ideas" (implied in Abrams v. United States, Justice Holmes, dissenting; 
articulated in Keyishian v. Board of Regents) as developed, for example, by Mill 1859, and the 
"reflective equilibrium" propounded by Rawls 1999a and Rawls 2005. It is in part motivated 
by the epistemological claim that truth will emerge through discourse, see generally Locke 
1689. For a classic formulation of this hope in the "forum" of deliberative democracy, see 
Elster 1997. Law as pluralism does not have such high hopes (and does not make such an 
epistemological claim about truth), at least not with regard to the legislative process engaged 
in by legislators as described here, or at least it does not presuppose that such high hopes are 
necessary to undertake joint (legislative) projects. Whether the political process as a whole, 
engaged in by the general population as manifested by civil society, the media, stakeholder 
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legislative process are therefore in practice likely to conflict with the 
fundamental commitments of at least some of the members of the population 
to be bound by the laws, even where the goal of the legislative process is to 
generate laws that are adequate to the conflicting fundamental commitments 
of the members of the population they bind. 
 
The "prima facie" clause in the formulation of the regulative ideal of law as 
pluralism takes account of this fact, playing a similar role as in the 
formulation of the conception of pluralism: as in the conception of pluralism, 
the presumption of equal validity of input commitments is upheld only to the 
extent achievable, i.e., the legislative output will reflect only those popular 
commitments offered as input commitments that do not lead to inconsistency 
or unenforceability. Without the "prima facie" qualification, the regulative 
ideal of pluralism would amount to a regulative ideal of relativism. In other 
words: laws adopted under law as pluralism will bind all members of the 
population,172 even where the fundamental commitments of individual 
members of the population conflict with the legislative commitments 
expressed by those laws. What the regulative ideal of law as pluralism 
demands, however, is that even though some members of the population will 
in fact be bound by laws conflicting with their fundamental commitments, 
and their behavior is thus changed by those laws, the determination of those 
laws should be guided by the ideal that the laws should only bind members of 
the population whose fundamental commitments do not conflict with the 
legislative commitments expressed by those laws.  
 
A succinct way of formulating this is: binding laws change the behavior of 
members of the population to the extent that their behavior (prior to adoption 
and enforcement of the law, or counterfactually if the law were not adopted 
and enforced) would otherwise be guided by fundamental commitments that 
are incompatible with the commitments reflected by the law. The regulative 
                                                
groups, and so on, can bend popular commitments into shape is not at issue here. For 
contrasting views on the impact the (democratic) political process should have on individual 
preferences (including, presumably, fundamental commitments), see Lijphart 1984, 1: "An 
ideal democratic government would be one whose actions were always in perfect 
correspondence with the preferences of all its citizens. Such complete responsiveness in 
government has never existed and may never be achieved, but it can serve as an ideal to 
which democratic regimes should aspire," and the response by Inoue 2005, 117: "By setting 
the responsiveness to people's preferences (which may involve a variety of naked special 
interests) as the democratic ideal, [Lijphart] disregards the fundamental role of deliberation in 
democracy that consists in transforming people's preferences. In the deliberative perspective, 
people's preferences as exogenous variables should not be the exclusive or dominant criteria 
for estimating the quality of democratic process. What counts as much or even more is the 
endogenous variable of this process, namely, whether and to what extent people can cultivate 
the public-spirited and well considered judgments within the process." See also Michelman 
1988, 1531, who claims that regardless of the impact the legislative process may have on 
popular commitments, other forums are more important: "The full lesson of the civil rights 
movement will escape whoever focuses too sharply on the country's most visible, formal 
legislative assemblies – Congress, state legislatures, the councils of major cities – as exclusive, 
or even primary, arenas of jurisgenerative politics and political freedom. I do not mean that 
those arenas are dispensable or unimportant. Rather I mean the obvious points that much of 
the country's normatively consequential dialogue occurs outside the major, formal channels 
of electoral and legislative politics, and that in modern society those formal channels cannot 
possibly provide for most citizens much direct experience of self-revisionary, dialogic 
engagement." What was true in 1988 is arguably even more true in 2011.  
172 At the level at which the legislation is adopted; this qualification will be discussed in more 
detail in chapter 6 on "Recursive pluralism." 
 72 
ideal of law as pluralism constitutes a presupposition against changing the 
behavior of members of the population (to the extent that behavior reflects 
their fundamental commitments173) by way of laws, but it does not preclude 
such changes to behavior if consistency and enforceability of the laws cannot 
be achieved otherwise. 
 
To what extent is this presumption non-arbitrary? Or would some other 
regulative ideal of law as pluralism be less arbitrary? Recall the trivial 
observation that norms expressing commitments can only bind those who 
have undertaken those commitments, if "bind" is taken to signify an internal 
obligation to follow a norm. The regulative ideal of law as pluralism is a 
normative extension of this (descriptive) trivial observation so as to include 
external obligations: under the regulative ideal of law as pluralism, laws 
expressing legislative commitments ought to, prima facie, only bind those who 
have undertaken commitments that correspond to those legislative 
commitments, if "bind" is taken to signify an external obligation to follow a 
norm. 
 
Is it permissible to "extend" a descriptive observation in that way in order to 
concoct a normative ideal? Is this an impermissible leap from is to ought? As 
indicated above in section 3.3 on "Prescriptive and descriptive commitments," 
the relationship between descriptive and normative statements is 
problematic, and the problems involved in deriving normative statements 
from descriptive statements will be discussed in chapter 5 on "Decomposing 
and synthesizing commitments." For now, suffice it to say that if the 
(normative) regulative ideal of law as pluralism is in fact implemented with 
respect to the legislative process, and if the resulting pluralistic legislative 
process is then described, the commitments outputted by the legislative 
process will bear an analogous relationship to individual members of the 
population as external obligations (provided the external obligations are not 
inconsistent or unenforceable) as the fundamental commitments of individual 
members of the population will bear to them as internal obligations. In other 
words, the laws expressing legislative commitments (where such laws are 
generated by a legislative process guided by the regulative ideal of law as 
pluralism) can only bind those who have undertaken the corresponding 
fundamental commitments, if "bind" is taken to signify an external obligation 
to follow a norm; this is a descriptive statement equivalent to the observation 
we have taken to be trivial. In this sense, the regulative ideal of law as 
pluralism is indeed non-arbitrary: the legislative commitments outputted by 
the legislative process guided by it are analogous to the fundamental 
commitments of the population bound by those legislative commitments 
(always with the proviso that the output is consistent and enforceable). 
 
For the sake of argument, assume that this extension is not permissible, i.e., 
that laws expressing legislative commitments need not, prima facie, only bind 
                                                
173 Naturally, some people (and all people sometimes) behave in a manner inconsistent with 
their own fundamental commitments. This is the paradox captured by the parable of Ulysses 
and the Sirens (see Elster 1984 and 1998) and is the rationale underlying the precommitment 
motive discussed above in subsection 2.3.2 on "Qualifying motives"): Peter drunk may behave 
in a manner inconsistent with the commitments of Peter sober; Ulysses may fall for the Sirens 
even though he is committed to returning home to Penelope. Laws embodying such 
precommitments do not pose a problem for the regulative ideal of law as pluralism, as long 
as the entire population shares the same precommitments. 
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those who have undertaken commitments that correspond to those legislative 
commitments, if "bind" is taken to signify an external obligation to follow a 
norm. Then the (thus reformulated) regulative ideal of law as pluralism must 
include some prima facie criteria for treating some fundamental commitments 
held by members of a population differently from others. What would those 
prima facie criteria be? They would have to be criteria derived from 
fundamental commitments other than the commitment to pluralism. But 
which fundamental commitments would these be? They would have to be 
some subset of the fundamental commitments held by members of the 
population. This means that the fundamental commitments chosen to ground 
the criteria would be treated differently from the fundamental commitments 
not chosen to ground the criteria – and the criteria for making that choice 
would again be derived from some subset of the fundamental commitments 
held by members of the population, and so on. This reformulated regulative 
ideal of law as pluralism would never get off the ground, unless it 
arbitrarily174 postulated some set of privileged fundamental commitments to 
serve as trumps – which would violate the conception of pluralism on which 
the regulative ideal of law as pluralism is stipulated to be based. 
 
4.1.3 The regulative ideal and adequacy 
 
While the conception of pluralism gives us a basis for how to treat popular 
commitments offered as input commitments (they should be accorded equal 
validity, to the extent achievable), the regulative ideal of law as pluralism tells 
us something about the nature of output commitments (they should only bind 
those who hold compatible fundamental commitments, to the extent 
achievable). Taken together, the conception of pluralism and the regulative 
ideal of law as pluralism provide a useful gloss on the two-part conception of 
adequacy under law as pluralism:  
 
Laws are adequate to the fundamental commitments of the members of 
the population they bind if the legislative process is guided by the 
conception of pluralism (ensuring that popular commitments offered 
as input commitments are accorded equal validity, to the extent 
achievable) and if the legislative output is guided by the regulative 
ideal of law as pluralism (ensuring that the output commitments only 
bind those who hold compatible fundamental commitments, to the 
extent achievable).  
 
While the conception of pluralism constitutes a presumption against 
privileging a fundamental commitment offered as an input commitment (or a 
set of such commitments) over others, the regulative ideal of law as pluralism 
                                                
174 In what sense would this selection of privileged fundamental commitments be arbitrary? It 
might, after all, be rationally and reasonably justifiable in terms of some more or less 
comprehensive worldview or political conception: a commitment to treating women and men 
equally, for instance, is rationally and reasonably justifiable in terms of most contemporary 
forms of political liberalism; the commitment to gender equality would thus not be arbitrary 
from the perspective of someone committed to the relevant premises of political liberalism. 
But it would still be arbitrary from the perspective of someone who does not share that 
commitment to the relevant premises of political liberalism: and choosing whose perspective 
to take would itself be an arbitrary decision from the perspective of the population as a 
whole. 
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constitutes a presumption against changing people's behavior (to the extent it 
reflects their fundamental commitments) by way of laws. A law is adequate 
under law as pluralism if these presumptions are intact, even if privileging of 
some commitments over others takes place in fact in order to ensure 
consistency and enforceability. 
 
The justificatory constraint of law as pluralism developed in this chapter 
implements the conception of pluralism and the regulative ideal of law as 
pluralism in practice, and therefore also the conception of adequacy. 
 
 
4.2 Justification implements adequacy 
 
What is the relationship between adequacy and justification? As stated in the 
preliminary definition of adequacy in subsection 1.3.3, there are two 
components to adequacy with respect to justification: a condition on the 
fundamental commitments admissible as potential justifications, and 
conditions on the use of those admitted fundamental commitments as 
justifications for laws actually adopted. According to the formulation of 
adequacy under law as pluralism developed at the end of the last section, 
laws are adequate to the fundamental commitments of the members of the 
population they bind if the legislative process is guided by the conception of 
pluralism (i.e., if the negotiation of the laws takes account of all popular 
commitments offered as input commitments to the extent achievable) and if 
the legislative output is guided by the regulative ideal of law as pluralism 
(i.e., if the adopted laws reflect all popular commitments offered as input 
commitments to the extent achievable). The first component of adequacy is 
thus internal to the legislature, and the second component of adequacy is 
external to the legislature: guidance by the conception of pluralism relates to 
the internal component of adequacy, namely the requirements on the 
negotiation of the laws, or in other words the internal workings of the 
legislative process; guidance by the regulative ideal of law as pluralism 
relates to the external component of adequacy, namely the requirements on 
the adoption of laws, or in other words the external relationship of the 
legislative process to the population bound by the outputted laws. 
 
Justification is the way in which both forms of guidance are implemented: the 
legislative process is guided by the justifications given for each step of that 
legislative process in terms of the conception of pluralism; legislative output 
is guided by the justifications given for each element of that output in terms 
of the regulative ideal of law as pluralism. Justification gives substance to 
guidance by the conception of pluralism and by the regulative ideal of law as 
pluralism: it ensures that guidance is not merely an empty concept, but rather 
can be verified with reference to the justifications given for each step and each 
element of that guidance. 
 
The internal component of adequacy is primarily implemented by the internal 
justification of the legislative process, i.e., how popular commitments are 
treated and justified during legislative negotiations. The external component 
of adequacy is primarily implemented by the external justification of the 
adopted laws, i.e., how output commitments are treated and justified once 
legislative negotiations are over. Justification is the hinge which connects the 
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internal and the external components of adequacy: if commitments serving as 
input to the legislative process are used as internal justifications for each step 
of the legislative process, the outputted laws from which they derive will be 
justifiable externally with respect to those selfsame commitments – i.e., with 
respect to the fundamental commitments of the members of the population 
bound by the outputted laws. 
 
If a law expressing an output commitment can be justified in terms of the 
popular commitments serving as input commitments, it is adequate to those 
commitments: the legislature is thus entitled to hold the commitments 
expressed by the adopted laws.175 If it can be shown that the legislature is not 
entitled to hold a certain output commitment because it cannot be justified in 
terms of the popular commitments serving as input commitments, then a law 
expressing that output commitment is not adequate to the fundamental 
commitments of the population it binds. 
 
Justification is thus the act by which the adequacy of laws to fundamental 
commitments can be demonstrated. Justifying a law in terms of an input 
commitment is to claim that the law reflects the input commitment, i.e., that 
the legislative commitment expressed by the law is compatible with the input 
commitment and can be derived from it. 
 
Under the conception of relativism, all popular commitments could serve as 
input commitments and hence be used as internal justifications during the 
legislative process; under the corollary regulative ideal of law as relativism, 
laws would be justifiable in terms of all fundamental commitments held by 
the population. But as we have seen in subsection 2.2.1 above, a legislative 
process guided by the conception of relativism would lead to laws which, 
while honoring the regulative ideal of law as relativism, would be 
inconsistent or unenforceable. Without prejudging the content of input 
commitments, is there a non-arbitrary way (i.e., a way compatible with the 
conception of pluralism and the regulative ideal of pluralism) to separate out 
the kinds of popular commitments that may serve as input commitments and 
hence be used as justifications during the legislative process (and therefore 
also as justifications for the laws outputted by that process) from those that 
cannot, in order to ensure consistency and enforceability of the outputted 
legislation?  
 
In other words: the justificatory constraint of law as pluralism we are 
developing must be able to constrain the behavior of legislators with respect 
to the justifications they invoke for taking positions during legislative 
negotiations and for adopting certain laws as opposed to others. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
175 This is the technical sense of entitlement elaborated in section 3.1 on "Fundamental and 
subsidiary commitments" above: the entitlement to hold a commitment, given the other 
commitments one holds. It does not have anything to say directly about the legitimacy of the 
commitment – but this discussion does give an indication of why adequacy might be a good 
basis on which to develop a theory of legitimacy. 
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4.3 Public justification 
 
The quest for such a justificatory constraint of law as pluralism is not 
dissimilar to the quest for a conception of public justification or public reason.176 
Like the justificatory constraint of law as pluralism, public justification aims 
to separate out the kinds of commitments that may be invoked as 
justifications in political or legal discourse. According to Rawls,  
 
The point of the ideal of public reason is that citizens are to conduct their 
fundamental discussions within the framework of what each regards as a 
political conception of justice based on values that the others can reasonably 
be expected to endorse and each is, in good faith, prepared to defend that 
conception so understood.177 
 
The demand for public justification – at least in pluralistic, Western societies – 
is particularly salient when the values in question are derived from religious 
commitments. As Connolly puts it, "Pluralists think it is extremely important 
[…] how people of diverse faiths hold and express their faiths in public 
space."178 Obama sums up the basic expectation succinctly: 
 
What our deliberative, pluralistic democracy does demand is that the 
religiously motivated translate their concerns into universal, rather than 
religion-specific, values. It requires that their proposals must be subject to 
argument and amenable to reason. If I am opposed to abortion for religious 
reasons and seek to pass a law banning the practice, I cannot simply point to 
the teachings of my church or invoke God's will and expect that argument to 
carry the day. If I want others to listen to me, then I have to explain why 
abortion violates some principle that is accessible to people of all faiths, 
including those with no faith at all.179 
 
Sajó formulates this "translation" explicitly in terms of translation from 
religious reasons to secular reasons: 
 
Secularism expresses the need for legal choices to be based on secular public 
reasons, that is, on reasons accessible to all, quite apart from their religious 
beliefs. Religiously grounded reasons have to be 'translated' into secular ones. 
For most translation theories, the requirement of a public reason is satisfied 
as long as the legislative reasons are presented and accepted on grounds 
reasonably accessible to all – that is, on grounds that do not presuppose some 
act of faith or belief in scripture, and without the constitutional arrangement 
itself being an act of faith.180 
                                                
176 The literature on public justification is vast, incestuously self-referential, and has become a 
central theme of liberal political theory and criticisms thereof. For a general overview, see 
D'Agostino 2008. 
177 Rawls 2005, 226. Rawls 2005 is the seminal work on public reason, see especially 212-254 on 
"The Idea of Public Reason," as supplemented by Rawls 1997 on "The Idea of Public Reason 
Revisited." Rawls bases his conception of public reason on what he calls the "duty of civility" 
incumbent on the citizens of a free and equal society. Rawls restricts his consideration of 
public reason to constitutional essentials and basic issues of justice; see Rawls 2005, 214. This 
restriction is ignored or tempered by many theorists (e.g., Greenawalt 1987 and 1995, Audi 
2000, Gaus 1996) and is not relevant to this paper's argument concerning the justificatory 
constraint of law as pluralism. 
178 Connolly 2005, 48. 
179 Obama 2006, 219. 
180 Sajó 2008, 626, internal citation omitted. 
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As indicated by Rawls, Obama, and Sajó, many conceptions of public 
justification focus on the reasonableness or rationality of the commitments 
invoked as justifications, with the aim of keeping unreasonable or irrational 
justifications, however defined, out of the political sphere.181 Some of the 
proposed restrictions on unreasonable justifications amount to a rejection of 
commitments, for the purpose of political and legal discourse, that are not 
supportable by secular argumentation,182 while others seek to specify what 
qualifies as reasonable in terms of what is acceptable by the other participants 
in the discourse.183 Other theorists of public reason take a less restrictive view 
of the commitments that may be invoked as justifications, arguing that 
justifications not accepted by the other participants in the discourse in light of 
the religious commitments underlying those justifications will in any event 
not serve as useful tools for persuading others and hence, as a matter of 
strategy, will generally be omitted in practice without the need for a theory as 
to what qualifies as reasonable.184 Finally, there are those who argue that 
religious commitments and the justifications relying on those commitments 
can be a welcome way to reinvigorate otherwise value-drained political 
discourse by reintroducing questions of fundamental and often moral 
convictions, even if this entails a more controversial and conflict-laden 
discourse.185 
                                                
181 See D'Agostino 2008, who stresses the centrality of the (essentially contested) concept of 
reasonableness to the debate, as well as its connection to legitimacy: "The idea [of public 
justification] is, roughly, that no regime is legitimate unless it is reasonable from every 
individual's point of view." The relationship between reasonableness and rationality is 
problematic: Rawls 2005, 48-54, develops an idiosyncratic distinction between reasonableness 
and rationality that will be critiqued by Connolly on p. 79 below. D'Agostino 2008 largely 
conflates the two terms, at least on the empirical (as opposed to the normative) reading of 
public justification: "On the empirical reading, some proposal is reasonable from some 
particular person's point of view only if that person has beliefs and desires which, according 
to h/er own scheme of reasoning, support that proposal to the degree, which, by h/er 
standards, is required" – an understanding of reasonableness that comes close to Rawls's 
understanding of rationality. For the purposes of this paper, not much hinges on any 
distinction between reasonableness and rationality, and it instead suffices to think of both as 
essentially contested concepts. What does matter to law as pluralism is the thin conception of 
rationality (or reasonableness) developed in the following section. 
182 See especially Audi 1993 and Audi 2000, who calls for a "principle of secular rationale" and a 
"principle of secular motivation"; see Audi 2000, 86 and 96. 
183 See, e.g., Rawls 2005 and Habermas 1993 for approaches to the problem of acceptability 
that call for more or less actual acceptance (more in the case of Habermas, less in the case of 
Rawls); see, e.g., Gaus 2003, for a counterfactual analysis of acceptance. Rawls himself is 
situated on the more restrictive end of the spectrum of conceptions of public justification, like 
others who advocate stringent criteria for what counts as public, such as Gutmann and 
Thompson 1996 and Solum 1993 (limiting public reasons to common-sense beliefs, ideas from 
the public political culture, and the noncontroversial conclusions of science). Habermas has 
recently (2005) adopted a slightly less restrictive conception of public justification compared 
with his earlier work. 
184 See, e.g., Greenawalt 1993, Greenawalt 1987 and 1995 (developing a theory of the 
"accessibility" of reasons to others), Alexander 1993 (advocating a more inclusive but 
avowedly liberal conception derived from the value of autonomy), and Möllers 2010 
(emphasizing that inaccessible reasons will, as a matter of practice, seldom be employed in 
political discourse with aspirations for success). Obama 2006, 208, makes the same point in 
relation to actual legislative practice in the United States. 
185 Restrictive conceptions of public justification have met with objections ranging from 
spirited to vicious: see, e.g., Perry 1993 and 1997, Weithman 2002, and Smith 2010 (who 
acknowledge many of the points raised by advocates of public justification, but believe they 
are outweighed by the benefits of free and open discourse) or Wolterstorff 1984, Carter 1993, 
and Eberle 2002 (who argue that public justification amounts to discrimination against those 
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The special concern of public justification with religious commitment boils 
down to the fear that expressions of faith are particularly prone to 
unreasonableness, thus bringing conversation to a halt before it has even 
begun. As Rorty puts it, "The main reason religion needs to be privatized is 
that, in political discussion with those outside the relevant religious 
community, it is a conversation-stopper."186 In a critique of Stephen Carter, 
Rorty emphasizes the pernicious role that unreasonable premises play in this 
regard: 
 
So when Carter complains that religious citizens are forced 'to restructure 
their arguments in purely secular terms before they can be presented' I 
should reply that 'restructuring the arguments in purely secular terms' just 
means 'dropping reference to the sources of the premises of the arguments', 
and that this omission seems a reasonable price to pay for religious liberty.187 
 
Audi motivates his call for secular justifications with reference to the same 
concern: "Where religious convictions are a basis of a disagreement, it is, other 
things equal, less likely that the disputants can achieve resolution or even 
peacefully agree to disagree."188 In his call for public justification, Obama 
similarly emphasizes the difference in the bases of faith and reason: 
 
For those who believe in the inerrancy of the Bible, as many evangelicals do, 
such rules of engagement [i.e., the requirement of public justification] may 
seem just one more example of the tyranny of the secular and material worlds 
over the sacred and eternal. But in a pluralistic democracy, we have no 
choice. Almost by definition, faith and reason operate in different domains 
and involve different paths to discerning truth. Reason – and science – 
involves the accumulation of knowledge based on realities that we can all 
apprehend. Religion, by contrast, is based on truths that are not provable 
through ordinary human understanding – the "belief in things not seen."189  
 
But Rorty himself acknowledges that this distinction between different kinds 
of premises stands on shaky ground:  
 
Carter thinks that 'contemporary liberal philosophers … make demands on 
[the religion's] moral conscience to reformulate that conscience – to destroy a 
vital aspect of the self – in order to gain the right to participate in the dialogue 
alongside other citizens'. But this requirement is no harsher, and no more a 
demand for self-destruction, than the requirement that we atheists, when we 
                                                
with strong religious convictions). See Audi and Wolterstorff 1996 for a direct debate on the 
salient points. For a view orthogonal to those mentioned above, see Sterba 1999, who 
attempts to bridge the controversy with an appeal to the ideal of fairness as requiring 
collective restraint on the majority as a whole rather than individual constraints on members 
of the majority. Finally, D'Agostino 1996 focuses on the essential contestability of public 
justification itself, and attempts to resolve the controversy through a pragmatic (and largely 
pragmatist) model of a workable and evolving consensus. 
186 Rorty 1999, 171. Rorty goes on to quote Carter 1993: "One good way to end a conversation 
– or to start an argument – is to tell a group of well-educated professionals that you hold a 
political position (preferably a controversial one, such as being against abortion or 
pornography) because it is required by your understanding of God's will." 
187 Rorty 1999, 173. 
188 Audi 2000, 69, emphasis added. 
189 Obama 2006, 219. 
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present our arguments, should claim no authority for our premises save the 
asset we hope they will gain from our audience.190 
 
This passage reflects both Rorty's pragmatism and his privileging of social 
progress over truth: it is irrelevant to Rorty what the sources of premises are, 
as long as they can be used to tell a story about the society we would like to 
live in. But this also draws attention to the general difficulties in grounding 
any premises – and in particular any fundamental commitments – reasonably 
or rationally. In a critique of Rawls distinction between reasonableness and 
rationality, Connolly expresses this skepticism as follows: 
 
The outcomes of rational calculations depend upon the premises adopted. 
Self-interest, for instance, does not serve as a sufficient basis for justice. "What 
rational agents lack is the particular form of moral sensibility that underlies 
the desire to engage in fair cooperation as such [Rawls]." What else is needed, 
then? Well, agents of justice are "reasonable" people. They are willing to 
accept reciprocal limits. Rawls's use of the word "reasonable" may suggest 
that this sensibility is a necessary companion of rationality, while it seems to 
me to be better understood as a kissing cousin of traditional theories of 
virtue. For by what procedure or mode of argument is reasonableness 
attained? On what logic is it grounded? Rawls says the disposition comes 
from a fortunate cultural tradition that already embodies it. Though for 
reasons yet to be discussed, Rawls does not like to emphasize this point, it is 
nested within cultural practices never entirely reducible to logic or 
rationality.191 
 
The problem facing law as pluralism is that it cannot take such cultural 
traditions – which provide the premises for reasonableness and rationality – 
for granted. This removes culturally thick understandings of reasonableness 
and rationality as a basis for deciding which popular commitments may be 
admitted to the legislative process and which may not.192 Connolly goes on to 
ask what should be done where this culturally shared basis is lacking: 
 
Note that Rawlsians are now unable to find the sufficient rational ground for 
justice they habitually accuse post-Nietzscheans of lacking. Reasonableness 
finds its grounds in itself and when it is already widely shared in a cultural 
tradition. But what does a Rawlsian moralist appeal to when such a tradition 
is deeply conflictual, or weak, or active in some domains and absent in 
others? What do Rawlsians appeal to, that is, when the appeal is most 
needed? Rawls has nothing compelling to say in such cases. This is because, 
in a way reminiscent of John Caputo, Richard Rorty, and Jürgen Habermas, 
he rules "comprehensive doctrines" out of public discourse in order to protect 
the impartiality of justice.193 
                                                
190 Rorty 1999, 173. Rorty 2003 updates his thoughts on conversation-stoppers somewhat, but 
if anything, this evolution further underscores the idea that religion is not special as a 
conversation-stopper. See, e.g., Rorty 2003, 148-149: "[I]nstead of saying that religion was a 
conversation-stopper, I should have simply said that citizens of a democracy should try to 
put off invoking conversation-stoppers as long as possible. We should do our best to keep the 
conversation going without citing unarguable first principles, either philosophical or 
religious. If we are sometimes driven to such citation, we should see ourselves as having 
failed, not as having triumphed." 
191 Connolly 1999, 64, internal citations omitted.  
192 On this basic distinction between thin and thick understandings, see Walzer 1994. 
193 Connolly 1999, 64. Connolly goes on to propose a post-Nietzschean remedy for this 
dilemma with respect to the public sphere at large; this paper shares Connolly's recognition 
of the underlying problem, but its remedies are limited to the restricted sphere of lawmaking. 
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The danger Connolly identifies is that in a sufficiently pluralistic society, there 
is little space left for justification to be public in the sense demanded by Rawls 
and other advocates of public justification. Irrespective of the consequences 
for the public sphere as a whole, this means that while both public 
justification and the justificatory constraint of law as pluralism aim to 
separate out the kinds of commitments that may be invoked as justifications, 
the line they draw between admissible commitments and inadmissible 
commitments will be different. 
 
 
4.4 Justificatory constraint vs. public justification 
 
The analysis in the preceding section puts us in a position to show more 
clearly how the justificatory constraint of law as pluralism differs from the 
various conceptions of public justification. It differs in at least four 
fundamental ways: First, it aims solely at legislative discourse, i.e., the 
negotiation of laws within a legislature, as stipulated in the first ground rule 
of this paper.194 The justificatory constraint of law as pluralism applies only to 
legislatures as a socially constructed institution that can be made subject to 
explicit rules. Law as pluralism as elaborated in this paper is agnostic as to the 
kind of discourse that is useful or should be permissible in society as a whole, 
and in particular in the public sphere that generates the popular 
commitments that may be offered as inputs to the legislative process.195 The 
justificatory constraint of law as pluralism is only concerned with which 
inputs should be admitted to the legislative process, and with what to do with 
those inputs once they have entered the legislative process. In this sense, the 
justificatory constraint of law as pluralism is compatible with a wide range of 
                                                
For extended critiques of the reasonableness or rationality (though not necessarily the 
desirability) of the premises underpinning "secular" or "Western" societies, see generally 
Taylor 2007 and Asad 2003. This difficulty is also identified by Waldron 1993, 846, with 
respect to the underpinnings of liberalism (and specifically property rights): "The question is, 
which is the most plausible premise with which to begin our own (secular) discussion of 
property? Here, though, the problem points to a general issue in liberal philosophy. Our 
theories of basic rights, of property and justice, of the respect due to the human person, are all 
rooted historically in theories of natural law and in conceptions that were specifically theistic 
and, indeed, Christian in approach. We are now engaged in the business of developing ways 
of thinking about politics and justice that abandon that orientation. As we do that, we – or, I 
should say, many of us – are determined to maintain as rich a sense as possible of the dignity 
of the human individual, the equality of worth of all men and women, and the urgency and 
priority of justice." 
194 Thus narrowing Connolly's claim about pluralists cited on p. 76 above: the justificatory 
constraint of law as pluralism is a constraint on how legislators with (or representing) diverse 
fundamental commitments hold and express those commitments in the legislative sphere. 
Different conceptions of public justification range from a narrow set of actors to a broad set of 
actors to which those conceptions are to apply. Rawls 2005, 443, for instance, limits his 
consideration of public reason to "judges in their decisions, […] government officials, 
especially chief executives and legislators […and] candidates for public office and their 
campaign managers." Greenawalt 1987 and 1995 distinguish different shades of public 
reasons that should be expected of different actors, e.g., legislators vs. common citizens. 
Others, e.g., Gaus 1996, Gutmann and Thompson 1996, and Audi 2000, develop a conception 
of public justification that is generally applicable to all citizens engaging in political 
discussion in the public sphere. This latter strain is particularly prevalent also among 
theorists of deliberative democracy. See, e.g., Cohen 1989 and Habermas 1993. 
195 See the discussion in section 7.4 on "The public sphere as generator of popular 
commitments" below. 
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conceptions of public justification, as long as such conceptions are limited to 
discourse that takes place outside legislatures. 
 
Second, the justificatory constraint of law as pluralism serves as an actual rule 
constraining the behavior of legislators, not simply a recommendation for 
what constitutes praiseworthy conduct.196 Most conceptions of public 
justification are not properly enforceable, other than through peer pressure and 
calls to good citizenship. Given that the justificatory constraint of law as 
pluralism is addressed to a clearly delineated group of (more or less) 
professional legislators already subject to constraints on their behavior in the 
form of rules of procedure, constitutional rules, and the like, enforcement of 
the justificatory constraint of law as pluralism is at least feasible.  
 
Third, the justificatory constraint of law as pluralism differs from conceptions 
of public justification to the extent such conceptions hinge on the 
reasonableness or rationality of fundamental commitments used as the 
premises of justification. In light of the conception of pluralism endorsed here, 
the justificatory constraint of law as pluralism cannot distinguish between 
secular, religious, or other sources of justifications by including some sources 
and rejecting others for the purposes of legislative discourse. Theories of 
reasonableness, including those that distinguish between secular and 
religious or public and private sources of justification, are themselves rooted 
in fundamental commitments that, under the conception of pluralism, must 
be treated equally prima facie to other theories of reasonableness, such as 
those holding that revelation, tradition, sacred texts, and the like, are equally 
reasonable sources of justification as theoretical and practical reason,197 
communicative reason,198 and other Enlightenment-inspired forms of secular 
reason.199 Pending a universally acceptable theory of reasonableness and 
rationality, particularistic theories of reasonableness or rationality cannot be 
used as a basis for the justificatory constraint of law as pluralism to evaluate 
the admissibility of premises of justification. 
 
Instead, the justificatory constraint of law as pluralism relies on a thin 
conception of rationality limited to the inferences that can be drawn from such 
premises of justification: namely a conception according to which 
commitments and entitlements can properly be attributed to a person in light 
of the other commitments that person has undertaken, in conjunction with the 
principles of committive and permissive inference as applied to those 
commitments.200 This means that the premises expressed in the commitments a 
                                                
196 See in particular the discussion in section 7.2 on "Rules of legislative procedure" and 
section 7.3 on "Constitutional rules and meta-constitutional rules" below. It is not always 
entirely clear whether conceptions of public justification are meant to be obligatory or 
permissive; see Ebels-Duggan 2010 for an attempt at classification (and a critique of the 
obligatory variant). 
197 Elaborated paradigmatically by Kant 1787 and Kant 1788. 
198 Elaborated paradigmatically by Habermas 1984. 
199 As examples of "reasonable" attempts to use sacred texts as a basis for political justification, 
see Kim and Draper 2008 and Khan 2008. 
200 This corresponds to the "technical" conception of reason according to Ely 1980, 56: 
"Technically, of course, reason alone can't tell you anything: it can only connect premises to 
conclusions. To mean anything, the reference has to be somewhat richer, to implicate the 
invocation of premises along with the ways in which one reasons from them." Garver 2006, 
170, in arguing that rationality is an essentially contested concept, links the thin conception of 
rationality to the problem of coercion: "When rationality is a contested concept, so too is 
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person has undertaken need not be reasonable or rational; they might be 
derived from hexagrams in the I Ching, the fragments of oracle bones, or 
random patterns of C-fibers firing. However, the conclusions that may be 
drawn from those premises, in light of the principles of committive and 
permissive inference, are not similarly up for grabs: they are subject to the 
practice of giving and asking for reasons that makes communication possible 
and is the minimum prerequisite for undertaking joint projects.201 
 
Fourth, and closely related to the third point regarding reasonableness, the 
justificatory constraint of law as pluralism is interested only in the adequacy of 
legislation in light of the commitments used to justify it, not the legitimacy 
thereof. Reasonableness is a crucial aspect of the legitimacy of legislation;202 
the thin conception of rationality used here is a crucial aspect of the adequacy 
of legislation. This fourth point tracks the claim made in subsection 1.3.3 
above that law as pluralism is not primarily concerned with legitimacy. 
 
To the extent that law as pluralism privileges this thin, inferentialist 
conception of rationality over thicker conceptions of rationality or 
reasonableness, the justificatory constraint of law as pluralism bears some 
resemblance to those theories of public justification (as restricted to legislative 
discourse) that take a "generous" view of the kinds of justifications that may 
be employed in legislative negotiations. In particular, the justificatory 
constraint of law as pluralism does not prima facie exclude justifications that 
are rooted (solely) in particularistic worldviews and systems of value and 
morality that are not shared or reasonably acceptable or accessible by all 
participants in the discourse, and it does not preclude the suggestion that the 
inclusion of such justifications in legislative discourse may have certain 
benefits. Law as pluralism is also open to the possibility that some 
justifications will be omitted in practice, as a matter of strategy, because they 
fail to persuade, rather than pursuant to some theory of what counts as a 
"good" justification.  
 
But, given the need under law as pluralism for the outputted laws to be 
adequate to all popular commitments, to the extent achievable in terms of 
consistency and enforceability, the justificatory constraint of law as pluralism 
must, compared with these "generous" conceptions of public justification, 
                                                
coercion, and liberal democrats and religious advocates often differ on what counts as 
coercion, and consequently on what counts as rational. However much we might disagree 
about whether a particular case is coercive, the standard is clear. Anything I cannot talk back 
to is coercive and irrational." The thin conception of rationality advanced in this paper in 
terms of "giving and asking for reasons" is simply that: ensuring the ability to talk back. 
201 Note that there is considerable flexibility here: the further commitments and entitlements 
attributed to X by Y in light of the commitments X has already undertaken need not be the 
same as the further commitments and entitlements acknowledged by X in light of the same 
commitments. This is the principle underlying the essentially perspectival character of 
conceptual contents according to Brandom's inferentialism, i.e., the need to keep two sets of 
books on one's own commitments and entitlements and those of others; see the discussion in 
Brandom 1994, 586-592, and in subsection 5.2.2 on "Keeping two sets of books on the 
legislative process" below. On this account, there is no single, "rational" perspective; the 
minimum prerequisite for communication requires simply the ability to keep track of one's 
own commitments and entitlements and those of others, and to justify inferences (not 
fundamental commitments serving as premises) when called upon to do so. 
202 Again, see D'Agostino 2008: "The idea [of public justification] is, roughly, that no regime is 
legitimate unless it is reasonable from every individual's point of view." 
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establish stricter criteria for what counts as an admissible justification within 
the legislative process and what does not. 
 
Under law as pluralism, laws (and the proposals that result in such laws) 
need not be reasonable or rational in a thick sense (according to whatever 
theory of reasonableness or rationality), but they do need to be justified in 
terms of popular commitments serving as input commitments to the 
legislative process – and in that sense must be rational in a thin sense. Since 
justification implements adequacy, laws cannot be adequate to fundamental 
commitments of the population they bind if they cannot be justified in terms 
thereof. If reasonableness or rationality (or, say, the distinction between 
secular and religious commitments) cannot be taken as the criterion for 
separating out the justifications that can be used as premises in legislative 
discourse from those that cannot, in order to achieve consistent and 
enforceable legislation that is adequate to the popular commitments offered 
as input commitments, then the justificatory constraint of law as pluralism 
must draw on other criteria for that purpose. 
 
To determine what those criteria might be, the following two sections 
consider how output commitments can be justified in terms of input 
commitments. As discussed in section 3.3 on "Prescriptive and descriptive 
commitments" above, popular commitments offered as input commitments 
may be either prescriptive or descriptive, and hence input commitments 
themselves may be either prescriptive or descriptive. We are thus concerned 
with the adequacy of laws (which generally express prescriptive output 
commitments) to both these types of input commitments. Since justification 
implements adequacy, laws (and the proposals that result in such laws) must 
be justified in terms of prescriptive input commitments and descriptive input 
commitments.203 
 
The two types of justification – in terms of prescriptive input commitments 
and in terms of descriptive input commitments – have distinct grammatical 
forms and distinct consequences for the legislative process. First, we shall 
turn to justification in terms of prescriptive input commitments. 
 
 
4.5 Justification in terms of prescriptive input commitments 
4.5.1 Grammatical form of prescriptive commitments 
 
The fundamental grammatical form of statements expressing prescriptive 
input commitments (which are intended to guide human conduct) is 
                                                
203 As Black 1964, 168, points out, there is a view that since ought-statements make no truth 
claims at all, as discussed on p. 61 above, this disqualifies them from serving either as 
premises or conclusions. This would seem to complicate the attempt to analyze inferences 
from prescriptive input commitments to output commitments, and from any input 
commitments to prescriptive output commitments. But aside from the open question of 
whether ought-statements do or do not in fact make truth claims, this concern is largely 
obviated here by the fact that we are dealing with material inferences rather than formal 
inferences in legislative negotiations, and that most of these inferences are permissive (i.e., akin 
to inductive reasoning) rather than committive (i.e., akin to deductive reasoning). See n. 116 on 
p. 51 and n. 119 on p. 52 above. But even if the inferences at issue were formal, deductive 
inferences, Black 1964 provides suggestions on how to work around the problem. 
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analogous to the fundamental grammatical form of statements expressing 
legislative output commitments (which are likewise intended to guide human 
conduct, i.e., they are also predominantly prescriptive).204 In the simplest case, 
such statements are of the grammatical form "X ought to A," where X is a 
person or class of persons and A is an action. This simplest form can be 
extended and refined in several ways: where the prescriptive commitment is 
intended to be explicitly compulsory or coercive, the simplest derivative form 
is "X shall (not) A," and where the prescriptive commitment is intended to be 
explicitly permissive or enabling, the simplest derivative form is "X may A." 
As we have seen in section 3.3 on "Prescriptive and descriptive commitments" 
above, prescriptive commitments can be expressed using a wide range of 
different possible grammatical forms, including passives, ellipses, 
abstractions, and so on, which may or may not specify an "X" denoting a 
natural person or class of natural persons. Nevertheless, as we have seen, 
laws can always be reduced to norms applicable to individual human beings, 
and this is similarly true of the prescriptive commitments serving as input to 
the legislative process.  
 
Both prescriptive input commitments and output commitments are expressed 
using the modal verbs "ought," "shall," "may," "must" and the like in their 
deontic (i.e., prescriptive) mode,205 meaning that both classes of commitments 
have direct implications for human conduct. Given the institutional purpose 
of legislation, output commitments are most often expressed using the modal 
verbs "shall (not)" and "may," expressing compulsion/prohibition and 
permission respectively, while prescriptive input commitments may have a 
broader range of prescriptive force, including the recommendatory "should" 
and the analogous interpretation of "ought." Despite the slightly larger set of 
modal verbs typically available to prescriptive input commitments than to 
output commitments, both classes of commitments can be expressed using the 
schema "X [deontic modal verb] A," and any given prescriptive input 
commitment of the form "X [deontic modal verb1] A" maps directly onto an 
output commitment of the form "X [deontic modal verb2] A," where [deontic 
modal verb1] and [deontic modal verb2] differ at most in the degree of 
compulsion/permission, but not the direction, of their force. 
 
4.5.2 No gap between input and output commitments 
 
Prescriptive input commitments expressed with the help of deontic modal 
verbs map directly onto analogous output commitments likewise expressed 
                                                
204 But see Ronald Moore 1973, arguing that the deontic (or, in the terminology used here, 
prescriptive) force of laws differs from the deontic force of non-laws, given that laws not only 
bind citizens, but also officials, who are responsible for imposing sanctions if the laws are 
violated by citizens. Non-laws, by contrast, do not include obligations relating to sanctions 
imposed by officials. Moore argues that this distinction makes it difficult to apply deontic 
logic straightforwardly to laws. While this may be true, ignoring the role of officials does no 
harm to the analysis presented in this subsection and the following subsection, since the 
relevant analogy between prescriptive input commitments and output commitments does not 
obtain between descriptive input commitments and output commitments, regardless of the 
role of officials and sanctions.  
205 As opposed to their epistemic mode, which is irrelevant here; e.g. "you must be Dr. 
Livingstone" or "that ought to be about right." For an overview of the relevant concepts 
relating to modal verbs, see Roméro 2005, especially chapter 4.5. 
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with the help of deontic modal verbs. This means that no further 
commitments are necessary to get from a prescriptive input commitment to 
the analogous output commitment – the only difference206 between a 
prescriptive input commitment and the analogous output commitment is that 
the former is held by an individual legislator (and/or the members of the 
population he or she represents), while the latter is held by the legislature as a 
collective body. In such a case, the legislature does not hold any additional 
commitments other than those held by the legislator – the only difference 
consists in who or what does the holding. There is no gap between the content 
of the prescriptive input commitment and the content of the output 
commitment, only a difference between the subjects to whom the 
commitment can be attributed. This gap does not need to be filled by any 
additional commitments. 
 
Another way of looking at this is to imagine that the legislature consists only 
of a single legislator: then the gap between the subjects to whom the 
commitment can be attributed disappears. The legislative commitment 
outputted by the legislative "process" would be the same as the prescriptive 
input commitment.207 No additional commitments would be needed to get 
from the input commitment to the output commitment. 
 
What of output commitments that are not strictly analogous to prescriptive 
input commitments in the sense of one prescriptive input commitment 
mapping directly onto an output commitment, i.e., output commitments that 
are derived from a consistent set of prescriptive input commitments held by a 
legislator (and/or the members of the population she represents)? This only 
insignificantly complicates the picture: the prescriptive input commitments 
would still be sufficient to generate the output commitment; no additional 
commitments would be needed to get from the input commitments to the 
output commitment. Or in the counterfactual situation where the legislature 
consists only of a single legislator: given the legislator's input commitments, 
the legislator would be entitled to hold the output commitment without any 
additional commitments. 
 
These considerations of the relationship between prescriptive input 
commitments and output commitments have consequences for justification 
within the pluralistic legislative process (where the legislature consists of 
more than one legislator): laws and the proposals which give rise to them can 
be justified directly in terms of analogous prescriptive input commitments or 
in terms of consistent sets of prescriptive input commitments. Given the 
regulative ideal of law as pluralism, laws – which express legislative output 
commitments – should prima facie only bind members of the population 
whose fundamental commitments do not conflict with the legislative output 
                                                
206 Other than perhaps a difference in the degree of compulsory/permissive force, as 
indicated in the preceding paragraph. 
207 Strictly speaking, this is only true of the relationship between the output commitment and 
the prescriptive input commitment held by the legislator, as opposed to the members of the 
population represented by the legislator: while the output commitment would be internal to 
the legislator (acting as the entire legislature), it would still be external to the members of the 
population (even though its content would coincidence exactly with the content of their 
fundamental commitments). Only in a direct democracy consisting of a single person would 
this distinction between internal and external collapse for the member (!) of the population as 
well. 
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commitments expressed by those laws. As a legislator, I can thus cite a 
prescriptive input commitment directly as a justification for the analogous 
output commitment: it is permissible for a law expressing that legislative 
commitment to bind the members of the population I represent, since their 
fundamental commitments correspond to the output commitments at issue 
and hence do not conflict with them. 
 
Where there are no conflicts among the relevant prescriptive commitments of 
the entire population,208 the justification of a law expressing such an output 
commitment (or a legislative proposal advancing such an output 
commitment) is thus straightforward: it can be justified directly in terms of 
the prescriptive input commitments. Conversely, introducing a prescriptive 
input commitment as a justification of a legislative proposal is unproblematic, 
since any law arising from such a proposal would be adequate to the 
uncontroversial popular commitments serving as input commitments. 
 
But where there are no conflicts among the relevant prescriptive 
commitments of the entire population, there is no fact of pluralism. 
Difficulties under law of pluralism arise when such conflicts do exist: then the 
set of relevant prescriptive input commitments is inconsistent, and output 
commitments can only be justified in terms of a consistent subset of that set.  
 
4.5.3 Exclusion of other input commitments 
 
Given the fact of pluralism, introducing a prescriptive input commitment as a 
justification of a legislative proposal directly prejudices the output commitment 
to be expressed by the law: the legislator introducing the proposal is in effect 
saying that her prescriptive input commitment (or her subset of prescriptive 
input commitments) should become law, binding even those who do not hold 
that prescriptive input commitment (or subset of prescriptive input 
commitments). A legislative proposal justified in terms of a prescriptive input 
commitment not shared by the entire population is tantamount to a proposal 
to exclude prescriptive input commitments that conflict with the commitment 
held by the proposer, since the legislative proposal cannot simultaneously 
reflect the proposer's prescriptive commitment and conflicting prescriptive 
commitments. This does not leave much room for negotiation, since no 
intermediate legislative commitments are generated in this version of the 
legislative process: the legislative process jumps directly from input 
commitments to analogous output commitments, without the articulation of 
intermediate commitments that is only possible through negotiation. 
 
In this sense, controversial prescriptive input commitments are the true 
conversation-stopper, regardless of their origin.209 By introducing a 
controversial prescriptive popular commitment as an input commitment, and 
hence as a premise for legislative negotiations that directly prejudices their 
                                                
208 Or the subset of the population under consideration; this complication will be discussed in 
more detail in chapter 6 on "Recursive pluralism." 
209 Cf. Rorty 1999, 171, and p. 78 above. 
 87 
conclusion, I am effectively bringing the negotiations to an end before they 
have begun.210 
 
Where the set of prescriptive commitments held by a population is 
inconsistent, we know that the legislative process must come up with some 
justification for excluding certain prescriptive popular commitments from 
serving as input commitments that can be reflected in the outputted laws, 
given the need for the laws to be consistent and enforceable. But according to 
the conception of pluralism, such a justification may not derive from any 
commitments that are not held by the entire population, in particular not a 
legislator's commitment to exclude other commitments.211  
 
Under law as pluralism, the only justification for excluding a prescriptive 
popular commitment as an input commitment would be that it leads to an 
inconsistent or unenforceable output. But from the perspective of any 
individual legislator introducing a legislative proposal, the exclusion of any 
prescriptive popular commitments in conflict with that proposal would be 
justified, since the inclusion of both the individual legislator's own 
commitments and those of others would lead to an inconsistent outcome. For 
the individual legislator, there is no criterion for excluding other prescriptive 
commitments as input commitments other than that they conflict with the 
prescriptive commitments of the legislator herself. Given a conflict between 
her own prescriptive commitments and those of other legislators, the 
legislator has the choice of excluding either her own commitments, or the 
commitments of others. Barring altruism and self-sacrifice (and the sacrifice of 
the commitments of the population the legislator represents), that choice is 
easily made.  
 
Instead of leaving it up to the individual legislator to justify which 
prescriptive popular commitments to exclude as input commitments, one 
could adopt a "bird's eye" perspective on the legislative process and leave it 
up to the legislature as a collective body to justify which prescriptive popular 
commitments to exclude as input commitments. But what justifications could 
the legislature invoke in doing so? Invoking controversial prescriptive 
popular commitments as justifications doesn't do the trick, since this would 
privilege certain popular commitments over others, thus violating the 
                                                
210 Note that this would not necessarily be the case if legislative negotiations are expected to 
modify the fundamental commitments of legislators and the members of the population they 
represent; cf. the discussion on p. 70 and in n. 171. But the premise of law as pluralism is that 
this is not what the legislative process is for. Other parts of the public sphere may be 
appropriate venues for modifying fundamental commitments, however, which is why the 
conclusions drawn here are restricted to the legislative process. See also the discussion in 
section 7.4 on "The public sphere as generator of popular commitments" below. 
211 There is one exception to this rule: the commitment to pluralism itself. The commitment to 
pluralism might conceivably be invoked to exclude popular commitments from serving as 
input commitments, given that the commitment to pluralism is "built into" law as pluralism 
and is always valid under law as pluralism even if it is not shared by the entire population. But 
for the purpose of excluding some prescriptive input commitments as opposed to others, the 
commitment to pluralism does us little good, since it is neutral with respect to the content of 
such prescriptive input commitments. It provides no substantive justification for excluding 
some prescriptive input commitments while including others, other than the threat of 
inconsistent or unenforceable output norms. 
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conception of pluralism.212 The only escape route would appear to be for the 
legislature to take a vote: but then the voting behavior of the individual 
legislators would be determined by their respective prescriptive 
commitments, which means that – regardless of the precise modality for 
determining the outcome of a vote213 – the outcome of the vote would 
arbitrarily exclude some popular commitments and include others, in the 
sense that the configuration of voting strengths within a legislature is an 
arbitrary, contingent matter: under the conception of pluralism, popular 
commitments should not be excluded simply because they fail to garner the 
required majority in a vote.214 And in any event, a vote does not constitute a 
justification, other than in terms of the controversial justificatory principle that 
(numeric) might makes right.215 
 
Whether justification for excluding certain prescriptive popular commitments 
as input commitments is left to individual legislators introducing and 
defending proposals or to the legislature as a whole, there are no non-
arbitrary criteria for justifying the exclusion of some prescriptive popular 
commitments as input commitments in favor of others. Under law of 
pluralism, there are accordingly only two possibilities: either no prescriptive 
popular commitments would be excluded as input commitments, or all 
conflicting prescriptive popular commitments would be excluded. But if no 
prescriptive popular commitments were to be excluded as input 
commitments, we would be back to law as relativism: it would be impossible 
to generate consistent and enforceable laws. 
 
4.5.4 First component of the justificatory constraint 
 
Under law as pluralism, the only prescriptive popular commitments216 that 
can serve as input commitments and hence as justifications for legislative 
proposals (and the laws to which they give rise), and thus also for positions 
taken in legislatures in the defense of such proposals, are those that are held by 
the entire population.217 Law as pluralism excludes all prescriptive popular 
commitments as input commitments and hence as justifications in the 
pluralistic legislative process, unless those prescriptive popular commitments 
                                                
212 Invoking the commitment to pluralism itself does not provide substantive justification for 
the legislature taken as a whole any more than it does for individual legislators: it merely 
stipulates that the laws outputted must be consistent and enforceable, but it does not 
differentiate in terms of the content of the input commitments that may lead to such 
inconsistent or unenforceable laws. 
213 Say, according to the applicable majority or supermajority rule. 
214 As Tribe and Dorf 1991, 105, point out with respect to coercive laws that enshrine the 
commitments of the majority: "[S]uch laws do not 'impose' anything on the majority. These 
laws are impositions only for those in the minority who disagree with the policies that 
underlie them, for it is only their liberty that is in any meaningful sense curtailed." 
215 Cf. Thucydides 431 BC, book V, chapter XVII: "Right, as the world goes, is only in question 
between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they 
must." The goal of law as pluralism is to generate legislation that is adequate to the 
fundamental commitments of the (numerically) strong and the weak. 
216 Other than the commitment to pluralism; but as pointed out in n. 211 above, the 
commitment to pluralism plays little role in legislative negotiations other than as embodied in 
the rules that constrain the legislative process. 
217 As we shall see in section 6 on "Recursive pluralism" below, this should read more 
precisely "held by the entire subset of the population in the respective legislative jurisdiction." 
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are uncontroversial.218 This is the first component of the justificatory 
constraint of law as pluralism, which relates to prescriptive popular 
commitments offered as input commitments. 
 
It is now trivial to see how this component of the justificatory constraint of 
law as pluralism implements the regulative ideal of law as pluralism. Under 
the regulative ideal of law as pluralism, there is a presumption against 
changing the behavior of members of the population by way of laws, if the 
laws express commitments that are incompatible with the fundamental 
commitments that otherwise would guide the behavior of those members. 
Laws justified solely in terms of prescriptive commitments held by the entire 
population would not change the behavior of the members of the population 
at all (provided that their behavior is in fact guided by their commitments), 
hence those laws are fully compatible with the regulative ideal of law as 
pluralism. 
 
 
4.6 Justification in terms of descriptive input commitments 
 
This would appear to provide only a very thin basis for legislative 
negotiations. How can legislative proposals be justified if the only 
prescriptive commitments that can serve as input commitments and hence as 
justifications must be held by the entire population? How, under these 
conditions, should a legislature generate laws in fields where the fundamental 
commitments of the population conflict with each other, such as abortion, 
euthanasia, stem cell research, gay marriage, polygamy, religious architecture, 
the head apparel of female Muslim basketball players, and other issues that at 
least some members of the population believe to be of fundamental 
importance? Should the legislature simply give up, thus privileging the status 
quo, whatever that status quo may happen to be? 
 
Privileging the status quo would violate the regulative ideal of law as 
pluralism, however: the status quo always privileges certain fundamental 
commitments over others, and law as pluralism would appear to require that 
the terms of such privileging must be renegotiable through the legislative 
process in principle – the only privileging permissible under law as pluralism 
is that which ensures consistency and enforceability of the outputted laws. 
Although it remains to be seen whether a legislature at a given level should in 
fact have the competence to adopt binding output commitments in any given 
field,219 law as pluralism should provide some means, at some level, to adopt 
or amend laws that concern any subject matter in principle. 
 
Fortunately, not all input commitments are prescriptive; some are descriptive. 
As we shall see in this subsection, the concerns discussed in the previous 
section regarding justification in terms of prescriptive input commitments do 
not apply in the same way to justification in terms of descriptive input 
commitments, thus opening up a door to legislative negotiations that would 
be closed if all controversial popular commitments, not just controversial 
prescriptive popular commitments, were excluded as input commitments and 
hence as potential justifications for legislative proposals and laws. 
                                                
218 Except, as usual, the commitment to pluralism. 
219 See the discussion in chapter 6 on "Recursive pluralism" below. 
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4.6.1 Grammatical form of descriptive commitments 
 
What is the salient difference between prescriptive input commitments and 
descriptive input commitments? To begin with, the fundamental grammatical 
form of statements expressing descriptive input commitments is not 
analogous to the fundamental grammatical form of statements expressing 
(prescriptive) output commitments. In the simplest case, statements 
expressing descriptive input commitments are of the grammatical form "Y is 
P," where Y is a thing of some sort, and P is a property of that thing. "Thing" is 
meant in the broadest possible sense: a thing may be a tangible or intangible 
object, a natural or non-natural person, a relationship, a sense impression, an 
abstraction (such as a mathematical or physical entity), or most generally: 
anything that can be followed by the copula "to be" in its indicative mood.220 
The copula in conjunction with the property P is a predicate of that thing, or in 
common parlance: a description of that thing. 
 
As was the case for statements expressing prescriptive commitments, this 
simplest form of a statement expressing a descriptive commitment can be 
extended and refined: most obviously by choosing a copula other than "to be" 
in its indicative mood, such as "Y seems P," "Y becomes P," "Y looks P," etc., or 
also copulas modified by modal verbs such as "Y would be P" or "Y will be P," 
and so on. Alternately, descriptive statements may do without a copula 
altogether and take the form "Y ∏," where ∏ is a predicate without a copula, 
as in "methane emissions cause global warming" or "deficit spending 
stimulates the economy." The simplest form, "Y is P," however, captures all 
that is essential about statements expressing descriptive commitments for our 
purposes, and it is claimed without further argument that all descriptive 
statements can, without significant loss of information, be reduced to the 
paradigmatic form "Y is P."221 
 
The main stipulation for our purposes is that the predicate of a descriptive 
statement not itself constitute a guide for human conduct. While the statement 
"incest is prohibited" superficially has the grammatical form "Y is P," it has 
prescriptive force, since "is prohibited" constitutes a guide for human 
conduct. "Incest is prohibited" should thus be unpacked as "thou shalt not 
engage in incest" or "persons may not engage in incest" or the like.222  
                                                
220 Note that the simplest form of descriptive statements presented here, "Y is P," is not 
unambiguously available in all languages (for instance in zero-copula languages such as 
Ancient Greek, Russian, and Semitic languages, or languages with multiple "be-words" such 
as Spanish, Portuguese, Japanese, Korean, and so on), but some form of a simple "thing-
predicate" relationship statement can be found in all human languages. 
221 E.g., "Y seems P" is equivalent to "Y is P-seeming," "Y becomes P" is equivalent to "Y is P-
becoming," and so on. Similarly, "Y would be P" is equivalent to "Y is P-in-another-possible-
world," "Y will be P" is equivalent to "Y is P-in-the-future," and so on. Similarly, descriptive 
statements that omit copulas altogether, such as "CO2 emissions cause global warming," can 
be reformulated as "CO2 emissions are global-warming-causing" or the like. Note that this 
transformation also works for descriptive statements that are not commonly considered 
descriptive, such as "the spotted owl should not go extinct," which can be transformed into 
the descriptive (but appraisive!) statement "the spotted owl is worthy-of-not-going-extinct." 
222 Abusing the classical Chomskyan model, one might say that the statement's "deep 
structure" is prescriptive, while its "surface structure" is descriptive. See Chomsky 1957 for 
the classical presentation of this model. 
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By contrast, and crucially for this analysis, "incest is an abomination" and 
"incest is against the will of God" are descriptive statements expressing 
descriptive commitments. While the predicates "to be an abomination" and "to 
be against the will of God" suggest a guide for human conduct (namely, 
persons should not engage in incest), they do not constitute a guide for human 
conduct – one can acknowledge the (descriptive) commitment "incest is 
against the will of God" and the (prescriptive) commitment "one should 
engage in incest at every opportunity" without inconsistency. Note, however, 
that an inconsistency does arise if, in addition to these commitments, one 
simultaneously acknowledges the (prescriptive) commitment, "one should 
never engage in acts that are against the will of God." In that case, one of the 
prescriptive commitments has to be excluded in order to avoid the 
inconsistency – but the descriptive commitment need not be excluded. 
 
4.6.2 Gap between input and output commitments 
 
The form of statements expressing descriptive input commitments (when 
properly unpacked), namely "Y [copula] P" is not the same as the form of 
statements expressing legislative output commitments, namely "X [deontic 
modal verb] A," and there is no straightforward way in which the former type 
of statement can be mapped onto the latter type of statement. Descriptive 
commitments accordingly do not map directly onto (prescriptive) output 
commitments – it is not immediately obvious what laws can be derived from 
descriptive input commitments, unless, as in the example of incest above, the 
input commitments also include commitments with prescriptive force. 
 
This is even true if we imagine the legislature consisting of a single legislator: 
the legislator may hold a set of descriptive input commitments, but this set 
does not entail any given law, and it is not sufficient to generate the relevant 
output commitments (which, as discussed in section 3.2 on "Popular 
commitments and legislative commitments" above, are predominantly 
prescriptive). In order to get from the (descriptive) input commitments to the 
(prescriptive) output commitments, even in a legislature of one, additional 
prescriptive commitments would be needed. Given the descriptive 
commitments held by the legislator (or the population the legislator 
represents), the legislator would not be entitled to hold any given output 
commitment to the exclusion of another, at least not without acknowledging 
additional, prescriptive commitments.  
 
There is, accordingly, a gap between descriptive input commitments and 
prescriptive output commitments. This gap opens up space for justification in 
terms of descriptive input commitments that is not available to justification in 
terms of prescriptive input commitments: even given the fact of pluralism and 
hence the inconsistent nature of the fundamental commitments held by a 
population, introducing a descriptive input commitment as a justification of a 
legislative proposal does not directly prejudice the output commitment to be 
expressed by the law. By introducing a proposal justified in terms of a 
descriptive input commitment, as opposed to a proposal justified in terms of a 
prescriptive input commitment, the legislator is not saying that her descriptive 
commitment should become law, since descriptive commitments can never 
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become law – at least not without conjoined prescriptive commitments. 
Descriptive input commitments do not guide human conduct, hence they 
cannot serve as the sole basis of law. 
 
4.6.3 No exclusion of other input commitments 
 
Crucially, unlike a legislative proposal justified in terms of prescriptive input 
commitments not shared by the entire population, a legislative proposal 
justified in terms of descriptive input commitments not shared by the entire 
population is not tantamount to a proposal to exclude descriptive input 
commitments that conflict with the commitments held by the proposer, since 
output commitments that reflect inconsistent descriptive input commitments are not 
necessarily inconsistent themselves.  
 
Consider an example. Say that one subset of the population (call it TCM) 
consists of advocates of traditional Chinese medicine. TCM holds the 
descriptive commitment DESCTCM "acupuncture is an effective remedy against 
allergies" (which may either be fundamental itself or subsidiary, i.e., derived 
from fundamental commitments).223 In our symbolic notation: 
 
Η (TCM, DESCTCM). 
 
Say that another subset of the population, NTCM, holds the (incompatible) 
descriptive commitment *DESCTCM "acupuncture is not an effective remedy 
against allergies," or in our symbolic notation: 
 
Η (NTCM, *DESCTCM). 
 
Say also that subset TCM holds the prescriptive commitment PRSCTCM "health 
insurers ought to pay for acupuncture treatment of allergies," while subset 
NTCM holds the (incompatible) prescriptive commitment *PRSCTCM "health 
insurers ought not to pay for acupuncture treatment of allergies." In symbolic 
notation: 
 
Η (TCM, PRSCTCM) and 
 
Η (NTCM, *PRSCTCM). 
 
Note that there is no (relevant) law expressing a legislative output 
commitment OUT that reflects both prescriptive commitments PRSCTCM and 
*PRSCTCM. Asserting either PRSCTCM or *PRSCTCM as a justification for a 
legislative proposal excludes the other, incompatible prescriptive 
commitment. How about asserting either of the descriptive commitments 
DESCTCM or *DESCTCM? If there is a law expressing an output commitment 
OUT that reflects both DESCTCM and *DESCTCM, then asserting either of these 
descriptive commitments does not exclude the other. Is there such a law? 
                                                
223 In the symbolic notation used in this paper, the superscript of a commitment denotes the 
individual or subset of the population that holds the commitment; the subscript of a 
commitment, if any, further specifies the content of the commitment, especially where more  
than one commitment is held by the same individual or subset of the population. 
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Trivially, a great number of laws are compatible with both DESCTCM and 
*DESCTCM, even an unrelated law such as "green beans may only be harvested 
on Fridays." There is certainly no contradiction between a law regulating the 
harvest of green beans and any descriptive commitment regarding the 
effectiveness of acupuncture. But such a law would not be derived from either 
of those descriptive commitments in any substantive sense, and that is was it 
means for a law (or more precisely, the output commitments expressed by 
that law) to reflect a commitment, as defined in section 3.1 above:224 one 
commitment reflects another commitment if it is compatible with that 
commitment and is derivable from it. A commitment is derivable from 
another commitment if it can be justified (at least in part) by that 
commitment: harvesting rules cannot be justified, either through committive 
or permissive inference, in terms of beliefs about acupuncture. 
 
So what law might reflect both DESCTCM and *DESCTCM? For instance, the law 
expressing the commitment OUT1 "allergy sufferers may use acupuncture at 
their own expense." OUT1 can be justified in terms of DESCTCM:  
 
"Because acupuncture is an effective remedy against allergies, allergy sufferers 
may use acupuncture at their own expense."  
 
OUT1 can also be justified in terms of *DESCTCM, even though *DESCTCM is 
incompatible with DESCTCM:  
 
"Because acupuncture is not an effective remedy against allergies, allergy 
sufferers may use acupuncture at their own expense." 
 
Note that both of these justifications are by permissive inference; someone or 
something (in this case a legislature L) committed to the descriptive 
commitment DESCTCM or *DESCTCM is not necessarily also committed to the 
legislative commitment OUT1, but is entitled to be so committed.225 In 
symbolic notation: 
 
Η (L, DESCTCM)  Η (L, OUT1) and Η (L, *DESCTCM)  Η (L, OUT1). 
 
Note that there is no problem that the legislature L simultaneously holds both 
of these mutually incompatible descriptive commitments – they are only 
legislative input commitments (or perhaps also intermediate legislative 
commitments), but not output commitments. The set of input commitments 
(and the set of intermediate commitments) may be inconsistent; only the set of 
output commitments must be consistent. In this case, the set of output 
commitments is merely {OUT1}, which trivially is consistent. Since all of these 
commitments are legislative, we can simplify the notation as follows: 
 
                                                
224 See especially n. 117 on p. 51 concerning the substantive connection required also for 
permissive inferences.  
225 Note that both of these inferences are also lacking an additional premise, but we shall 
assume that this omitted premise is uncontroversial (say: "allergy sufferers ought to be able to 
use any sort of remedy, whether effective or ineffective, at their own expense"). This 
complication will be discussed in more detail below in section 5.4 on "Deriving output 
commitments from conflicting descriptive input commitments." 
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DESCTCM  OUT1 and *DESCTCM  OUT1. 
 
So OUT1 is compatible with and derivable from each of the mutually 
incompatible input commitments DESCTCM and *DESCTCM. Subset TCM of the 
population will emphasize the first phrase of OUT1, "allergy sufferers may use 
acupuncture," while subset NTCM will emphasize the second phrase of OUT1, 
"(but only) at their own expense." Regardless of these differences in emphasis, 
OUT1 reflects both DESCTCM and *DESCTCM, hence asserting either DESCTCM or 
*DESCTCM does not exclude the other descriptive commitment. 
 
There are, of course, other laws expressing other legislative commitments that 
reflect both DESCTCM and *DESCTCM. For instance OUT2, "health insurers shall 
cover the costs of acupuncture for the treatment of allergies, but only up to a 
threshold of 250 euros a year," or OUT3, "practitioners of acupuncture shall 
require a license issued by the national medical board." The laws justified in 
terms of descriptive input commitments (and in particular mutually 
incompatible descriptive input commitments) are not necessarily unique; 
there may be a wide range of laws reflecting a given set of descriptive input 
commitments. All of these legislative output commitments OUT1, OUT2 and 
OUT3, as well as countless others, can be justified in terms of each of the two 
mutually incompatible descriptive input commitments DESCTCM and 
*DESCTCM. All of these laws reflect the inconsistent set of descriptive input 
commitments without being inconsistent themselves. 
 
4.6.4 Second component of the justificatory constraint 
 
This feature of descriptive input commitments gives us the second component 
of the justificatory constraint of law as pluralism: Under law as pluralism, all 
descriptive popular commitments may serve as input commitments and 
hence as justifications for legislative proposals (and the laws to which they 
give rise), and accordingly also for positions taken in legislatures in the 
defense of such proposals. Thus, for a given subset of the population X, a 
given legislature L, and a given descriptive popular commitment DESC held 
by X: 
 
Η (X, DESC)  Η (L, DESC). 
 
How does this second component of the justificatory constraint of law as 
pluralism implement the regulative ideal of law as pluralism? Under the 
regulative ideal of law as pluralism, laws – which express legislative output 
commitments – should prima facie only bind members of the population 
whose fundamental commitments do not conflict with the legislative output 
commitments expressed by those laws. Now, a given law justified in terms of 
descriptive input commitments may very well end up conflicting with the 
prescriptive commitments held by a given member of the population – the law 
expressing OUT2 ("health insurers shall cover the costs of acupuncture for the 
treatment of allergies, but only up to a threshold of 250 euros a year"), for 
instance, conflicts (partially) with both PRSCTCM ("health insurers ought to pay 
for acupuncture treatment of allergies") and *PRSCTCM ("health insurers ought 
not to pay for acupuncture treatment of allergies"). But any law fulfilling the 
second component of the justificatory constraint of law as pluralism at least 
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potentially reflects the descriptive commitments of all members of the 
population.226 There is nothing about the second component of the 
justificatory constraint of law as pluralism that results in laws binding 
members of the population whose descriptive fundamental commitments 
conflict with the output commitments expressed by the laws. The fact that 
laws fulfilling the second component of the justificatory constraint of law as 
pluralism may conflict with some prescriptive fundamental commitments held 
by members of the population is what distinguishes pluralism from 
relativism: while no prescriptive fundamental commitments are privileged 
prima facie, some may end up conflicting with the legislative commitments 
while others do not, in the interest of achieving legislation that is both 
adequate (at least to all descriptive popular commitments and 
uncontroversial prescriptive popular commitments) as well as consistent and 
enforceable. 
 
4.7 Defining the justificatory constraint 
 
In the previous subsection, we showed that the entitlement relationship that 
obtains for descriptive popular commitments 
 
Η (X, DESC)  Η (L, DESC) 
 
does not generally obtain for prescriptive popular commitments; instead, a 
prescriptive popular commitment PRSC may only serve as an input 
commitment if no subset of the population holds a prescriptive commitment 
incompatible with PRSC. Hence, for subsets of the population X and Y: 
 
(Η (X, PRSC) & ∃ Y (Η (Y, *PRSC))) / Η (L, PRSC) but 
 
(Η (X, PRSC) & ~∃ Y (Η (Y, *PRSC)))  Η (L, PRSC). 
 
Taken together, the two components of the justificatory constraint of 
pluralism developed in subsections 4.5.4 and 4.6.4 give us the following 
complete formulation of the justificatory constraint of law as pluralism:  
 
Under law as pluralism, a popular commitment may serve as an input 
commitment and hence as a justification for legislative proposals and 
the laws to which they give rise, and accordingly also for positions 
taken in legislatures in the defense of such proposals, if that popular 
commitment is (a) descriptive, or (b) prescriptive and held by the entire 
population.227 
 
                                                
226 At least to the extent they have been asserted as justifications during the legislative process 
and have succeeded in being reflected by the relevant output commitments. What the chances 
of success are will become clearer in chapter 5 on "Decomposing and synthesizing 
commitments." 
227 Again more precisely: "prescriptive and held by the entire subset of the population in the 
legislative jurisdiction in which the legislation is adopted"; this qualification will be discussed 
in more detail in chapter 6 on "Recursive pluralism." Note that the commitment to pluralism 
may also serve as an input commitment, because it is already "built into" the pluralistic 
legislative process. But in general, the commitment to pluralism does little work in the 
justification of laws; it does most of its work in the form of the justificatory constraint of law as 
pluralism itself. 
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Symbolically:  
 
Η (X, DESC)  Η (L, DESC), 
 
(Η (X, PRSC) & ∃ Y (Η (Y, *PRSC))) / Η (L, PRSC), 
 
(Η (X, PRSC) & ~∃ Y (Η (Y, *PRSC)))  Η (L, PRSC). 
 
The justificatory constraint of law as pluralism delivers on the promise made 
in section 3.2 on "Popular commitments and legislative commitments," 
namely to draw the line between popular commitments that may serve as 
justifications for laws and those that may not: descriptive popular 
commitments and uncontroversial prescriptive popular commitments are 
okay, while controversial prescriptive popular commitments are not. 
 
Informally speaking, this means that only uncontroversial oughts may be 
imported from the greater public sphere into the legislative process – 
controversial oughts are left at the doorstep of the legislative chamber. In 
contrast, all ises may be imported into the legislative process, regardless of 
whether they are controversial or not. Now the legislature's job is to generate 
oughts that are binding on the entire population subject to the legislature's 
jurisdiction; it constructs these oughts solely out of the ises and 
uncontroversial oughts that have been imported from the public sphere.228 
 
4.7.1 Separation of law and morality? 
 
Does this mean that controversial prescriptive fundamental commitments 
held by members of a population are irrelevant to the justification of laws, and 
hence that the prescriptive commitments embodied in laws bear no 
relationship to the population's prescriptive fundamental commitments to the 
extent they are controversial? In other words, is law of pluralism an extreme 
form of legal positivism, in which there is no normative connection between 
law and morality (or other forms of controversial prescriptive fundamental 
commitments)?229 
 
                                                
228 Along with any controversial oughts whose controversy is not rooted in fundamental 
commitments – but this is not the concern of law as pluralism or of this paper.  
229 As mentioned in n. 33 on p. 14 above, law as pluralism is not so interested in the analytical 
or conceptual question of what the law is, but rather in the normative question of what 
lawmaking ought to be under conditions of conflicting fundamental commitments. So law as 
pluralism is in principle compatible with any analytical theory of what the law is, including the 
exclusive legal positivism of Hart 1994, Raz 1994 or Marmor 1997 (for a general discussion of 
exclusive legal positivism, see Marmor 2002), the inclusive legal positivism of Coleman 2001 
(for a general discussion of inclusive legal positive, see Himma 2002), the interpretivism of 
Dworkin 1986, or even the classical or modern traditions of natural law (see Finnis 2002 and 
Bix 2002). Of course, to the extent that law as pluralism focuses primarily on the process of 
legislating as opposed to the content of legislation, the "separation thesis" or "separability 
thesis" of exclusive legal positivism lends itself readily to an analysis of law as pluralism. But 
the question at issue in this subsection is whether law as pluralism constitutes an extreme 
form of legal positivism, in which law and morality are entirely separate, as caricatured for 
instance by Fuller 1958. 
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Not necessarily – the justificatory constraint of law as pluralism is merely a 
constraint on the justification, not on the content of the laws (and the proposals 
resulting in those laws). The content of a law may very well reflect certain 
controversial prescriptive fundamental commitments of a population, as long 
as the content of the law is justified in the right way (i.e., according to the 
justificatory constraint of law as pluralism). Given that adequate laws must be 
consistent, they are likely to reflect some of the prescriptive fundamental 
commitments of the population they bind and not others. With respect to the 
prescriptive fundamental commitments they do reflect, there is a normative 
connection between law and morality (or other forms of controversial 
prescriptive fundamental commitments). 
 
What is positivistic about law as pluralism is merely that there is no prima 
facie connection of that sort. No particular prescriptive fundamental 
commitment is more likely to be reflected in a law under law as pluralism 
than any other particular prescriptive fundamental commitments.230 There is 
no presupposition in favor of one set of prescriptive fundamental commitments 
over any other set. The connection between law and morality is contingent 
upon the way the pluralistic legislative process in fact pans out, given a 
particular constellation of fundamental commitments in the population. There 
is no necessary connection between any particular system of morality and the 
laws that bind a population. 
 
Given that controversial prescriptive fundamental commitments cannot serve 
as justifications under law as pluralism, is there nevertheless a way they can 
be "smuggled into"231 the legislative process? As long as they can be smuggled 
in subject to the justificatory constraint of law as pluralism, smuggling them 
in is not necessarily a bad thing.232 Smuggling such commitments in may in 
fact tighten the connection between laws and the population's prescriptive 
fundamental commitments, thus making law as pluralism less "positivistic" 
and more responsive to moral and other prescriptive concerns.233  
 
The preceding discussion suggests how to smuggle prescriptive fundamental 
commitments into the legislative process: by translating them into descriptive 
input commitments that can be used as justifications under law as pluralism. 
How this can be done (and the limits to doing so) is discussed in the following 
chapter on "Decomposing and synthesizing commitments." 
 
                                                
230 Except for the commitment to pluralism, which is "built into" the legislative process and in 
particular into the justificatory constraint of law as pluralism. 
231 A major theme of Smith 2010, who argues that moral notions inadmissible under the 
constraint of public justification are (and indeed should be) smuggled into political and legal 
discourse. 
232 Some members of the population might believe that such commitments should not be 
smuggled in, but that belief would be a prescriptive fundamental commitment that cannot be 
used as a justification during legislative negotiations – or as part of the specification of the 
justificatory constraint. 
233 And hence perhaps more legitimate, but this goes beyond the scope of the paper's 
discussion. 
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5 Decomposing and synthesizing commitments 
 
5.1 Decomposing prescriptive commitments 
 
Does it even make sense to speak of translating prescriptive commitments into 
descriptive commitments? The gap between is and ought would seem to 
indicate that descriptive commitments (and the descriptive statements that 
express them) and prescriptive commitments (and the descriptive statements 
that express them) are two distinct species: Hume's guillotine234 would seem 
to cut off the possibility of deriving an ought-statement from an is-statement, 
at least straightforwardly and without engaging in considerable philosophical 
controversy.235 
 
Be that as it may, the challenge here is not to derive ought-statements from is-
statements, but rather to move in the opposite direction: how, given a 
prescriptive (ought-)statement, can we derive a descriptive (is-)statement that 
captures at least the most salient features of what we are trying to say with 
the prescriptive statement? For this is the essence of translation: trying one's 
best to express in the target language (in this case, the language of descriptive 
statements) what was expressed more completely in the source language (in 
this case, the language of prescriptive statements). 
 
The intuition behind this translation process from prescriptive statements into 
descriptive statements is that any prescriptive commitment PRSC can be split 
up into a descriptive commitment DESC and a prescriptive "linking" 
commitment LINK, which captures the prescriptive aspect or force of the 
prescriptive commitment PRSC expressed by the original prescriptive 
statement. This translation or decomposition process can be represented 
symbolically as: 
 
PRSC  DESC & LINK 
 
In other words, if I hold the prescriptive commitment PRSC, I am entitled to 
hold the descriptive commitment DESC and the (prescriptive) linking 
commitment LINK, which captures the prescriptive force of PRSC.236 
 
DESC and LINK need not be unique for any given PRSC. For instance, the 
prescriptive commitment PRSC "brides ought to wear white" can be split up 
into a descriptive commitment DESC1 "typical brides wear white" and the 
linking commitment LINK1 "brides ought to wear what typical brides wear." 
But PRSC can also be split up into a descriptive commitment DESC2 "brides 
who wear white are taken more seriously than brides who wear other colors" 
                                                
234 Black 1964, 166. 
235 Not that such controversy has ever been avoided, at least not by philosophers. Admirable 
attempts to bridge the gap from is to ought have been made by Black 1964, Searle 1964, Searle 
1969, 175-198, and Searle 1995 (using speech acts and institutional facts as a springboard from 
is to ought), MacIntyre 2007 (arguing that the derivation is rooted in our cultural DNA, so to 
speak), and Hampshire 1989 (like MacIntyre, pursuing an Aristotelian line of thought). 
236 Note that linking commitments are always prescriptive; hence, only the simplified term 
"linking commitment" instead of the term "prescriptive linking commitment" will be used 
from this point forward. 
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and a linking commitment LINK2 "brides should aim to be taken as seriously 
as possible."  
 
How does this work with prescriptive fundamental commitments that a 
legislator might want to "smuggle into" the legislative process? I.e., how can a 
legislator translate a prescriptive fundamental commitment that cannot serve 
as an input commitment and hence cannot be used as a justification under the 
justificatory constraint of law as pluralism into a descriptive commitment that 
can serve as an input commitment and hence can be used as a justification 
under the justificatory constraint of law as pluralism? As an example, 
consider the prescriptive popular commitment (which may be either 
fundamental or subsidiary) PRSCV held by subset V of the population: 
"Women ought to wear veils in public." 
 
There are many different ways to separate out a descriptive commitment from 
this prescriptive commitment, depending in part on the reasons why the 
legislator holds the prescriptive commitment and the legislator's motivation 
for smuggling it into the legislative process. If the legislator holds the 
prescriptive commitment because it has been ordained by God, and because 
the legislator believes it is important for God's will to be reflected in 
legislation, a corresponding descriptive commitment DESCV1 might be, for 
instance, "God has ordained that women ought to wear veils in public." If the 
legislator holds the prescriptive commitment because it is based on tradition, 
and the legislator believes it is important for legislation to reflect tradition, a 
corresponding descriptive commitment DESCV2 might be "traditionally, 
women have always worn veils in public." And if the legislator believes 
PRSCV to be true because it is the most cost-efficient way to protect women 
from the unwanted advances of men, and the legislator believes it important 
for legislation to protect women in that way, a corresponding descriptive 
commitment DESCV3 might be "wearing veils in public is the most cost-
efficient way to protect women from the unwanted advances of men." 
 
None of these descriptive commitments fully capture what the legislator is 
committed to by holding PRSCV. There is indeed no way they could: 
descriptive commitments can never fully correspond to prescriptive 
commitments, given the difference in force between (prescriptive) ought and 
(descriptive) is, or between the corresponding deontic modal verbs and the 
corresponding descriptive copula. In order to fully reflect the prescriptive 
commitments from which they derive, descriptive commitments must be 
supplemented by linking commitments that restore the prescriptive force of 
the original prescriptive commitment, in our case PRSCV: for instance, the 
descriptive commitment DESCV1 "God has ordained that women ought to 
wear veils in public" must be supplemented by the linking commitment 
LINKV1 "all persons must do what God has ordained" in order to have the 
same force as PRSCV. The descriptive commitment DESCV2 "traditionally, 
women have always worn veils in public" must be supplemented by the 
linking commitment LINKV2 "traditions must be continued in the future." And 
the descriptive commitment DESCV3 "wearing veils in public is the most cost-
efficient way to protect women from the unwanted advances of men" must be 
supplemented by LINKV3 "women must be protected from the unwanted 
advances of men as cost-efficiently as possible." 
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By translating a prescriptive commitment such as PRSCV into a descriptive 
commitment, something is always lost in translation. The translation from a 
prescriptive commitment PRSC into a descriptive commitment DESC strips 
away the prescriptive force of the statement – a prescriptive force which is 
captured by the linking commitment, LINK. LINK is what is lost in 
translation from PRSC to DESC. 
 
And something may very well be lost in decomposition as well. Only if  
 
DESC & LINK → PRSC  
 
is nothing lost. In general,  
 
PRSC  DESC & LINK but ~(DESC & LINK → PRSC).  
 
Many decompositions of PRSC to which the holder of PRSC is entitled do not 
fully capture what the holder is committed to by holding PRSC. The challenge 
for a legislator holding a given prescriptive commitment PRSC is to find a 
descriptive commitment DESC that captures as much as possible of what 
PRSC commits one to, while keeping the "stripped away" prescriptive 
component, LINK, to a minimum. According to the justificatory constraint of 
law as pluralism, DESC may serve as input to the legislative process, while 
LINK in general may not (unless of course it is uncontroversial237). It may 
therefore be in the interest of the legislator (and the members of the 
population the legislator represents) to maximize the content of DESC while 
minimizing the content of LINK. The precise way in which the legislator splits 
up PRSC into DESC and LINK depends on the structure of the legislator's 
beliefs and values – e.g. what other commitments the legislator holds, and why 
the legislator holds the commitments he or she holds – as well as the 
legislator's goals in contributing the descriptive commitment (and any 
uncontroversial linking commitments) to the legislative process. The 
legislator's success in smuggling in the descriptive translation of a 
prescriptive justification PRSC will depend on the legislator's skill in splitting 
up PRSC into DESC and LINK. 
 
We will return to this question of legislative skill once we have considered 
how to derive laws (or rather the output commitments expressed by those 
laws) from input commitments, the topic of the following sections. 
 
 
5.2 Deriving output commitments from input commitments 
5.2.1 The role of intermediate commitments 
 
Recall the distinction between popular commitments and legislative 
commitments made in section 3.2: popular commitments are fundamental 
commitments (or subsidiary commitments derived from fundamental 
commitments) held by members of the population and the legislators who 
represent them; legislative commitments are pragmatic commitments held by 
                                                
237 This will be a key point in subsection 5.3.1 on "Synthesizing prescriptive commitments" 
below. 
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the legislature that arise through the legislative process. Popular 
commitments may, subject to the justificatory constraint of law as pluralism, 
serve as input commitments to the legislative process; legislative (output) 
commitments are expressed by the laws outputted by the legislative process 
(and thereby endorsed by the legislature). 
 
Laws expressing legislative output commitments are derived from popular 
commitments serving as input commitments by being justified in terms of 
those commitments. Laws derived from popular commitments serving as 
input commitments reflect those popular commitments and are thus adequate 
to them. But this justification is seldom direct; it is seldom the case that, given 
a popular commitment serving as an input commitment INP and a law 
expressing an output commitment OUT, 238 
 
INP → OUT or even INP  OUT 
 
without intermediate steps. Similarly, a set of popular commitments serving 
as the set of input commitments to the legislative process, ΣINP = {INP1, INP2, 
… INPn} generally only justifies a set of output commitments ΣOUT = {OUT1, 
OUT2, … OUTm} by way of a set of intermediate legislative commitments 
ΣINT = {INT1, INT2, … INTk}, which in turn are justified in terms of the set of 
popular commitments serving as input commitments: 
 
ΣINP  ΣINT  ΣOUT. 
 
Note that while the set of input commitments is in general inconsistent 
(because the descriptive popular commitments serving as input commitments 
are in general controversial), and while the set of output commitments must 
be consistent in order to ensure consistent legislation, the set of intermediate 
commitments may be either consistent or inconsistent. If the set of 
intermediate commitments is in fact inconsistent, the legislature is thus 
entitled to hold the set of intermediate commitments, but not to endorse it. 
 
What, exactly, do intermediate commitments represent within the legislative 
process? They represent all the commitments held by the legislature that are 
not input commitments themselves, but are justified in terms of input 
commitments, and have not (yet) been endorsed by the legislature as an 
output commitment to be expressed by a law. In particular, proposals for 
output commitments made by legislators during the legislative process are 
one species of intermediate commitment.239 But intermediate commitments 
                                                
238 In the following, "popular commitments serving as input commitments" will in general be 
referred to simply as "input commitments," even where we speak of a legislator holding an 
input commitment. Properly speaking, a legislator can only hold a popular commitment 
serving as an input commitment, while only a legislature can hold an input commitment; but 
as long as it is kept in mind who or what does the holding, this distinction is excessively 
nitpicky. Popular commitments serving as input commitments are the hinge, so to speak, 
between popular commitments and legislative commitments. 
239 Note that input commitments themselves may only serve as proposals for output 
commitments if they are prescriptive; this means that they must be uncontroversial and hence 
admissible under the justificatory constraint of law as pluralism. In the general case of 
conflicting popular commitments, input commitments cannot serve directly as proposals for 
output commitments – instead, intermediate commitments derived from input commitments 
are necessary for that purpose. 
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also include any preliminary conclusions drawn by legislators (and hence by 
the legislature) from the set of input commitments during the legislative 
process – including conclusions that can only be drawn once the legislative 
process has commenced. For instance, a conclusion that can only be drawn 
from the conjunction of two separate input commitments contributed by 
distinct subsets of the population (who, prior to the negotiations, might not 
even have been aware of the existence of the other commitment) could not 
have been offered as an input commitment itself – it can only be generated 
during the legislative process. Such an intermediate conclusion need not 
constitute a proposal for an output commitment – it might be used simply as 
a basis for further negotiations.240 
 
Note that in practice, output commitments are not justified only in terms of 
sets of popular commitments serving as input commitments; they are also 
justified in terms of other legislative commitments the legislature has already 
endorsed, paradigmatically the output commitments expressed in laws 
already adopted.241 These output commitments already endorsed also serve as 
input commitments to the legislative process. Given a set of output 
commitments ΣOUT already endorsed by the legislature, the legislative 
process thus looks like this: 
 
Η (P, ΣPOP) & Ε (L, ΣOUT)  H (L, ΣINP)  H (L, ΣINT)  Ε (L, ΣOUT'). 
 
I.e., given the set of popular commitments held by population P and the set of 
output commitments ΣOUT the legislature has already endorsed, the 
legislature is entitled to hold a set of input commitments ΣINP consisting of 
the admissible popular commitments and the legislative commitments 
already endorsed; from this set, the legislature derives a set of intermediate 
commitments ΣINT it is entitled to hold. This set of intermediate 
commitments in turn entitles the legislature to generate a new set of output 
commitments ΣOUT' which it may endorse. 
 
5.2.2 Keeping two sets of books on the legislative process 
 
Now consider this legislative process from the standpoint of individual 
legislators within the legislative process. Individual legislators (and the 
members of the population they represent) do not necessarily hold or endorse 
(the popular commitment with the same content as) any given legislative 
commitment (whether an input commitment or intermediate commitment 
simply held by the legislature during the legislative process or a commitment 
already endorsed by the legislature) – but they may use the fact that the 
legislature holds such a commitment when justifying proposals for further 
legislative commitments. Given a set of legislative commitments, each 
legislator is free to infer what further commitments the legislature is 
committed or entitled to hold. Once the legislature holds a legislative 
commitment, it thereby becomes available to legislators as a justification for 
                                                
240 An example of such an intermediate commitment will be explored in section 5.4.3 
"Derivation using identical linking commitments" below. 
241 This will be a crucial point when considering the integrity of law as pluralism in section 7.1 
on "Making justification explicit" below. 
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further legislative commitments. So while, for a given legislator X, a 
legislature L, and a given legislative commitment LC, it may be the case that 
 
~Η (X, LC) 
 
and hence that X will not use LC as a premise in her justifications, X may 
nevertheless make arguments of the following sort, for a given subset of input 
commitments ΣINP held by X and a given set of legislative commitments ΣLC 
held by L: 
 
Η (X, ΣINP) & Η (L, ΣLC)  Η (L, ΣINT) or even  
 
Η (X, ΣINP) & Η (L, ΣLC) → Η (L, ΣINT). 
 
The legislator may thus propose a set of intermediate commitments ΣINT for 
endorsement by the legislature as output commitments that the legislator 
believes the legislature is entitled to hold or committed to holding, in light of 
the subset of input commitments ΣINP the legislator holds and in light of the 
legislative commitments ΣLC the legislature already holds. In particular, ΣLC 
may include *INP, which is incompatible with the subset of input 
commitments ΣINP held by the legislator. So while the legislature does not 
hold *INP herself, the legislator may use the fact that *INP serves as an input 
commitment as a premise for her own proposals. 
 
From the perspective of the legislature, the legislative process is about 
outputting laws that derive from all the popular commitments serving as 
input commitments and the legislative commitments the legislature has 
already endorsed. From the perspective of the legislature, the legislature 
acknowledges the legislative commitments it has already endorsed, but it does 
not necessarily acknowledge the popular commitments that serve as input 
commitments – it does, however, acknowledge that it has undertaken them. 
An informal way of putting this is that as far as the legislature is concerned, 
the commitments it has endorsed (by acknowledging them) are true, while it 
is agnostic about the truth values of the popular commitments it has not (yet) 
endorsed. 
 
From the perspective of a given legislator, the legislative process is about 
proposing laws (and supporting other legislators' proposals) that derive from 
the popular commitments he or she holds and the fact that the legislature holds 
certain legislative commitments, which may or may not include commitments 
that are incompatible with the legislator's own commitments. From the 
perspective of the legislator, the legislator acknowledges the popular 
commitments he or she contributes as input commitments to the legislative 
process, but the legislator does not necessarily acknowledge the popular 
commitments other legislators contribute to the legislative process. An 
informal way of putting this is that as far as a given legislator is concerned, 
the commitments she has endorsed (by acknowledging them) are true, while 
the legislator is agnostic (or even antagonistic) about the truth values of the 
popular commitments she has not endorsed. 
 
At all times, the difference between the perspective of the legislature and the 
perspective of the legislator must be kept in mind – in other words, it must 
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always be kept in mind who or what is holding a given commitment. Every 
legislator must therefore keep two sets of books: one set of books to keep track 
of which commitments she holds and which further commitments are 
permissively or committively implied by these commitments, as well as 
which further commitments are ruled out by these commitments; and a 
second set of books to keep track of which commitments the legislature holds 
and which further commitments are permissively or committively implied by 
these commitments, as well as which further commitments are ruled out by 
these commitments. A legislator may acknowledge or endorse a commitment as 
her own and use that commitment to justify further commitments of her own. 
But a legislator may also attribute a commitment to the legislature and use that 
commitment to justify further commitments that may be attributed to the 
legislature or that may be proposed for expression as a law – without 
necessarily endorsing those commitments herself.242 
 
Brandom calls this process of keeping track of one's own commitments and 
entitlements and those of others "deontic scorekeeping:"243  
 
Mutual understanding and communication depend on interlocutors' being 
able to keep two sets of books, to move back and forth between the point of 
view of the speaker and the audience, while keeping straight on which […] 
commitments are undertaken and which are attributed by the various parties. 
Conceptual contents, paradigmatically propositional ones, can genuinely be 
shared, but their perspectival nature means that doing so is mastering the 
coordinated system of scorekeeping perspectives, not passing something 
nonperspectival from hand to hand (or mouth to mouth).244 
 
The kind of "mutual understanding" and "communication" we are interested 
in here is the ability of legislators to negotiate legislation together even where 
they disagree on the truth245 of the relevant commitments used as 
justifications. The "conceptual contents" of these commitments are thus 
always perspectival. 
 
Canale and Tuzet summarize these relationships as follows: 
 
Competent practitioners keep track of their own and each other's linguistic 
actions: They "keep score" of commitments and entitlements by attributing 
these deontic statuses to others and undertaking them themselves.246 
 
Substitute "legislative actions" for "linguistic actions," and this provides a 
good description of the legislative process: the legislative process thus takes 
place in the field of tension between the popular commitments held by 
legislators and the legislative commitments held by the legislature. Since the 
legislature can only act through its legislators, legislators must 
simultaneously keep track of their own commitments and of the legislature's 
                                                
242 At this point, we are only interested in cases where the second set of books refers to the 
commitments and entitlements of the legislature. But the same principle holds when the 
second set of books refers to the commitments and entitlements of another legislator, as will be 
discussed in subsection 6.2.2 below on "What it means for a commitment to mean the same 
thing." 
243 See Brandom 1994, 141-143. 
244 Brandom 1994, 590. 
245 Or even the meaning, as we shall see below in chapter 6 on "Recursive pluralism." 
246 Canale and Tuzet 2007, 36-37. 
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commitments. Proposals for legislative commitments always come from 
legislators, even if those legislators do not always hold the justifying 
commitments themselves. 
 
The distinction between the perspective of the legislature and the perspective 
of the legislator also gives us an alternate way to describe adequacy: a law is 
adequate to a set of popular commitments if it can be justified in terms of that 
set from the perspective of the legislature. But given that a legislature can only 
engage in the process of justification through its individual legislators, a law 
can only be justified from the perspective of the legislature if it can be justified 
by each individual legislator. The operative word here is "can:" a legislator can 
justify a law if the law reflects the intermediate commitments which reflect 
the popular commitments serving as input commitments – whether that 
particular legislator holds all of those popular commitments or not. Whether a 
given legislator actually does justify a given law in practice is a separate 
question.  
 
 
With these tools in hand, the next section will illustrate how to derive laws 
from descriptive input commitments in general; the section after next will 
illustrate how to derive laws from conflicting descriptive input commitments 
in particular. 
 
 
5.3 Deriving output commitments from descriptive input 
commitments 
5.3.1 Synthesizing prescriptive commitments 
 
What the translation from prescriptive commitments into descriptive 
commitments has put asunder, the legislative process must join together 
again. Descriptive input commitments serve no purpose in the legislative 
process if they cannot serve as justifications for legislative proposals and 
therefore laws. Some descriptive input commitments are and always have 
been descriptive, while others started out as inadmissible prescriptive 
popular commitments that were decomposed into descriptive commitments 
(which may serve as input) and linking commitments (which in general may 
not, unless they are uncontroversial). It is this latter case which is of particular 
interest for the remainder of this chapter: the case where a descriptive input 
commitment has been translated from an inadmissible prescriptive popular 
commitment. 
 
In order for descriptive input commitments, regardless of their origin, to 
serve as justifications for output commitments – i.e., in order for output 
commitments to reflect them rather than just coincidentally be compatible with 
them – they must in general be joined together again with prescriptive 
commitments of some sort. In particular, inadmissible prescriptive 
commitments that have been decomposed into admissible descriptive 
commitments and linking commitments must now be synthesized into 
prescriptive commitments as part of the legislative process. 
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Why is this the case? Due to the gap between descriptive commitments and 
prescriptive commitments, with is analogous to the gap between is-statements 
and ought-statements, descriptive commitments in isolation cannot 
straightforwardly serve as justifications for prescriptive commitments – such 
as those expressed by laws. This is the essence of the is-ought problem: ought-
statements cannot be derived straightforwardly from is-statements.247 A 
further prescriptive commitment is generally needed to link the descriptive 
(input) commitment to the prescriptive (output) commitment, i.e., to allow the 
descriptive (input) commitment to serve as a justification for the prescriptive 
(output) commitment. From section 5.1 on "Decomposing prescriptive 
commitments," we already know what is needed to make this link from a 
mere (descriptive) statement of fact to a (prescriptive) obligation: a linking 
commitment that lends its prescriptive force to the descriptive commitment. 
 
When justifying prescriptive (output) commitments in terms of descriptive 
(input) commitments, the linking commitment is not always apparent and, in 
informal speech, is often omitted. Recall, for instance, our allergy sufferers in 
subsection 4.6.3: subset TCM of the population holds the descriptive 
commitment DESCTCM "acupuncture is an effective remedy against allergies." 
We claimed that TCM may argue: 
 
"Because acupuncture is an effective remedy against allergies, allergy sufferers 
may use acupuncture at their own expense,"  
 
thus justifying the law expressing the output commitment OUT "allergy 
sufferers may use acupuncture at their own expense" in terms of DESCTCM 
alone. However, an additional premise or link is missing here: namely the 
linking commitment LINK "allergy sufferers ought to be allowed to use 
effective remedies at their own expense."248 The full justification should 
therefore read:  
 
"Because acupuncture is an effective remedy against allergies (DESCTCM), and 
because allergy sufferers ought to be allowed to use effective remedies at their 
own expense (LINK), allergy sufferers may use acupuncture at their own 
expense (OUT)." 
                                                
247 As discussed on p. 98 and in n. 235 above, some thinkers on the is-ought problem dispute 
this, claiming that certain is-statements directly entail ought-statements – most prominently, 
teleologists and moral realists. See, e.g., MacIntyre 2007 and Harris 2010. But the claim of 
moral realists, for example, entails that is-statements of the relevant sort are also ought-
statements: the prescriptive aspect of an is-statement can be read off of the statement directly. 
The distinction between descriptive commitments and prescriptive commitments thus 
collapses with respect to descriptive commitments that can serve directly as justifications for 
prescriptive commitments. The claim in this paper is that descriptive commitments that do 
not have a prescriptive aspect cannot serve directly as justifications for prescriptive 
commitments that do have a prescriptive aspect – a claim that even moral realists would agree 
to. Black 1964 offers a more general way of deriving prescriptive statements from generally 
two descriptive statements, but it is unclear how Black's method would transfer to statements 
that express fundamental (and subsidiary) commitments, as opposed to statements expressing 
contingent characteristics such as especially desires. Similarly, the attempt by Searle 1964, 
Searle 1969 and Searle 1995 to bridge the gap using speech acts and institutional facts does 
not straightforwardly transfer to fundamental commitments. Regardless of one's approach to 
blunting Hume's guillotine, this section and the following section should be understood as 
showing how prescriptive output commitments can be derived from descriptive input 
commitments even where other bridges from is to ought are unavailable or problematic. 
248 As we will see in subsection 5.4.3 below, this is not the only possible linking commitment. 
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This gives us a general pattern for the justification of a legislative output 
commitment (OUT):249 
 
DESC & LINK  OUT 250 
 
which means that a legislative output commitment is justified in terms of a 
descriptive commitment in conjunction with a linking commitment. The 
linking commitment LINK adds prescriptive force to the merely descriptive 
commitment. 
 
This pattern also applies to legislative proposals advanced by individual 
legislators or groups thereof; i.e., intermediate commitments proposed as 
potential output commitments are derived in the same way: 
 
DESC & LINK  INT. 
 
Where DESC comes from is clear: it is either a descriptive input commitment 
that has always been descriptive, or it is a descriptive input commitment that 
has been translated from a prescriptive popular commitment (where the 
linking commitment, i.e., the prescriptive force, has been "stripped off" for the 
purposes of legislative negotiations under law as pluralism). In either case, 
DESC is admissible as an input commitment because it is descriptive. 
 
But where does LINK come from? In other words, what prescriptive 
commitments may serve as linking commitments within the legislative 
process? Clearly, controversial prescriptive commitments held by members of 
the population are ruled out under the justificatory constraint of law as 
pluralism – in particular, any linking commitments that have been "stripped 
off" during decomposition because they were controversial cannot reenter the 
legislative process. The solution is straightforward: only linking commitments 
that are uncontroversial, i.e., that are held by the entire population,251 can serve 
as linking commitments within the legislative process. By conjoining a 
descriptive input commitment (which may have been decomposed from an 
inadmissible prescriptive popular commitment) with an uncontroversial 
linking commitment, a prescriptive commitment can be synthesized for the 
purpose of serving as an intermediate commitment (representing a legislative 
proposal) or an output commitment (representing a commitment actually 
endorsed by the legislature in order to express it as a law).  
 
                                                
249 The following discussion elides the distinction between the modal verb "ought (not)," 
which is appropriate for popular commitments, and the modal verbs "shall/may (not)," 
which are appropriate for legislative (output) commitments. 
250 A stronger version of this inference would be committive as opposed to permissive, i.e., 
DESC & LINK → OUT. In general, however, inferences of this sort in legislative practice will 
be (merely) permissive – especially in light of the binding nature of output commitments as 
opposed to the generally non-binding nature of prescriptive input commitments such as 
LINK. A claim that X ought to do A may entitle one to claim that X shall do A, but it does not 
commit one to that claim. Committive inferences of this sort are more likely to arise when 
(binding) output commitments from previous legislative processes serve as linking 
commitments in a new legislative process. 
251 As always, in the relevant legislative jurisdiction. The commitment to pluralism is a special 
case of a potential linking commitment, since, by fiat, it is incorporated into the very structure 
of the legislative process.  
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In the general case, this synthesized prescriptive commitment will not be 
identical to any prescriptive commitment that was inadmissible because it 
was controversial. Synthesized prescriptive commitments are the best 
prescriptive commitments a legislator can work with during legislative 
negotiations, given that the justificatory constraint of law as pluralism has 
screened out her prescriptive commitments that were controversial. Which 
prescriptive commitments the legislator is able to synthesize during 
legislative negotiations depends on the particular constellation of popular 
commitments (in particular, on which prescriptive popular commitments are 
uncontroversial and hence admissible), and on the legislator's skill in 
decomposing controversial and hence inadmissible prescriptive 
commitments. If the legislator is skillful and if the constellation of popular 
commitments works to her advantage, she may be able to synthesize a 
prescriptive commitment within the legislative process that closely resembles 
the prescriptive popular commitment that was deemed inadmissible. 
 
Where the legislator actually succeeds in synthesizing a prescriptive 
commitment that is identical to a prescriptive popular commitment that was 
screened out by the justificatory constraint of law as pluralism, then the 
legislator has successfully "smuggled in" that controversial popular 
commitment – but as an intermediate commitment justified in terms of 
admissible input commitments, not as an input commitment itself. 
 
The following example illustrates this. 
 
5.3.2 Smuggling in controversial prescriptive commitments 
 
Say that one subset of the population, PL,252 holds the prescriptive 
fundamental commitment PRSCPL "all abortions ought to be prohibited," and 
that the complementary subset of the population, PC,253 holds the prescriptive 
fundamental commitment PRSCPC "only abortions after viability ought to be 
prohibited," where viability is determined by the best of medical ability, 
currently sometime in the second trimester. Note that 
 
PRSCPL / PRSCPC  
 
i.e., the two prescriptive commitments are mutually incompatible and hence 
inadmissible as input commitments. 
 
Now say that PL and PC decompose these inadmissible prescriptive 
commitments as follows: PL decomposes PRSCPL into DESCPL "human life 
begins at conception" and the linking commitment LINKPL "human life ought 
not to be aborted"; PC decomposes PRSCPC into DESCPC "human life begins at 
viability" and the linking commitment LINKPC "human life ought not to be 
aborted." Symbolically, 
 
 
 
                                                
252 As in "pro life." 
253 As in "pro choice." 
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PRSCPL  DESCPL & LINKPL 
 
PRSCPC  DESCPC & LINKPC. 
 
Note that 
 
DESCPL / DESCPC  
 
i.e., the two descriptive commitments are mutually incompatible, but because 
they are descriptive, they are admissible as input commitments. 
 
Note also that both PL and PC hold the linking commitment LINKPL = LINKPC 
= LINK "human life ought not to be aborted." LINK is thus uncontroversial. 
Since it is uncontroversial, this prescriptive commitment may serve as an 
input commitment and thus as a justification of a legislative output 
commitment or of any proposals for such an output commitment. PL may 
therefore argue:  
 
"Because human life begins at conception (DESCPL), and because human life 
ought not to be aborted (LINK), all abortions ought to be prohibited (INTPL)." 
In symbolic notation: 
 
DESCPL & LINK  INTPL . 
 
PC, conversely, may argue:  
 
"Because human life begins at viability (DESCPC), and because human life ought 
not to be aborted (LINK), only abortions after viability ought to be prohibited 
(INTPC)." I.e., 
 
DESCPC & LINK  INTPC . 
 
PL thus is entitled to offer the prescriptive intermediate commitment INTPL 
"all abortions ought to be prohibited" as a proposal for an output 
commitment, while PC is entitled to offer the prescriptive intermediate 
commitment INTPC "only abortions after viability ought to be prohibited" as a 
proposal for an output commitment. 
 
Note what has happened here: because of the way PL has broken down the 
initial prescriptive commitment PRSCPL "all abortions ought to be prohibited" 
(which, under the justificatory constraint of law as pluralism, may not serve 
as an input commitment to the legislative process, since it is prescriptive and 
controversial) into a descriptive commitment DESCPL "human life begins at 
conception" (which may serve as an input commitment, since it is descriptive) 
and a linking commitment LINK "human life ought not to be aborted" (which 
may also serve as an input commitment, since it is uncontroversial), PL is 
entitled to offer INTPL = PRSCPL as a proposal within the legislative process, 
even though PRSCPL cannot serve as an input commitment. Accordingly, the 
legislature may also hold INTPL = PRSCPL as a intermediate commitment, even 
though it may not hold it as an input commitment. While PRSCPL cannot enter 
the legislative process directly as an unjustified commitment, it can 
nevertheless serve as a justification within the legislative process because it 
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has itself been justified in terms of descriptive commitments and linking 
commitments that are admissible as input commitments. PRSCPL as a 
fundamental (or more generally, popular) commitment is thus excluded from 
the legislative process; but PRSCPL as an intermediate (legislative) commitment 
is admissible. The proposal cannot be justified in terms of PRSCPL as a 
controversial input commitment; but it may be justified in terms of PRSCPL if 
PRSCPL is in turn justified in terms of a descriptive input commitment and an 
uncontroversial linking commitment. 
 
This is analogously true of PRSCPC, which may likewise not serve as an input 
commitment, but it may be derived from DESCPC and LINK, which both may 
serve as input commitments. As an intermediate, legislative commitment, INTPC 
= PRSCPC "only abortions after viability ought to be prohibited" may serve as 
a proposal for an output commitment. 
 
The two controversial prescriptive popular commitments PRSCPL and PRSCPC 
have thus been "smuggled into" the legislative process by way of 
decomposition and synthesis: they have been decomposed into commitments 
that are admissible as input commitments to the legislative process, and they 
have been synthesized out of these admissible commitments within the 
legislative process.  
 
Note, however, that while the legislature may hold these controversial 
prescriptive commitments as intermediate commitments, it does not 
necessarily endorse them – unless it adopts a law that expresses them.254 
Hence, 
 
Η (L, PRSCPL) & Η (L, PRSCPC), but ~Ε (L, PRSCPL) & ~Ε (L, PRSCPC). 
 
We have thus shown how both legislative proposals INTPL = PRSCPL "all 
abortions ought to be prohibited" and INTPC = PRSCPC "only abortions after 
viability ought to be prohibited" can be justified in terms of admissible input 
commitments. There is, of course, no law which expresses both equivalent 
output commitments OUTPL "all abortions shall be prohibited" and OUTPC 
"only abortions after viability shall be prohibited" in a consistent manner. The 
process of decomposing inadmissible prescriptive commitments into 
admissible descriptive commitments and admissible linking commitments, 
thus enabling legislators to "smuggle in" inadmissible prescriptive 
commitments, does not result in a unique specification of a consistent law. 
The process of decomposition and synthesis merely clarifies which 
commitments may serve as justifications for laws and how those justifications 
may be derived.255  
                                                
254 Or otherwise endorses them by making them explicit, as we shall see in section 7.1 below. 
255 This process of decomposition and synthesis mirrors or implements the two logical 
moments of comprehensive pluralism according to Rosenfeld 1999, 209: "Set against a 
competition among a multiplicity of first-order norms vying for predominance, 
comprehensive pluralism's first logical moment is a negative one characterized by a strict 
refusal to endorse or favor any of the competing first-order norms. Thus, in its negative 
moment, comprehensive pluralism imposes strict equality and neutrality among all existing 
first-order norms and the conceptions of the good from which they derive." This first, 
negative moment corresponds to the decomposition of prescriptive popular commitments 
necessitated by the justificatory constraint of law as pluralism, which implements the prima 
facie equal treatment of fundamental commitments under the normative conception of 
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5.3.3 Skillful decomposition of prescriptive commitments 
 
This will serve us well in the chapter 6 on "Recursive pluralism," which will 
illustrate how to derive laws that do reflect all the (descriptive and 
uncontroversial prescriptive) input commitments in a consistent manner. But 
it also helps us answer the question that motivated this example: How can a 
legislator skillfully smuggle a prescriptive commitment into the legislative 
process by decomposing it first into a descriptive commitment and a linking 
commitment? Are there good ways and bad ways to go about doing this? 
 
The legislators representing subsets of the population PL and PC in the 
example above were successful in smuggling in their prescriptive 
commitments PRSCPL and PRSCPC: by decomposing them completely into 
descriptive commitments and linking commitments that can serve as input to 
the legislative process, the legislators ensured that PRSCPL and PRSCPC can 
serve as justifications for laws, even though they are introduced into 
legislative negotiations as intermediate commitments derived from input 
commitments rather than directly as popular commitments serving as input 
commitments. 
 
But what if PRSCPL, for instance, had been decomposed differently? Recall 
that PRSCPL is "all abortions ought to be prohibited." Say that the legislator 
representing PL had opted to decompose PRSCPL into DESCPL2 "abortion is 
against the will of God" and LINKPL2 "the will of God ought to be law." Also 
                                                
pluralism. Rosenfeld continues: "Carried to its logical conclusion, however, comprehensive 
pluralism's first moment leads to self-destruction. If all first-order norms are completely 
neutralized through a leveling negation, then the very pursuit of pluralism would become 
meaningless. In the absence of a plurality of viable conceptions of the good, no first-order 
norms would remain for pluralism to protect. Accordingly, to avoid self-destruction, 
comprehensive pluralism must supplement its negative moment with a positive moment. The 
object of that positive moment is to foster readmittance of previously leveled and equalized 
conceptions of the good into the pluralist universe." This second, positive moment 
corresponds to the synthesis of prescriptive intermediate commitments within the legislative 
process, thus "readmitting" prescriptive popular commitments that were previously screened 
out by the justificatory constraint. But as Rosenfeld points out: "Not all conceptions of the 
good excluded in the course of comprehensive pluralism's negative moment can gain 
readmission in its positive moment. For example, a crusading religion, for which conversion 
of the infidel, by force if necessary, is a sacred duty that admits of no exceptions, has no place 
under comprehensive pluralism." It has no place under law as pluralism, either: a 
prescriptive commitment can only be "readmitted" or synthesized by way of a linking 
commitment that is uncontroversial: this ensures that the content of competing commitments is 
taken into account when readmitting or synthesizing controversial prescriptive 
commitments. While law as pluralism is defined as a procedure, without adherence to any 
substantive norms other than the second-order commitment to pluralism, its reliance on the 
content of conflicting commitments during the synthesis phase keeps law of pluralism from 
degenerating into pure proceduralism. Rosenfeld 1999, 211, makes the analogous claim about 
comprehensive pluralism: "[S]ince regeneration of first-order norms in the course of its 
positive moment is not automatic, but instead contingent on their compatibility with second-
order norms and with other first-order norms, comprehensive pluralism's positive moment, 
unlike its negative moment, is not reducible to proceduralism." What distinguishes law as 
pluralism from comprehensive pluralism in this context is that decomposition, unlike the first 
moment of comprehensive pluralism, is not entirely reducible to proceduralism, either, since 
the content of prescriptive popular commitments determines whether they are 
uncontroversial and hence admissible as input commitments in the first place. 
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assume that the legislator representing PC had opted to decompose PRSCPC 
"only abortions after viability ought to be prohibited" as before into DESCPC 
"human life begins at viability" and LINKPC "human life ought not to be 
aborted." What would the consequences of this different strategy be for the 
proposed output commitments OUTPL "all abortions shall be prohibited" and 
OUTPC "only abortions after viability shall be prohibited"? 
 
As before, OUTPC can still be justified within the legislative process solely in 
terms of admissible input commitments: it derives from DESCPC, which is 
admissible because it is descriptive, and from LINKPC, which is admissible 
because it is shared by PL and hence uncontroversial.256 OUTPL, however, can 
now no longer be justified solely in terms of admissible input commitments: 
while DESCPL2, as a descriptive commitment, is admissible, LINKPL2 is not, 
since the "the will of God ought to be law" is not shared by PC,257 and hence it 
cannot serve as a linking commitment. Because of the way the legislators 
representing PL and PC, respectively, opted to decompose their prescriptive 
commitments, the output commitment OUTPC reflecting PC's fundamental 
commitments can be justified within the legislative process, while the output 
commitment OUTPL reflecting PL's fundamental commitments cannot. 
Because the legislator representing PC was more skillful than the legislator 
representing PL, PC's prescriptive commitments could be smuggled into the 
legislative process and reflected in the output commitment, while PL's 
prescriptive commitments could not. 
 
Of course, not all is lost for PL: the PL legislator must merely decompose 
PRSCPL according to the first method, namely into DESCPL and LINKPL instead 
of according to the second method, namely into DESCPL2 and LINKPL2. Then 
the legislative playing field would be level again. 
 
At first glance, it might appear as if law as pluralism indeed privileges non-
religious justifications over religious justifications, thus deriving a kind of 
"principle of secular rationale"258 through the back door: after all, LINKPL 
"human life ought not to be aborted" is admissible as an input commitment, 
while LINKPL2 "the will of God ought to be law" is not. But this conclusion is 
false for three reasons: First, descriptive religious commitments such as 
"abortion is against the will of God" are just as admissible as are descriptive 
non-religious commitments such as "human life begins at viability." Second, 
an admissible prescriptive popular commitment such as "human life ought 
not to be aborted" may in fact (also) be motivated by religious conviction. 
Third, what separates admissible from inadmissible prescriptive popular 
commitments is not their religious or non-religious motivation, but rather 
their shared nature. Non-religious prescriptive commitments that are not 
shared are just as inadmissible as are religious prescriptive commitments that 
are not shared.259 
                                                
256 Even though PL has not explicitly endorsed LINKPC by introducing it as a commitment of 
its own, LINKPC "human life ought not to be aborted" is a committive inference of PRSCPL "all 
abortions ought to be prohibited," which we know PL holds. 
257 At least as far as we know: if everyone agrees that the will of God ought to be law, then 
OUTPL can in fact be justified solely in terms of admissible input commitments. 
258 Cf. Audi 2000, 86. 
259 But always bear in mind that not all input commitments used as justifications in the 
legislative process must be shared (or "public"): only prescriptive input commitments must be 
shared, not descriptive input commitments. 
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This last point can be illustrated by flipping the previous example. Say that, as 
in the original example, PL decomposes its prescriptive commitment PRSCPL 
"all abortions ought to be prohibited" into DESCPL "human life begins at 
conception" and LINKPL "human life ought not to be aborted." PC, however, 
deviates from the original example and decomposes its prescriptive 
commitment PRSCPC "only abortions after viability ought to be prohibited" 
into DESCPC2 "before viability, embryos and fetuses are part of the pregnant 
woman's body and have no independent existence" and LINKPC2 "women 
ought to have full control over their own bodies." In this case, PRSCPL can be 
justified as an intermediate commitment within the legislative process in 
terms of admissible input commitments, and it may serve as a justification for 
the output commitment OUTPL "all abortions shall be prohibited," while 
PRSCPC relies on the linking commitment LINKPC2, which is inadmissible 
because it is not shared by PL,260 and hence PRSCPC cannot serve as a 
justification for the output commitment OUTPC "only abortions after viability 
shall be prohibited." Here, PL is represented by the more skillful legislator, 
and the output commitment reflects its prescriptive commitments, while PC is 
left out in the cold, because its desired output commitment cannot be justified 
in terms of its prescriptive commitments (in the way they have been 
decomposed by PC's legislator). Even though PC's linking commitment 
LINKPC2 "women ought to have full control over their own bodies" is entirely 
non-religious (or at least PC believes it to be), it is not admissible as an input 
commitment because it is not shared. 
 
The moral of the story is: legislators are free to decompose their prescriptive 
commitments into whatever descriptive commitments and linking 
commitments they please – depending, for instance, on what other 
commitments they hold and why they hold the commitments they hold; but a 
skillful legislator whose goal is to smuggle her prescriptive (popular) 
commitments into the legislative process will always decompose her 
prescriptive commitments as follows: 
 
PRSC  DESC & LINK, where LINK is an uncontroversial prescriptive 
commitment. 
 
If this decomposition rule is followed, the legislator may make legislative 
proposals that reflect her prescriptive (popular) commitments, even if those 
prescriptive commitments are controversial and hence inadmissible as input 
commitments. If this decomposition rule is not followed, there is a danger 
that the legislator will be unable to justify her preferred legislative proposals 
in terms of admissible input commitments and hence these proposals are 
ruled out by the justificatory constraint of law as pluralism, while competing 
legislative proposals that are so justified determine which laws are outputted 
by the legislative process. 
 
                                                
260 At least as far as we know: if everyone agrees that women ought to have full control over 
their own bodies, then OUTPC can in fact be justified solely in terms of admissible input 
commitments. 
 114 
For instance, the prescriptive popular commitment "methane emissions ought 
to be reduced"261 might skillfully be decomposed into the descriptive 
commitment "methane emissions cause global warming" and the linking 
commitment "global warming ought to be reduced" if everyone in fact agrees 
that global warming ought to be reduced (even if they do not necessarily 
agree that methane emissions cause global warming). The output 
commitment "methane emissions shall be reduced" would thus be justifiable 
in terms of the skillfully decomposed prescriptive popular commitment. But if 
there is disagreement as to whether global warming ought to be reduced (say, 
if some legislators believe that northern climes ought to be given a chance to 
grow more wheat and corn), then another decomposition of "methane 
emissions ought to be reduced" might be more appropriate: say, into the 
(compound) descriptive commitment "methane emissions cause the ozone 
layer to deteriorate, which causes skin cancer" and the linking commitment 
"skin cancer ought to be reduced" – if everyone in fact agrees that skin cancer 
ought to be reduced.262 
 
The legislator's skill thus lies in the ability to gauge which linking 
commitments are shared by everyone (or at least are represented by all 
legislators) and hence can serve as admissible linking commitments in the 
legislative process. This determination of a skillful decomposition is 
contingent on the actual makeup of the legislature and the population the 
legislature represents: there is no way to simply "read off" from a prescriptive 
commitment PRSC what would be a "good" way to decompose it into a 
descriptive commitment DESC and a linking commitment LINK. A 
decomposition is only "good" if the commitment expressed by the split-off 
prescriptive component LINK is in fact shared by everyone. 
 
 
5.4 Deriving output commitments from conflicting descriptive 
input commitments 
5.4.1 Getting to the same law by different routes 
 
The example of methane emissions at the end of the last section suggests how 
laws – expressing legislative commitments that are actually endorsed by the 
legislature as output commitments, rather than merely proposed by individual 
legislators as intermediate commitments – can be justified in terms of 
different, distinct descriptive popular commitments serving as input 
commitments. For instance, the law "methane emissions shall be reduced" 
may be justified in terms of the descriptive commitment "methane emissions 
cause global warming" and the linking commitment "global warming ought 
to be reduced," assuming that everyone agrees on that linking commitment, 
                                                
261 This is probably not a fundamental popular commitment, but it may very well be a 
subsidiary commitment derived from fundamental commitments. 
262 Note that it matters not to law as pluralism whether the decomposition is "sincere" or 
"insincere," i.e., whether the legislator, deep down in her heart of hearts, truly believes that 
the descriptive commitment resulting from the decomposition is true. In this sense, law as 
pluralism has more affinity with the approach of Greenawalt 1995, 163-164, in relation to 
public justification than, say, to Rawls, at least as interpreted by Greenawalt 1995, 112-113, or 
to Sajó 2008, 626, specifically with regard to legislative reasons: "The legislative reasons given 
must be honest; their honesty and accessibility are subject to judicial review." 
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and that same law may be justified in terms of the descriptive commitment 
"methane emissions cause the ozone layer to deteriorate, which causes skin 
cancer" and the linking commitment "skin cancer ought to be reduced," 
assuming that everyone agrees on that linking commitment. The same output 
commitment may thus be justified in terms of distinct descriptive input 
commitments, even if each of the descriptive input commitments is controversial, 
i.e., even if not everyone agrees that "methane emissions cause global 
warming" and not everyone agrees that "methane emissions cause the ozone 
layer to deteriorate, which causes skin cancer." In fact, the law "methane 
emissions shall be reduced" may be endorsed by everyone (and hence by the 
legislature, which represents everyone), even if no one in the legislature 
believes that both of these descriptive input commitments are true. As long as 
everyone holds both of the two linking commitments ("global warming ought 
to be reduced" and "skin cancer ought to be reduced"), no one needs to 
simultaneously hold both of the descriptive popular commitments serving as 
input commitments. The same law can thus be justified by two different 
routes that originate at two different (controversial) starting points, pass 
through two different (uncontroversial) linking commitments, and end up at 
the same (uncontroversial) output commitment, which is then endorsed in the 
form of a law. 
 
This is also true even if the descriptive input commitments conflict with each 
other, i.e., are mutually incompatible. In subsection 4.6.3 on "No exclusion of 
other input commitments" and section 5.2 on "Deriving output commitments 
from input commitments," we developed some of the tools for doing this. The 
following subsection uses an example to illustrate in more detail how this is 
done, with the help of uncontroversial, but distinct, linking commitments. 
 
5.4.2 Derivation using distinct linking commitments 
 
Let's go back and see how our allergy sufferers in subsection 4.6.3 are doing. 
Recall that one subset of the population, TCM, believes that DESCTCM 
"acupuncture is an effective remedy against allergies," while the 
complementary subset of the population, NTCM, believes that *DESCTCM 
"acupuncture is not an effective remedy against allergies." DESCTCM and 
*DESCTCM are mutually incompatible; the set of descriptive commitments 
{DESCTCM, *DESCTCM} is inconsistent. In order for a law expressing an output 
commitment OUT to reflect both of these descriptive commitments under law 
as pluralism, there must be a linking commitment LINKTCM that is used by 
TCM as part of its justification of OUT but is also held by NTCM, even if NTCM 
does not use it as part of its justification; analogously, there must be a linking 
commitment LINKNTCM that is used by NTCM as part of its justification of 
OUT but is also held by TCM, even if TCM does not use it as part of its 
justification. Why does LINKTCM have to be held by NTCM, even if NTCM 
does not use it as part of its justification, and why does LINKNTCM have to be 
held by TCM, even if TCM does not use it as part of it justification? Because 
otherwise, these linking commitments would be controversial and hence 
ruled out by the justificatory constraint of law as pluralism. 
 
In the TCM example in subsection 5.3.1 on "Synthesizing prescriptive 
commitments," a candidate for LINKTCM was suggested: "allergy sufferers 
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ought to be allowed to use effective remedies at their own expense." This 
linking commitment would allow TCM to argue:  
 
"Because acupuncture is an effective remedy against allergies (DESCTCM), and 
because allergy sufferers ought to be allowed to use effective remedies at their 
own expense (LINKTCM), allergy sufferers may use acupuncture at their own 
expense (OUT)."  
 
Is NTCM likely also to hold LINKTCM? It would certainly not be inconsistent 
for NTCM to do so: the disagreement between TCM and NTCM is not about 
TCM's linking commitment, but rather about TCM's descriptive commitment. 
If NTCM does indeed hold LINKTCM, TCM may use it as a linking 
commitment under the justificatory constraint of law as pluralism.  
 
Even though NTCM may hold LINKTCM, however, it does not use it as part of 
its own justification: there is no way to get from *DESCTCM "acupuncture is not 
an effective remedy against allergies" to OUT "allergy sufferers may use 
acupuncture at their own expense" by way of LINKTCM "allergy sufferers 
ought to be allowed to use effective remedies at their own expense." In order to 
get from *DESCTCM to OUT, NTCM may instead use the following linking 
commitment LINKNTCM: "allergy sufferers ought to be allowed to use ineffective 
remedies at their own expense." This linking commitment would allow 
NTCM to argue:  
 
"Because acupuncture is not an effective remedy against allergies (*DESCTCM), 
and because allergy sufferers ought to be allowed to use ineffective remedies at 
their own expense (LINKNTCM), allergy sufferers may use acupuncture at their 
own expense (OUT)."  
 
Although TCM does not use NTCM's linking commitment LINKNTCM as part 
of its own justification, TCM may very well still hold LINKNTCM. If this is the 
case, both LINKTCM and LINKNTCM are therefore admissible under the 
justificatory constraint of law as pluralism. The legislative output 
commitment OUT can accordingly be justified by way of two distinct pairs of 
descriptive commitments and linking commitments, even though the 
respective descriptive commitments are mutually incompatible: 
 
DESCTCM & LINKTCM  OUT and  
 
*DESCTCM & LINKNTCM  OUT,  
 
where {DESCTCM, *DESCTCM} is inconsistent but {LINKTCM, LINKNTCM} is not. 
 
5.4.3 Derivation using shared linking commitments 
 
In the example in the preceding subsection, LINKTCM and LINKNTCM were 
uncontroversial, but they were not identical, i.e. 
 
LINKTCM ≠ LINKNTCM .  
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While these linking commitments were uncontroversial, they were not used by 
both TCM and NTCM as part of their respective justifications, and hence it 
had to be surmised that they were in fact uncontroversial.  
 
Is it instead possible to find a single, shared linking commitment LINK that is 
in fact used by both TCM and NTCM as part of their respective justifications – 
analogously to the shared linking commitment in the abortion example in 
5.3.2, but where a consensual output commitment can be justified in terms of 
the input commitments? I.e., can a consensual law be justified by conflicting 
descriptive input commitments and a single, shared, uncontroversial linking 
commitment? If so, then we have come a long way toward a mechanism for 
generating legislation that is adequate to conflicting (descriptive) popular 
commitments. 
 
The easiest solution would be the conjunction of LINKTCM and LINKNTCM: 
"allergy sufferers ought to be allowed to use effective remedies at their own 
expense (LINKTCM), and allergy sufferers ought to be allowed to use ineffective 
remedies at their own expense (LINKNTCM)." This can be simplified as LINK1: 
"allergy sufferers ought to be allowed to use any remedy, whether effective or 
ineffective, at their own expense." This allows TCM to say:  
 
"Because acupuncture is an effective remedy against allergies (DESCTCM), and 
because allergy sufferers ought to be allowed to use any remedy, whether 
effective or ineffective, at their own expense (LINK1), allergy sufferers may 
use acupuncture at their own expense (OUT)." 
 
NTCM can make the analogous argument:  
 
"Because acupuncture is not an effective remedy against allergies (*DESCTCM), 
and because allergy sufferers ought to be allowed to use any remedy, whether 
effective or ineffective, at their own expense (LINK1), allergy sufferers may 
use acupuncture at their own expense (OUT)." 
 
As a commitment, LINK1 is a weak one, however, and it leaves out a lot of 
information that might be relevant to both TCM and NTCM. It makes no 
distinction between remedies that both TCM and NTCM might deem 
effective (say, cortisone shots) and those that both TCM and NTCM might 
deem ineffective (say, tap-dancing). Both TCM and NTCM might hold a 
shared commitment that effective remedies ought to be paid for by health 
insurers, while ineffective remedies ought to be paid for by allergy sufferers 
out of their own pockets. In each of the descriptive commitments DESCTCM 
"acupuncture is an effective remedy against allergies" and *DESCTCM 
"acupuncture is not an effective remedy against allergies," the only operative 
part of the predicate for purposes of the justification via LINK1 is that 
acupuncture is (some sort of) a remedy against allergies, not that it is effective or 
ineffective. Both TCM's descriptive commitment and NTCM's descriptive 
commitment could be reformulated as "acupuncture is (some sort of) a 
remedy against allergies" and could be used by both as a premise in their 
argument. But then TCM and NTCM wouldn't disagree about their relevant 
descriptive commitments, and the set of descriptive input commitments 
would be trivially consistent. In effect, the linking commitment LINK1 filters 
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out the controversial aspects of the descriptive commitments and makes them 
irrelevant to everyone's argument. 
 
A stronger linking commitment would be one that both TCM and NTCM 
share, but that preserves the distinct, conflicting aspects of their respective 
descriptive commitments. The following linking commitment LINK2 meets 
these criteria:  
 
LINK2: "allergy sufferers ought to be allowed to use remedies whose 
effectiveness is contested at least at their own expense." 
 
What does it mean for something to be contested? It does not simply mean that 
two input commitments are incompatible – in this case, the input 
commitments DESCTCM and *DESCTCM. It means that the incompatibility at 
issue arises due to an essentially contested concept – in this case, the concept 
"effective remedy against allergies."263 TCM and NTCM do not agree on the 
meaning of "effective remedy against allergies:"264 TCM believes that "effective 
remedy against allergies" means a set of remedies that includes acupuncture; 
NTCM believes that "effective remedy against allergies" means a set of 
remedies that does not include acupuncture. The incompatibility between 
DESCTCM and *DESCTCM thus arises due to the essential contestability of the 
concept they both make use of, namely "effective remedy against allergies." 
Specifically, it is the effectiveness of remedies against allergies that is contested 
(not, say, what constitutes a remedy or an allergy).  
 
Under the assumptions we've made here, both TCM and NTCM are likely to 
share this prescriptive commitment, hence it is admissible as an input 
commitment under the justificatory constraint of law as pluralism.265 
Assuming that all legislators hold LINK2 and hence LINK2 is uncontroversial, 
the legislature can even endorse LINK2 (as an intermediate commitment) 
without contradiction. Therefore, for a legislature L, 
 
(∀ X Η (X, LINK2))  (E (L, LINK2)). 
 
But does LINK2 actually allow TCM to make the following argument: 
 
"Because acupuncture is an effective remedy against allergies (DESCTCM), and 
because allergy sufferers ought to be allowed to use remedies whose 
effectiveness is contested at least at their own expense (LINK2), allergy 
sufferers may use acupuncture at their own expense (OUT)," 
 
                                                
263 This is analogous to the essential contestability of "a work of art." See the discussion on 
essentially contested concepts on p. 62 and in n. 152. 
264 At least in terms of its extension, i.e., the set of referents to which it applies, as opposed to 
its intension, i.e., the set of features shared by everything to which it applies. Subsection 6.2.2 
below will discuss in detail the differences of meaning that are relevant to law as pluralism. 
265 But note that this is an entirely contingent fact: another legislature might include members 
who do not share this commitment, in which case it would be inadmissible as an input 
commitment. Unlike the distinct linking commitments in the previous subsection, however, 
the uncontroversial nature of this linking commitment can be put to the test – namely, by 
seeing whether both TCM and NTCM use it as part of their justifications. 
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while NTCM may make the analogous argument using *DESCTCM instead of 
DESCTCM? Yes – but an additional premise is missing, namely the descriptive 
commitment 
 
DESCECC: "the effectiveness of acupuncture as a remedy against allergies is 
contested." 
 
Where does DESCECC come from, and who holds it? It is not an input 
commitment in the scenario described here: the only popular commitments 
serving as descriptive input commitments that say anything about the 
effectiveness of acupuncture are DESCTCM and *DESCTCM, which claim that 
acupuncture is effective and ineffective, respectively. As far as TCM and 
NTCM know at the outset, the concept "effective remedy against allergies" 
may not be essentially contested; it only turns out to be essentially contested 
once the legislative process is underway. 
 
DESCECC is instead a descriptive commitment that emerges through the 
legislative process and is held by the legislature. DESCECC is thus a (descriptive) 
intermediate legislative commitment. It does not say anything about the 
effectiveness of acupuncture as such; instead, it says something about what 
the input commitments say about the effectiveness of acupuncture. In this 
sense, DESCECC is a descriptive commitment about the subsets of the 
population (and the legislators representing these subsets) and the input 
commitments they hold, not about the object of those input commitments. The 
formulation of DESCECC depends entirely on the contingent fact of which 
popular commitments enter the legislative process as input commitments, 
and because that fact is uncontroversial, DESCECC is itself uncontroversial; it 
can thus be endorsed by the legislature. This derivation can be represented as 
follows, where L is the legislature: 
 
Η (TCM, DESCTCM) & Η (NTCM, *DESCTCM)  
 
 Η (L, {DESCTCM, *DESCTCM })  
 
 Η (L, DESCECC) 
 
 E (L, DESCECC). 
 
The intermediate commitment DESCECC is thus a recognition by the legislature 
(and hence by the legislators making up the legislature) that the inconsistency 
of a set of input commitments arises from the essential contestability of a 
concept employed by those commitments. Since TCM holds DESCTCM and 
NTCM holds the conflicting commitment *DESCTCM, and since both of these 
descriptive popular commitments may serve as input commitments, the 
legislature is entitled to hold them. But it cannot endorse them, since they are 
mutually incompatible: it can only endorse the fact that their mutual 
incompatibility arises from the essential contestability of the key concept they 
employ. 
 
From the perspective of a particular legislator, each of the descriptive 
commitments DESCTCM and *DESCTCM is held by some legislators within the 
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legislative process, but not necessarily by that particular legislator. From the 
perspective of a legislator representing NTCM, for instance,  
 
∃ Y (Η (Y, DESCTCM))  
 
is true even if DESCTCM is not. Since the legislature holds any popular 
commitment that serves as an input commitment, the legislator representing 
NTCM will also be able to use Η (L, DESCTCM) as a premise for her arguments, 
even if the legislator does not hold DESCTCM herself. Accordingly, all 
legislators in the legislature can derive the legislative proposal expressing the 
output commitment OUT "allergy sufferers may use acupuncture at their own 
expense" as follows: 
 
Η (L, DESCTCM) & Η (L, *DESCTCM)  Ε (L, DESCECC) 
 
Ε (L, DESCECC) & Ε (L, LINK2)  Ε (L, OUT). 
 
Or in words: "Because the legislature has endorsed that the effectiveness of 
acupuncture as a remedy against allergies is contested (Ε (L, DESCECC)), and 
because the legislature has endorsed that allergy sufferers ought to be 
allowed to use remedies whose effectiveness is contested at least at their own 
expense (Ε (L, LINK2)), the legislature may endorse that allergy sufferers may 
use acupuncture at their own expense (Ε (L, OUT))." 
 
The justification for the legislature to adopt the law expressing OUT is thus 
derived from the two conflicting descriptive input commitments DESCTCM 
and *DESCTCM, the descriptive intermediate commitment DESCECC inferred 
from this inconsistent set of input commitments, and the shared linking 
commitment LINK2, all of which are either admissible as input commitments 
under the justificatory constraint of law as pluralism, or are derived as 
uncontroversial legislative commitments within the legislative process. Given 
two conflicting descriptive input commitments and a shared prescriptive 
input commitment, the legislative process outputs a law that reflects all of 
these input commitments. The law is thus adequate to the conflicting 
descriptive popular commitments serving as input to the legislative process. 
 
Of course, this is only possible in our TCM scenario because a (reasonably) 
strong linking commitment LINK2 was found that can help justify a 
(reasonably) strong law. In the worst case scenario, the only available linking 
commitments will be the (potentially very weak) lowest common 
denominator of the legislators' prescriptive commitments. Chapter 6 on 
"Recursive pluralism" below will discuss how to derive laws nevertheless 
when no strong linking commitments can be found. 
 
But first, consider a variant on this subsection's TCM example: namely where 
the mutually incompatible popular commitments are originally prescriptive, 
not descriptive. 
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5.4.4 Derivation from decomposed prescriptive commitments 
 
The preceding TCM example started with conflicting descriptive 
commitments that (as far as we know) were not translated from prescriptive 
commitments. Now consider the situation where a law is justified in terms of 
conflicting descriptive commitments which are in fact translated from 
conflicting prescriptive commitments. Is it still possible for legislators holding 
conflicting prescriptive commitments to justify the same law, i.e., can a law be 
found that is adequate to an inconsistent set of prescriptive popular 
commitments (to the extent achievable under the justificatory constraint)? 
 
Let's start with the prescriptive popular commitments held by TCM and 
NTCM, respectively, in subsection 4.6.3:  
 
PRSCTCM: "health insurers ought to pay for acupuncture treatment of 
allergies," and 
 
*PRSCTCM: "health insurers ought not to pay for acupuncture treatment of 
allergies." 
 
These prescriptive commitments are mutually incompatible; the set {PRSCTCM, 
*PRSCTCM} is inconsistent. As noted in subsection 4.6.3, there is no (relevant) 
law expressing a legislative output commitment OUT that (fully) reflects both 
prescriptive commitments PRSCTCM and *PRSCTCM. But is there a law that 
reflects these commitments to the extent achievable under the justificatory 
constraint of law as pluralism? 
 
PRSCTCM can be straightforwardly decomposed into DESCTCM "acupuncture is 
an effective remedy against allergies" and LINKTCM "health insurers ought to 
pay for effective remedies against allergies." Analogously, *PRSCTCM can be 
decomposed into *DESCTCM "acupuncture is not an effective remedy against 
allergies" and LINKNTCM "health insurers ought not to pay for ineffective 
remedies against allergies." DESCTCM and *DESCTCM can serve as input 
commitments because they are descriptive; LINKTCM and LINKNTCM can serve 
as input commitments because they are uncontroversial.266 As before: 
 
Η (L, DESCTCM) & Η (L, *DESCTCM)  Ε (L, DESCECC), 
 
i.e., the legislature endorses that the effectiveness of acupuncture as a remedy 
against allergies is contested. 
 
Is LINK2 still available as a linking commitment as it was before in order to 
derive 
 
Ε (L, DESCECC) & Ε (L, LINK2)  Ε (L, OUT)? 
 
In other words, can both TCM and NTCM hold the commitment 
                                                
266 At least we have no reason to believe that TCM or NTCM would object to either of them. 
But note that even if these linking commitments are uncontroversial, the term "(in)effective 
remedy" is still an essentially contested concept – TCM and NTCM do not agree on what that 
term means (at least in terms of its extension as opposed to its intension). See the discussion in 
subsection 5.4.3 above. 
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LINK2: "allergy sufferers ought to be allowed to use remedies whose 
effectiveness is contested at least at their own expense"?  
 
As always, the answer in practice depends on the makeup of the particular 
legislature in question and the population it represents. But there is no 
theoretical obstacle to both TCM and NTCM holding LINK2, given that LINK2 
is not incompatible with any of the known prescriptive commitments held by 
TCM and NTCM, including PRSCTCM and *PRSCTCM, respectively: LINK2 does 
not conflict with PRSCTCM because a commitment that health insurers ought to 
pay for acupuncture does not rule out that allergy sufferers ought to be 
allowed to use acupuncture at least at their own expense, while LINK2 does 
not conflict with *PRSCTCM because a commitment that health insurers ought 
not to pay for acupuncture does not rule out that allergy sufferers ought to be 
allowed to use acupuncture at least at their own expense. LINK2 is likely 
compatible with the prescriptive commitments held by everyone, and is hence 
likely admissible as a linking commitment.  
 
So all legislators representing TCM can derive the output commitment OUT 
"allergy sufferers may use acupuncture at their own expense" as follows: 
 
Η (TCM, PRSCTCM)  Η (TCM, DESCTCM) & Η (TCM, LINKTCM) 
 
Η (TCM, DESCTCM)  Η (L, DESCTCM) 
 
Η (NTCM, *DESCTCM)  Η (L, *DESCTCM) 
 
∀ X Η (X, LINK2)  E (L, LINK2) 
 
Η (L, DESCTCM) & Η (L, *DESCTCM)  Ε (L, DESCECC) 
 
Ε (L, DESCECC) & Ε (L, LINK2)  Ε (L, OUT). 
 
Analogously, all legislators representing NTCM can derive the output 
commitment OUT as follows: 
 
Η (NTCM, *PRSCTCM)  Η (NTCM, *DESCTCM) & Η (NTCM, LINKNTCM) 
 
Η (NTCM, *DESCTCM)  Η (L, *DESCTCM) 
 
Η (TCM, DESCTCM)  Η (L, DESCTCM) 
 
∀ X Η (X, LINK2)  E (L, LINK2) 
 
Η (L, DESCTCM) & Η (L, *DESCTCM)  Ε (L, DESCECC) 
 
Ε (L, DESCECC) & Ε (L, LINK2)  Ε (L, OUT). 
 
Since all legislators can derive the output commitment OUT in a way that 
reflects their respective input commitments, it is adequate to the conflicting 
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commitments of all the legislators and hence of all the members of the 
population whom they represent.267 
 
5.4.5 Checking output commitments for adequacy 
 
In the preceding subsections, we have shown how to derive an adequate law 
from conflicting descriptive input commitments. But given a law, how can we 
check whether that law is adequate to the set of input commitments? We 
could check one by one whether it is possible to derive the law from each 
input commitment; but generally, it suffices to check whether the law is 
incompatible with any of the input commitments. While this does not show 
that the law is actually derived from a given input commitment, it does show 
that the law is in principle derivable from the input commitment, if the output 
commitment bears some substantive relation to the input commitment.268 
Compatibility as verified by this procedure is thus a necessary, but not a 
sufficient, condition for adequacy. The following test checks whether a law is 
in principle derivable from a given input commitment in this sense. 
 
Generally speaking, none of the commitments endorsed by the legislature 
may preclude entitlement to any other commitment held by the legislature. If 
a commitment endorsed by the legislature were to preclude entitlement to 
any other legislative commitment (all of which are derived from at least some 
of the input commitments), this would contradict the normative conception of 
pluralism. 
 
This can be represented symbolically as follows, for a given commitment C: 
 
Η (L, C) / Ε (L, *C). 
 
Recall that Η (L, C) is not incompatible with Η (L, *C), i.e., the legislature may 
hold the incompatible set of commitments {C, *C}. But if the legislature holds a 
commitment (i.e., if any of the legislators hold a commitment that serves as 
input to the legislative process or an intermediate commitment derived from 
the input commitments), then the legislature is not entitled to endorse any 
commitment incompatible with that commitment.  
 
Adequacy is a special case of this general rule: where a law is adequate to the 
input commitments to the legislative process, none of the output 
commitments expressed by that law may be incompatible with any of the 
input commitments. If the legislature were entitled to endorse an output 
commitment incompatible with an input commitment, then the law 
expressing that output commitment would not be adequate to the input 
commitment – which would violate the normative conception of pluralism. 
 
Informally speaking, an adequate law accepts the possibility that either of two 
mutually incompatible (descriptive) input commitments may be true. 
 
                                                
267 Note that in this example, the respective linking commitments LINKTCM and LINKNTCM are 
not used as premises for the justification of OUT; but they may very well be used as premises 
for the justification of further output commitments that are consistent with OUT. 
268 See the discussion on p. 52 and in n. 117. 
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The law expressing the output commitment OUT "allergy sufferers may use 
acupuncture at their own expense" developed in the TCM cases above is 
adequate (in this simplified sense), since OUT is not incompatible with either 
DESCTCM "acupuncture is an effective remedy against allergies" or *DESCTCM 
"acupuncture is not an effective remedy against allergies" – even though 
DESCTCM is incompatible with *DESCTCM. Nothing can be inferred from OUT 
about whether acupuncture is an effective remedy against allergies or not. 
Informally speaking, OUT accepts the possibility that either DESCTCM is true 
or that *DESCTCM is true. 
 
Or take abortion: an adequate law on abortion must accept the possibility that 
DESCPL "human life begins at conception," but it must also accept the 
possibility that DESCPC "human life begins at viability."269 An example of such 
a law might express the output commitment OUT1 "abortions after viability 
shall be prohibited" (not: "only abortions after viability shall be prohibited"), 
which would not specify whether abortions performed before viability shall 
also be prohibited. Another example of such a law might express the output 
commitment OUT2 "destruction of any embryo or fetus without the consent of 
the woman carrying the embryo or fetus shall be prohibited," which would 
not specify whether the act shall also be prohibited if the woman carrying the 
embryo or fetus does give her consent. 
 
If endorsement of an output commitment precludes entitlement to an input 
commitment, then the law expressing that output commitment is not 
adequate to the input commitment. If endorsement of an output commitment 
does not preclude entitlement to an input commitment, then the law 
expressing that output commitment is in principle derivable from that input 
commitment, even if it is not actually derived from the input commitment. This 
means that the law is at least in principle adequate to the input commitment. 
 
 
5.5 Bridging the gap 
 
Section 5.1 in this chapter showed how a population's prescriptive 
commitments can be decomposed into descriptive commitments and linking 
commitments, in order that the (perhaps controversial) descriptive 
components and the (uncontroversial) prescriptive linking components may 
serve as input to the legislative process under the justificatory constraint of 
law as pluralism. Sections 5.2 to 5.4 showed how distinct descriptive 
commitments – whether fundamental descriptive commitments or subsidiary 
descriptive commitments translated from fundamental or subsidiary 
prescriptive commitments – can serve as justifications for the same law, even 
where those distinct descriptive commitments conflict with each other. In 
other words, the chapter has shown how a consistent law can be adequate to 
an inconsistent set of fundamental commitments held by the population 
bound by that law. 
 
                                                
269 In this simplified example where these are the only descriptive popular commitments held 
by the legislators; other commitments might include variants such as "human life begins at 
implantation of the embryo in the uterus," "human life begins after the twelfth week of 
pregnancy," "human life begins at birth," and the like. 
 125 
This goes some way toward implementing the aspiration expressed by 
Kwame Anthony Appiah in this paper's third epigraph: "We can live together 
without agreeing on what the values are that make it good to live together; 
we can agree about what to do in most cases, without agreeing about why it is 
right."270 There may be profound disagreement on fundamental commitments 
(such as the reasons why a law is right), but a consistent law (i.e., agreement 
about what a law should be) may nevertheless be found. We have also 
progressed some way toward eliminating the premises that serve as 
conversation-stoppers in legislative negotiations, without going so far as to 
eliminate all controversial fundamental commitments as premises,271 thus 
facilitating the aspiration of living and legislating together in a pluralistic 
society, without necessarily ever coming to an agreement on fundamental 
values. 
 
These are major steps toward the overarching goal of this paper – but much 
work remains to be done. Firstly, we have so far only shown how a relatively 
special class of laws can be justified in this way, namely where there are easily 
identifiable and fairly strong, uncontroversial linking commitments available 
to bridge the gap from the conflicting descriptive input commitments to the 
law. In many, if not most, cases, linking commitments of that special sort will 
not be available; linking commitments may be limited to the (weak) lowest 
common denominator of the legislators' prescriptive commitments. Many 
classes of laws that we would wish to see in practice have thus been left out 
so far. Secondly, we have so far neglected the multi-level nature of legislation, 
i.e., the paper's third methodological premise set out in subsection 1.5.3 and 
the stipulation of the normative goal in section 1.2 that laws be adequate to 
the commitments held by the members of the population in the respective 
legislative jurisdiction. Instead, we have simplified matters and assumed that 
all laws are negotiated and adopted by a single legislature operating at a 
single level, i.e., that the laws adopted by that legislature and only the laws 
adopted by that legislature are universally binding upon the entire 
population. These two neglected points are closely related to each other, and 
the following chapter on "Recursive pluralism" will show how extending the 
tools we have developed so far to include multiple levels of laws can help 
extend the class of linking commitments used to bridge the gap between a 
population's fundamental commitments and the laws that bind it. 
 
This should help master the challenges derived from the other two of this 
paper's epigraphs: namely how to undertake joint projects not only when 
there is disagreement on fundamental commitments, but also when mutual 
understanding about what commitments mean is only partial and limited.272 
 
 
                                                
270 Appiah 2006, 71, cited also on p. 2. Ramadan 2004, 93, makes this distinction nicely in 
terms of the "why" versus the "how" of identity: "Muslim identity is a response to the 
question: 'Why?,' while national identity is a response to the question: 'How?," and it would 
be absurd and stupid to expect geographical attachment to resolve the question of being." The 
legislative process under law as pluralism is concerned with legislating the "how" of living 
together, not the "why" – of anything. 
271 Cf. Rorty 1999, 173, discussed also on pp. 78 and 79. 
272 Cf. Brandom 2000, 363, and Connolly 1993, 40, cited on p. 2. 
 126 
6 Recursive pluralism 
 
6.1 Single-level and multi-level legislative processes 
 
So far, we have discussed a simplified version of the legislative process, in 
which an entire population is represented by a single legislature and only a 
single legislature, which has exclusive authority to negotiate and adopt all 
laws that will bind that entire population. This is, in fact, a simplification 
often implicitly or explicitly adopted by works of political and legal 
philosophy, especially those coming from a rationalist Enlightenment 
tradition.273 Whether reason is understood individualistically274 or 
communicatively,275 a given legislative problem is often implicitly or explicitly 
assumed to have a right answer that can be obtained through sustained 
exchange of opposing viewpoints.276 While theorists generally concede that 
                                                
273 To mention only some of the classics in the field: Rawls 1999a and Rawls 2005, Habermas 
1996, Hart 1994, Ely 1980, Raz 2009, and Dworkin 1986 largely ignore federalism, subsidiarity, 
and other forms of multi-level lawmaking, or treat them as a historical contingency or an 
inconvenient afterthought. (One of the more intriguing of those afterthoughts is Dworkin 
1986, 186, where Dworkin attempts to save his "law as integrity" from the threat of 
federalism: "Some scholars and politicians opposed to the Supreme Court's 1973 abortion 
decision now argue that the Constitution should be understood to leave decisions about 
abortion to the various states, so that some could permit abortion on demand, others prohibit 
it in all circumstances, and others adopt intermediate regimes. That suggestion is not itself a 
checkerboard solution: each state would retain a constitutional duty that its own statute be 
coherent in principle, and the suggestion offers itself as recognizing independent sovereigns 
rather than speaking for all together. But a question of integrity remains: whether leaving the 
abortion issue to individual states to decide differently if they wish is coherent in principle 
with the rest of the American constitutional scheme, which makes other important rights 
national in scope and enforcement.") Two recent major compilations of papers in legal 
philosophy, Coleman and Shapiro 2002 and Mootz 2009, waste nary a word on the subject. 
Where such arrangements are considered in some detail (as in Kelsen 1945, 303-327), they are 
generally discussed as a form of separation of powers or as a purely administrative 
arrangement. This also appears to have been the approach taken by the drafters of the 
paradigmatic federal constitution, namely that of the United States; see Rakove 1996, 52: 
"[Madison's] constitutional theory rested on a more profound insight into the nature of 
legislative power itself. The most striking qualities of legislative power, he now understood, 
were its plasticity and suppleness, its resistance to neat classification or limitation, and thus 
its capacity to extend its reach. This insight allowed Madison to approach the distinct issues 
of federalism and separation of powers as complementary aspects of one fundamental 
problem." There is, of course, much work done on federalism, subsidiarity, and other multi-
level lawmaking arrangements (see, e.g., Goodwin 1995, Everett 1997, Elazar 2001, Frey 2001, 
and pretty much anything written about the European Union), and supreme courts in 
federalist states regularly deal with the topic (Virginia v. Sebelius is the current hot federalism 
case in the United States), but this has done little to encourage a multi-level conception of law 
as an integral part of legal philosophy. This may be changing, however, due to the increasing 
interest in the confluence between international law and constitutional law: even Rawls 1999b 
and Habermas 2008, 312-352, have taken a half-hearted stab at the topic. For an excellent 
recent treatment of these issues, especially as they relate to pluralism, see Krisch 2010; for a 
sophisticated philosophical analysis, see Rosenfeld 2008. For an analysis of federalism and 
subsidiarity as applied to contemporary legal interpretation and adjudication, see Breyer 
2010, 121-136. See also the discussion of legal pluralism in n. 72 on p. 28. 
274 See, e.g., Kant 1787, Kant 1788, Kant 1796/2007, Rawls 1999a, and Rawls 2005. 
275 See, e.g., Habermas 1984 and Habermas 1993. 
276 This is notoriously Dworkin's view also with regard to legal interpretation, e.g., in Dworkin 
1985. At issue here is not interpretation, however, but rather the general Enlightenment 
sentiment that the right solution can be found to any given problem through reason. 
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consensus is often unachievable in practice277 and must be cut short by, say, a 
majority vote, this concession is seen as a necessary practical evil, while they 
contend that in theory, a rational consensus would eventually be found.278 The 
systems of legislative decision-making on which these theories are based 
often reflect these assumptions, and cut-off mechanisms such as majority 
votes are often a non-theoretically motivated afterthought.279 Given these 
theoretical assumptions, the focus on a single-level legislature adopting laws 
binding the entire society makes sense: if there is only a single right answer, 
then there might as well be only a single legislature to find it. 
 
Critics of the rationalist Enlightenment tradition often contend that there is no 
single right answer, but rather that the outcome of legislative negotiations 
will reflect the cultural prejudices,280 traditions,281 power relations,282 economic 
relations,283 and other contingent constellations of the respective legislatures 
and societies. Instead of a right answer, legislatures just happen to output an 
answer that corresponds to the particular cultural, power, and economic 
dynamics of the legislature. While some theorists see this as a regrettable fact 
about the world,284 others adopt an avowedly ethnocentric view and argue for 
exclusive national or local control of legislative matters by culturally 
homogeneous populations.285 But once the appropriate, ethnically or 
culturally sufficiently homogeneous level is found, these theorists again often 
implicitly or explicitly work with single-level models of legislative decision-
making appropriate to their preferred level. 
 
This paper takes no position on whether the rationalist Enlightenment 
tradition is right or wrong on this matter, or whether the culturally contingent 
                                                
277 Rawls's "burdens of judgment" in Rawls 2005, especially 54-58, are a concession that 
convergence upon a right answer, say regarding the conception of justice articulated in Rawls 
1999a, is regrettably unlikely in practice, in light of the cognitive limitations even of 
reasonable persons. But as Waldron 1999a, 105-106, points out: "Liberals do a good job of 
acknowledging [disagreement], so far as comprehensive views of religion, ethics, and 
philosophy are concerned. Thus John Rawls insists that 'a diversity of conflicting and 
irreconcilable comprehensive doctrines' is 'not a mere historical condition that may soon pass 
away; it is a permanent feature of the public culture of democracy'. And he says it is therefore 
fortunate that we do not need to share a common view in society about religion, ethics, and 
philosophy. But liberals have done a less good job of acknowledging the inescapability of 
disagreement about the matters on which they think we do need to share a common view, 
even though such disagreement is the most prominent feature of the politics of modern 
democracies." On the issue that matters most to Rawls (namely, the development of a political 
conception), he falls back into Enlightenment convergence thinking. 
278 This is of course what motivates inquiry in the natural sciences as well; C. S. Peirce's  
theory of truth as the ideal point of convergence of inquiry is a popular way of thinking about 
both scientific and political problem-solving. See Burch 2010. 
279 But for a philosophical defense of the majority vote, see Waldron 1999a, 113-114. 
280 Even where viewed in a positive light, such as Rorty's liberal, benign "ethnocentrism"; see, 
e.g., Rorty 1991, 203-210. 
281 A line pursued prominently by communitarian critics of liberalism, such as MacIntyre 2007 
and Taylor 2007. 
282 See, e.g., Lukes 1974. 
283 The theory underlying the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, largely discounted by 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. 
284 Critical Legal Studies generally falls into this camp; see Unger 1986. See also Marx 1848. 
285 This view is implicit or explicit in the fear of globalization, internationalization, 
Islamization and other –izations that are purported to undermine, say, the (Judeo-)Christian 
or the secular or (paradoxically) the Enlightenment tradition of a culturally more-or-less 
homogeneous Western Europe, however that homogeneity might be defined. See, e.g., Hitler 
1925/26, Mölzer 2006, Sarrazin 2010. 
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ethnocentrists will carry the day – it merely contends that the legislative 
process should not take a position on that controversy, either. Law as 
pluralism observes that as a matter of fact, full consensus – in the sense of full 
agreement on which course of legislative action should be taken, and on what 
reasons motivate that course of action – is seldom achieved, and that popular 
commitments are only imperfectly changed, if at all, in the course of 
legislative negotiations.286 Although it may be surmised that legislative 
debates might play a useful educational role in shaping a society's attitudes,287 
it should not be forgotten that the primary role of legislatures is legislative, not 
educational, and that legislatures ought to be designed accordingly.288 
 
So the question remains: if full consensus cannot be achieved in a legislature, 
what should the cut-off mechanism be to ensure that laws can nevertheless 
actually be adopted, rather than debated ad infinitum? A majority vote (or a 
two-thirds vote or other supermajority mechanism) is certainly one possibility 
– but if there is a theoretically motivated goal of achieving adequacy of laws to 
all input commitments, then a majority (or supermajority) vote privileges the 
commitments of those legislators who win the vote and deprivileges the 
commitments of those who lose the vote. Votes on matters where there is 
fundamental disagreement always lead to inadequate legislation, in the 
technical sense of the term used in this paper. 
 
Given the goal of adequacy, the preferred cut-off mechanism under law as 
pluralism must be something other than a vote. While at some point, a vote 
may nevertheless be necessary on purely practical grounds,289 law as 
pluralism is interested in pushing consensus as far as it goes without the 
assumption that full consensus can even theoretically ever be obtained or that 
the fundamental commitments of members of the population will in practice 
ever be changed. Law as pluralism takes the fundamental commitments of the 
population as they are, assumes that they may be immutable for better or for 
worse, and asks what kind of legislative process will lead to legislation that is 
adequate to those unchanging, controversial fundamental commitments of 
the population, yet will still be able to regulate the full range of human affairs 
that legislation is commonly expected to regulate. 
 
The third methodological premise of this paper, articulated in subsection 
1.5.3, is that a multi-level legislative process opens the door to legislation that 
is adequate in this way. The tool for implementing this process will be 
recursive pluralism, which aims to achieve tight and loose consensus. The 
relationship between tight and loose consensus is the topic of the following 
section.  
 
 
                                                
286 But see the hopes to the contrary referenced in n. 171 on p. 70. 
287 One of the premises of Mr. Smith Goes to Washington and the more recent filibuster by U.S. 
Senator Bernie Sanders. See Buchman and Foster 1939 and Sanders 2010. 
288 This is a prescriptive commitment of this paper, but a prescriptive commitment one may 
hope is shared by anyone interested in designing a legislature for a pluralistic society. In any 
event, it is one way of expressing the commitment to pluralism. 
289 In particular with respect to enforceability; this will be explored in more detail in section 6.7  
on "Termination conditions." 
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6.2 Tight consensus and loose consensus 
6.2.1 Sufficiently vs. insufficiently specified laws 
 
In legislative negotiations, legislators (either individually or in groups) 
propose and support laws. In justifying why a proposed law should be 
adopted, the supporters of the proposal give reasons why they themselves 
endorse the commitments expressed in that proposal and reasons why other 
legislators should endorse those commitments. Opponents of the proposal in 
turn give reasons why they themselves do not endorse those commitments 
and reasons why other legislators should not endorse them. As debate on the 
proposed law proceeds, legislators may ask each other for additional reasons 
why the commitments expressed by the proposed law should be endorsed or 
not. In the course of these negotiations, alternate laws may be proposed. 
Ultimately, some proposal expressing a set of output commitments will be 
adopted and hence endorsed by the legislature as a law – assuming the 
legislative process reaches a definitive conclusion. 
 
Under the justificatory constraint of law as pluralism, the fundamental 
commitments admitted as justifications may be prescriptive only if they are 
uncontroversial, and descriptive even if they are controversial.290 Under the 
regulatory ideal of law as pluralism, the laws expressing output commitments 
must be adequate to the fundamental commitments of the population bound 
by those laws. Since the justificatory constraint of law as pluralism screens out 
controversial prescriptive commitments and hence generates a set of input 
commitments that is inconsistent only with regard to descriptive commitments, 
the legislative process achieves the goal of adequacy by ensuring that the 
output commitments reflect (i.e., are compatible with and derived from) the 
entire set of input commitments. As we have seen, this may provide only a 
thin basis for output commitments, especially if the set of uncontroversial 
linking commitments is small or weak. 
 
In particular, doubts may arise as to the enforceability of the laws generated by 
the pluralistic legislative process. If the only adequate output commitment 
generated by the legislative process is something like "human life shall not be 
aborted," without further specification of what "human life" means, then 
enforcement of the law expressing such an output commitment is impossible. 
This is especially the case where the law includes terms expressing essentially 
contested concepts that are not further defined.291 Essentially contested concepts 
                                                
290 Recall that this paper is only interested in fundamental commitments and subsidiary 
commitments derived from fundamental commitments. Commitments that are not 
fundamental or derivable from fundamental commitments, i.e., based on differences in 
economic and social standing, gender, age, race, language, sexual orientation, family 
circumstances, and other contingent characteristics, always pass through the screen of the 
justificatory constraint of law as pluralism. 
291 See n. 152 on p. 62 above on Gallie's original definition of essentially contested concepts. 
Hurley 1989, 46-47, defines and refines essentially contested concepts as follows: "These are 
concepts that characteristically admit of substantive disagreement. Gallie describes essentially 
contested concepts as appraisive and applicable to objects of an internally complex character 
that may be described in various ways by altering one's view of the significance of 
descriptions of their component features. […] [C]orrect descriptions of component features 
characteristically compete with one another to influence applications of [essentially contested 
concepts]. Examples are the general concepts of what ought to be done, all things considered, 
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arise when the same concepts are used in different ways by different 
legislators (and the members of the population they represent) who hold 
conflicting fundamental commitments relevant to the definition of those 
concepts. 
 
On the other hand, if the set of uncontroversial linking commitments is 
sufficiently large or strong (or if the controversies surrounding descriptive 
input commitments are minor), then the pluralistic legislative process may 
very well generate enforceable laws expressing output commitments such as 
"allergy sufferers may use acupuncture at their own expense," "abortions after 
viability shall be prohibited," "abortions after conception shall be prohibited," 
and so on. The terms in such laws are sufficiently specified for the law to be 
enforceable.292 
 
Laws outputted by the pluralistic legislative process may thus be sufficiently 
specified and hence enforceable, or they may be insufficiently specified and hence 
unenforceable. Where laws meet the former criterion, we will say that they 
enjoy tight consensus; where laws meet the latter criterion, we will say that 
they enjoy (merely) loose consensus. This gives us the following precise 
definitions: 
 
A law enjoys tight consensus where, given an inconsistent set of 
relevant input commitments, the output commitments reflect that 
inconsistent set and are hence adequate to them, and the law 
expressing the output commitments is sufficiently specified.293  
 
In contrast: 
 
A law enjoys loose consensus where, given an inconsistent set of 
relevant input commitments, the output commitments reflect that 
inconsistent set and are hence adequate to them, but the law 
expressing the output commitments is insufficiently specified.  
 
Analogously, we will also say that an adequate output commitment enjoys tight 
consensus when it is sufficiently specified, and that it enjoys loose consensus 
when it is insufficiently specified. 
 
Both laws enjoying tight consensus and those enjoying loose consensus are 
adequate to their (inconsistent) sets of input commitments, but only laws 
enjoying tight consensus are sufficiently specified. 
 
                                                
and of what the law requires, all things considered, as well as many specific ethical and legal 
concepts." It is this sort of concept that makes enforceability especially problematic. 
292 Assuming that there is agreement on the definition of "abortion," "viability," and 
"conception." Defining these terms is not generally what gives rise to controversy; what is 
controversial is which abortions ought to be permitted, given commonly agreed definitions of 
these terms. This differs from the example of "effective remedy against allergies" discussed in 
subsection 5.4.3 above, where the term does not refer to the same things for different people. 
293 Due to contingent characteristics such as those referred to in n. 290 (such as conflicting 
interests or purely political reasons), the law may still not enjoy full consensus, but this is 
irrelevant to the special problems arising under law as pluralism as opposed to law as 
particularism. 
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6.2.2 What it means for a commitment to mean the same thing 
 
For a law to be sufficiently specified, i.e., for the law to enjoy tight consensus, 
the output commitments expressed by that law must mean the same thing to 
every legislator. Conversely, output commitments expressed by a law 
enjoying (merely) loose consensus mean different things to different legislators. 
 
What does it mean for a commitment to mean the same thing to different 
legislators (and the members of the population they represent)? One way to 
understand the meaning of a commitment is to look at the inferential roles it 
plays: a commitment C means the same thing to two persons if it plays the 
same role in the giving and asking of reasons by those persons, i.e., if C plays the 
same inferential role as a premise in the justifications offered by those persons, 
and if C plays the same inferential role as a conclusion in the justifications 
offered by those persons.294 Each legislator attributes the same (relevant) 
premises and conclusions to the other legislator as that legislator 
acknowledges herself. Or in other words: the two sets of books kept by each 
legislator line up fully with each other.295 
 
But under law as pluralism, we know that a given output commitment may 
have been derived from inconsistent input commitments, i.e., the output 
commitment plays a different inferential role as a conclusion for different 
legislators holding different popular commitments that serve as input 
commitments. For instance, a legislator holding DESCTCM "acupuncture is an 
effective remedy against allergies" derives OUT "allergy sufferers may use 
acupuncture at their own expense" in a different way from a legislator 
holding *DESCTCM "acupuncture is not an effective remedy against allergies." 
This results in a slightly different inferential role and hence a slightly different 
meaning of OUT for each of these legislators. As we saw above in the original 
discussion of allergy sufferers in subsection 4.6.3, this may manifest itself in a 
slight difference in emphasis with respect to OUT: a legislator holding 
DESCTCM may emphasize the phrase "allergy sufferers may use acupuncture," 
while a legislator holding *DESCTCM may emphasize the phrase "(but only) at 
their own expense." These kinds of differences in (shades of) meaning arise 
whether an output commitment enjoys tight or loose consensus; they are, in 
                                                
294 This expressly endorses a pragmatic (and pragmatist) understanding of meaning, i.e., the 
meaning of a commitment is explained in terms of its use. This is the approach taken by 
Brandom (1994, xii): "One of the overarching methodological commitments that orients this 
project is to explain the meaning of linguistic expressions in terms of their use – an 
endorsement of one dimension of Wittgenstein's pragmatism." Brandom goes on to explain 
this aspect of Wittgenstein's approach as follows (1994, 13): "The starting point of his 
investigations is the insight that our ordinary understanding of states and acts of meaning, 
understanding, intending, or believing something is an understanding of them as states and 
acts that commit or oblige us to act and think in various ways. To perform its traditional role, 
the meaning of a linguistic expression must determine how it would be correct to use it in 
various contexts. To understand or grasp such a meaning is to be able to distinguish correct 
from incorrect uses." Brandom proceeds to explain such correct and incorrect uses in terms of 
the inferential role played by expressions as premises and conclusions. 
295 See subsection 5.2.2 on what it means for a given legislator to keep one set of books on her 
own commitments and entitlements, and one set of books on the legislature's commitments 
and entitlements. The same principle of double bookkeeping applies when a given legislator 
keeps one set of books on her own commitments and entitlements, and one set of books on 
another legislator's commitments and entitlements. 
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fact, a crucial tool allowing legislatures to get their job done.296 What we are 
interested in here instead is the difference in meaning that arises when an 
output commitment serves as a premise for further commitments; in other 
words: when the two sets of books diverge with respect to the committive and 
permissive inferences of a given output commitment.297 
 
Depending on the collateral commitments a person holds, i.e., depending on the 
circumstances of application, the inferential role of a commitment as a premise 
may differ.298 For instance, if I hold the commitment C "Socrates is a man" as a 
premise, I will draw different conclusions regarding the goodness of Socrates 
depending on whether I hold the collateral commitment CC1 "men are good" 
or the collateral commitment CC2 "men are evil." My commitment C means 
something else depending on whether I hold CC1 or whether I hold CC2: in 
the former case, I mean (among other things) that Socrates is good; in the 
latter case, I mean (among other things) that Socrates is evil. Depending on 
my collateral commitments, the interpretation of my commitments serving as 
premises may differ. 
 
This is particularly salient in the case of prescriptive commitments – the genus 
of which (most) output commitments are a species. Where the inferential role 
of an output commitment as a premise differs, the law expressing that output 
commitment is open to different interpretations, which in turn impacts the 
enforceability of the law. Without further specification, the law may even be 
unenforceable if the interpretations differ too strongly. 
 
Accordingly, where an output commitment plays the same inferential role as a 
premise for all legislators, the law expressing that output commitment is 
interpreted in the same way by all legislators. The output commitment means 
the same thing (with regard to its conclusions) for all legislators. Where the 
law is thus enforceable without further specification,299 it enjoys tight consensus. 
 
Conversely, where an output commitment plays different interferential roles as 
a premise for different legislators, the law expressing that output commitment 
is interpreted in different ways by different legislators. The output 
commitment does not mean the same thing (with regard to its conclusions) 
                                                
296 Marmor 2008 makes a similar point, building on Gricean implicatures and maxims. 
297 By making these differences explicit, we are moving from what Triandis 2006, 26, calls 
"unconscious incompetence" to "conscious competence:" "When people come into contact 
with members of other cultures, they are often not aware of their miscommunications, 
because they think that the others are more or less like they are. This is the stage of 
unconscious incompetence. After some interpersonal difficulties, people realize that they are 
miscommunicating, but they do not know exactly what is wrong. That is the stage of conscious 
incompetence. As they get to know more and more about the culture of the other, they begin 
communicating correctly, but they have to make an effort to communicate in a different way. 
That is the stage of conscious competence. Finally, after they develop habits of correct 
communication with members of the other culture, they reach the stage of unconscious 
competence, where the communication is effortless and correct." It is the aspiration of law as 
pluralism that legislators attain conscious competence in their negotiations under conditions of 
conflicting fundamental commitments; but unconscious competence may be too much to ask. 
298 See Brandom 2000a, 62-66, for a concise account of circumstances and consequences of 
application, drawing on Dummett. 
299 There may still be practical obstacles to enforcement, but these obstacles would not be due 
to differences in how the law is interpreted. This will be discussed in more detail in 
subsection 6.7.3 on "Failure to achieve enforceability in practice." 
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for all legislators. Where the law is thus not enforceable without further 
specification, it enjoys merely loose consensus. 
 
Take, for instance, the law expressing the output commitment OUTVIA "all 
abortions after viability shall be prohibited," and assume that this law reflects 
the descriptive commitments of all the legislators. Assume further that none 
of the terms used in this law refer to an essentially contested concept.300 Then 
the following relationship obtains for any legislator X, any legislator Y, and 
any relevant301 commitment C: 
 
(Η (X, OUTVIA)  Η (X, C)) → (Η (Y, OUTVIA)  Η (Y, C)). 
 
In words: legislator Y is entitled draw the same conclusions from OUTVIA as X 
is entitled to draw. For instance, by holding OUTVIA as a premise, X is entitled 
to hold the commitment "fetuses in the 30th week of pregnancy may not be 
destroyed." By holding the same premise, Y is entitled to draw the same 
conclusion. If this is true of all relevant conclusions derived from OUTVIA as a 
premise, OUTVIA means the same thing for Y as it does for X, and the law 
expressing OUTVIA is enforceable. The law expressing OUTVIA therefore enjoys 
tight consensus. 
 
In contrast, consider the law expressing the output commitment OUTHL 
"human life shall not be aborted," and assume that this law reflects the 
descriptive commitments of all the legislators. Assume further that the term 
"human life" used in this law refers to an essentially contested concept. Then 
the following relationship obtains for any legislator X, any legislator Y, and 
any relevant commitment C: 
 
~((Η (X, OUTHL)  Η (X, C)) → (Η (Y, OUTHL)  Η (Y, C))). 
 
In words: legislator Y may not be entitled to draw the same conclusions from 
OUTHL as X is entitled to draw. For instance, if X holds the collateral 
commitment "human life begins at conception," then by holding OUTHL as a 
premise, X is entitled to hold the commitment "fetuses in the 15th week of 
pregnancy may not be destroyed" as a conclusion. But if Y holds the collateral 
commitment "human life begins at viability," then by holding the same 
premise, Y is not necessarily entitled to draw the same conclusion. OUTHL 
thus does not mean the same thing for Y as it does for X, and the law expressing 
OUTHL is not enforceable. The law expressing OUTHL therefore enjoys merely 
loose consensus. 
 
Where all legislation is negotiated and adopted at a single legislative level, the 
laws enjoying loose consensus under conditions of conflicting fundamental 
commitments are not enforceable, since they are insufficiently specified. This 
would seem to limit (enforceable) law as pluralism to laws that enjoy tight 
consensus as opposed to loose consensus – but this would be a very thin basis 
for enforceable legislation, given how hard it is to achieve strong output 
                                                
300 I.e., everyone agrees on what "abortion" and "viability" (and "prohibited") mean. 
301 There are any number of irrelevant commitments X may be entitled to hold as a 
consequence of holding OUTVIA; we are concerned only with those conclusions that bear 
some substantive relation to the premise. See the comment in n. 117 on p. 51. 
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commitments enjoying tight consensus when deriving them from an 
inconsistent set of input commitments. 
 
By introducing multiple legislative levels, laws enjoying loose consensus can 
be made enforceable, even though they are unenforceable at a single level – 
thus considerably expanding the basis for enforceable legislation under law as 
pluralism. 
 
 
6.3 Consensus across multiple legislative levels 
6.3.1 Making loose consensus tight 
 
Consider a twist on the story about our allergy sufferers. Say again that the 
population is split into two subsets, TCM and NTCM, where TCM holds the 
descriptive commitment DESCTCM "acupuncture is an effective remedy against 
allergies" and NTCM holds the incompatible descriptive commitment 
*DESCTCM "acupuncture is not an effective remedy against allergies." But now 
say that the only shared linking commitment is LINK "allergy sufferers may 
only use effective remedies against allergies" – LINK is the lowest common 
denominator of TCM's and NTCM's relevant prescriptive commitments. 
 
Then TCM can argue: 
 
Η (L, DESCTCM) & Η (L, LINK)  Η (L, INTTCM), where INTTCM is TCM's 
proposal for the output commitment "allergy sufferers may use acupuncture 
against allergies" 
 
and NTCM can argue 
 
Η (L, *DESCTCM) & Η (L, LINK)  Η (L, INTNTCM), where INTNTCM is NTCM's 
proposal for the output commitment "allergy sufferers may not use 
acupuncture against allergies."  
 
But now INTTCM is incompatible with *DESCTCM & LINK, and INTNTCM is 
incompatible with DESCTCM & LINK. Hence, neither INTTCM nor INTNTCM is 
adequate to all of the descriptive input commitments, and neither of them 
enjoys loose consensus. In this case, in fact, there is no output commitment 
adequate to all of the descriptive input commitments except OUT "allergy 
sufferers may only use effective remedies against allergies," which is 
equivalent to the lowest common denominator, the linking commitment 
LINK. 
 
But OUT only enjoys loose consensus, since it means different things to TCM 
and NTCM. The term "effective remedies against allergies" refers to an 
essentially contested concept, and TCM and NTCM will draw different 
conclusions from OUT as a premise: since TCM holds the collateral 
commitment that acupuncture is an effective remedy against allergies, TCM 
will infer that acupuncture may be used against allergies. And since NTCM 
holds the collateral commitment that acupuncture is not an effective remedy 
against allergies, NTCM will infer that acupuncture may not be used against 
allergies. The law expressing OUT is thus insufficiently specified and hence 
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unenforceable. It cannot serve as a guide for human conduct, since it is 
nowhere specified what "effective remedies against allergies" means in the 
context of OUT. 
 
By introducing multiple legislative levels, the scope of enforceable laws 
enjoying loose consensus expands considerably. To see why this is so, take a 
population P consisting of two subsets TCM and NTCM holding the same 
commitments as before. Instead of postulating a single legislature with a 
monopoly on the negotiation and adoption of all laws binding all members of 
P, say that there are three legislatures at two levels: at the top level, there is a 
legislature LP with the authority to negotiate and adopt laws binding all 
members of P; at the second-to-top level, there is a legislature LTCM with the 
authority to negotiate and adopt laws binding all members of TCM, and a 
legislature LNTCM with the authority to negotiate and adopt laws binding all 
members of NTCM.  
 
As before, the only law enjoying loose consensus that can be adopted at the 
top level by LP expresses the output commitment OUTP "allergy sufferers may 
only use effective remedies against allergies," where the term "effective 
remedies against allergies" is not sufficiently specified. On its own, the law 
expressing OUTP is thus unenforceable, as before. 
 
In the legislature LTCM, *DESCTCM "acupuncture is not an effective remedy 
against allergies" is not inputted to the legislative process, since *DESCTCM is 
not held by any members of the population bound by the legislative output of 
LTCM. DESCTCM "acupuncture is an effective remedy against allergies" is thus 
uncontroversial and can be endorsed by LTCM. Any legislator in LTCM may thus 
make the following legislative proposal: 
 
Ε (L, DESCTCM) & Ε (L, LINK)  Ε (L, INTTCM), where INTTCM is TCM's 
proposal for the output commitment "allergy sufferers may use acupuncture 
against allergies." 
 
Conversely, in the legislature LNTCM, DESCTCM "acupuncture is an effective 
remedy against allergies" is not inputted to the legislative process, since 
DESCTCM is not held by any members of the population bound by the 
legislative output of LNTCM. *DESCTCM "acupuncture is not an effective remedy 
against allergies" is thus uncontroversial and can be endorsed by LNTCM. Any 
legislator in LNTCM may thus make the following legislative proposal: 
 
Ε (L, *DESCTCM) & Ε (L, LINK)  Ε (L, INTNTCM), where INTNTCM is NTCM's 
proposal for the output commitment "allergy sufferers may not use 
acupuncture against allergies."  
 
In legislature LTCM, INTTCM enjoys tight consensus; and in legislature LNTCM, 
INTNTCM enjoys tight consensus: in both cases, the laws expressing the 
corresponding output commitments OUTTCM and OUTNTCM are sufficiently 
specified. In the legislative jurisdiction of LTCM, OUTTCM is therefore 
enforceable; and in the legislative jurisdiction of LNTCM, OUTNTCM is 
enforceable. 
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Not only that, however: in the legislative jurisdiction of LTCM, OUTP (in 
conjunction with DESCTCM) is now likewise enforceable, and in the legislative 
jurisdiction of LNTCM, OUTP (in conjunction with DESCNTCM) is also enforceable. 
The loose consensus that OUTP enjoys at the level of LP has been made tight in 
the jurisdiction of LTCM by the descriptive commitment DESCTCM, and it has 
been made tight in the jurisdiction of LNTCM by the descriptive commitment 
DESCNTCM. The term "effective remedies against allergies," which referred to 
an essentially contested concept at the level of LP, now refers to an 
uncontested concept in each of the legislative jurisdictions of LTCM and LNTCM. 
Taking those legislative jurisdictions into account, the law expressing OUTP is 
now sufficiently specified. 
 
In this example, OUTP & DESCTCM is equivalent to OUTTCM, and OUTP & 
DESCNTCM is equivalent to OUTNTCM. The law expressing OUTP & DESCTCM, for 
instance, is thus equivalent to the law expressing OUTTCM. The difference 
between the two only becomes apparent in relation to which institutions 
participate in enforcement: if the institutions at the level of LP participate in the 
enforcement of the law (say, the judicial and executive bodies entrusted with 
the enforcement of legislation outputted by LP), then it makes sense to speak 
of the law expressing OUTP & DESCTCM as the law binding subset TCM of the 
population P; if not, then it makes sense to speak of the law expressing 
OUTTCM as the law binding subset TCM of the population P. This distinction 
will be important in section 6.7 below on "Termination conditions." For now, 
note that in the former case, i.e., where the law expressing OUTP & DESCTCM is 
the law binding TCM, it suffices for LTCM to endorse the descriptive commitment 
DESCTCM as an output commitment; there is no need for LTCM to endorse 
OUTTCM, paradigmatically by adopting a law expressing it. 
 
6.3.2 Partially enforceable laws 
 
In some cases, a law may enjoy tight consensus with respect to certain 
commitments expressed by the law, while it enjoys merely loose consensus 
with respect to other commitments expressed by the law. If the law is adopted 
at the highest legislative level, it is then only partially enforceable at that level. 
The rest of the law must be further specified at lower legislative levels in 
order to be enforceable at those levels. 
 
Take, for instance, negotiations on a law at the highest legislative level LP to 
ban the reproductive cloning of human beings.302 Let us assume that cloning 
of human beings for "reproductive" purposes, as opposed to "therapeutic" or 
medicinal purposes, is condemned by all legislators and the members of the 
population they represent, hence agreement exists that a law should be 
drafted to prohibit it throughout the entire population P. Disagreement arises, 
however, with respect to when a purpose can be considered "reproductive"; 
                                                
302 The highest (quasi-)legislative level is generally the level of the nation-state, but it may also 
be the level of a supranational organization such as the European Union or the United 
Nations. Cf. the non-binding United Nations Declaration on Human Cloning, which originally 
was intended as a binding international convention. The following discussion of this example 
is based on the corresponding debates in the Ad Hoc Committee on an International 
Convention against the Reproductive Cloning of Human Beings of the General Assembly of 
the United Nations. 
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"reproductive" is hence an essentially contested concept. For example, the 
relevant descriptive input commitments may include DESCalways "cloning is 
always reproductive" and DESCterm "cloning is reproductive only if the intent 
of the cloner is to bring the clone to term."303 Since there are instances of 
cloning where the intent of the cloner is not to bring the clone to term (but 
rather, say, to develop a drug against Parkinson's disease), the set of input 
commitments {DESCalways, DESCterm} is inconsistent. 
 
The output commitment OUTP1 "cloning shall be prohibited if the intent of the 
cloner is to bring the clone to term" reflects the input commitments at the 
level of LP: if the intent of the cloner is to bring the clone to term, then both 
those who hold DESCalways and those who hold DESCterm agree that the cloning 
must be prohibited. But if a law LAW expresses only that commitment OUTP1, 
and if LAW were to allow cloning if the intent of the cloner is not to bring the 
clone to term (such as in the Parkinson's drug scenario), then LAW is not 
adequate to the input commitment DESCalways and will not be endorsed by 
those who hold it. For LAW to be adequate to the entire set of input 
commitments, LAW must therefore express OUTP1 and a further commitment 
OUTP2 that leaves open the question of what must be done if the cloner has no 
intent to bring the clone to term. LAW might therefore be phrased as "cloning 
shall be prohibited if the intent of the cloner is to bring the clone to term 
(OUTP1), and other forms of reproductive cloning shall likewise be prohibited 
(OUTP2)." LAW is thus sufficiently specified with respect to scenarios in which 
the cloner has the intent to bring the clone to term (captured by the output 
commitment OUTP1), but it is insufficiently specified with respect to scenarios in 
which the cloner has no intent to bring the clone to term (captured by the 
output commitment OUTP2). LAW is thus partially enforceable at the level of 
LP. 304 
 
What happens now in scenarios in which the cloner has no intent to bring the 
clone to term, but nevertheless clones an embryo? At the level of a legislature 
Lalways (subordinate to LP), whose output commitments are binding on those 
who hold DESCalways, this scenario would be considered reproductive cloning. 
By endorsing the descriptive commitment DESCalways "cloning is always 
reproductive," Lalways further specifies LAW and thereby prohibits all forms of 
cloning at the level of Lalways. LAW is now sufficiently specified to be 
enforceable at the level of Lalways and it enjoys tight consensus at that level. 
 
Analogously, a legislature Lterm (subordinate to LP and coordinate to Lalways), 
whose output commitments are binding on those who hold DESCterm, would 
further specify LAW by endorsing the descriptive commitment DESCterm 
"cloning is reproductive only if the intent of the cloner is to bring the clone to 
term." This limits the prohibition of cloning at the level of Lterm to scenarios in 
which the cloner has the intent to bring the clone to term. LAW is now 
sufficiently specified to be enforceable in the legislative jurisdiction of Lterm, 
and it enjoys tight consensus in that jurisdiction. 
                                                
303 The commitment DESCalways bears a resemblance to the commitment DESCPL "human life 
begins at conception" in the abortion debate, and in practice, these two commitments are in 
fact often jointly held. Conversely, DESCterm is often held by those who believe that human 
life begins at some point after conception. 
304 At least to the extent that intent can be proven – a common enough problem in criminal 
law. 
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Note that Lalways and Lterm each endorse a descriptive commitment as an output 
commitment in this example. If there were only a single legislative level, this 
would be contrary to the prescriptive purpose of legislation: a descriptive 
commitment cannot constitute a guide for human conduct, even if it is 
endorsed by a legislature as an output commitment. If there are multiple 
legislative levels, however, endorsing a descriptive commitment may indeed 
constitute a guide for human conduct: namely in conjunction with the 
prescriptive output commitments already endorsed at a higher legislative 
level. DESCalways ("cloning is always reproductive") endorsed as an output 
commitment by Lalways alone does not constitute a guide for human conduct; 
but in conjunction with OUTP2 ("other forms of reproductive cloning shall 
likewise be prohibited"), it does. 
 
From the perspective of the entire legislative structure consisting of three 
legislatures at two levels, which covers the entire population P, LAW is both 
adequate to all the relevant popular commitments of the members of 
population P serving as input commitments, and it is sufficiently specified to 
be enforceable. LAW thus enjoys tight consensus across population P, even 
though not all of the output commitments it expresses enjoy tight consensus 
at the level of LP. Without this multi-level legislative process, no relevant law 
would be adequate and enforceable across population P, and hence no 
relevant law would enjoy tight consensus. Where output commitments 
enjoying tight consensus at the level of LP are at issue (in this case, OUTP1), the 
institutions at the level of LP may participate in the enforcement of LAW; 
where output commitments enjoying merely loose consensus at the level of LP 
are at issue (in this case, OUTP2), which are then further specified at lower 
legislative levels, the institutions at those lower levels may participate in the 
enforcement of LAW. 
 
 
6.4 Multi-level laws 
 
In the reproductive cloning example, LAW is a multi-level law, since it does 
not enjoy tight consensus at any given single level; it enjoys tight consensus 
only when considered from the perspective of the entire, multi-level 
legislative structure. At the level of LP, LAW expresses the output 
commitments OUTP1 and OUTP2, which are generated at the level of LP; at the 
level of Lalways, it expresses the output commitment DESCalways, which is 
generated at the level of Lalways; and at the level of Lterm, it expresses the output 
commitment DESCterm, which is generated at the level of Lterm. The way we 
have defined output commitments and laws, output commitments are always 
single-level, i.e., they are the output commitments only of the legislators 
legislating at a given level and of the subsets of the population represented by 
those legislators. In contrast, laws may be multi-level, i.e., they may be 
outputted by multiple legislative levels working in concert and are binding on 
the entire population, not just on a subset of the population at a given level. 
They are in a sense spread out across all relevant legislative levels, while 
output commitments belong only to a single legislative level. This distinction 
helps explain why this paper has made such a big deal about speaking of laws 
as expressing output commitments, rather than simply conflating the two 
concepts. If there were only a single legislative level, it would be easy enough 
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to say that a law is the same thing as the set of output commitments endorsed 
by the legislature at that level.305 But the matter is made more complicated by 
the existence of multiple legislative levels: a law tells us which sets of output 
commitments have been endorsed at which legislative levels. 
 
In the following, we will represent this relationship between laws and output 
commitments more precisely as follows: 
 
LAW = { 〈L1, ΣOUT1〉, 〈L2, ΣOUT2〉, …, 〈Ln, ΣOUTn〉 } 
 
i.e., a law is a set of pairs containing a legislature and the set of output 
commitments endorsed by that legislature. Defined in this way, a law gives us 
all the information we need to determine which members of a given 
population P are bound by which output commitments., i.e., LAW is a well-
defined guide for human conduct. 
 
In the reproductive cloning example above, LAW can be represented as: 
 
LAW = { 〈LP, {OUTP1, OUTP2} 〉, 〈Lalways, {DESCalways} 〉, 〈Lterm, {DESCterm} 〉 }  
 
For any law LAW defined in this way, a given member M of the population P 
is bound by the output commitments that are paired with the legislatures to 
which M is subject. 
 
We could, of course, define laws differently and stipulate that they apply only 
to a single legislative level and the subset of the population represented at 
that level. This is in fact the way laws are usually thought of: as emanating 
from a single legislature. In the example of reproductive cloning above, there 
would thus be three different laws: one binding the entire population P, one 
binding the subset of the population subject to Lalways, and one binding the 
subset of the population subject to Lterm. What is lost in this conception, 
however, is the close link between these separate laws due to their common 
subject matter (namely, the prohibition of reproductive cloning) – and more 
pertinently, the areas of considerable agreement across the population 
(namely, the desire to prohibit reproductive cloning, however defined). The 
possibility of multi-level laws does justice to the overarching goal of law as 
pluralism, namely to clearly separate out areas of agreement and areas of 
disagreement in a given population, and thereby to undertake the joint project 
of lawmaking even where mutual understanding is partial or limited – thus 
fulfilling the promises encapsulated in this paper's first and second 
epigraphs.306 While the concept of multi-level laws is thus preferable for the 
purposes of this paper and will continue to be employed in the following 
discussion, nothing in this analysis hinges on it; one could just as well define 
law as pluralism without the concept of multi-level laws. 
 
                                                
305 Although we might still opt for the more complicated formulation for the following reason: 
while a commitment is something that can be undertaken privately or publically with or 
without endorsing it, a law is the written form that expresses the endorsement of that 
commitment. Laws are to output commitments what sentences are to propositions – with all 
the philosophical complications that analogy entails.  
306 See Brandom 2000, 363, and Connolly 1993, 40, cited on p.2. 
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That said, the following section shows how to generate multi-level laws using 
the device of recursion.  
 
 
6.5 Recursion over multiple legislative levels 
 
In the previous section, we described what a law looks like that is sufficiently 
specified and thus enforceable across multiple legislative levels as opposed to 
a single legislative level: at the top-most level, it enjoys tight consensus with 
respect to at most some, but not all, of the output commitments it expresses, 
while it enjoys merely loose consensus with respect to the other output 
commitments it expresses. The law must be further specified at lower legislative 
levels with respect to those other output commitments in order for it to be 
enforceable. 
 
In this section, we will describe the multi-level legislative process or algorithm 
for generating such laws. This process – which we will refer to as recursive 
pluralism – will be implemented using a recursive function in which the 
overarching problem of the legislative process (namely, of how to generate 
adequate and enforceable output commitments for a given population) is 
solved by breaking it down into simpler subproblems of the same type 
(namely, of how to generate adequate and enforceable output commitments 
for subsets of that population).307 Once defined, this function can be executed 
by the top-level legislature to generate the adequate and enforceable law as 
output.308 
 
6.5.1 The output of the recursive function 
 
For this purpose, we shall define the recursive function legislate, which, 
when executed at the top-most legislative level, returns a law LAW as its 
output: 
 
 
 
 
                                                
307 Although, by nature, a recursive function solves a problem from the top down, the 
recursive function defined here can be seen as an implementation of the bottom-up principle 
of subsidiarity, as described by Breyer 2010, 123, drawing on Millon-Delsol 1992: 
"Subsidiarity insists that governmental power to deal with a particular kind of problem 
should rest in the hands of the smallest unit of government capable of dealing successfully 
with that kind of problem. One begins by assuming that power to solve a problem should 
remain at the local level. One then asks whether it is necessary to abandon this assumption in 
order to resolve the problem. One can continue to ask this question, level by level. And one 
should answer it by climbing no higher up the governmental unit ladder than necessary to 
deal effectively with the problem." This is, in essence, a recursive definition of subsidiarity. 
But note that the emphasis of subsidiarity is on effectiveness, which is only one aspect of 
recursive pluralism; the main goal of recursive pluralism is to implement adequacy to 
fundamental commitments. 
308 This follows the second methodological premise articulated in subsection 1.5.2, namely 
that at least some aspects of lawmaking are algorithmic. The goal of the remaining sections in 
this chapter is to formalize those algorithmic aspects using functions defined in pseudocode 
(based mainly on C and some Pascal conventions), in order to describe them more precisely 
and concisely than would be possible in plain English. 
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legislate (…) { 
 
 … 
 
return LAW 
} 
 
Note that given a set of input commitments, a legislative process is likely able 
to generate several potential laws in practice, rather than a single law (in 
particular since the justifications used in the legislative process are primarily 
permissive as opposed to committive). The output of the function legislate 
would therefore be more properly defined as a set of laws, namely the various 
options for enforceable laws that are adequate to the input commitments. For 
the sake of simplicity, the following discussion will omit this complication, 
but the algorithm defined here can easily be extended to account for the 
generation of multiple laws.309 
 
As we have seen in the case of a single-level legislative process, laws 
negotiated at a single legislative level may be very restricted: they may reflect 
only the lowest common denominator of the various popular commitments 
serving as input commitments. While adequate, the law may not be 
enforceable, i.e., it may enjoy only loose consensus, or it may simply cover 
only a very limited range of scenarios one might want to regulate. Since, 
when executed at the top-most legislative level, our function legislate is 
supposed to output not only adequate laws, but also enforceable laws, the 
function may have no output if the legislative process takes place only at a 
single level. By expanding the legislative process to multiple legislative levels, 
the range of possible adequate laws enjoying tight consensus is expanded 
considerably, and hence the range of adequate and enforceable laws and the 
scenarios they cover. This increases the likelihood that legislate will 
actually generate an output. 
 
If the problem of generating adequate and enforceable legislation cannot be 
solved exclusively at the top-most level, the unsolved parts of the problem are 
delegated to the subordinate legislative levels in order to find a full solution. 
In the example of reproductive cloning, the problem was to find a law 
prohibiting legislative cloning, given an inconsistent set of input 
commitments regarding the meaning of the essentially contested concept of 
"reproductive." While a law was generated at the top-most level that partially 
enjoyed tight consensus, the generation of the rest of the law was delegated to 
subordinate legislative levels. Some of the output commitments expressed by 
the law were derived only at the top-most level LP (namely OUTP1 "cloning 
shall be prohibited if the intent of the cloner is to bring the clone to term," 
which enjoyed tight consensus at the level of LP, and OUTP2 "other forms of 
reproductive cloning shall likewise be prohibited," which enjoyed only loose 
consensus at the level of LP), while other output commitments expressed by 
the law were derived at subordinate legislative levels (namely DESCalways 
"cloning is always reproductive" at the level of Lalways, and DESCterm "cloning is 
reproductive only if the intent of the cloner is to bring the clone to term" at the 
level of Lterm). 
                                                
309 In practice, a set of potential laws would be desirable, since it would allow the legislators to 
select a single law from that set and adopt it in light of their interests and other contingent 
characteristics. 
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Given that the purpose of the recursive function is to output a multi-level law 
binding the entire population P, as opposed to separate single-level laws 
generated at each legislative level and binding only the respective subsets of 
the population, the output of the recursive function legislate at legislative 
levels lower than the top-most level LP cannot properly be interpreted as a law. 
Instead, the output of legislate at lower legislative levels can be thought of 
as contributions to the multi-level law outputted at the top-most legislative 
level. We are not interested in laws that might be generated by any given 
subordinate legislature (say, particularistic laws that have nothing to do with 
the subsets of the population not represented by that legislature) – we are 
interested only in the laws that apply to the entire population and that are 
generated by the entire multi-level legislative system working in concert. 
When executed at lower legislative levels, the return value outputted by 
legislate must still be of the same type as a law, however, namely a set of 
pairs containing a legislature and the set of output commitments endorsed by 
that legislature: 
 
{ 〈L1, ΣOUT1〉, 〈L2, ΣOUT2〉, …, 〈Ln, ΣOUTn〉 } 
 
Output of this type can be returned by a given instance of the recursive 
function to the instance that called it. Or in other words: the output 
commitments endorsed by a lower-level legislature can be packaged in this 
form and sent back up to the higher-level legislature as its contribution to the 
further specification of the law. 
  
6.5.2 The parameters of the recursive function 
 
What parameters310 does the function legislate take? One might be 
tempted to pass the set of input commitments to legislate, but this would be 
doing some of the function's work for it: the function itself (i.e., the legislature 
executing the function) must decide which popular commitments are 
admissible as input commitments to the legislative process under the 
justificatory constraint of law as pluralism and which are not. The function 
legislate thus takes as a parameter the entire set of popular commitments 
ΣPOP held by the members of the subset of the population in the legislative 
jurisdiction for which the function is called. Where legislate is executed in the 
top-most legislative jurisdiction, this will be the set of popular commitments 
held by the members of the entire population. So far, then, the function 
legislate looks like this: 
 
legislate (…, ΣPOP, …) { 
 
 … 
 
return LAW 
} 
                                                
310 For the sake of simplicity (and to avoid confusion with the "arguments" used in legislative 
negotiations), both formal parameters (which make up part of the function definition) and 
actual parameters or arguments (the values passed to the function) will be referred to as 
"parameters" here. 
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Another parameter taken by legislate becomes apparent when looking 
back at the reproductive cloning example in subsection 6.3.2 on "Partially 
enforceable laws." In order to decide which output commitments to endorse, 
each legislature must know which output commitments have already been 
endorsed at the legislative levels above it, i.e., at the level of the legislature making 
the recursive call and above. In the reproductive cloning example, the 
legislature Lalways needs to endorse only the output commitment DESCalways 
because LP has already endorsed OUTP1 and OUTP2. So now the header of 
legislate looks like this:  
 
legislate (…, ΣPOP, ΣOUT) 
 
where ΣOUT is the set of output commitments already endorsed at higher 
legislative levels. When legislate is called the first time, i.e., when the top-
level legislature is invoked, the set of output commitments ΣOUT will be 
empty, i.e., { }. 
 
It is clear what the recursive function legislate recurs over: the various 
legislative levels. So the final parameter passed to legislate must specify 
the legislative jurisdiction in which the function is to be executed, i.e., the 
legislative jurisdiction called upon to generate output commitments that will 
contribute to the further specification of the law. By way of this parameter, 
the recursive function legislate keeps track of which legislature it is 
currently dealing with. The simplest solution would be to directly pass the 
invoked legislature L to the function: 
 
legislate (L, ΣPOP, ΣOUT) 
 
However, each instance of the recursive function must also know what 
legislative jurisdictions are subordinate to the current legislature. In other 
words: every legislature must know which lower-level legislatures to invoke 
next once it has completed its own task of determining adequate output 
commitments. A straightforward way of doing this would be to provide each 
instance of the function with the entire structure of the legislative system, i.e., 
with information on what the entire hierarchy of the legislative levels is. In its 
simplest form, the structure of the legislative system can be represented by an 
(upside-down) tree consisting of hierarchically linked nodes: e.g., in a classic 
federal system such as Switzerland, the top-most node (or root node) of the 
multi-level legislative structure is the Federal Parliament; the second level of 
nodes (i.e., the child nodes of the root node) consists of the legislatures of the 
cantonal parliaments; and the third level of nodes (i.e., the child nodes of the 
child nodes) consists of municipal assemblies, city parliaments, and the like.311 
                                                
311 In the United States, the top-most node would be the United States Congress, the second 
level of nodes would be the legislatures of the fifty states (and of territories such as Puerto 
Rico), and the third level would roughly correspond to the county, municipal, and tribal 
lawmaking bodies and the like. The U.S. legislative tree is in fact a bit more complicated than 
this, however, since municipalities and counties may be arranged hierarchically, not 
coordinately, while certain competences of tribal governments and states may be coordinate, 
not hierarchical. The U.S. legislative system is thus more precisely rendered as a directed 
acyclic graph – which is the more general data structure than the tree. The relationship between 
the European Union, the member states of the European Union, and the international 
organizations to which they belong is also more accurately represented as a directed acyclic 
graph than as a tree. A more precise definition of the recursive function legislate would 
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If we were to include a supranational organization such as the United 
Nations, then this would be the root node, and national legislatures such as 
the Swiss Federal Parliament would be in the second level of nodes, along 
with other national legislatures. 
 
For any given legislature, however, it is irrelevant what the structure of the 
tree looks like above that legislature, or what the tree looks like in coordinate 
branches: it is only relevant what output commitments have already been 
endorsed in the direct line above that legislature – and those output 
commitments are already being passed in as a separate parameter. So each 
legislature need only know what the structure of the system looks like from 
that legislature on down; it therefore suffices to pass the subtree LS rooted at the 
node representing the invoked legislature L as a parameter, or in other words: 
the root node representing the current legislature with the subordinate 
legislatures attached to that root node as child nodes. Since that subtree 
already tells the function which legislature is being invoked by the call 
(namely, the legislature L represented by the root node of the subtree LS), it 
suffices to pass the subtree LS as a parameter instead of the subtree and the 
legislature L. LS thus represents the entire legislative structure from the 
current legislature on down. 
 
This completes the skeleton of the recursive function legislate: 
 
 
legislate (LS, ΣPOP, ΣOUT) { 
 
 … 
 
 return LAW 
} 
 
 
where LAW is a set of pairs of legislatures and the output commitments they 
endorse (and in the case of the top-most instance of the function, the adequate 
and enforceable law itself), LS is the subtree rooted at the legislature L 
invoked by the function call, ΣPOP is the set of popular commitments held by 
the members of the population subject to L, and ΣOUT is the set of output 
commitments already endorsed at the legislative levels above L.312 
 
By executing legislate at the top-most level, the desired law is generated: 
 
LAW = legislate (LSP, ΣPOPP, {}) 
 
where LAW is the adequate and enforceable multi-level law, LSP is the full 
tree representing the entire legislative structure rooted at LP, and ΣPOPP is the 
                                                
thus take a directed acyclic graph (consisting of vertices) as a parameter instead of a tree 
(consisting of nodes); but for the simplified purposes of this discussion, a tree shall suffice. 
312 One additional parameter will be necessary later on: the set of laws already endorsed in 
previous legislative processes. This parameter serves as input to legislative negotiations in the 
same way that popular commitments admissible as input commitments do; see the discussion 
at the end of subsection 5.2.1 above. But since this set of laws applies to the entire legislative 
system, it is convenient to consider it a global parameter ΣLAW, which is available to all the 
functions that make up law as pluralism.  
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set of popular commitments held by members of the entire population P. The 
third parameter is an empty set, since no output commitments have been 
generated so far. 
 
 
Now that we know what the return value of legislate is and what 
parameters it takes, we can begin fleshing out the body of the function. 
 
 
6.6 Defining the recursive function 
6.6.1 Generating output commitments in a given legislature 
 
Two preliminary clarifications are in order: first, the function legislate 
assumes that all the popular commitments are known in advance, i.e., before 
legislative negotiations actually begin. In practice, this will not always be the 
case: legislators may attempt to introduce new popular commitments as input 
commitments even after legislative negotiations are underway. The definition 
of legislate could be expanded to take account of this, but it would unduly 
complicate things. Note, however, that the possible outcomes of the negotiations 
are the same whether popular commitments are introduced at the outset or 
whether they are introduced during negotiations: it is simply a matter of skill 
and strategy as to when they are introduced. 
 
Second, note that legislators must already put their skills to use even before the 
function legislate is called for the first time: namely when deciding which 
popular commitments to put forward as potential input commitments, and 
when deciding whether to introduce prescriptive commitments as prescriptive 
commitments or whether to decompose them first into descriptive commitments 
and linking commitments. As defined below, the function legislate 
assumes that this process has already taken place, and that the set of popular 
commitments passed as a parameter to legislate is both complete and has 
already been skillfully selected and structured by the individual legislators.  
 
Given that this set of popular commitments is inputted to the recursive 
function legislate, the first task of legislate is to weed out the popular 
commitments that cannot serve as input commitments from those that can. 
 
With the justificatory constraint of law as pluralism, this is a straightforward 
task: if a popular commitment is descriptive, it is admitted as an input 
commitment; if a popular commitment is prescriptive, it is admitted only if it 
is compatible with the other prescriptive popular commitments. This can be 
defined using a simple helper function get_ΣINP, which generates the set of 
input commitments from the set of popular commitments proposed as input 
commitments: 
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get_ΣINP (ΣPOP) { 
 
 ΣINP = {}  
 
for all POP ∈ ΣPOP { 
 
  if ((not is_prescriptive (POP)) or  
is_uncontroversial (POP, ΣPOP))  
 
ΣINP = ΣINP + POP 
 
 } 
 
 return ΣINP 
} 
 
 
The helper function is_uncontroversial (POP, ΣPOP), which checks 
whether POP is compatible with all the prescriptive members of ΣPOP and is 
hence uncontroversial, can be defined as follows: 
 
is_uncontroversial (POP, ΣPOP) { 
 
for all POP' ∈ ΣPOP { 
 
if (is_prescriptive (POP') and (POP / POP')) return FALSE 
 
} 
 
return TRUE 
} 
 
 
The functions is_prescriptive and / are considered primitive, i.e., it is 
assumed that legislators can agree on their return values without major 
controversy, given how prescriptive commitments and incompatibility have 
been defined in sections 3.3 and 3.1 above.313 
 
The function legislate can now work with an admissible set of input 
commitments. Now the meaty part of the legislative negotiations at a given 
legislative level begins: the legislators must use their negotiation skills to 
propose output commitments that the legislature might endorse, in 
accordance with the principles set out in chapter 5 on "Decomposing and 
synthesizing commitments." The set of proposed output commitments is a set 
of intermediate commitments: the legislature holds them all simultaneously, 
without yet having endorsed any of them. For the purposes of law as 
pluralism, the function that generates these intermediate commitments from 
the input commitments is an undefined black box: all that matters is the input 
and the output, while the precise workings are up to the skills of the 
legislators. While law as pluralism constrains certain aspects of the legislative 
process and hence treats the legislative process as an algorithm, this black box 
is where legislators are free to act within those constraints in whatever 
                                                
313 If controversy does in fact arise, it can be eliminated by the rules "when in doubt, a 
commitment is prescriptive" and "when in doubt, two prescriptive commitments are 
incompatible with each other" – at the cost of reducing the set of admissible input 
commitments at a given legislative level. 
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algorithmic or non-algorithmic matter they choose. Since this is where 
negotiation proper (as constrained by law as pluralism) takes place, the 
function will be referred to as negotiate. It takes the set of input 
commitments as input and generates a set of intermediate commitments: 
 
negotiate (ΣINP) { 
 
//this is where the real meat of the negotiation happens 
 
return ΣINT 
} 
 
The legislature can endorse the intermediate commitments thus generated 
only if they are adequate, i.e., if they reflect the set of input commitments. The 
following helper function get_ΣOUT' generates the set of endorsable output 
commitments given a set of intermediate commitments (which represent 
proposed output commitments) and the set of input commitments: 
 
 
get_ΣOUT' (ΣINT, ΣINP) { 
 
 ΣOUT' = {}  
 
 for all INT ∈ ΣINT { 
 
  if (is_adequate (INT, ΣINP)) ΣOUT' = ΣOUT' + INT 
 
 } 
 
 return ΣOUT' 
} 
 
 
The helper function is_adequate implements the simple check for 
adequacy described above in subsection 5.4.5 on "Checking output 
commitments for adequacy." While the function does not check whether the 
proposed output commitment has in fact been derived from the entire set of 
relevant input commitments (a fact that depends on the legislators' skill in 
making arguments and proposing output commitments), the function does 
check whether the proposed output commitment is compatible with all the 
input commitments, a necessary but not sufficient condition for derivability. 
The definition of is_adequate, which takes a proposed output commitment 
and the set of input commitments as parameters, is similar to that of 
is_uncontroversial – which, in light of the definition of adequacy, 
should not come as a surprise: 
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is_adequate (INT, ΣINP) { 
 
for all INP ∈ ΣINP { 
 
if (INT / INP) return FALSE 
 
} 
 
return TRUE 
} 
 
 
Note that the function get_ΣOUT' generates the set of output commitments 
that the legislature may endorse; but which elements of the set are actually 
endorsed depends on which output commitments the legislature ultimately 
decides to endorse.314 For the sake of simplicity, the following discussion will 
assume that all endorsable output commitments are actually endorsed – this 
is analogous to the simplification made above regarding the assumption of a 
single law instead of a set of possible laws. 
 
These helper functions give legislate all the tools it needs to generate its 
output commitments in a given legislative jurisdiction: 
 
 
legislate (LS, ΣPOP, ΣOUT) { 
 
 ΣINP = get_ΣINP (ΣPOP) 
ΣINT = negotiate (ΣINP) 
ΣOUT' = get_ΣOUT' (ΣINT, ΣINP) 
 
 … 
} 
 
 
This implements the legislative process in a given legislative jurisdiction as 
defined in subsection 5.2.1 above:315 
 
Η (P, ΣPOP) & Ε (L, ΣOUT)  H (L, ΣINP)  H (L, ΣINT)  Ε (L, ΣOUT'). 
 
6.6.2 Making the recursive call 
 
The function legislate is now ready to make the recursive call to itself; it 
has done everything it can at this level (other than returning its output, which 
will only be possible once the recursive call has been made).  
 
In order to make the recursive call to itself, legislate must determine which 
subordinate legislatures to invoke. Given that the subtree rooted at the current 
                                                
314 Note that, as we have defined law as pluralism, it does not matter what modality the 
legislature uses to choose from among possible output commitments, since every one of them 
is adequate to the set of input commitments – which is all that law as pluralism requires. The 
actual endorsement of an adequate output commitment will likely depend on other factors, 
especially contingent characteristics. 
315 Omitting, so far, the output commitments generated in previous legislative processes; see 
n. 312 on p. 144 above. 
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legislature, which represents the legislative structure from the current 
legislature on down, has been passed to legislate as a parameter, this task 
is straightforward: legislate must make a recursive call to each legislature 
that is child node (i.e., a directly subordinate legislature) of the root node (i.e., 
the current legislature) passed as a parameter to the current instance of 
legislate: 
 
 
legislate (LS, ΣPOP, ΣOUT) { 
 
 ΣINP = get_ΣINP (ΣPOP) 
ΣINT = negotiate (ΣINP) 
ΣOUT' = get_ΣOUT' (ΣINT, ΣINP) 
 
 for all LS' = child node of LS { 
 
  … = legislate (LS',…, …) 
 
 } 
 
 … 
} 
 
What about the further parameters that legislate must pass to the next 
instances of itself? The second parameter, i.e., the set of relevant popular 
commitments, is also relatively straightforward: it is simply the set of popular 
commitments held by the subset of the population that is subject to the 
legislature represented by the root node of LS'. Determining that subset of 
popular commitments is as trivial (or not) as determining the initial set of 
popular commitments for the entire population. Hence the helper function 
get_ΣPOP' – which takes the legislature LS' (or more precisely, the subtree 
rooted at that legislature) and the entire set of popular commitments passed 
into the current instance of the function legislate as its parameters, and 
which generates the relevant subset of popular commitments as its output – is 
primitive, in the sense that it depends on the skills of the legislators offering 
popular commitments as input commitments: 
 
 
get_ ΣPOP' (LS', ΣPOP) { 
 
 … 
 
 return ΣPOP' 
} 
 
 
This gives us: 
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legislate (LS, ΣPOP, ΣOUT) { 
 
 ΣINP = get_ΣINP (ΣPOP) 
ΣINT = negotiate (ΣINP) 
ΣOUT' = get_ΣOUT' (ΣINT, ΣINP) 
 
 for all LS' = child node of LS { 
 
  … = legislate (LS', get_ ΣPOP' (LS', ΣPOP), …) 
 
 } 
 
 … 
} 
 
 
Finally, the third parameter: namely the set of output commitments already 
endorsed. Given the simplification assumed above, ΣOUT' is the set of output 
commitments actually endorsed by the current legislature. And ΣOUT, which 
was passed as a parameter to the current legislature, is the set of output 
commitments already endorsed prior to the current instance of the function, 
by the legislatures in the direct line above the current legislature. Hence 
ΣOUT ∪ ΣOUT', or the union of those two sets, is the entire set of output 
commitments endorsed so far. Note that it doesn't matter whether some of the 
commitments contained in ΣOUT' are identical to the commitments contained 
in ΣOUT: within the union of ΣOUT' and ΣOUT, each commitment is unique. 
The parameter passed to the next instance of legislate is thus ΣOUT ∪ ΣOUT': 
 
 
legislate (LS, ΣPOP, ΣOUT) { 
 
 ΣINP = get_ΣINP (ΣPOP) 
ΣINT = negotiate (ΣINP) 
ΣOUT' = get_ΣOUT' (ΣINT, ΣINP) 
 
 for all LS' = child node of LS { 
 
  … = legislate (LS', get_ΣPOP' (LS', ΣPOP), ΣOUT ∪ ΣOUT') 
 
 } 
 
 … 
} 
 
So far, we have failed to specify the return value of legislate. We know it 
must be a set of pairs of legislatures and the output commitments they 
endorse, but how can we derive that return value from the information we 
have generated so far? 
 
Representing the output commitments of the current instance of the recursive 
function is easy, namely 〈LS, ΣOUT'〉. What about the output commitments of 
the other legislatures? 
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Bear in mind that any instance of the recursive function legislate only 
returns the set of pairs of legislatures from the current legislature on down and 
the output commitments endorsed by those legislatures. But the set of pairs of 
legislatures below the current legislature and the output commitments endorsed 
by those legislatures is simply the union of the sets returned by the recursive 
calls. The union of that set and {〈LS, ΣOUT'〉} thus represents all the 
legislatures from the current legislature on down and the output 
commitments endorsed by those legislatures – and is thus returned by the 
recursive function: 
 
legislate (LS, ΣPOP, ΣOUT) { 
 
 LAW = {} 
 
 ΣINP = get_ΣINP (ΣPOP) 
ΣINT = negotiate (ΣINP) 
ΣOUT' = get_ΣOUT' (ΣINT, ΣINP) 
 
 for all LS' = child node of LS { 
 
  LAW = LAW ∪ legislate(LS', get_ΣPOP'(LS',ΣPOP), ΣOUT ∪ ΣOUT') 
 
 } 
 
 return {〈LS, ΣOUT'〉} ∪ LAW 
} 
 
 
6.7 Termination conditions 
6.7.1 Reaching tight consensus before the structure is exhausted 
 
The recursive function legislate is now almost complete, but an important 
point has been omitted so far: the termination conditions of the recursive 
function. As it has been defined so far, the recursive function never terminates 
– or rather, it terminates only once it has run out of legislatures (i.e., child 
nodes) to invoke, i.e., once the tree representing the entire multi-level 
legislative structure has been exhausted.316 
 
This may, in fact, be sufficient as a termination condition under the following 
circumstances: if the only laws that enjoy tight consensus are those including 
output commitments endorsed at the lowest legislative levels. If tight 
consensus cannot be achieved at any level higher than the lowest legislative 
levels, no sufficiently specified and enforceable laws can be generated by 
terminating the recursion before it hits the bottom of the tree representing the 
legislative structure. This may be the case in a population that shares only 
very few fundamental commitments, and agreement on such fundamental 
commitments can be reached only within very particularistic subsets of the 
population subject to the lowest level of legislatures. 
 
                                                
316 In the function legislate, if LS has no child nodes, the for-loop is simply not executed, 
and the function terminates by returning its contribution to the law. 
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Where tight consensus can be achieved at levels higher than the lowest levels, 
however, there is no need for the recursion to continue all the way down. 
Some laws may be relatively uncontroversial, i.e., agreement on the relevant 
output commitments can be reached at relatively high levels, and perhaps 
only minor details need to be further specified at lower levels, if at all; or the 
structure of the population is such that it divides into only a few subsets with 
regard to the fundamental commitments at issue (e.g., pro-choice/pro-life, 
pro-death-penalty/anti-death-penalty, pro-TCM/anti-TCM, and so on). 
Continuing the recursion downward beyond levels where tight consensus can 
be reached is not only unnecessary – it also wastes legislative resources. Once 
tight consensus is achieved – at any level – the law outputted by the top-most 
call to the recursive function legislate is sufficiently specified to be 
enforceable. 
 
Hence, the recursive function can be terminated at the level of any given 
legislature, if the output commitments of that legislature enjoy tight 
consensus. Where this is the case, there is no reason to make a recursive call to 
legislate and invoke the next lower legislatures represented by the child 
nodes. 
 
How does a legislature determine that tight consensus has been achieved? As 
mentioned above, tight consensus is achieved when all the output 
commitments generated so far mean the same thing to every legislator in that 
legislature, at least with respect to the committive and permissive inferences 
of that output commitment.317 Meaning the same thing can be defined 
conveniently in terms of the inferential role the output commitments play for 
each of the legislators, i.e., the relevant conclusions each legislator may draw 
from the output commitments. As we have seen, for any legislator X, any 
legislator Y, and any (relevant) commitment C: 
 
(Η (X, OUT)  Η (X, C)) → (Η (Y, OUT)  Η (Y, C)). 
 
If all of the relevant commitments held by X and Y were known, this 
relationship could be tested algorithmically. In practice, however, any 
legislator is entitled to a great many relevant commitments without 
necessarily being aware of them or even interested in what they might be. 
There is no simple way for a legislator to make the commitments explicit that 
he or she is entitled to, given the legislator's commitment to the output 
commitment.318 Moreover, which further commitments the legislator is 
entitled to in light of a given output commitment generally only becomes 
apparent as the law plays out over time: once it becomes apparent how the 
law functions in the real world and what it thereby implies, by either 
committive inference or permissive inference, will a legislator be able to say 
with certainty whether the law actually means what the legislator thought it 
meant. 
 
A skillful legislator engaged in legislative negotiations, however, will be able 
to ascertain more or less accurately whether her understanding of the output 
                                                
317 See the discussion in subsection 6.2.2 above on "What it means for a commitment to mean 
the same thing." 
318 Or, more precisely, given the legislator's commitment to the (probably subsidiary) popular 
commitment with the same content as the output commitment. 
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commitments expressed by a law corresponds to the understanding of those 
commitments by her legislative colleagues. If the expression of an output 
commitment includes the term "human life," the legislators can be expected to 
know whether they all agree on the relevant meaning of that term or not. In 
other words, skillful legislators will know whether the concepts included in 
the legislature's output commitments are essentially contested or not. 
 
Recall what happens if tight consensus is not reached in a given legislature: 
the function legislate is then called recursively, and the next-lower 
legislatures are invoked. In practice, a decision must be made whether 
consideration of a legislative proposal can terminate at a given level, i.e., 
whether tight consensus has already been reached, or whether consideration 
of the legislative proposal should be passed downward to the next level of 
legislatures. Who or what makes that decision is determined by the 
institutional competence of the actors in the legislative system in question: the 
decision may be made by the legislature currently considering the proposal 
(i.e., the legislature may delegate further specification of the law to lower 
levels), or it may be made by the legislatures below the current level (i.e., the 
subordinate legislatures may assert the right to further specify the law).319 
Conceivably, some other political actor (e.g., the executive or judicial branch) 
may decide that the law must be further specified at a lower legislative level. 
 
Regardless of who or what makes the decision as to whether the output 
commitments generated by a given legislature enjoy tight consensus: once 
tight consensus has been achieved at a given level with respect to the output 
commitments expressed by a law, the law has been sufficiently specified to be 
enforceable and no further recursive calls are necessary. This decision to 
terminate the recursion can be specified using the following primitive helper 
function, which takes the set of output commitments generated by a given 
legislature as its parameter and returns TRUE or FALSE: 
 
 
is_tight (ΣOUT') { 
 
 … 
 
 return TRUE or return FALSE 
} 
 
 
Including this termination condition in the recursive function legislate 
gives us the following definition of the function: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
319 This difference mirrors the difference in emphasis between the Solange II judgment and the 
Solange I judgment with respect to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice and the 
Federal Constitutional Court of Germany. 
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legislate (LS, ΣPOP, ΣOUT) { 
 
 LAW = {} 
 
 ΣINP = get_ΣINP (ΣPOP) 
ΣINT = negotiate (ΣINP) 
ΣOUT' = get_ΣOUT' (ΣINT, ΣINP) 
 
 if (not is_tight (ΣOUT ∪ ΣOUT')) {  
 
for all LS' = child node of LS {   
  
LAW=LAW ∪ legislate(LS',get_ΣPOP'(LS',ΣPOP),ΣOUT ∪ ΣOUT') 
 
  } 
 
 } 
 
 return {〈LS, ΣOUT'〉} ∪ LAW 
} 
 
 
The recursive function legislate will thus terminate once it has run out of 
legislatures to invoke or once tight consensus on the output commitments has 
been achieved in a given legislature. 
 
As the function recurs upward again, the law which previously only enjoyed 
loose consensus now enjoys tight consensus, thanks to the contributions by the 
lower-level legislatures to further specification of the law, and hence it is 
enforceable. The law outputted by the top-level recursive call to legislate 
is thus both adequate to the popular commitments held by the entire 
population and enforceable – i.e., it meets the conditions set out in the 
normative goal of this paper. 
 
6.7.2 Libertarian and (de)centralized communitarian variants 
 
One final scenario must be considered before the recursive function 
legislate can be considered complete. It was hinted at above: what if the 
function recurs over all legislative levels, i.e., every legislature has had the 
opportunity to contribute to the further specification of the law, yet the law 
still does not enjoy tight consensus? This may happen if the disagreement 
regarding fundamental commitments is still so great even at the lowest 
legislative levels that no tight consensus can be reached. If this is the case, 
then the legislative structure is unable to generate a (relevant) law that is both 
adequate and enforceable.  
 
A straightforward implementation of law as pluralism would happily fail to 
specify the law: there simply would be no enforceable law adequate to the full 
set of popular commitments, hence no sufficiently specified law should be 
generated to guide the human conduct under consideration – in other words: 
a legislative output would be generated, but it would enjoy only loose 
consensus, and thus would state a general, unenforceable principle relevant to 
the human conduct in question without constituting a specific, enforceable 
norm. In practice, this would mean that the conduct in question would be 
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unregulated and hence left to the discretion of the individual members of the 
population – this might be called the libertarian variant of the recursive 
function legislate. This libertarian variant of legislate is the variant 
defined above: 
 
// libertarian variant 
legislate (LS, ΣPOP, ΣOUT) { 
 
 LAW = {} 
 
 ΣINP = get_ΣINP (ΣPOP) 
ΣINT = negotiate (ΣINP) 
ΣOUT' = get_ΣOUT' (ΣINT, ΣINP) 
 
 if (not is_tight (ΣOUT ∪ ΣOUT')) {  
 
for all LS' = child node of LS {   
  
LAW=LAW ∪ legislate(LS',get_ΣPOP'(LS',ΣPOP),ΣOUT ∪ ΣOUT') 
 
  } 
 
 } 
 
 return {〈LS, ΣOUT'〉} ∪ LAW 
} 
 
There are, however, other options. These alternate implementations of law as 
pluralism involve privileging enforceability over adequacy and hence look more 
like the traditional legislative process that is less concerned with the adequacy 
of laws to the full range of fundamental commitments held by the population 
bound by them. Compared with the libertarian implementation of law as 
pluralism, these implementations are thus more communitarian in the sense 
that the community (as represented by the legislatures making up the 
legislative structure) has more to say about what qualifies as acceptable 
human conduct than under the libertarian variant. The basic idea of the 
communitarian variants is that if tight consensus cannot be achieved even 
after invoking all of the legislatures in the entire legislative structure, then 
some legislature has to make a decision as to what output commitments to 
endorse, even if those output commitments are not adequate to the popular 
commitments of the relevant subset of the question. How that decision is 
made is determined by the rules governing the individual legislatures and the 
legislative system as a whole: for instance, where tight consensus is not 
achievable, the system might specify that the top-most legislature decide by a 
majority or supermajority vote which output commitments to endorse (a 
more centralized option); or it might specify that the bottom-most legislatures 
decide by a majority or supermajority vote which output commitments to 
endorse (a more decentralized option). The decentralized option privileges 
the fundamental commitments held by the respective majorities (or 
supermajorities) of the smallest subsets of the population represented by a 
legislature, while the centralized option privileges the fundamental 
commitments held by a majority (or supermajority) of the entire population. 
 
Note that under the centralized option, the law is then no longer generated by 
recursion: the only role of the recursive function is to check whether tight 
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consensus can be achieved, and if so, to generate the law enjoying such tight 
consensus. Where tight consensus is not achievable, the law is simply 
outputted non-recursively by the top-most legislature. 
 
In this sense, the decentralized option comes closer to the spirit of the 
libertarian implementation of law as pluralism, as it achieves adequacy to the 
extent achievable, using the device of recursive pluralism. The decentralized 
communitarian option thus occupies the middle ground between the 
libertarian variant of law as pluralism, which emphasizes adequacy over 
enforceability, and the centralized communitarian variant of law as pluralism, 
which sacrifices adequacy in the interest of (centralized) enforceability. In the 
following, the decentralized variant will be used, but it should be borne it 
mind that alternate implementations, such as the libertarian variant or the 
centralized variant, are also feasible.  
 
The decentralized variant of legislate can be derived from the libertarian 
variant by specifying an additional termination condition: if a legislature at 
the lowest level of the legislative structure is reached and the set of output 
commitments generated by that legislature does not enjoy tight consensus, 
then a vote is taken (implemented by the primitive helper function vote) to 
decide which of the intermediate commitments (i.e., the proposed output 
commitments) to endorse as output commitments: 
 
// decentralized variant 
legislate (LS, ΣPOP, ΣOUT) { 
 
 LAW = {} 
 
 ΣINP = get_ΣINP (ΣPOP) 
ΣINT = negotiate (ΣINP) 
ΣOUT' = get_ΣOUT' (ΣINT, ΣINP) 
 
 if (not is_tight (ΣOUT ∪ ΣOUT')) {  
 
if (∃ child node of LS) for all LS' = child node of LS { 
 
   LAW=LAW ∪ legislate(LS',get_ΣPOP'(LS',ΣPOP),ΣOUT ∪ ΣOUT') 
 
  } else ΣOUT' = vote (ΣINT) 
 
 } 
 
 return {〈LS, ΣOUT'〉} ∪ LAW 
} 
 
6.7.3 Failure to achieve enforceability in practice 
 
Finally, one last criterion should be built into the recursive function 
legislate: as currently defined, the function legislate may generate 
laws that, in light of the tight consensus they enjoy, are enforceable in theory, 
but are not enforceable in practice. Even though a law is sufficiently specified 
and hence enforceable in theory, it may not be enforceable in practice due to 
the unavailability of enforcement mechanisms, the involvement of too many 
competing enforcement mechanisms, the exorbitant cost of enforcement, or 
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the sheer complexity of the law. Where a law threatens to become 
unenforceable on such practical grounds, the legislative process must be cut 
short and a decision taken to adopt a law even though recursive pluralism has 
not been given the opportunity to run its full course. While this may ensure 
the enforceability of the resulting law, the law may no longer be fully 
adequate to the popular commitments of the population it binds. The criterion 
of practical enforceability is thus a step away from the prima facie equal 
treatment of all relevant fundamental commitments in favor of equal 
treatment to the extent achievable. 
 
There are several ways to implement the criterion of practical enforceability, 
but – analogously to the decentralized variant of legislate – it does least 
damage to the principle of recursive pluralism if the decision to cut off the 
recursion prematurely is taken (paradigmatically by a vote) at the lowest 
possible level. The simplest way to do this is the following: if, before 
returning from a given instance of the recursive function, the output 
commitments generated so far (by the current legislature as well as by the 
legislatures in a direct line both above and below the current legislature) 
would, in the judgment of the current legislature, be enforceable as a practical 
matter when expressed as a law, then the output returned by the current 
instance of the function will be the same as before. If not, however, then the 
current legislature takes a vote on what contribution it decides to make to the 
emerging law, in light of the need for the resulting law to be practically 
enforceable. 
 
This entails the following modification of the recursive function legislate: 
 
 
legislate (LS, ΣPOP, ΣOUT) { 
 
 LAW = {} 
 
 ΣINP = get_ΣINP (ΣPOP) 
ΣINT = negotiate (ΣINP) 
ΣOUT' = get_ΣOUT' (ΣINT, ΣINP) 
 
 if (not is_tight (ΣOUT ∪ ΣOUT')) {  
 
if (∃ child node of LS) for all LS' = child node of LS { 
 
   LAW=LAW ∪ legislate(LS',get_ΣPOP'(LS',ΣPOP),ΣOUT ∪ ΣOUT') 
 
  } else ΣOUT' = vote (ΣINT) 
 
 } 
 
 if (is_enforceable ({〈LS, ΣOUT ∪ ΣOUT'〉} ∪ LAW)) { 
 
return {〈LS, ΣOUT'〉} ∪ LAW 
  
 } else { 
 
  return {〈LS, vote (ΣINT)〉} 
 
 } 
} 
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The function is_enforceable is primitive, i.e., the legislators in the current 
legislature must skillfully (and most likely non-algorithmically) decide 
whether the law resulting inter alia from the recursive calls to the lower 
legislative levels is enforceable as a practical matter or not. The function 
is_enforceable takes only one parameter: the preliminary law constructed 
from the output commitments contributed by all the legislatures in a direct 
line above the current legislature, the current node itself, and the legislatures 
in direct lines below the current legislature. While this preliminary law does 
not include the contributions made by the legislatures not in direct lines above 
or below the current legislature, it represents the components of the law that 
would be enforced in the current legislative jurisdiction if the law were in fact 
adopted – the output commitments generated by legislatures not in a direct 
line with the current legislature are irrelevant to the current legislative 
jurisdiction, since they do not concern the subset of the population subject to 
the current legislature. 
 
Note that the parameter passed to is_enforceable counterfactually 
assumes that the output commitments of the legislatures above the current 
legislature are all attributed to the current legislature, rather than to the 
respective legislatures above the current legislature. This makes no difference 
in practice: given the way the recursive function legislate is designed, all 
of the output commitments generated by legislatures above the current 
legislature apply both to the legislative jurisdictions above the current 
legislature as well as to the current legislative jurisdiction. The preliminary law 
passed to is_enforceable can thus be assessed for its practical 
enforceability. If it is deemed enforceable in practice, the relevant components 
are returned back up to the next-higher instance of the recursive function; if 
not, the current legislature takes a vote and decides which contribution to 
make to the law so that it is enforceable in practice. 
 
This completes the definition of legislate; the next section will examine the 
top-level function that makes the initial call to the recursive function. 
 
 
6.8 Executing the recursive function 
 
When called at the top-most level, i.e., when executed by the top-most 
legislature, the recursive function legislate (in any of its libertarian or 
communitarian variants) implements recursive pluralism. Any law outputted 
by that top-level call is adequate to the fundamental commitments of the entire 
population (at least to the extent achievable) and is enforceable (at least if a 
variant of legislate is chosen that makes a decision on an enforceable law 
when tight consensus cannot be achieved). Given a constellation of interests 
and other contingent characteristics, a legislature is free to choose (say, by a 
vote or any other decision mechanism) which laws outputted by legislate 
to actually adopt – any of them meet the requirements of law as pluralism. 
Which of the laws outputted by legislate are actually adopted is irrelevant 
to law as pluralism, since they are all enforceable and equally adequate. 
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Of course, lawmaking consists of a potentially infinite number of legislative 
processes dealing with particular issues relevant to human conduct: the 
recursive function legislate must therefore be called again and again, 
depending on the legislative project at issue. Each time legislate is 
executed at the top-most level, it is passed the structure of the entire 
legislative system and the popular commitments relevant to the issue under 
consideration. 
 
What the function legislate has neglected so far is the set of laws already 
endorsed by the legislative system in previous legislative processes. This set is 
the same for any given instance of the recursive function within a given 
legislative process: it is only updated once the recursive function has run its 
entire course and a new law is actually adopted. In this sense, the set of laws 
is global to the entire legislative structure and to all of the functions called 
therein. Hence it can be represented as a global variable ΣLAW that need not 
be passed to the individual functions as a parameter.320 This set of laws ΣLAW 
already adopted can be used by any of the functions, most notably 
negotiate, to derive the set of output commitments and hence the new 
laws. The availability of ΣLAW to the legislative process implements the fact 
that any (non-revolutionary) legislature always builds on the existing 
legislation already in force. 
 
The potentially infinite iteration of legislative processes under law as 
pluralism can be represented by the following top-level function 
law_as_pluralism, the main purpose of which is to make the top-level call 
to legislate and to update the set of laws according to the output of 
legislate: 
 
 
global ΣLAW = {} 
 
law_as_pluralism (LSP, ΣPOPP) { 
 
 while humanity_exists { 
 
LAW = legislate (LSP, ΣPOPP, {}) 
 
ΣLAW = purge_ΣLAW (LAW, ΣLAW) 
 
ΣLAW = ΣLAW ∪ LAW    
 
} 
 
} 
 
 
The parameters passed to law_as_pluralism are the legislative structure 
LSP rooted at the top-level legislature and the entire set of popular 
commitments held by the population ΣPOPP. 321 The global variable ΣLAW is 
                                                
320 Apologies to those modular and object-oriented computer scientists aghast at the notion of 
a global variable. 
321 Strictly speaking, ΣPOPP is a dynamic variable, since its value may change at any time 
during the execution of law_as_pluralism. Any such changes are external to 
law_as_pluralism, however: they are not brought about by the legislative process, but 
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initially defined as empty, assuming there are no pre-existing laws endorsed 
by the legislative system. The flag humanity_exists is assumed to be 
primitive.322 Within the (potentially) infinite while-loop, repeated calls to 
legislate at the top-most level are made, with the entire legislative 
structure and the entire set of popular commitments as input. In each iteration 
of the while-loop, the set of laws is updated to include the new laws 
outputted by the recursive function legislate. 
 
The line  
 
ΣLAW = purge_ΣLAW (LAW, ΣLAW) 
 
is not strictly necessary under law as pluralism, but it is desirable, and it will 
be relevant to the discussion of integrity in section 7.1 on "Making 
justifications explicit" below: it ensures the consistency of the set of laws by 
implementing the principle of lex posterior derogat priori, i.e., any old laws 
contained in ΣLAW inconsistent with the new law LAW are deemed void (or 
repealed). This line will be invoked especially if the set of popular 
commitments changes over time, or simply if alternate laws are chosen from 
the set of potentially endorsable laws that conflict with those previously 
chosen. 
 
Implementation of purge_ΣLAW is as straightforward as checking for the 
incompatibility of laws: 
 
 
purge_ΣLAW (LAW, ΣLAW) { 
 
 ΣLAW' = ΣLAW 
 
for all LAW' ∈ ΣLAW' { 
 
 if (LAW / LAW') ΣLAW' = ΣLAW' - LAW' 
 
} 
 
return ΣLAW' 
} 
 
 
The function law_as_pluralism implements law as pluralism given a fixed 
legislative structure, generating a consistent set of enforceable laws that are 
adequate (to the extent achievable) to the (potentially changing) set of popular 
commitments held by the population. The following section examines how 
this function must be modified to take account of variable legislative 
structures. 
 
 
                                                
rather by other social forces operating in the public sphere as well as individual autonomous 
decisions made in private. 
322 Although in the real world, it at least partially depends on ΣLAW. 
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6.9 The relationship between popular commitments and the 
legislative structure 
 
So far, we have assumed that both the entire set of popular commitments 
ΣPOPP held by the population P and the entire multi-level legislative structure 
LSP are given, i.e., that neither of them are changed by law as pluralism 
(although we have noted that ΣPOPP may change over time due to exogenous 
factors). We have ignored the ways in which each of these quantities may 
influence the other. 
 
A basic premise of law as pluralism is that the negotiation of laws is not about 
the popular commitments that serve as input to the legislative process, but 
rather about how to bind, in a consistent and enforceable manner, members of 
a population who hold a particular constellation of conflicting popular 
commitments.323 Accordingly, any impact LSP has on ΣPOPP must be 
incidental, not intrinsic to law as pluralism. 
 
What about the converse? Any legislative structure is historically contingent, 
i.e., shaped by wars, revolutions, constitutional conventions, executive fiat, 
royal prerogative, legislative action, judicial review, political and social 
culture, monied interests, the role of religion in society, expediency, and so 
on. More generally, the legislative structure is determined by the popular 
commitments of the population it governs (in the case of the world's legislative 
structure, the world's population) and the contingent characteristics that have 
prioritized certain popular commitments over others and certain 
particularistic interests over others.  
 
A full implementation of the regulative ideal of law as pluralism would give 
greater weight to popular commitments than to contingent characteristics 
when defining the legislative structure: not only the substantive norms 
outputted by the legislative process should be guided by the regulative ideal 
of law as pluralism, but also the legislative structure which implements the 
legislative process itself should be guided by the regulative ideal of law as 
pluralism. Ensuring that the legislative structure reflects the set of popular 
commitments in a population makes it more likely that the laws outputted by 
that legislative structure enjoy tight consensus.  
 
The discussion in subsection 6.7.2 above regarding the distinction between 
libertarian and communitarian variants of the recursive function legislate 
indicates why this is so. A variable legislative structure offers a more refined 
solution to the problem of the recursive function legislate exhausting the 
entire legislative structure before tight consensus is reached: if tight consensus 
is regularly impossible to achieve in a given legislative structure, even when 
recurring downward to the lowest level of the legislative structure, then – 
instead of settling the matter with a vote as in the communitarian variant of 
legislate in a fixed legislative structure – the legislative structure itself can 
be expanded to include further child nodes below the existing lowest level,324 
                                                
323 See the discussion on p. 58 and in nn. 137 and 138 above. 
324 This is one way to implement self-determination: see the initiative by the Principality of 
Liechtenstein at the United Nations on Effective Realization of the Right of Self-Determination 
through Autonomy for a general discussion of potential mechanisms for this purpose, and 
article 4(2) of the Constitution of the Principality of Liechtenstein for a concrete implementation 
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or it can be reorganized to bring previously disparate subsets of the 
population holding similar fundamental commitments together under the 
same legislature.325 
  
This possibility of a variable legislative structure brings the libertarian and 
communitarian variants closer together by reducing the need for votes to be 
taken under conditions of conflicting fundamental commitments: unlike the 
libertarian variant of legislate, but like the communitarian variant, the 
possibility of a variable legislative structure allows more decisions to be taken 
by legislatures as opposed to individuals; but unlike the communitarian variant 
of legislate, and like the libertarian variant, fewer decisions affecting the 
conduct of human beings would be taken by a vote. 
 
What would a function get_LS look like that generates a (new) legislative 
structure, given the set of popular commitments (and the existing legislative 
structure, where one exists)? The generation of a new legislative structure is 
what Bruce Ackerman would call a constitutional moment or an instance of 
higher lawmaking:326 the procedure by which the new legislative structure is 
defined would itself be determined by the popular commitments at the time. 
So, like negotiate, get_LS is a black box for the purposes of law as 
pluralism. All that matters is that the output of get_LS be adequate to the 
popular commitments serving as input commitments to the higher 
lawmaking process, in accordance with the principles elaborated in chapters 4 
and 5 on "The justificatory constraint of law as pluralism" and "Decomposing 
and synthesizing commitments" above. The function get_LS can thus be 
represented as follows: 
 
 
get_LS (LSP, ΣPOPP) { 
  
 LSP' = ∅  
 
 //this is where higher lawmaking takes place and LSP' is defined 
 
 return LSP' 
} 
 
 
Taking the possibility of variable legislative structures into account, the ideal 
top-level function law_as_pluralism would be redefined as follows:  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
of such a mechanism. Taken to its logical conclusion, this makes possible the conditions 
referred to by Asad 2003, 180: "What kind of conditions can be developed in secular Europe – 
and beyond – in which everyone may live as a minority among minorities?" It also implements 
the "exit option" referred to in Ely 1980, 178-179, without requiring physical relocation of 
members of the population. Adjusting the legislative structure moves the mountain, not the 
prophet. 
325 Arguably, this is the process aspired to in the progressive development of the European 
Union. 
326 See Ackerman 1991, 266-294, and Choudhry 2008. 
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law_as_pluralism (ΣPOPP) { 
 
 LSP = ∅ 
 
 while humanity_exists { 
 
LSP = get_LS (LSP, ΣPOPP) 
 
LAW = legislate (LSP, ΣPOPP, {}) 
 
ΣLAW = purge_ΣLAW (LAW, ΣLAW) 
 
ΣLAW = ΣLAW ∪ LAW   
  
 } 
} 
 
 
The top-level function law_as_pluralism now only takes the set of 
popular commitments as its (potentially always changing) parameter: the 
legislative structure LSP is now defined within the function 
law_as_pluralism, given that it is now dependent on the changing set of 
popular commitments. LSP starts out as an empty tree ∅: this assumes that the 
first legislative act under law as pluralism comes at a constitutional moment, 
i.e., the legislative structure must be defined first before ordinary lawmaking 
can commence. The line  
 
LSP = get_LS (LSP, ΣPOPP) 
 
is inside the while-loop: this means that a constitutional moment is always 
possible in principle, i.e., the legislative structure may be modified 
dynamically at any time as popular commitments change. After the first 
iteration of the while-loop, get_LS makes use of the existing legislative 
structure to generate the new legislative structure; exactly what use is made 
of it is determined solely by the black box of get_LS's definition, however. In 
particular, it is the responsibility of get_LS to decide whether a proposed 
modification to the existing legislative structure is feasible in practice, or also 
whether an entirely new legislative structure should be established. 
 
The possibility of a variable legislative structure raises the question of what 
all can be considered a legislature: so far, we have assumed that a legislature is 
akin to the standard situation in modern nation states: a more or less 
representative body with fixed, territorial, more or less compulsory, and 
generally non-overlapping (but hierarchically arranged) legislative jurisdiction. 
None of these criteria are necessary elements of law as pluralism, however: 
legislatures under law as pluralism may also have legislative jurisdictions that 
are variable, non-territorial, voluntary, or overlapping. The only criteria for 
inclusion as a legislature under law as pluralism is that the resulting 
legislative structure be a tree with a single root node,327 and that the 
legislature's output commitments contribute to a law that is binding on the 
                                                
327 Or more precisely, a directed acyclic graph with a single "root" vertex. 
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members of the population subject to the legislature, as long as they are in fact 
subject to the legislature.328 
 
 
This completes the definition of the recursive function legislate and the 
top-level function law_as_pluralism – including the possibility of 
dynamically changing the legislative structure as the set of popular 
commitments changes – and hence the definition of the algorithmic aspects of 
law as pluralism. The full definition is included in the Appendix. 
 
Now that law as pluralism has been formally defined as an executable 
function, the final section in this chapter will test the function using the 
example of the essentially contested concept of marriage. 
 
 
6.10 Test case: A recursive definition of marriage 
6.10.1 Marriage as an essentially contested concept 
 
Marriage is an essentially contested concept: not only is the contested 
definition of marriage emotionally charged, it is also rooted in fundamental 
commitments that concern the most basic aspects of what it means to be 
human, including sexuality, love and affection, birth and child-raising, 
property rights, individual freedom versus familial and communal 
obligations, the meaning of life and death, the threat of eternal damnation, 
and so on. Few people are indifferent as to the definition of marriage and its 
significance or lack thereof, and most if not all religions have strong views 
about what marriage is, how their adherents should approach it, and what 
kinds of human conduct are appropriate only inside or outside of marriage. 
 
Marriage is therefore destined to be a test case of law as pluralism and the 
mechanisms used by law as pluralism. The following example illustrates how 
                                                
328 Examples might include the millet system in the Ottoman Empire, norms binding upon 
members of religious groups, norms governing the use of social networks, and so on. See the 
references in n. 72 on p. 28, especially Rosenfeld 2008, and Krisch 2010. The territorial 
conception of federalism as manifested in hierarchical legislative arrangements is a 
particularly European innovation; see Everett 1997, 101: "The traditional Euro-American 
theories of federalism assumed that it was territorial units that would be represented in 
broader publics. However, in the Indian situation we see a parallel indigenous 'federalism' of 
caste, commune, language, and religion. That is, the treatylike voluntary agreements of 
federalism are challenged by relatively involuntary units bonded together by traditions, 
genetic makeup, and communal identity." There is even nothing in the definition of law as 
pluralism that prevents certain nodes from being eschatological; see, e.g., Asad 2003, 239, 
discussing Ahmad Safwat's legal theory: "Where the disregard or breaking of a rule leads to 
punishment imposed by the state, says Safwat, there is (secular) law; where transgression is 
sanctioned only be punishment in the next world, there is (religious) morality. The interesting 
point here is not simply that law and morality are distinguished (medieval Islamic jurists 
made that distinction too […]), but that the distinction between 'morality' and 'law' can be 
defined in parallel ways as rules, and that their obligatory character is constituted by the 
punishment attached to them." What law as pluralism does impede, however, is the existence 
of worldly nodes subordinate to such eschatological nodes, at least in terms of the tree 
representing the legislative structure. But this does not mean that worldly nodes are 
necessarily superior to eschatological nodes in anything but this restricted sense; cf. Audi 
2000, 140: "Agreeing on the principles – and referees – of a game does not entail believing 
that, from a higher point of view, there can be no better game, or no superior referees." 
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law as pluralism, and in particular recursive pluralism, might generate laws 
governing the contested institution of marriage. Note, however, that the 
actual outcome of such negotiations is not predetermined by the algorithms 
that define law as pluralism: the content of any actual law will depend on the 
distribution of popular commitments in the population and the legislatures, 
the legislative structure, the skill of legislators during the negotiations, and 
the behavior of legislators if they are called upon to vote. 
 
6.10.2 Identifying the popular commitments 
 
Assume that at time t0, various members of the population P hold the 
following prescriptive popular commitments (which are either fundamental 
or subsidiary, i.e., derived from fundamental commitments) relevant to 
marriage: 
 
PRSCBENE = "Married persons ought to be entitled to a set of benefits arising 
from their married status, including in regard to taxation, inheritance, child 
custody, property, health and pension insurance, visitation rights and legal 
privilege, welfare benefits, and so on" 
 
PRSCMW = "Only a man and a woman ought to be allowed to marry" 
 
PRSCBISEX = "Any two adults ought to be allowed to marry" 
 
PRSCM4W = "Any one man and up to four women ought to be allowed to 
marry" 
 
PRSCMP-AD = "Only married persons ought to be allowed to adopt a child" 
 
PRSCAP-AD = "Any adult person ought to be allowed to adopt a child" 
 
So far, the set of popular commitments in population P is thus defined as 
follows: 
 
ΣPOPP = {PRSCBENE, PRSCMW, PRSCBISEX, PRSCM4W, PRSCMP-AD, PRSCAP-AD} 
 
Assume that only PRSCBENE is held by the entire population P; the other 
popular commitments are held by various subsets of the population, some of 
which overlap, some of which do not. The subsets of the population are 
related as follows: 
 
PMW ∩ PBISEX = {}, PMW ∩ PM4W = {}, PBISEX ∩ PM4W = {} 
 
PMP-AD ∩ PMW ≠ {}, PMP-AD ∩ PBISEX ≠ {}, PMP-AD ∩ PM4W ≠ {} 
 
PAP-AD ∩ PMW ≠ {}, PAP-AD ∩ PBISEX ≠ {}, PAP-AD ∩ PM4W ≠ {} 
 
Finally, assume that the set of relevant laws at time t0 is empty; society exists 
in a state of nature, so to speak, with regard to the institution of marriage: 
 
ΣLAW = {} 
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Before the legislative process under law as pluralism commences, legislators 
(in the top-level legislature) will skillfully determine which popular 
commitments to propose for inclusion as input commitments to the legislative 
process, and whether any popular prescriptive commitments should be 
decomposed into descriptive commitments and linking commitments in order 
to be admissible. 
 
Skillful legislators will notice that only PRSCBENE can be included directly as 
an input commitment. The other prescriptive commitments are controversial 
at the level of P and hence inadmissible as input commitments to the 
legislative process in LP. To be included, the controversial prescriptive 
commitments must be skillfully decomposed into descriptive commitments 
and uncontroversial linking commitments, for example as follows: 
 
PRSCMW  DESCMW "Marriage is between a man and a woman" &  
   LINKMW   "Any adult person ought to be allowed to marry" 
 
PRSCBISEX  DESCBISEX   "Marriage is between any two adults" & 
   LINKBISEX "Any adult person ought to be allowed to marry" 
 
PRSCM4W  DESCM4W "Marriage is between a man and up to four women" & 
   LINKM4W   "Any adult person ought to be allowed to marry" 
 
PRSCMP-AD DESCMP-AD   "Adoption is between married persons and a child" & 
   LINKMP-AD     "Any adult person ought be allowed to adopt" 
 
PRSCAP-AD DESCAP-AD   "Adoption is between an adult person and a child" & 
   LINKAP-AD      "Any adult person ought to be allowed to adopt" 
 
 
Note that LINKMW = LINKBISEX = LINKM4W and LINKMP-AD = LINKAP-AD. We can 
therefore refer to the former simply as LINKMARRY "any adult person ought to 
be allowed to marry" and the latter as LINKADOPT "any adult person ought to 
be allowed to adopt." 
 
The expanded set of popular commitments, including the results of the 
decompositions, is now: 
 
ΣPOPP = {PRSCBENE, PRSCMW, PRSCBISEX, PRSCM4W, PRSCMP-AD, PRSCAP-AD,  
     DESCMW, DESCBISEX, DESCM4W, DESCMP-AD, DESCAP-AD, 
     LINKMARRY, LINKADOPT} 
 
 
6.10.3 Starting the legislative process at the top-most level 
 
The legislative process can now commence by calling  
 
law_as_pluralism (ΣPOPP) 
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The function begins by initializing the legislature structure LSP to an empty 
tree, checking whether humanity still exists, and generating the current 
legislative structure LSP in light of the set of popular commitments ΣPOPP. 
Given the set of popular commitments and contingent characteristics such as 
shared histories, shared cultures, dominant religions, the respective social 
statuses, birth ratios, and life expectancies of men and women, the location of 
mountain passes and streams, and so on, assume that the function get_LS 
generates an overall legislative structure LSP that roughly reflects the 
structure of the population with regard to popular commitments PRSCMW, 
PRSCBISEX, and PRSCM4W: 
 
        LP 
          /      \ 
      LM4W LMONO   
            /           \ 
         LMW            LBISEX 
 
This means that the top-level legislature LP binds the entire population P; the 
second-level legislatures LM4W and LMONO bind the subsets PM4W and PMW ∪ 
PBISEX, respectively; and the third-level legislatures LMW and LBISEX (which are 
subordinate to LMONO) bind the subsets PMW and PBISEX, respectively. 
 
The law LAW governing marriage can now be generated by calling the 
recursive function legislate with LSP, ΣPOPP and the currently empty set 
of output commitments as parameters: 
 
LAW = legislate (LSP, ΣPOPP, {}) 
 
The first instance of legislate invokes the top-most legislature LP (the root 
node of LSP). After initializing the law LAW to an empty set, the function 
get_ΣINP generates the set of input commitments, given the set of popular 
commitments. Only descriptive commitments and uncontroversial 
prescriptive commitments are admitted as input commitments; this gives us 
the following set of input commitments:  
 
ΣINPP = {PRSCBENE, DESCMW, DESCBISEX, DESCM4W, DESCMP-AD, DESCAP-AD, 
LINKMARRY, LINKADOPT} 
 
 
The meaty part of the negotiations now begins: the function negotiate 
generates the proposed output commitments, in the form of a set of 
intermediate commitments ΣINTP. The precise set of proposed output 
commitments will depend on the skills of the legislators; given the input 
commitments, however, ΣINTP is likely to include at least the following 
proposed output commitments, corresponding to the uncontroversial 
prescriptive input commitments: 
 
INTPBENE = "Married persons shall be entitled to a set of benefits arising from 
their married status, including in regard to taxation, inheritance, child 
custody, property, health and pension insurance, visitation rights and legal 
privilege, welfare benefits, and so on" 
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INTPMARRY = "Any adult person shall be allowed to marry" 
 
INTPADOPT = "Any adult person shall be allowed to adopt" 
 
Since all of these intermediate commitments are adequate to all of the input 
commitments, the function get_ΣOUT' will include the corresponding 
output commitments in the set of endorsable output commitments, hence:329 
 
ΣOUTP = {OUTPBENE, OUTPMARRY, OUTPADOPT} 
 
6.10.4 Invoking lower-level legislatures 
 
As the function is_tight will determine, however, this set of output 
commitments does not enjoy tight consensus: a law expressing this set of 
output commitments would not be sufficiently specified, and hence it would 
not be enforceable – precisely because the concepts of "marriage" and 
"adoption" are essentially contested at the level of LP. Accordingly, new 
instances of the recursive function legislate are called for each of the child 
nodes of LP, i.e., LM4W and LMONO. ΣOUTP – the set of output commitments so 
far – is passed to each of these instances as a parameter, as is the subset of 
popular commitments held by the subsets of the population subject to LM4W 
and LMONO as generated by get_ΣPOP': 
 
ΣPOPM4W = {PRSCBENE, PRSCM4W, PRSCMP-AD, PRSCAP-AD,  
      DESCM4W, DESCMP-AD, DESCAP-AD, 
      LINKMARRY, LINKADOPT} 
 
ΣPOPMONO = {PRSCBENE, PRSCMW, PRSCBISEX, PRSCMP-AD, PRSCAP-AD,  
        DESCMW, DESCBISEX, DESCMP-AD, DESCAP-AD, 
        LINKMARRY, LINKADOPT} 
 
ΣPOPM4W thus does not include PRSCMW, PRSCBISEX, DESCMW and DESCBISEX 
(the "monogamous" commitments), which are held only by members of the 
subset PMONO (the "monogamous" subset of the population), while ΣPOPMONO 
does not include PRSCM4W and DESCM4W (the "polygamous" commitments), 
which are held only by members of the subset PM4W (the "polygamous" subset 
of the population). 
 
The two recursive calls to legislate by LP are thus: 
 
legislate (LSM4W, ΣPOPM4W, ΣOUTP) and 
 
legislate (LSMONO, ΣPOPMONO, ΣOUTP), 
 
each of which returns a contribution to the emerging law. 
 
                                                
329 Other output commitments might be included in the set of endorsable output 
commitments, such as OUTM-ECC = "The definition of marriage is contested" and OUTA-ECC = 
"The definition of adoption is contested," but these are omitted for the sake of simplicity. 
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Let's look at the simpler of these two cases, i.e., the call to LM4W. 
 
The input commitments ΣINPM4W are generated by a call to get_ΣINP, which 
weeds out the controversial prescriptive commitments from ΣPOPM4W. Now 
that we are dealing only with "polygamists," the only controversial 
prescriptive popular commitments at the level of LM4W are PRSCMP-AD and 
PRSCAP-AD (the prescriptive commitments relating to adoption), hence: 
 
ΣINPM4W = {PRSCBENE, PRSCM4W, DESCM4W, DESCMP-AD, DESCAP-AD, LINKMARRY, 
LINKADOPT} 
 
What set of endorsable output commitments ΣOUTM4W can be generated by 
the calls to the functions negotiate and get_ΣOUT'? This level of 
negotiation need not concern itself with PRSCBENE, since the relevant output 
commitment was already generated at the next-higher level. Unlike at the 
previous level, the commitments PRSCM4W and DESCM4W are now 
uncontroversial, hence the legislature LM4W could endorse both of the 
following proposed output commitments: 
 
INTM4WPRSC-M4W = "Any one man and up to four women shall be allowed to 
marry" 
 
INTM4WDESC-M4W = "Marriage is between a man and up to four women." 
 
Since the commitment OUTPMARRY "any adult person shall be allowed to 
marry" is already available to LM4W as an output commitment, however, it 
may be used as a linking commitment to synthesize INTM4WPRSC-M4W from 
INTM4WDESC-M4W: 
 
INTM4WDESC-M4W & OUTPMARRY  INTM4WPRSC-M4W 
 
The explicit endorsement of INTM4WPRSC-M4W is thus redundant; it suffices for 
LM4W to endorse the output commitment corresponding to INTM4WDESC-M4W 
"marriage is between a man and up to four women" to ensure that a man in 
PM4W can marry up to four women in PM4W. 
 
OUTM4WDESC-M4W = "Marriage is between a man and up to four women"  
 
can thus be included in the set of output commitments ΣOUTM4W. 
 
No headway can be made in this legislative jurisdiction on the question of 
adoption, however: members of the population in the jurisdiction of LM4W 
hold the conflicting prescriptive commitments PRSCMP-AD and PRSCAP-AD on 
this issue, which is why they were not included as input commitments. The 
only relevant input commitments for this legislature are  
 
DESCMP-AD = "Adoption is between married persons and a child" 
 
DESCAP-AD = "Adoption is between an adult person and a child" and 
 
LINKADOPT  = "Any adult person ought to be allowed to adopt," 
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which at most might generate the endorsable output commitment 
 
OUTADOPT = "Any adult person shall be allowed to adopt," 
 
which was already endorsed at the next-higher level. 
 
So the entire non-redundant set of output commitments generated by LM4W so 
far is  
 
ΣOUTM4W = {OUTM4WDESC-M4W} 
 
This instance of the recursive function legislate now reaches the if-
condition: does the set of output commitments generated so far enjoy tight 
consensus? The set of output commitments generated so far is  
 
ΣOUTP ∪ ΣOUTM4W = {OUTPBENE, OUTPMARRY, OUTPADOPT, OUTM4WDESC-M4W} 
 
This set does not enjoy tight consensus in this legislative jurisdiction, since 
OUTPADOPT is still not sufficiently specified and hence not enforceable; the 
other output commitments in the set would in fact be (jointly) sufficiently 
specified and hence (jointly) enforceable in this legislative jurisdiction: 
OUTPBENE has always been sufficiently specified, and OUTM4WDESC-M4W & 
OUTPMARRY are jointly sufficiently specified. So the entire set is partially 
sufficiently specified. 
 
LM4W does not have any child nodes, i.e., it is the bottom-most legislature 
along this branch of the legislative tree. No recursive call can be made, and 
the legislature must take a vote to generate its output commitments as a 
contribution to the emerging law. The output commitment OUTM4WDESC-M4W 
has already been included, since it enjoys tight consensus in this legislative 
jurisdiction; the problem is what to do with adoption, since no tight 
consensus has been achievable. The issue will be decided by a vote: given the 
distribution of DESCMP-AD versus DESCAP-AD in the population and other 
contingent characteristics, some output commitment OUTM4WADOPT that is 
enforceable as a practical matter in this legislative jurisdiction will be adopted 
by a vote and included in the set of returned output commitments, such that: 
 
ΣOUTM4W = {OUTM4WDESC-M4W, OUTM4WADOPT} 
 
The set of output commitments generated so far is now 
 
ΣOUTP ∪ ΣOUTM4W = {OUTPBENE, OUTPMARRY, OUTPADOPT, OUTM4WDESC-M4W, 
OUTM4WADOPT} 
 
All the output commitments in this set are now (jointly) sufficiently specified 
and hence enforceable, so the preliminary law 
 
{〈LM4W, {OUTPBENE, OUTPMARRY, OUTPADOPT, OUTM4WDESC-M4W, OUTM4WADOPT}〉} 
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would also be enforceable.330 This meets the is_enforceable if-condition, 
so the contribution 
 
{〈LM4W, {OUTM4WDESC-M4W, OUTM4WADOPT}〉} 
 
is returned by the LM4W instance of the recursive function legislate to the 
LP instance of legislate, where it is added to that instance's emerging law 
LAW. Since LAW was previously empty, the emerging law LAW is now 
 
LAW = {〈LM4W, {OUTM4WDESC-M4W, OUTM4WADOPT}〉}  
 
Together with the output commitments generated at the level of LP, LAW is 
sufficiently specified with regard to the legislature LM4W. The for-loop 
continues to the next iteration, where it makes the second recursive call, 
 
legislate (LSMONO, ΣPOPMONO, ΣOUTP)  
 
We know that the set of popular commitments at the level of LMONO is 
 
ΣPOPMONO = {PRSCBENE, PRSCMW, PRSCBISEX, PRSCMP-AD, PRSCAP-AD,  
        DESCMW, DESCBISEX, DESCMP-AD, DESCAP-AD, 
        LINKMARRY, LINKADOPT}  
 
i.e., the "monogamous" commitments. The controversial prescriptive 
commitments PRSCMW (the "heterosexual" prescriptive commitment) and 
PRSCBISEX (the "bisexual" prescriptive commitment) are not admissible as 
input commitments at this level; neither are the controversial prescriptive 
commitments PRSCMP-AD and PRSCAP-AD (relating to adoption). The set of input 
commitments to LMONO will thus be: 
 
ΣINPMONO = {PRSCBENE, DESCMW, DESCBISEX, DESCMP-AD, DESCAP-AD, LINKMARRY, 
LINKADOPT}  
 
But the incompatible descriptive commitments DESCMW "marriage is between 
a man and a woman" and DESCBISEX "marriage is between any two adults" 
cannot be used to generate an adequate output commitment along the lines of 
OUTM4WDESC-M4W "marriage is between a man and up to four women," which in 
conjunction with OUTPMARRY "any adult person shall be allowed to marry" is 
sufficiently specified. At most, they can be used to generate the following 
descriptive output commitment, which enjoys only loose consensus, even in 
conjunction with OUTPMARRY: 
 
OUTMONODESC-MONO = "Marriage is between exactly two adults." 
 
Although this is a weak output commitment, it allows certain enforcement 
actions to be taken at the level of LMONO that were not yet possible at the level 
of LP: for instance, all corollary legislation and aspects of  
 
                                                
330 Note that the helper function is_enforceable makes the counterfactual simplification 
described on p. 158, namely that the output commitments of the legislatures above the 
current legislature (in this case, of LP) are all attributed to the current legislature (in this case, 
LM4W), rather than to the respective legislatures above the current legislature (in this case, LP). 
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OUTPBENE = "Married persons shall be entitled to a set of benefits arising from 
their married status, including in regard to taxation, inheritance, child 
custody, property, health and pension insurance, visitation rights and legal 
privilege, welfare benefits, and so on" 
 
that depend on the number but not the gender of the married persons involved 
can now be effectively administered in the legislative jurisdiction of LMONO, 
while they could not in the legislative jurisdiction of LP as a whole. 
 
Analogously to LM4W, no output commitment with regard to adoption can be 
generated at the level of LMONO that would enjoy tight consensus. So the entire 
non-redundant set of output commitments generated by LMONO so far is 
 
ΣOUTMONO = {OUTMONODESC-MONO} , 
 
which does not enjoy tight consensus. The set of output commitments 
generated so far in this direct line of the legislative tree is thus  
 
ΣOUTP ∪ ΣOUTMONO = {OUTPBENE, OUTPMARRY, OUTPADOPT, OUTMONODESC-MONO} , 
 
which likewise does not enjoy tight consensus. This instance of legislate 
must therefore invoke the next lower legislatures, LMW and LBISEX. 
 
The ability of LMW and LBISEX to achieve tight consensus on the issues of 
marriage and adoption is analogous to that of LM4W: tight consensus can be 
reached with regard to marriage, while a vote must be taken with regard to 
adoption. Accordingly, LMW may generate a descriptive output commitment 
such as  
 
OUTMWDESC-MW = "Marriage is between a man and a woman"  
 
while LBISEX may generate a descriptive output commitment such as 
 
OUTBISEXDESC-BISEX = "Marriage is between any two adults." 
 
Since both legislatures are at the bottom of the legislative tree, votes must be 
taken to generate the output commitments OUTMWADOPT and OUTBISEXADOPT. 
 
LMW will return the enforceable contribution 
 
{〈LMW, {OUTMWDESC-MW, OUTMWADOPT}〉} 
 
and LBISEX will return the enforceable contribution 
 
{〈LBISEX, {OUTBISEXDESC-BISEX, OUTBISEXADOPT}〉} 
 
to the LMONO instance of legislate. Inside the for-loop of that instance, 
legislate constructs the joint contribution of these two contributions: 
 
{〈LMW, {OUTMWDESC-MW, OUTMWADOPT}〉,〈LBISEX, {OUTBISEXDESC-BISEX, OUTBISEXADOPT}〉} , 
 
which is finally merged with  
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{〈LMONO, {OUTMONODESC-MONO}〉} 
 
to create 
 
{〈LMONO, {OUTMONODESC-MONO}〉, 〈LMW, {OUTMWDESC-MW, OUTMWADOPT}〉, 〈LBISEX, 
{OUTBISEXDESC-BISEX, OUTBISEXADOPT}〉} . 
 
This contribution to the emerging law LAW is then returned to the LP instance 
of legislate, where it is merged with the contribution from LM4W,  
 
{〈LM4W, {OUTM4WDESC-M4W, OUTM4WADOPT}〉} ,  
 
to create 
 
{〈LM4W, {OUTM4WDESC-M4W, OUTM4WADOPT}〉, 〈LMONO, {OUTMONODESC-MONO}〉, 〈LMW, 
{OUTMWDESC-MW, OUTMWADOPT}〉, 〈LBISEX, {OUTBISEXDESC-BISEX, OUTBISEXADOPT}〉} . 
 
 
6.10.5 Adopting the law 
 
The LP instance of legislate now enters the final if-condition of the 
function, where the enforceability of the entire law 
 
{〈LP, {OUTPBENE, OUTPMARRY, OUTPADOPT}〉, 〈LM4W, {OUTM4WDESC-M4W, 
OUTM4WADOPT}〉, 〈LMONO, {OUTMONODESC-MONO}〉, 〈LMW, {OUTMWDESC-M4W, 
OUTMWADOPT}〉, 〈LBISEX, {OUTBISEXDESC-BISEX, OUTBISEXADOPT}〉} 
 
is tested. This law is in fact now sufficiently specified and thus enforceable: by 
consulting this law, every member of the entire population P can determine 
the output commitments that bind her, and hence whom he or she may marry 
and under what conditions he or she may adopt, as well as the benefits that 
accrue to her by being married (at least as far as the involvement of the state is 
concerned). Not every member of the population will be bound by the same 
output commitments expressed by this law; only those output commitments 
are binding on a given person that are enforceable in the legislative 
jurisdiction to which that person is subject. 331 
 
Similarly, the law shows which output commitments may be enforced by the 
institutions of each legislative jurisdiction, and what the contribution to 
enforcement of each legislative jurisdiction may be. Cooperatively, all of the 
                                                
331 Naturally, no member of the population should be expected to consult law represented in 
pseudocode data structures; in practice, it would be available in plain English, just like any 
other law (to the extent any other law is written in plain English). For instance, a member of 
PBISEX would be bound by the law expressing the following output commitments formulated 
in plain English, assuming that DESCMP-AD was endorsed as OUTBISEXADOPT by a vote: "Any 
adult person shall be allowed to marry; marriage is defined as between any and exactly two 
adults. Married persons shall be entitled to a set of benefits arising from their married status 
[…]. Any adult person shall be allowed to adopt; adoption is defined as between married 
persons and a child." 
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legislative jurisdictions captured by the legislative structure LSP enforce the 
law. In this sense, the law constitutes a recursive definition of marriage. 
 
The law is returned to the top-level function law_as_pluralism, where it is 
assigned to the variable LAW. The set of laws already in force, ΣLAW, is now 
purged of any laws that are incompatible with LAW: 
 
ΣLAW = purge_ΣLAW (LAW, ΣLAW) 
 
Since this is the first iteration of law_as_pluralism, ΣLAW is still empty 
and nothing needs to be purged. ΣLAW is now supplemented by LAW: 
 
ΣLAW = ΣLAW ∪ LAW , 
 
so that the set ΣLAW now contains the single element 
 
LAW = {〈LP, {OUTPBENE, OUTPMARRY, OUTPADOPT}〉, 〈LM4W, {OUTM4WDESC-M4W, 
OUTM4WADOPT}〉, 〈LMONO, {OUTMONODESC-MONO}〉, 〈LMW, {OUTMWDESC-M4W, 
OUTMWADOPT}〉, 〈LBISEX, {OUTBISEXDESC-BISEX, OUTBISEXADOPT}〉}. 
 
This completes the first legislative project of law_as_pluralism; the loop 
cycles back to the beginning, where  
 
LSP = get_LS (LSP, ΣPOPP) 
 
is again executed. 
 
6.10.6 Adjusting the legislative structure 
 
While the first iteration of law_as_pluralism generated an adequate and 
enforceable law in regard to marriage in general, as aspired to under law as 
pluralism, it failed to generate an adequate and enforceable law in regard to 
the specific aspect of adoption. While the adoption aspect of LAW is 
enforceable as a practical matter, it is not adequate, since the corresponding 
output commitment was adopted by a vote – it does not enjoy tight 
consensus. The reason why the first iteration failed in this regard was in part 
due to the legislative structure itself: while LSP mirrored the structure of the 
population with respect to the distribution of popular commitments relevant 
to the definition of marriage, it did not do so with respect to the distribution 
of popular commitments relevant to adoption. The execution of  
 
LSP = get_LS (LSP, ΣPOPP) 
 
during the second iteration of law_as_pluralism allows this defect to be 
remedied: the legislative structure LSP can be modified to account for the 
diversity of popular commitments relevant to adoption, for instance by 
creating overlapping legislative jurisdictions or expanding the legislative tree 
downward to include even smaller legislative jurisdictions than those subject 
to LM4W, LMW, and LBISEX. 332 While the regulative ideal of law as pluralism may 
                                                
332 See Rosenfeld 2008 for suggestions on how just arrangements might work in practice. 
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never be fully implemented, it may at least be approached asymptotically, as 
practical enforceability allows. 
 
 
This concludes the test of the formal definition of law as pluralism. Now that 
law as pluralism has been formally defined as a function and tested, the final 
chapter will consider what law as pluralism means in practice and how law as 
pluralism can be implemented in the real world of law and politics. 
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7 Implementing law as pluralism 
 
7.1 Making justifications explicit 
 
Law as pluralism relies heavily on the justificatory constraint of law as 
pluralism to ensure the adequacy of laws to the conflicting fundamental 
commitments of the entire population. Augmented by the multi-level 
considerations introduced in the previous chapter on "Recursive pluralism," 
the justificatory constraint of law as pluralism is defined as follows: 
 
Under law as pluralism, a popular commitment may serve as an input 
commitment for a legislature and hence as a justification for legislative 
proposals and the laws to which they give rise, and accordingly also 
for positions taken in that legislature in the defense of such proposals, 
if the popular commitment is (a) descriptive, or (b) prescriptive and 
held by the entire subset of the population subject to the jurisdiction of 
that legislature. 
 
So far, we have considered only isolated laws generated by a given legislative 
process; we have not considered the emergence of a more or less coherent 
body of laws over time, other than simply noting that the set of laws ΣLAW 
must be updated continuously to include new laws, both by adding new laws 
and by purging old laws from the set that are incompatible with the new 
laws. 
 
In order to ensure that a body of legislation is coherent in practice, which in 
turn helps ensure that the body of legislation is enforceable as a practical 
matter, more work must be done to keep track of the commitments that each 
of the legislatures has entered into when negotiating and adopting laws. The 
main way in which legislative commitments have been endorsed has been as 
output commitments, which serve as contributions to laws that are adopted by 
the legislatures making up the legislative system. But as some of the examples 
above have shown,333 there is nothing in principle that prevents a legislature 
from endorsing intermediate legislative commitments, even if they are not 
formally adopted as output commitments contributing to a law. 
 
In particular, there is nothing preventing a legislature from endorsing 
intermediate legislative commitments that serve as justifications for the output 
commitments that are actually adopted as part of laws. Any of the input 
commitments admissible under the justificatory constraint of law as pluralism 
and the intermediate commitments derived from those input commitments 
may in principle serve as justifications for output commitments, and they may 
in principle be endorsed by the legislature, whether they are endorsed as 
output commitments or not. 
 
Endorsing an intermediate commitment that serves as a justification for an 
output commitment, and hence for a law, allows subsequent legislative 
processes (and extra-legislative review mechanisms, in particular courts, as 
will be discussed in section 7.3 on "Constitutional rules and meta-
constitutional rules" below), to ensure that new legislation fits with those 
                                                
333 Such as the endorsement of LINK2 in subsection 5.4.3 above. 
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existing justifications, rather than simply throwing old legislation overboard 
that is incompatible with the new legislation. This helps legislatures (and 
courts) ensure a degree of integrity of the body of legislation that is not 
achievable otherwise.334 By making justifications explicit in this way,335 i.e., by 
expressing the commitments used as justifications that otherwise would 
remain unexpressed, legislatures (and courts) have the tools at their disposal 
to decide whether the justifications used in the adoption of existing law shall 
likewise be used to justify the adoption of new law, or whether those old 
justifications shall be disregarded. Making justifications explicit thus gives 
legislatures the tools to balance the relative weight of existing legislation and 
new legislation, and it gives courts the tools to decide what precedential value 
existing legislation should have when reviewing new legislation.336 
 
It would be unrealistic to expect a body of legislation to be fully coherent, or 
to expect all justifications used in the negotiation and adoption of laws to be 
made explicit.337 Even at a given legislative level, a certain degree of 
ambiguity is sometimes desirable to ensure (tight or loose) consensus or at 
least sufficient agreement to adopt a law, as well as to ensure practicability of 
enforcement – utter precision would strangle the legislative process. 
Nevertheless, making justifications explicit by providing a record of endorsed 
but unadopted legislative commitments (in particular justifications of output 
commitments) helps ensure that new legislation is not an alien element in a 
                                                
334 This conception of integrity is a legislative counterpoint to "law as integrity" developed by 
Dworkin 1986, especially in 176-275: while Dworkin is concerned primarily with integrity as a 
guide for legal interpretation, paradigmatically by courts, integrity under law as pluralism is 
concerned with lawmaking by legislatures. See Dworkin 1986, 225: "According to law as 
integrity, propositions of law are true if they figure in or follow from the principles of justice, 
fairness, and procedural due process that provide the best constructive interpretation of the 
community's legal practice." Dworkin's project is to rein in the threat of legal positivism with 
reference to the correct moral principles of the society within which laws are made; integrity 
under law as pluralism in turn constrains the discretion that an interpreter of the law may 
exercise in determining what those principles are and hence in developing the "best 
constructive interpretation of the community's legal practice." Dworkin himself believes that 
integrity on the lawmaking side is a virtue; he calls this the "legislative principle" of political 
integrity. See Dworkin 1986, 176: "We have two principles of political integrity: a legislative 
principle, which asks lawmakers to try to make the total set of laws morally coherent, and an 
adjudicative principle, which instructs that the law be seen as coherent in that way, so far as 
possible." But law as pluralism is not concerned with the moral coherence of legislation per se, 
given that morality is itself essentially contested and derived from potentially conflicting 
fundamental commitments; instead, it aims to achieve pragmatic coherence of legislation in 
the sense that the conditions for divergent interpretations of output commitments are 
specified by the legislative process itself. Integrity under law as pluralism is thus akin to but 
weaker than Dworkin's legislative integrity. See Marmor 2007, 39-56, for a similarly 
motivated critique of Dworkin's legislative integrity from the perspective of pluralism. 
335 The project of "making justifications explicit" is of course inspired by Brandom 1994's 
project of making "it" explicit (in the domain of communication in general) and Klatt 2008's 
project of making "the law" explicit (especially in regard to legal argumentation and 
interpretation). 
336 As Oliver-Lalana 2005 argues, making justifications explicit helps enhance the legitimacy of 
legislation. Waaldijk 1987 considers the feasibility of requiring legislatures to state the reasons 
for their legislative decisions. This paper does not go so far as to require legislatures to make 
(all) their justifications explicit: it merely indicates how justifications could and should be 
made explicit, and what this would entail in the context of law as pluralism. 
337 On the political and practical limits to legislative integrity, see Marmor 2008 and Marmor 
2007, 39-56. See Dahlman 2002 for a similarly motivated critique and the respective role of 
Dworkin's "rules" and "principles" in legislative integrity. 
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given body of law, and it helps hold legislators and legislatures to the 
commitments they have previously endorsed. 
 
Nothing prevents existing commitments from being purged in the same way 
that obsolete laws are purged; whether a commitment continues to be held by 
a legislator or a legislature is the decision of that legislator or legislature (or 
the court reviewing the legislation; see subsection 7.3.2 on "Judicial review of 
law as pluralism" below). But keeping track of the commitments endorsed (or, 
in Brandom's terminology, keeping a "set of books" on those commitments,338 
allows the web of commitments and entitlements that justify laws to be 
updated methodologically and coherently, rather than haphazardly. 
 
For instance, if a legislature has previously justified an output commitment 
(as a contribution to a law expressing that output commitment) such as 
OUTPROHIBIT "abortion shall always be prohibited" in terms of an intermediate 
commitment INTSACRED "innocent human life is sacred," then a new output 
commitment OUTPRENATAL "prenatal health care shall not be subsidized" may 
require a modification of the endorsement of the existing intermediate 
commitment INTSACRED, or at least an additional set of justifications to show 
how INTSACRED  OUTPROHIBIT, but not OUTPROHIBIT → *OUTPRENATAL. And if 
INTSACRED is abandoned in light of the desire to endorse OUTPRENATAL (say, if 
OUTPRENATAL only enjoys tight consensus in a given legislative jurisdiction if 
that jurisdiction no longer endorses INTSACRED), then this might call for 
concomitant modifications of OUTPROHIBIT in the next iteration of the legislative 
process. 
 
Making justifications explicit in practice is not difficult: in the algorithmic 
definition of law as pluralism elaborated in the last chapter, it simply requires 
another global variable analogous to ΣLAW which stores all the intermediate 
commitments endorsed but not adopted as part of a law by all the legislatures in 
the legislative structure. Call this set of explicit justifications ΣJUST. The 
structure of ΣJUST will be analogous to the structure of ΣLAW, i.e., a set of 
pairs of legislatures and the intermediate commitments they endorse but do 
not adopt. The mechanisms for negotiating and endorsing the commitments 
included in ΣJUST will be identical to those relevant to ΣLAW, and both 
ΣJUST and ΣLAW will be available as input to the legislative processes in all 
of the legislatures. The only difference is that ΣLAW contains the laws that 
have been adopted, while ΣJUST contains the intermediate commitments that 
have been endorsed but not adopted as part of a law.339 Expanding the 
algorithmic definition of law as pluralism is thus straightforward: in parallel 
with the operations affecting ΣLAW, equivalent operations can be introduced 
that affect ΣJUST.340 
                                                
338 See Brandom 1994, 590, and section 5.2.2. 
339 Or more precisely: ΣLAW contains those laws that are potentially adopted under law as 
pluralism, i.e., that are adequate and enforceable; whether a law is actually adopted depends 
on the contingent characteristics that lead a legislature to choose one adequate and 
enforceable law over another. 
340 In fact, the algorithmic definition of law as pluralism included in the Appendix need not be 
modified at all, if each element of ΣLAW is understood to include information as to whether 
the endorsed commitments in question have been adopted as part of a law or not; this can be 
done simply by changing the data type of LAW from a set of pairs of legislatures and their 
endorsed commitments to a set of triples of legislatures, their endorsed commitments, and a 
flag indicating whether the commitment has been adopted as a law or not.  
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Even without law as pluralism, legislatures are often already interpreted as 
having endorsed commitments without formally adopting them as law: these 
endorsed but unadopted commitments may include preambles to 
legislation,341 records of legislative negotiations, legislative committee reports, 
statements before and after the vote,342 and so on.343 These sources are often 
consulted (inter alia by courts) in the attempt to ascertain the intent or purpose 
of the legislature in adopting a given law.344 So ΣJUST may often already be 
implicitly assumed as the background or context of the set of laws ΣLAW, 
thus serving as an aid in the interpretation of ΣLAW. Under law as pluralism, 
the recording of such unadopted commitments is simply more explicit and 
systematic – a task made simpler by the need to comply with the justificatory 
constraint of law as pluralism and the other justificatory methods elaborated 
in chapters 4 and 5 on "The justificatory constraint of law as pluralism" and 
"Decomposing and synthesizing commitments."345 
 
The following sections on "Rules of legislative procedure" and "Constitutional 
rules and meta-constitutional rules" will discuss how making justifications 
explicit can be used to facilitate and monitor the implementation of law as 
pluralism. 
 
 
7.2 Rules of legislative procedure 
7.2.1 Enforceable and binding rules 
 
Since law as pluralism primarily concerns legislation, the implementation of 
law as pluralism focuses initially on the activities of legislatures and the 
legislators that constitute them. The algorithmic definition of law as pluralism 
                                                
341 Although preambles are usually considered part of the adopted legislation; their role in 
justification is often greater in international treaties than in national legislation. See concerns 
on the preamble of the New START Treaty expressed by McCain 2010. On the potential use of 
justifications in preambles and a critique thereof, see Greenawalt 1995, 59. 
342 See Greenawalt 1995, 110, on the publicity of justifications contained in committee reports, 
etc. 
343 Or in the case of American constitutional norms, The Federalist Papers and the records of the 
Philadelphia Convention and the state ratification conventions. See Rakove 1996, especially 3-
22, for an analysis of the historical possibilities and difficulties in ascertaining the original 
justifications relevant to the U.S. Constitution. 
344 See Waldron 1999a, 145-146: "[S]ome American judges make a practice of appealing to 
certain statements on the legislative record (a formal committee report, for example, or the 
unchallenged statement of a bill's manager) which do not traditionally count as part of [the] 
text of the statute they are considering. It seems to me that Ronald Dworkin has this exactly 
right when he says in effect that the judges are developing a practice of recognizing such 
statements as acts of the legislature and that legislators are responding to that recognition by 
producing statements that are intended to be taken in that way. Nothing I have said is 
incompatible with these practices: they represent in effect a gradual modification of the legal 
system's rule of recognition from the judges' side, and, as far as the legislature is concerned, 
they represent a gradual modification of its constitutive procedures [internal citations 
omitted]." 
345 For a skeptical account of making justifications explicit, or what Ely calls an "articulation 
requirement," see Ely 1980, 125-131. But the proposal here is not that legislators be required to 
articulate their reasons; only that there are certain advantages to doing so, in light of the 
desire to achieve adequate legislation, and that when legislators in fact do so, only certain 
justifications ought to be admissible. 
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provides rules (in the form of functions) that can be followed in order to 
ensure that a legislature generates laws that are in fact adequate and 
enforceable as defined under law as pluralism. One might envision 
interpreting such rules as voluntary or moral principles of conduct, 
compliance with which would be a convenient but ultimately fickle way of 
facilitating the pluralistic legislative process.346 But one of the advantages of 
defining these rules algorithmically is that they are actually enforceable and 
can hence be treated as binding on legislators. Rules of legislative procedure are a 
natural medium for expressing these binding rules.347 
 
Law as pluralism relies to a considerable extent on the (potentially non-
algorithmic) skills of legislators in proposing popular commitments as input 
commitments (even before the legislative process as such commences) and in 
bridging the gap from admissible input commitments to proposed output 
commitments (i.e., what happens within the black box of the function 
negotiate). The exercise of these skills is not subject to enforceable rules: 
whether a legislator does in fact engage skillfully in negotiations is ultimately 
the legislator's own responsibility (and the responsibility of the legislator's 
constituency). But certain important features of law as pluralism are at least 
partially algorithmic and hence potentially enforceable by way of rules of 
legislative procedure: most saliently, the justificatory constraint of law as 
pluralism and the termination conditions of recursive pluralism. The 
enforcement of rules of legislative procedure governing these two features of 
law as pluralism is facilitated by making justifications explicit as discussed in 
the previous section. 
 
7.2.2 Enforcement of the justificatory constraint and termination 
conditions 
 
The justificatory constraint of law as pluralism can, for instance, be enforced 
using rules of procedure as follows: within any legislative negotiation, 
justifications for or against legislative proposals shall only be permissible if they 
are expressed in terms of descriptive popular commitments, uncontroversial 
prescriptive popular commitments, or legislative commitments derived from such 
popular commitments. If a legislator argues in favor of or against a legislative 
proposal using controversial prescriptive popular commitments as 
justifications, these justifications shall be deemed inadmissible by the 
legislator and shall be stricken from the legislative record, and the legislator 
shall be barred from continuing the argument along these lines.348 Moreover, 
the inadmissible justifications may not be endorsed by the legislature as a 
justification for the output commitments actually adopted. These rules of 
procedure can be administered and enforced by the person chairing the 
                                                
346 This is generally the way public justification is conceived; but see n. 196 on p. 81. 
347 They can thus be seen as part of the implementation of the "secondary rules" in Hart 1994's 
formulation of legal positivism. See Hart 1994, 80-81, and n. 160 on p. 64. 
348 This is similar to the striking of statements from court records that are deemed 
inadmissible by the judge; in the case of legislatures, this might be implemented by an 
analogous procedure according to which other legislators raise objections, or according to 
which the chair of the negotiations has (contestable) authority to strike inadmissible 
justifications from the legislative record. It is also similar to legislative rules requiring 
legislators' speeches to be on point. 
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legislature or committee in question (subject to scrutiny by the members of 
the legislature or committee, for instance). 
 
Similarly, the termination conditions of recursive pluralism can likewise be 
enforced using rules of legislative procedure. The default procedure under 
law as pluralism is for negotiations in a given legislature to continue until 
tight or loose consensus has been reached. If tight consensus is reached, there 
is no need for a vote and hence no additional termination condition arises.349 If 
only loose consensus is achieved, the task of legislating is delegated to the 
next-lower legislatures, if there are any. As defined in the function 
legislate, a termination condition is invoked and a vote is taken only if (a) 
the law as further specified by the lower-level legislatures is deemed unenforceable as 
a practical manner, or (b) no lower-level legislatures are available to further specify 
an emerging law that enjoys only loose consensus.  
 
Where termination condition (a) applies, if the legislature decides that a vote 
must be taken because the law would otherwise be unenforceable, the 
legislature should provide a justification why this is so. Accordingly, the 
legislature should endorse a legislative commitment explaining why a vote is 
being taken at that level instead of delegating further specification of the law 
to lower-level legislatures. Once such a justification has been endorsed by a 
legislature, that legislature can be held to that justification in future iterations of 
the legislative process, i.e., when future laws are negotiated. If, at some point 
in the future, the justification is deemed lacking – or incompatible with the 
goals of the future legislation – the original law settled by the vote could be 
revisited accordingly. The rules of legislative procedure might thus specify 
that if a vote is taken where an emerging law is deemed unenforceable, the 
legislature must endorse a justification of that decision. 
 
Where termination condition (b) applies, it is normally straightforward to 
justify why a vote is being taken: simply because no lower-level legislatures 
are available to further specify the law. But recall that the function get_LS 
gives the legislative structure the opportunity to reorganize itself should the 
adequacy of laws regularly be in danger. If a given legislative structure 
regularly fails to achieve tight consensus on laws, then the burden of proof is 
on the legislative structure to justify why it should be maintained 
notwithstanding the regularly inadequate output – and that justification must 
relate to the practical enforceability of the laws outputted by the legislative 
structure. So the rules of legislative procedure might specify that if a vote is 
taken because no lower-level legislatures are available, the legislature must 
endorse a justification as to why the existing legislative structure should 
nevertheless be maintained on grounds of practical enforceability – or it 
should endorse a recommendation that the legislative structure in fact be 
reorganized. 
 
The two termination conditions and the justifications for invoking them put a 
practical check on the theoretical excesses of law as pluralism. If law as 
pluralism were implemented radically, a single legislator with an outlying 
commitment – or even a single member of the population with an outlying 
                                                
349 As always, at least as far as fundamental commitments are concerned: a vote may still be 
taken on grounds of contingent characteristics, in which case one of the options enjoying tight 
consensus under law as pluralism is selected for adoption.  
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commitment, assuming that all popular commitments would be represented 
in the legislature – would be able to prevent consensus in a given legislature 
and potentially force the expansion of the legislative structure to take account 
of that outlying commitment. The two termination conditions prevent this 
scenario from happening, if the scenario is unenforceable as a practical 
matter: termination condition (a) ensures that in a given legislature structure, 
an outlier cannot hold consensus hostage at the cost of enforceability, while 
termination condition (b) ensures that an outlier cannot demand a 
reorganization of the legislative structure at the cost of enforceability. The two 
termination conditions ensure that the regulative ideal of law as pluralism is 
implemented to the extent achievable, but where implementation is not possible 
as a matter of practical enforceability, justifications must be given as to why 
full implementation is not enforceable. 
 
7.2.3 Examples of rules of legislative procedure 
 
Rules of legislative procedure enforcing law as pluralism would thus include 
at least the following rules: 
 
• A rule according to which any justification for positions taken by 
legislators in legislative negotiations be framed in terms of descriptive 
popular commitments, uncontroversial prescriptive popular 
commitments, or legislative commitments derived from such popular 
commitments (the rule on justification of proposals). 
• A rule according to which any justification endorsed by the legislature 
be framed in terms of descriptive popular commitments, 
uncontroversial prescriptive popular commitments, or legislative 
commitments derived from such popular commitments (the rule on 
justification of laws). 
• A rule according to which the legislature must justify a vote taken 
where an emerging law is deemed unenforceable as a practical matter 
(the rule on justification of unenforceability). 
•  A rule according to which the legislature must justify why the existing 
legislative structure should be maintained on grounds of practical 
enforceability, notwithstanding the fact that no lower-level legislatures 
are available to further specify a law (the rule on justification of the 
legislative structure). 
 
The first rule concerns justifications endorsed by legislators within the 
legislative process; the other three rules concern justifications endorsed by 
legislatures and made available beyond the legislative process (namely, as part 
of the set of endorsed but unadopted legislative commitments ΣJUST). 
 
Note that only the rule on justification of unenforceability and the rule on 
justification of the legislature structure require that a justification be offered. 
These two rules concern the two termination conditions: if the regulative ideal 
of law as pluralism is deviated from, i.e., if adequacy is achieved only 
imperfectly, then the legislature is required to justify that deviation (say, in 
the legislative record or in the preamble to the legislation in question). The 
other two rules require only that if a justification is offered, it honor the 
justificatory constraint of law as pluralism. Whether a legislator decides to 
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justify a proposal or a legislature decides to justify a law depends on whether 
the legislator/legislature desires to make her/its intent explicit with regard to 
the proposed or adopted law. Where there is no such desire, no justification 
need be provided. The disadvantage (for the legislator/legislature) of 
providing such a justification is that the legislator/legislature can 
subsequently be held to that justification, with possible implications for the 
negotiation and adoption of future laws; the advantage (for the 
legislator/legislature) of providing such a justification is that the 
legislator/legislature thus makes it more difficult to interpret the proposed or 
adopted law in a manner contrary to the original intent.350 
 
These four rules on justification (of proposals, laws, unenforceability, and the 
legislative structure) help address the potential difficulty of strategic behavior 
on the part of legislators and legislatures: namely where legislators or 
legislatures claim that a disagreement relates to fundamental commitments 
(and hence competing prescriptive popular commitments are excluded as 
justifications for proposed and adopted laws), but where the disagreement 
actually relates to contingent characteristics.351 The four rules on justification 
make it easier to hold legislators and legislatures to the commitments they 
have previously endorsed; if such commitments were endorsed merely as a 
front for concealed contingent characteristics, the commitments are now 
nevertheless part of the web of commitments justifying the laws, regardless of 
whether the commitments were endorsed out of conviction or strategy. By 
endorsing a commitment strategically, legislators and legislatures must expect 
to be held to that commitment in the negotiation and adoption of future laws 
– even where the originally concealed contingent characteristics might make a 
different outcome desirable. The rules on justification ensure that if a 
contingent characteristic is masked by a purported commitment, the mask 
remains even after the legislative project at issue is finished. 
 
In addition to these four rules on justification, the following rule on integrity 
ensures the consistency of the set of laws ΣLAW and their compatibility with 
the set of endorsed but unadopted commitments ΣJUST: 
 
• A rule according to which any law endorsed by the legislature must be 
consistent with the laws and justifications already endorsed, or else the 
incompatible laws and justifications already endorsed must be 
modified or invalidated accordingly (the rule on integrity). 
 
The rule on integrity ensures that new laws fit into the existing sets of laws 
and justifications endorsed by the legislative system, or that the function 
                                                
350 As Atienza 2005, 309 points out in regard to legislative justifications: "It is not true, for 
example, that each party feels committed to replying to the objections raised by the other 
party to their thesis (instead, the questions that may appear awkward are avoided); neither is 
it presupposed that the principle of sincerity, that of universality or that of avoiding 
ambiguity in the use of language, govern." Individual legislators, or the legislature as a 
whole, may opt not to play the game of "giving and asking for reasons." If they do play the 
game, they may choose to make their justifications explicit; if not, their justifications will 
remain tacit or under- or overdetermined. 
351 As discussed in subsection 1.4.4 above, law as pluralism does not assume that fundamental 
commitments can be separated cleanly from contingent characteristics; but it does assume 
that fundamental commitments are in fact used as justifications for proposed and adopted 
laws, and that such talk is meaningful independently of contingent characteristics. 
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purge is executed properly to eliminate old laws that have become 
incompatible with the new laws.352 
 
7.2.4 Demands on the professionalism of legislators 
 
Rules of legislative procedure implementing law as pluralism place 
considerable demands on the professionalism and skills of legislators. By 
joining a legislature, a legislator commits herself to pluralism as embedded in 
the rules that constrain the legislative process, in the same way that the 
legislator commits herself to the other requirements of the job. Committing 
oneself to pluralism is never easy – even when that commitment to pluralism 
comes with the rules of the game that are part of the job description. 
 
In particular, legislators must learn to justify their legislative proposals, and 
their support of other legislators' proposals, in terms of descriptive or 
uncontroversial prescriptive commitments. They must learn not to invoke 
controversial prescriptive commitments as justifications – or they must suffer 
the penalties imposed by the legislature for their failure to comply with the 
justificatory constraint of law as pluralism.353 And they must learn to identify 
when other legislators invoke such inadmissible justifications, so that they 
may respond accordingly. These demands obtain all the more for the chair of 
the legislature in charge of enforcing the rules of procedure – she must be able 
to recognize when inadmissible justifications are brought forward by 
legislators, or when the legislature as a whole is in danger of violating the 
rules of legislative procedure. 
 
At the same time, legislators must develop the skills necessary to decompose 
and synthesize commitments in such a way that they may serve as effective, 
but admissible justifications; in particular, if they want to ensure that 
controversial prescriptive popular commitments may nonetheless be relevant 
to the output of the legislature, they must be decomposed and synthesized 
skillfully so that they can be smuggled in as descriptive or uncontroversial 
commitments. 
  
Legislators under law as pluralism may therefore not speak as "freely" as 
legislators in, say, a contemporary representative democracy, in the sense that 
their legislative speech is subject to more constraints. These constraints are 
not greater than those imposed on lawyers arguing before a court, however, 
or than those imposed on judges adjudicating a court case. It is a historic 
oddity of legislatures that they traditionally impose fewer constraints on their 
members than do courts on their members and parties354 – an oddity perhaps 
                                                
352 Because of the practical and political limits to the desirability of legislative integrity as 
explored by Marmor 2007, 39-56, one might opt to formulate this rule less strictly than the 
other four rules. 
353 Penalties that may be as mild as having the offending justification stricken from the record; 
or as severe as the legislature may deem necessary to enforce its rules of procedure. 
354 An oddity that also struck James Madison, for instance, when thinking through his 
constitutional proposals in Philadelphia; see Rakove 1996, 35-56. Gutmann and Thompson 
1996, 91, make this comparison explicit: "The principles [of accommodation] imply that the 
forums in which we conduct our political discussion should be designed so as to encourage 
officials to justify their actions with moral reasons, and to give other officials as well as 
citizens the opportunity to criticize those reasons. Legislators, for example, might act more 
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motivated by the idea that legislators should be common people like the 
people they represent. But to the extent that idea ever corresponded to the 
truth, it seldom does today, especially in the highly professionalized 
legislatures of pluralistic societies.355 There is no prima facie reason why 
professional legislators should not be expected to abide by rules of the sort 
proposed under law as pluralism – especially where the adequacy of 
legislation to fundamental commitments is at stake.356 
 
This is also true where the rules in question are monitored by institutions 
beyond the legislature. So far, we have seen how the rules on justification can 
be implemented as (internal) rules of legislative procedure; but as the 
following section will show, they can also be implemented as rules imposed 
externally on the legislature as constitutional rules or meta-constitutional 
rules. 
 
 
7.3 Constitutional rules and meta-constitutional rules 
7.3.1 What are meta-constitutional rules? 
 
The difference between constitutional rules and meta-constitutional rules is 
that constitutional rules are expressly embodied in a constitution357 (or in the 
body of constitutional law expressly referring to a constitution358), while meta-
constitutional rules concern the manner in which constitutional rules are 
interpreted and applied.359 The Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution 
("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel 
and unusual punishments inflicted"), for instance, expresses several 
constitutional rules, as do the rules expressed in case law interpreting the 
Eighth Amendment.360 Similarly, the amendment process set out in Article V 
of the U.S. Constitution consists of constitutional rules. The manner in which 
the U.S. Constitution originally came into being, however, is a paradigmatic 
example of a process governed by meta-constitutional rules: no constitutional 
mechanisms existed for bringing the U.S. Constitution into being.361 Similarly, 
                                                
like judges by assuming a regular responsibility to explain in writing, in principled terms, the 
basis for their decisions." 
355 Exceptions may be the part-time legislatures of countries such as Switzerland or 
Liechtenstein, or the local and regional legislatures of political subdivisions, especially in 
rural areas. But these legislatures are not prototypes of the kind of legislatures that have to 
deal with a broad diversity of conflicting fundamental commitments. 
356 As it is, most legislatures in theory already burden their members with considerable 
technical demands relating to the complexity of the legislation they are expected to negotiate 
and the language in which that legislation is expressed – although in practice, many of those 
technical skills are outsourced to the executive branch or to professional legislative staff. This 
may in itself be a reason to expect more professionalism and technical skills of legislators, if 
only to ensure that they live up to their job description as lawmakers, rather than as 
figureheads or marionettes of the true legislative wizards hiding behind the curtain. 
357 Whether written or not; the distinction between constitutional rules and meta-
constitutional rules is likely crisper in the case of written constitutions, however. 
358 E.g., constitutional case law, treatises recognized as a source of constitutional law, and the 
like. 
359 For an overview of meta-constitutionalism within the context of the European Union, see 
Walker 2000. 
360 For instance the comparatively recent interpretation that imposing the death penalty on 
minors constitutes cruel and unusual punishment; see Roper v. Simmons. 
361 See Rakove 1996, especially 23-34. 
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the various methods employed for interpreting the constitutional rules set out 
in the U.S. Constitution and case law are examples of meta-constitutional 
rules: "strict constructionism," "textualism," "originalism,"362 
"interpretivism,"363 "the living constitution,"364 and so on, are not defined by 
constitutional rules set out in the Constitution itself or in binding 
constitutional law; rather, these judicial philosophies are derived from beyond 
the Constitution (say, from law review articles and other non-binding 
academic writings, judicial confirmation hearings, and the private and public 
musings of judges and law professors) in order to interpret the Constitution. 
The doctrine of judicial review in the United States is a constitutional rule 
derived from Article III of the Constitution and case law such as Marbury v. 
Madison; the fact that a Supreme Court ruling such as Bush v. Gore is actually 
implemented is guided by a meta-constitutional rule that the Supreme Court 
should be accorded the last word on such controversies, even where it has lost 
its collective mind. 
 
For the purpose of law as pluralism, it matters not whether a given rule is 
constitutional or meta-constitutional: what matters is that – in contrast to 
rules of legislative procedure – the rule is administered, interpreted, and 
enforced by an entity other than the legislature. While constitutional rules often 
help avoid the ambiguity and uncertainty arising from meta-constitutional 
rules, meta-constitutional rules may be just as effective as constitutional rules 
in ensuring the proper functioning of a constitutional system, and in 
particular the proper functioning of the legislative process. In most cases, the 
extra-legislative bodies administering, interpreting, and enforcing 
constitutional rules are courts and the enforcement bodies entrusted with 
executing their orders; while other extra-legislative bodies are conceivable,365 
the following discussion will focus on constitutional and meta-constitutional 
rules within the purview of courts.  
 
The three rules defined in the last section concerning justifications endorsed 
by legislatures (namely the rules on justification of laws, unenforceability, and 
the legislative structure) can be implemented just as easily as constitutional or 
meta-constitutional rules as they can as rules of procedure: the set of 
endorsed but unadopted justifications ΣJUST is available for appraisal both 
within and beyond the legislature. The same applies to the rule on integrity. 
The choice whether to implement these rules as rules of procedure, 
constitutional rules, meta-constitutional rules, or a combination thereof 
depends on the respective roles accorded to legislatures and extra-legislative 
bodies, in particular courts: where legislatures are trusted sufficiently to 
                                                
362 U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, a self-proclaimed textualist, discusses the 
distinctions between strict constructionism (advocating a "strict" reading of the text), 
textualism (advocating a "reasonable" reading of the text, ostensibly without reference to 
purported legislative intent and history), and originalism (with reference to purported 
legislative intent and history) in Scalia 1997. 
363 Of which Dworkin 1986 is the quintessential statement. 
364 See McBain 1927. For a more recent statement of the idea of a "living" or evolving 
constitution, see Sunstein 2009. 
365 In Liechtenstein, for instance, the Reigning Prince has the last word on questions of 
constitutional interpretation (see article 112(2) of the Constitution of Liechtenstein) and may 
dissolve Parliament at will (subject to justification; see article 48(1) of the Constitution of 
Liechtenstein). 
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manage their own affairs,366 rules of legislative procedure suffice; where 
courts or other extra-legislative bodies are believed to be capable of doing a 
better job in this regard than legislatures, constitutional or meta-constitutional 
rules will be preferable.367 The rule concerning justifications endorsed by 
legislators, on the other hand, is properly implemented only as a rule of 
legislative procedure: the justifications endorsed by individual legislators are 
intermediate commitments available only within a given legislature, unless 
they are endorsed by the legislature as a whole (in which case, the rule on 
justification of laws would apply). 
 
The following subsection will consider judicial review under law as 
pluralism, in which the three rules on justification applicable to legislatures 
and the rule on integrity are implemented as constitutional or meta-
constitutional rules by the courts. 
 
7.3.2 Judicial review of law as pluralism 
 
In the most general terms, judicial review of a law amounts to verification by 
a court whether the law complies with the applicable constitutional and meta-
constitutional rules in the court's jurisdiction.368 Such constitutional rules may 
be substantive or procedural, or a combination of both: as Tribe has argued, 
the very distinction between substantive and procedural judicial review is 
problematic.369 While this may be true of constitutional systems in general, the 
three rules on justification applicable to legislatures set out in the last chapter 
and the rule on integrity are at least predominantly procedural: they concern 
the mechanisms by which laws have been adopted, and whether those 
mechanisms complied with the procedures set out in the algorithmic 
definition of law as pluralism. Whether a justification honors the justificatory 
constraint of law as pluralism or whether a termination condition is properly 
justified in terms of enforceability as a practical matter has little to do with the 
substance or content of the law in question: it has to do with the procedures 
by which the law was adopted. In this sense, the three applicable rules on 
justification and the rule on integrity are part of the rule of recognition used to 
ascertain whether a given law properly belongs in the set of laws, i.e., 
whether its adoption meets the criteria necessary for it to be considered part 
of the body of law of a given legal system.370 Whether judicial review can be 
                                                
366 Waldron 1999a, Tushnet 1999, and Kramer 2004 contain recent arguments in favor of 
letting the legislature determine the constitutionality of its own laws. To a great extent, this is 
also the rule in countries such as the United Kingdom, where Parliament is deemed 
sovereign; but see Human Rights Act 1998. Cf. also direct democracies such as Switzerland, 
where decisions by the people are generally not subject to judicial review (unlike U.S. states 
such as California; see, e.g., In re Marriage Cases). 
367 This is the dominant strain in American constitutional thinking, e.g., Ackerman 1991, 
Dworkin 1986, Scalia 1997, Tribe 2008, Posner 2008, Sunstein 2009, Breyer 2010, and is also 
common in other countries with a strong tradition of judicial review and legislative 
malfeasance, e.g. Germany. 
368 Judicial review of a law may be in the abstract or as applied (abstrakte vs. konkrete 
Normenkontrolle); the difference is irrelevant here. On the "case or controversy" requirement of 
the U.S. Supreme Court, see Article III, section 2 of the U.S. Constitution, and the discussion 
in Stone, Seidman, Sunstein, and Tushnet 1996, 88-90. The extent of judicial review may shift 
over time; on the recent change in France, see Hieber 2010. 
369 See Tribe 1980. 
370 See Hart 1994, 100-110. 
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procedural in an actual constitutional system is an open question, but a 
procedural approach to judicial review is appropriate specifically in regard to 
the three rules on justification applicable to legislatures and the rule on 
integrity. 
 
How, then, would a court consider a given law that comes up for judicial 
review under law as pluralism? The input to judicial review under law as 
pluralism would consist of the law LAW, the set of laws in force ΣLAW, and 
the set of justifications of those laws endorsed by the legislatures ΣJUST. The 
court then considers these inputs in light of the three rules on justification 
applicable to legislatures (the rule on justification of laws, unenforceability, 
and the legislative structure) and the rule on integrity. First, let's consider the 
rule on justification of laws:  
 
Any justification endorsed by the legislature must be framed in terms 
of descriptive popular commitments, uncontroversial prescriptive 
popular commitments, or legislative commitments derived from such 
popular commitments. 
 
Given a law LAW, the court will check the commitments in ΣJUST used to 
justify LAW. If such a commitment JUST fails the rule's test, i.e., if the 
commitment is a controversial prescriptive popular commitment or is only 
derivable from controversial prescriptive popular commitments, then the 
court will invalidate both JUST and LAW (or any output commitments 
expressed by LAW that are justified in terms of JUST). If LAW can be justified 
by commitments in ΣJUST other than the inadmissible commitment JUST, the 
court has the option of reinstating LAW (or the relevant output commitments 
expressed by LAW), but with an admissible justification rather than the 
justification offered by the legislature. 
 
This straightforwardly implements the justificatory constraint of law as 
pluralism as applied to legislatures. The rule on justification of laws fits 
closely together with the rule on integrity, so we shall consider that rule next: 
 
Any law endorsed by the legislature must be consistent with the laws 
and justifications already endorsed, or else the incompatible laws and 
justifications already endorsed must be modified or invalidated 
accordingly. 
 
Even if the commitments used to justify a law LAW are admissible according 
to the rule on justification of laws, or even if no commitments in ΣJUST have 
been used by the legislature to justify LAW (i.e., the legislature has simply 
adopted LAW without justification), then LAW may still be attacked by a 
plaintiff on the ground that it is incompatible with commitments contained in 
either ΣLAW or ΣJUST that have been endorsed in the past in the same 
legislative jurisdiction as the relevant commitments expressed by LAW. LAW 
may thus be found to be inconsistent with either ΣLAW or ΣJUST. These two 
cases will be considered separately in the following. 
 
If the court finds that LAW is inconsistent with ΣLAW, then the legislature 
has failed to purge ΣLAW of laws incompatible with LAW. This may be 
deliberate: the legislature may believe that an old law is compatible with a 
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new law, whereas, in the view of the court, it is not. The paradigmatic case is 
when a new law conflicts with an old constitutional (or otherwise 
superordinate) norm: the legislature may believe that the law is compatible 
with that norm, while the court holds that it is not. The court then has two 
options: it may either modify LAW to make it compatible with the old norm 
or invalidate it entirely, or it may modify the old norm to make it compatible 
with LAW or invalidate it entirely. Which option the court chooses will 
depend on the respective relationships of each norm with ΣLAW as a whole, 
and whether one of the two norms enjoys a status superordinate to the other. 
This captures review of the constitutionality of laws as a special case of the 
rule on justification of laws: if a new law is incompatible with old, 
superordinate norms, then the new law is deemed invalid. 
 
If the court finds that LAW is inconsistent with ΣJUST, then the legislature 
has failed to respect the integrity of the body of legislation in terms of its 
justifications: the commitments it has used in the past to justify other laws are 
incompatible with the new law LAW. The new law LAW is thus not adequate 
to the popular commitments that have been used to justify laws in the past. 
This may be either because the popular commitments have changed over 
time, or because the legislature is trying to have it both ways: using one set of 
commitments to justify a given law LAWOLD, and using an incompatible set of 
commitments to justify a given law LAWNEW. This may be evidence of 
strategic behavior by the legislature, i.e., the legislature is masking contingent 
characteristics with purported fundamental commitments, or it may simply 
be evidence of legislative negligence, carelessness, or imprecision. Again, the 
court has two options: it may either modify or invalidate LAW and any 
inconsistent legislative commitments used to justify it, or it may modify or 
invalidate any inconsistent legislative commitments in ΣJUST and the laws 
that can only be justified in terms of those commitments. 
 
Depending on whether a legislature has made its justifications explicit by 
endorsing them (and hence including them in ΣJUST) or not, the court will 
have less or more discretion in imputing intent to the legislature.371 To the 
extent justifications have been made explicit, the original intent of the 
legislature is clear: the court will have the option of modifying or invalidating 
laws only to the extent that incompatibilities arise between a law as it has been 
justified by the legislature and the other laws and justifications endorsed by the 
legislature. If justifications have not been made explicit, the original intent of 
the legislature is potentially unclear, and the court is at greater liberty to 
reinterpret the law in light of the other laws and justifications that make up 
ΣLAW and ΣJUST.372 By making justifications explicit, the legislature makes it 
more difficult for the court to disregard the original intent of the legislature; 
the trade-off is that more targets are provided for the court to invalidate or 
modify the law due to the admissibility of its justifications or the 
inconsistency of its justifications with ΣLAW or ΣJUST. By not making 
justifications explicit, the legislature makes it easier for the court to disregard 
the original intent of the legislature and to employ some other theory of 
                                                
371 Plug 2005 considers the difficulties for a court in using the intentions of legislatures and 
legislators to justify its interpretations of the law; making justifications explicit facilitates this 
process somewhat.  
372 Say, along the lines of Dworkin 1986's law as integrity. 
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legislative interpretation; the trade-off is that fewer targets are provided for 
the court to invalidate or modify the law. 
 
The final two constitutional or meta-constitutional rules for the judicial 
review of laws under law as pluralism concern the termination conditions of 
recursive pluralism. First, the rule on justification of unenforceability: 
 
The legislature must justify a vote taken where an emerging law is 
deemed unenforceable as a practical matter. 
 
Here, the court must determine whether the legislature has applied the 
appropriate criteria of enforceability. While these criteria are substantive, they 
do not amount to a substantive appraisal of the content of the law: they 
concern merely whether the law is enforceable in light of the practical 
circumstances under which the law is to be enforced, in particular the 
institutions involved in enforcement and the distribution of popular 
commitments relevant to the law. A law with a given content might be 
enforceable under some circumstances and not enforceable under others: it 
depends on the particular constellation of institutions and the distribution of 
popular commitments in the legislative jurisdiction in question. Through its 
jurisprudence, the court can develop a set of general criteria of enforceability 
that are applicable to any law, without passing judgment on the law's content 
per se. These criteria would make reference to the structure of institutions 
involved in enforcement and their relationships with each other, and to the 
distribution of popular commitments and the impact of that distribution on 
enforceability of the law in question. 
 
If the court finds that a legislature L has applied the criteria of enforceability 
inappropriately, it may invalidate the law that was endorsed by L's vote, and 
call upon the legislatures below L to further specify the law. 
 
Judicial review under the rule on justification of the legislative structure is 
analogous: 
 
The legislature must justify why the existing legislative structure 
should be maintained on grounds of practical enforceability, 
notwithstanding the fact that no lower-level legislatures are available 
to further specify a law. 
 
Here again, the court must determine whether the legislature has applied the 
appropriate criteria of enforceability, this time in relation to a potential 
expansion or reorganization of the legislative structure. Since it is generally 
more difficult to expand or reorganize the legislative structure than to adopt a 
law, the rule on justification of the legislative structure will likely give the 
legislatures more leeway than they enjoy under the rule on the justification of 
unenforceability. But the same general principles apply: the criteria for 
judging whether a legislative structure should be maintained in light of its 
inability to reach tight consensus on a given law do not amount to a 
substantive appraisal of the content of the law as such (which, if this 
termination condition is reached, has not yet been fully specified anyway), 
but rather concern whether an expanded or reorganized legislative structure 
might be better able to reach tight consensus in such cases, given practical 
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circumstances such as the distribution of popular commitments within the 
population, and whether such an expansion or reorganization would be 
practicable. In particular, the criterion of practicability would have to consider 
whether an expanded or reorganized legislative structure would be able to 
enforce laws more or less effectively that the current legislative structure. 
 
If the court finds that a legislature L has applied the criteria of enforceability 
inappropriately, it may invalidate the law that was endorsed by L's vote, and 
call upon the top-level legislature to initiate the function get_LS, i.e., to begin 
consideration of an expansion or reorganization of the legislative structure. 
 
 
This concludes the consideration of the three rules on justification applicable 
to legislatures and the rule on integrity as constitutional or meta-
constitutional rules. Briefly put, judicial review of laws under law as 
pluralism involves checking whether the legislatures have justified their 
commitments properly. While rules of legislative procedure task the 
legislatures themselves with proper justification of their commitments, 
constitutional rules and meta-constitutional rules provide an external check 
on legislatures in this regard. 
 
The following section returns to the first ground rule of this paper: the 
consideration so far has been limited to what legislatures and legislators do 
when they engaging in lawmaking. But what of the role of the public sphere 
beyond the legislature in the development of laws?  
 
 
7.4 The public sphere as generator of popular commitments 
 
As laid down in the first and second ground rules in subsections 1.4.1 and 
1.4.2, this paper has focused on the negotiation of laws by more or less 
representative legislatures; it has not considered the role of the public sphere 
or of the relationship between law as pluralism and democracy, liberalism, or 
other political conceptions. Now that law as pluralism has been defined, 
however, the question arises what the link between law as pluralism and the 
public sphere in general might be. 
 
The answer is indicated by the parameter passed to the function 
law_as_pluralism: ΣPOPP. In order for law as pluralism to function, it 
must know what the popular commitments in the population P are. Only 
once these popular commitments are available can law as pluralism 
determine which of these commitments should be admitted as input 
commitments to the legislative process. 
 
The set of popular commitments is not supplied to the legislature out of thin 
air: rather, relevant commitments are proposed for inclusion as input 
commitments by the legislators. Which popular commitments are proposed for 
inclusion is a matter of the skill of legislators in assessing the prospects of the 
negotiation. But given that the legislature under law as pluralism is stipulated 
to be representative of the population it binds, the popular commitments are 
not generated by the legislators themselves; rather, they are generated by the 
population, i.e., by the public sphere. 
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How popular commitments are generated by the public sphere is irrelevant to 
law as pluralism, as long as the popular commitments made available to the 
legislature (in each legislative jurisdiction) are representative of the subset of 
the population in question. If certain popular commitments are screened out 
before they reach the legislature, law as pluralism cannot function as 
specified. Communitarian and civic republican theories of ascertaining the 
commitments of a population are one possibility for ensuring that the set of 
popular commitments made available to the legislature is complete: lively 
public participation in political issues may be conducive to this goal.373 Other 
alternatives might include statistically sound surveys of popular 
commitments374 or the "virtual representation"375 of popular commitments in 
the legislature. 
 
Regardless of the method actually chosen in a given population, the criterion 
for evaluating its success is simply whether the set of popular commitments 
made available to the legislative process is complete. If a society is unable to 
convey the full set of popular commitments to the legislature, law as 
pluralism fails. 
 
Since law as pluralism stipulates that the legislative process is not about 
modifying fundamental commitments, but rather only about negotiating and 
adopting laws that bind a population with conflicting fundamental 
commitments,376 it is likewise important that the public sphere be able to play 
the role of modifying popular commitments where necessary. A freewheeling 
Millian "marketplace of ideas" is one option,377 as are various conceptions of 
public political discourse guided by public justification,378 or the unrestricted 
exercise of religious or philosophical education, discourse, and practice. It is 
irrelevant to law as pluralism whether popular commitments are shaped 
through rationale persuasion, narratives, peer pressure, or indoctrination – as 
long as none of the commitments held by a population are prevented from 
entering the legislative process. 
 
This means that while legislatures under law as pluralism employ a technical 
sense of "justification" as employed in the chapters above, especially chapter 4 
on "The justificatory constraint of law as pluralism" and chapter 5 on 
"Decomposing and synthesizing commitments," the public sphere can get by 
with a much looser species of "reasons." Appiah gives the example of a group 
of people discussing an Afghan film, in order to evaluate whether toppling 
the Taliban was the right thing to do: 
 
You could insist on a technical use of the word "reason" to mean something 
like "calculation," which is what it seems to mean when modern Positivists 
use it. And then it would be fine to say that when people talk in these ways 
[i.e., discussing the Afghan film] they are not, strictly speaking, reasoning 
                                                
373 A tradition going back at least to Rousseau 1762 and advocated most fervently nowadays 
by deliberative democrats. 
374 E.g., the "deliberative polling" of James Fishkin; see Fishkin 2009 and Fishkin, He, Luskin, 
and Siu 2010. 
375 A previously frowned-up concept revived by Ely 1980, 82-87. 
376 See the discussion on p. 70 and in n. 171 above. 
377 See Mill 1859. 
378 See subsections 4.3 and 4.4 on public justification above. 
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together. But in the English we speak every day, it is natural to call what we 
do when we seek, through a conversation rich in the language of value, to 
shape each other's thoughts and sentiments and deeds, "offering reasons."379 
 
In the public sphere, the game of "giving and asking for reasons" is played on 
a much larger field than in legislatures. While at least some of what legislators 
do under law as pluralism comes close to the positivistic "calculation" Appiah 
refers to, this type of reasoning is inappropriately restrictive for the public 
sphere. Only once the public sphere has had the opportunity to generate 
reasons in the loose sense, can these reasons be considered for admission to 
the legislative process as justifications in the technical sense. 
 
The rules by which the public sphere may engage in its task of generating 
popular commitments for the legislative process will ultimately depend on 
the norms established by the legislative process itself: laws will determine 
what kinds of persuasion, discourse, indoctrination, education, etc., are 
permissible and what kinds are impermissible. But these laws will themselves 
be generated by law of pluralism and hence guided by the commitment to 
pluralism and the regulative ideal of law as pluralism: any law that would 
prevent a popular commitment from reaching the legislative process (at least 
as a candidate for a proposed input commitment) would be incompatible 
with the commitment to pluralism and hence with law as pluralism. 
 
There is therefore a partial separation between the legislative process and 
discourse in the public sphere: this separation is defined by the different 
procedures that are used to engage in discourse and the rules constraining 
those procedures. The rules constraining legislative discourse are defined by 
law as pluralism; the rules constraining popular discourse are defined (at 
least in part) by the legislative process under law as pluralism. But the 
separation is only partial, since the two spheres are linked by the set of 
popular commitments. 
 
Because of the multi-level nature of law as pluralism, the public sphere will 
also be structured into multiple levels: each legislature is fed popular 
commitments by the public sphere in that legislature's jurisdiction. The multi-
level structure of the public sphere will thus mirror the legislative structure. 
But it will also be as porous as the legislative structure, given the constant 
flow of commitments from one legislative jurisdiction to the other. And it will 
also be as variable as the legislative structure, given the possibility of 
expanding and modifying the legislature structure – especially as popular 
commitments change. The relationship between the public sphere and the 
legislative process is thus intimate, but each is governed by its own rules and 
plays its own role in the development of law. 
 
This relationship between the public sphere and the legislative process under 
law as pluralism also puts a clearer perspective on the role played by the 
qualifying motives set out in 2.3.2: since the commitment to pluralism is 
embodied in the legislative process itself, discourse in the public sphere need 
not be governed by that commitment. As a corollary, the four qualifying 
motives (the missionary motive, the motive from fear, the precommitment 
motive, and the defense of pluralism motive), like any other popular 
                                                
379 Appiah 2006, 30. 
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commitments, may be voiced freely in the public sphere (to the extent 
permitted under the laws outputted by the legislative process). Within the 
legislative process, however, the missionary motive will be the toughest to 
express as an admissible justification, in light of the justificatory constraint of 
law as pluralism: since the missionary motive is strongest where someone 
else's prescriptive fundamental commitments are at issue (for instance, when I 
claim that the way someone else believes they ought to behave is a way I 
believe they ought not to behave), any prescriptive commitments voiced in 
terms of the missionary motive that conflict with those other fundamental 
commitments would be deemed inadmissible as a justification once they 
reach the doorstep of the legislative chamber. But note that those other, 
conflicting prescriptive fundamental commitments would likewise be 
inadmissible within the legislative process: this goes some way toward 
implementing the motive from fear and the defense-of-pluralism motive as an 
integral part of the commitment to pluralism embodied in the legislative 
process under law as pluralism. Finally, the precommitment motive on its own 
terms, i.e., not in conjunction with the missionary motive, will easily slip past 
the gatekeeper of the justificatory constraint of law as pluralism, as long as 
everyone (in a given legislative jurisdiction) agrees that the precommitment is 
worthwhile. So while there is no (prima facie) restriction on expressing the 
qualifying motives as justifications in the public sphere in general, the 
justificatory constraint of law as pluralism requires that those qualifying 
motives be abandoned or translated within the legislative process to the 
extent they are prescriptive and controversial. 
 
 
7.5 International law as pluralism 
 
Recall that the normative goal of this paper had a utopian formulation and a 
less ambitious formulation. The less ambitious formulation was: 
 
to define rules for the negotiation and adoption of laws so that, in each 
legislative jurisdiction, the laws are adequate to the potentially 
conflicting fundamental commitments of the members of the 
population in that legislative jurisdiction. 
 
The utopian formulation of the goal would have been: 
 
to define rules for the negotiation and adoption of laws so that the laws 
are adequate to the potentially conflicting fundamental commitments 
of the members of the entire world's population. 
 
The discussion in this paper has focused on the less ambitious goal, but as 
remarked at the outset in section 1.2, the utopian goal is nothing but a special 
case of the less ambitious goal: the population P under consideration is 
simply the population of the whole world. So what we have said about the 
legislative process and the role of the public sphere with respect to a given 
population P also applies where P covers the entire planet. What implications 
does this have for the relationship between international law and law as 
pluralism? 
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The international law relevant to this discussion is international law that is 
potentially applicable to the population of the entire planet or a significant 
subset thereof; bilateral treaties between states governing particularistic 
matters are of little interest here. International law as a species of international 
relations is not very interesting for purposes of law as pluralism: at issue are 
not the arrangements between states as such, but rather the international law 
negotiated at the international level that serves as a guide for human conduct, 
not (merely) state conduct. 
 
Negotiated international law in this restricted sense is thus equivalent to the 
output commitments generated by the top-most legislature under law as 
pluralism, ΣOUTP, where P is the entire world population. As formally 
defined, law as pluralism has only one root node: hence the legislature LP 
must be the legislature that negotiates and adopts ΣOUTP, i.e., international 
law. 
 
What would this legislature LP be? Historically, it had has been close to non-
existent: there has been no single world legislative body that generates output 
commitments applicable to the entire global population.380 A shift occurred in 
1945 with the adoption of the UN Charter,381 but even then, LP remains ill-
defined. There are, however, intermittent hints of LP in the United Nations 
Security Council, especially acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the 
United Nations; this is currently in fact the only instance of a quasi-legislative 
global body issuing binding "laws" (i.e., resolutions) that are enforceable at 
the global level.382 Other bodies, such as the International Court of Justice 
acting in contentious cases, the dispute settlement mechanisms of the World 
Trade Organization, or the various international criminal tribunals – 
especially the International Criminal Court, which in theory has jurisdiction 
over every individual on Earth383 – also issue binding norms that guide 
human action. These latter bodies are quasi-judicial institutions, however; the 
equivalent of LP would have to be sought in the quasi-legislative bodies that 
established these institutions – such as the United Nations General Assembly, 
diplomatic conferences, the WTO Ministerial Conference, and so on. Taken 
together, the quasi-legislative bodies with global jurisdiction that negotiate 
and adopt norms that serve as a guide for human conduct can be considered 
an imperfect implementation of LP. 
 
The fact that the norms issued by these bodies are not (always) enforceable at 
the global level is irrelevant to law as pluralism, as is the fact that they often 
need to be further specified at lower legislative levels (e.g., by incorporation 
and implementation into domestic law): law as pluralism operates under the 
assumption that some high-level output commitments will enjoy only loose 
                                                
380 Kant 1796/2007 may have been a tentative attempt to outline LP, but most of Kant's 
prescriptions focused on the relations between peoples, not people – although his advocacy of a 
republican constitution and hospitality toward foreigners may be considered a first step in 
that direction.  
381 The League of Nations may have been a valiant experiment, but it was too dysfunctional to 
qualify as LP. 
382 An example might be United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001), adopted in the 
wake of September 11, 2001; see especially articles 1 and 2. 
383 At least in situations referred by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the 
Charter of the United Nations; see article 13(b) and article 87(7) of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court. 
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consensus at those levels, and that they must be further specified at lower 
levels. In this sense, (potentially) global international treaties, such as human 
rights instruments, adopted e.g. by the United Nations General Assembly can 
thus be considered top-level output commitments under law as pluralism: 
while they enjoy only loose consensus and are not directly enforceable, they 
can be further specified by legislation at the national level, thus making them 
enforceable. 
 
The most glaring defect of the current system for negotiating and adopting 
output commitments at the global level, however, is not whether the 
commitments generated at that level are enforceable at that level; it is whether 
the output commitments are ever adequate to the popular commitments of the 
entire world population. As discussed in the previous section, the role of the 
public sphere for the purposes of law as pluralism is to generate popular 
commitments that can serve as potential input commitments to the legislative 
process: at the international level, this would mean that the availability of all 
popular commitments to the international legislative process must be ensured 
– which is not yet the case. In addition to a clearer definition of LP at the 
global level (whether or not commitments outputted by LP are in fact 
enforceable in the legislative jurisdiction that covers the entire planet), 
international law as pluralism would have to implement mechanisms to ensure 
the availability of all global popular commitments to the legislative process in 
LP, so that the output commitments adopted by LP might be adequate to those 
popular commitments. 
 
The negotiation and adoption of laws at the global level is simply a special 
case where LP binds the entire world population. Where this special case 
applies, all (multi-level) laws adopted worldwide (to the extent they reflect 
conflicting fundamental commitments) are a species of international law: the 
top-most output commitments expressed by any law are generated by the 
top-most legislature LP, while lower-level output commitments are generated 
by lower-level (say, national) legislatures. A hint of this already can be seen 
inter alia in the domain of international human rights, humanitarian, and 
criminal law, certain aspects of international trade and diplomatic law, law of 
war, law of the sea and outer space, and international environmental law: 
national prohibitions against genocide, for instance, are generally nothing 
other than a further specification of the output commitments expressed in the 
Genocide Convention,384 and even national and sub-national provisions 
governing food and product safety, for instance, often implement norms that 
have been negotiated and adopted at the international level. Under law as 
pluralism, the relevant laws are multi-level, rooted in the global legislature LP 
(whatever LP may be for the relevant subject matter) and extending 
downward through multinational (e.g., European Union), national, and sub-
national legislative levels; the relevant output commitments, in contrast, are 
generated separately at each of these levels. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
384 See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, especially articles II 
and III. 
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7.6 Law as pluralism as a critical tool 
 
The previous section on "International law as pluralism" indicates how law as 
pluralism can serve as a critical tool: it is not merely a theoretical construct 
bearing no relation to (current) reality; it is a tool that can be used to critique 
the adequacy of real-world legislation and the appropriateness of real-world 
legislative structures and processes. 
 
Legislative systems, including their structures and processes, are seldom 
created ex nihilo:385 as formally defined in this paper, law as pluralism could 
perhaps only be implemented on Pluto. But our Plutonian diplomat's task at 
the outset of this project was not to recreate the Plutonian legislative system 
on Earth; it was to nudge Earthlings in the direction of law as pluralism. For 
this purpose, the formal definition of law as pluralism can be used as a tool to 
critique existing legislative systems and suggest possible improvements. 
 
7.6.1 Examples of uses as a critical tool 
 
First and foremost, the critique leveled at international law in the previous 
section applies to all legislative jurisdictions, regardless of their extension: law 
as pluralism requires that any legislature L with the power to bind a 
population or subset of a population in its legislative jurisdiction must, to the 
extent achievable, take account of all popular commitments held in that 
legislative jurisdiction. Because of the justificatory constraint of law as 
pluralism, not all of the popular commitments will actually be admitted to the 
legislative process as input commitments: but they must be available as 
candidates for such admission. This has consequences both for the role of the 
public sphere, as discussed in section 7.4 above, and for the composition of 
the legislature: the public sphere must be able to generate popular 
commitments freely and make them available to the legislature, and the 
legislature must be representative enough (in accordance with the second 
ground rule set out in subsection 1.4.2) to give these popular commitments 
sufficient consideration. A legislature that is too small for a given population 
or subset thereof may not be representative enough to ensure the adequacy of 
its output commitments – especially if the legislatures below that legislature 
are likewise not fine-grained enough to make up for the deficit. Conversely, a 
legislature that is too large may be unable to reach loose consensus or tight 
consensus – and hence generate enforceable laws – even just on practical 
grounds: the inefficiencies of negotiation might make the legislative process 
unmanageable. The first two potential uses of law as pluralism as a critical 
tool are accordingly the following: 
 
1. A legislature can serve its role properly only if the public sphere is able 
to make all popular commitments available to that legislature for 
consideration as input commitments. 
                                                
385 Even "revolutionary" constitutions such as the U.S. Constitution of 1787/89, the French 
Constitutions of 1791-1799, the German and Japanese Constitutions after the Second World 
War, the post-colonial constitutions of the 1960s and 1970s, the post-Soviet constitutions after 
1989, and the South African Constitution of 1996 built on existing formal and informal 
legislative structures and processes, even when the old structures and processes were 
formally abolished. 
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2. A legislature may be too small and/or insufficiently representative to 
ensure the adequacy of legislation; or it may be too large and hence too 
unwieldy to ensure the enforceability of legislation. 
 
For instance, a public sphere that prohibits public expression of Holocaust 
denial might be critiqued with reference to (1);386 a legislature whose first-
past-the-post election system excludes representation of marginalized 
minorities might be critiqued with reference to (2).387 
 
Once all popular commitments are made available and the legislative process 
is underway in a sufficiently representative and workable legislature, the four 
rules on justification and the rule on integrity can serve as critical tools, even 
where they are not formally enshrined as rules of legislative procedure or 
constitutional or meta-constitutional rules. 
 
First, the rule on justification of proposals: whereas offering controversial 
prescriptive commitments as justifications for legislative proposals in the 
public sphere is compatible with law as pluralism, offering them as 
justifications within the legislative process is not. When legislators are working 
as legislators (and not, say, as campaigners or public advocates), the 
justifications they offer should either be descriptive or uncontroversial (or 
both). The separation between the legislative persona and the public persona 
of a legislator is not always straightforward: a legislator may make a public 
pronouncement on a legislative proposal in order to secure a better 
negotiating position within the legislature, or a justification may be advanced 
in legislative negotiations with the intention to secure votes in the next 
elections. What law as pluralism requires is that when legislators justify their 
support of or opposition to proposals on the legislative record, in public or non-
public legislative deliberations, or when subject to the rules of legislative procedure, 
they honor the justificatory constraint of law as pluralism. This desired 
separation between the legislative persona of a legislator and the public 
persona of a legislator is not dissimilar to that of a judge, prosecutor, or 
lawyer in and out of court: some statements and justifications may be 
appropriate outside the courtroom, while the same statements and 
justifications are inappropriate inside the courtroom (or even the jury room or 
judge's chambers). In light of the rule on justification of proposals, law as 
pluralism may thus be used as a critical tool in the following way: 
 
3. When engaged in legislative negotiations, a legislator should refrain 
from making justifications in terms of controversial prescriptive 
                                                
386 Though not necessarily conclusively: a descriptive commitment such as "public 
expressions of Holocaust denial lead to civic unrest" would be admissible as an input 
commitment and might have a determinative impact on the relevant laws adopted. 
387 These two potential critiques are not uniquely available to law as pluralism; they are also 
commonly used by advocates of political liberalism. They may even be used by monarchists 
and direct democrats distrustful of the role of legislatures; see, e.g., Hans-Adam 2009, 96: "It is 
difficult to say what the optimum size of a parliament should be. It probably differs from one 
case to another. Whenever there is doubt, a smaller number is better. The parliament of 
Liechtenstein had for a long time only fifteen members and a few deputy members, none of 
them full-time. Compared to much larger parliaments, the small Liechtenstein parliament did 
a good job." What is unique about these critiques with respect to law as pluralism is that they 
refer to the ability of popular commitments to serve as input commitments, and the adequacy 
of output commitments to those input commitments. 
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commitments; other legislators and the public should hold the 
legislator to this. 
 
For instance, a legislator justifying a ban on the construction of minarets in 
terms of the controversial prescriptive commitment "the public space should 
be free from non-Christian religious symbols" could be critiqued with 
reference to (3); a legislator justifying the same ban in terms of the descriptive 
commitment "minarets are a sign of the political aspirations of Islam" could 
not.388 
 
The rule on justification of laws expands this principle from the individual 
legislator to the legislature as a whole: providing justifications for a given law 
makes the law appear less arbitrary; unjustified laws may in fact be 
unjustifiable. The legislative justification of laws provides a guide for 
interpretation, both to the executive and judicial branches, but also to the 
public. Justification may be particularly important where fundamental 
commitments are at stake: if a law is in danger of conflicting with the 
fundamental commitments of members of the population it binds, the 
perceived need for justification may be even greater than where "mere" 
contingent characteristics are at stake. Used as a critical tool, law as pluralism 
says that where such justifications are in fact provided, they should not be in 
terms of controversial prescriptive commitments. Justifying a law in terms of 
controversial prescriptive commitments implies that incompatible 
commitments held by members of the population are to be excluded in 
principle, not in light of the practical need to find laws that are workable for an 
entire (subset of a) population with diverse and conflicting commitments. By 
limiting the justification of laws to descriptive commitments and 
uncontroversial prescriptive commitments, and the intermediate 
commitments that can be derived therefrom, the legislature helps ensure that 
debates about controversial prescriptive commitments remain outside the 
legislature, where they belong. This leads to the following use of law as 
pluralism as a critical tool: 
 
4. Where fundamental commitments are at stake, a legislature should 
justify the laws it adopts. Where such justifications are offered, the 
legislature should refrain from making them in terms of controversial 
prescriptive commitments; the other branches of government, other 
legislatures, and the public should hold the legislature to this. 
 
For instance, a legislature justifying a reduction of daycare subsidies in terms 
of the controversial prescriptive commitment "mothers should be encouraged 
to stay at home" could be critiqued with reference to (4); a legislature 
justifying the same reduction in terms of the descriptive commitment 
"daycare subsidies provide an incentive for mothers to work full-time" could 
not. 
 
Closely related to this is the rule on integrity: if the purpose of legislation is to 
provide a guide for human conduct, especially where fundamental 
                                                
388 As an exercise, one might skim through the arguments made by the Swiss People's Party in 
favor of a ban on minarets and consider whether they would be admissible in the legislative 
process under law as pluralism – and at what legislative level. See 
http://www.svp.ch/g3.cms/s_page/78670/s_name/auslaenderpolitik. 
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commitments are at stake, the body of legislation applicable to any given 
member of the population should be consistent. No one should be put in a 
position where the laws applicable to that person pull him in two different 
directions at the same time,389 especially where conflicts with fundamental 
commitments arise. This consistency is called for within the body of law 
adopted by a given legislature, but also in regard to the laws adopted across 
legislatures, to the extent they concern one and the same person. New laws 
applicable to a given person should either fit into the body of law applicable 
to that person, or they should be accompanied by the amendment or repeal of 
existing, incompatible laws: 
 
5. Where fundamental commitments are at stake, a legislature should 
only adopt laws that are consistent with those already in force – 
regardless of the legislature that adopted them – if the new laws affect 
the same persons as the laws already in force; or else the existing, 
incompatible laws should be amended or repealed accordingly. The 
other branches of government, other legislatures, and the public 
should hold the legislature to this. 
 
For instance, a California law decriminalizing the possession of marijuana 
against the backdrop of a federal law criminalizing the possession of 
marijuana could be critiqued with reference to (5);390 while a California law 
reducing the penalty for possession of marijuana to an infraction could not.391 
 
The last two rules on justification – the rule on justification of unenforceability 
and the rule on justification of the legislative structure – both aim at justifying 
deviations from tight consensus: the default requirement under law as 
pluralism is that every law affecting fundamental commitments should enjoy 
tight consensus, i.e., it must be adequate to the fundamental commitments of 
the members of the population it binds, to the extent those fundamental 
commitments have been admitted as input commitments to the legislative 
process, and it must be enforceable. Adequacy trumps enforceability at a 
given level if lower-level legislatures are available that can ensure 
enforceability; in that case, it suffices for the legislature at a given level to 
ensure loose consensus. The rule on justification of unenforceability requires a 
legislature to justify why laws that would enjoy tight consensus across multiple 
existing levels are unenforceable, and hence a vote must be taken to settle the 
issue; the rule on justification of the legislature structure requires a legislature 
to justify why the legislative structure should not be expanded or modified in 
order to achieve tight consensus, and hence a vote must be taken to settle the 
issue. Even where tight consensus is a mere aspiration, not a default 
requirement, the principles underlying these rules can be used to critique the 
adoption of laws by way of a vote: 
 
6. Where fundamental commitments are at stake, a legislature should 
adopt a law by way of a vote instead of limiting itself to the areas in 
which loose consensus can be achieved and delegating the remaining 
issues to lower-level legislatures only if the resulting law would be 
unenforceable as a practical matter. The legislature must justify such a 
                                                
389 Thus turning him into Buridan's ass. 
390 California Proposition 19 (2010); see Regulate, Control and Tax Cannabis Act of 2010. 
391 California Senate Bill 1449, which entered into force on 1 January 2011; see Senate Bill 1449. 
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vote in terms of enforceability. The other branches of government, 
other legislatures, and the public should hold the legislature to this. 
 
7. Where fundamental commitments are at stake and tight consensus 
cannot be achieved given the existing legislative structure, a legislature 
should adopt a law by way of a vote instead of proposing a 
modification or expansion of the legislative structure only if the 
modification or expansion of the legislative structure would lead to 
unenforceable legislation as a practical matter. The other branches of 
government, other legislatures, and the public should hold the 
legislature to this. 
 
If, for instance, the U.S. Congress votes to limit marriage to heterosexual, 
monogamous couples, while state legislatures would happily extend marriage 
to include homosexual couples, and no enforceability problems arise, that 
vote by the U.S. Congress might be critiqued with reference to (6);392 a vote by 
the U.S. Congress setting out uniform rules for the distribution of Social 
Security benefits to married couples might not. Similarly, a vote by the 
majority-Muslim Sudanese legislature to suspend a referendum on self-
government in majority-Christian South Sudan might be critiqued with 
reference to (7); while a vote by the United Nations Security Council refusing 
to admit Facebook as an independent member state might not. 
 
7.6.2 Adequacy as a measure of the pluralism of legislation 
 
The use of these critical tools helps nudge existing legislative systems, 
regardless of their level and the members of the world population they bind, 
toward the ideal of law as pluralism, even where law as pluralism cannot be 
implemented ex nihilo. The adequacy of legislation to conflicting fundamental 
commitments provides a measure of the pluralism of the legislation – a measure 
that can be used to critique the "goodness" of the legislation in terms of the 
normative conception of pluralism, alongside other measures one may choose 
to apply under other, complementary political conceptions. 
 
Using law as pluralism as a critical tool, mechanisms can be defined and 
successively improved for negotiating and adopting legislation at all levels 
that is adequate to the plurality of conflicting beliefs, values, and other 
fundamental commitments held by the members of the population bound by 
that legislation. The task of the Plutonian diplomat is done; it is up to 
Earthlings to put law as pluralism into practice, to the extent achievable. 
 
 
                                                
392 See, e.g., Defense of Marriage Act of 1996. This critique is not uniquely available to law as 
pluralism; it is also often invoked by critics of federal power. See, e.g., Goodwin 1995. 
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8 Appendix 
 
This Appendix includes the entire algorithm (in pseudocode) implementing 
law as pluralism. Functions assumed to be primitive are specially marked: 
these functions are executed directly by the legislature in question and are 
either straightforward (marked in blue), or they are where the hard (and 
potentially non-algorithmic) work of legislative negotiation takes place 
(marked in red). These hard functions, the outcome of which is determined by 
the skill of the legislators, are the following: get_LS, negotiate, vote, and 
is_enforceable.  
 
 
//The global variable ΣLAW is the set of all laws currently in force 
//and is available to all the functions. 
 
global ΣLAW = {} 
 
 
 
//The function law_as_pluralism is the top-level function which 
//makes the initial call to the recursive function legislate. It 
//takes the set of popular commitments of the entire population as a 
//parameter and returns no output. It runs in a potentially infinite 
//loop, continuously updating ΣLAW by adding newly generated 
//laws and purging it of obsolete laws. The function law_as_pluralism 
//also provides the opportunity for the legislative structure itself 
//to be updated, given the continuously changing set of popular 
//commitments. 
 
law_as_pluralism (ΣPOPP) { 
 
 LSP = ∅ 
 
 while humanity_exists { 
 
LSP = get_LS (LSP, ΣPOPP) 
 
LAW = legislate (LSP, ΣPOPP, {}) 
 
ΣLAW = purge_ΣLAW (LAW, ΣLAW) 
 
ΣLAW = ΣLAW ∪ LAW   
  
 } 
} 
 
 
 
//The function get_LS modifies the legislative structure in light of 
//changing popular commitments. It takes the current legislative  
//structure and the current set of popular commitments as its 
//parameters. It returns the modified legislative structure. 
//The function get_LS is only partially algorithmic: it requires 
//higher lawmaking work to define the new legislature structure. 
 
get_LS (LSP, ΣPOPP) { 
  
 LSP' = ∅  
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 //this is where higher lawmaking takes place and LSP' is defined 
 
 return LSP' 
} 
 
 
 
//The recursive function legislate is the heart of law as pluralism. 
//Given a set of popular commitments at a given level, it generates 
//the relevant set of output commitments as its contribution 
//to the emerging law. When called at the top-most 
//legislative level, it generates the law itself. The 
//recursive function takes the legislative structure rooted at the 
//current legislature, the set of popular commitments held by the 
//relevant subset of the population, and the output commitments 
//generated so far by legislatures in a direct line above the current 
//legislature as its parameters. It returns a law or a  
//contribution to a law. 
//The recursive function first generates the set of admissible input 
//commitments from the set of popular commitments. It then calls the 
//function negotiate, which generates proposed output commitments (in 
//the form of intermediate commitments), given the set of input 
//commitments. It calls get_ΣOUT' to weed out the intermediate 
//commitments that are incompatible with the input commitments, thus 
//generating an adequate set of output commitments. 
//If the set of output commitments generated so far enjoys only loose 
//consensus, the recursive function calls itself and invokes the 
//next-lower legislatures with the appropriate parameters, if such 
//legislatures exist. If no such legislatures exist, the current 
//legislature takes a vote to decide on its contribution to the 
//law. 
//If, on the other hand, the set of output commitments enjoys tight 
//consensus, the legislature checks whether the preliminary 
//law is enforceable as a practical matter. If it is, 
//the relevant contribution to the law is returned to 
//the calling function. If not, a vote is taken, and the result of 
//that vote is returned to the calling function as the current 
//legislature's contribution to the law. 
 
legislate (LS, ΣPOP, ΣOUT) { 
 
 LAW = {} 
 
 ΣINP = get_ΣINP (ΣPOP) 
ΣINT = negotiate (ΣINP) 
ΣOUT' = get_ΣOUT' (ΣINT, ΣINP) 
 
 if (not is_tight (ΣOUT ∪ ΣOUT')) {  
 
if (∃ child node of LS) for all LS' = child node of LS { 
 
   LAW=LAW ∪ legislate(LS',get_ΣPOP'(LS',ΣPOP),ΣOUT ∪ ΣOUT') 
 
  } else ΣOUT' = vote (ΣINT) 
 
 } 
 
 if (is_enforceable ({〈LS, ΣOUT ∪ ΣOUT'〉} ∪ LAW)) { 
 
return {〈LS, ΣOUT'〉} ∪ LAW 
  
 } else { 
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  return {〈LS, vote (ΣINT)〉} 
 
 } 
} 
 
 
 
//The function get_ΣINP generates the admissible input commitments, 
//given the relevant set of popular commitments. It takes that set 
//of popular commitments as its parameter and returns the generated 
//set of input commitments. For each popular commitment, it checks 
//whether the commitment is descriptive or uncontroversial, in which 
//case the commitment is admissible as an input commitment; 
//otherwise it is not. 
 
get_ΣINP (ΣPOP) { 
 
 ΣINP = {}  
 
for all POP ∈ ΣPOP { 
 
  if ((not is_prescriptive (POP)) or  
is_uncontroversial (POP, ΣPOP))  
 
ΣINP = ΣINP + POP 
 
 } 
 
 return ΣINP 
} 
 
 
 
//The function is_prescriptive has the legislature check whether a 
//given popular commitment is prescriptive or not. It takes a popular 
//commitment as its parameter; it returns TRUE if the commitment is 
//prescriptive and FALSE if it is not. 
 
is_prescriptive (POP) { 
 
 //this is where the legislature decides whether POP is 
//prescriptive 
 
 return TRUE or return FALSE 
} 
 
 
 
//The function is_uncontroversial checks whether a given popular 
//commitment is compatible with each of the other prescriptive 
//popular commitments and hence uncontroversial. It takes a 
//(prescriptive) popular commitment and the set of popular 
//commitments as its parameters; if the popular commitment is 
//uncontroversial, the function returns TRUE; otherwise it  
//returns FALSE. 
 
is_uncontroversial (POP, ΣPOP) { 
 
for all POP' ∈ ΣPOP { 
 
if (is_prescriptive (POP') and (POP / POP')) return FALSE 
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} 
 
return TRUE 
} 
 
 
 
//The function negotiate has the legislature negotiate and generate 
//proposed output commitments in the form of intermediate 
//commitments. It takes the set of input commitments as its parameter 
//and returns the set of proposed output commitments. 
//The function is non-algorithmic: the legislature must do the hard, 
//skillful work of negotiating in accordance with the principles of 
//law as pluralism, in particular the justificatory constraint of 
//law as pluralism and the synthesis of intermediate commitments. 
 
negotiate (ΣINP) { 
 
//this is where the real meat of the negotiation happens 
 
return ΣINT 
} 
 
 
 
//The function get_ΣOUT' generates a set of adequate and endorsable 
//output commitments, given a set of proposed output commitments. 
//The function takes the set of proposed output commitments, in the 
//form of intermediate commitments, and the set of admissible input 
//commitments as its parameters. It returns the set of adequate and 
//endorsable output commitments. For each proposed output commitment, 
//the function checks whether the commitment is adequate to the set 
//of input commitments. If so, the proposed output commitment is  
//included as an endorsable output commitment; if not, it is 
//discarded.  
 
get_ΣOUT' (ΣINT, ΣINP) { 
 
 ΣOUT' = {}  
 
 for all INT ∈ ΣINT { 
 
  if (is_adequate (INT, ΣINP)) ΣOUT' = ΣOUT' + INT 
 
 } 
 
 return ΣOUT' 
} 
 
 
 
//The function is_adequate checks whether a proposed output 
//commitment, in the form of an intermediate commitment, is adequate 
//to the set of input commitments. It takes an intermediate 
//commitment and the set of input commitments as its parameters. If 
//the intermediate commitment is compatible with each of the input 
//commitments, the function returns TRUE; otherwise it returns FALSE. 
 
is_adequate (INT, ΣINP) { 
 
for all INP ∈ ΣINP { 
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if (INT / INP) return FALSE 
 
} 
 
return TRUE 
} 
 
 
 
//The function is_tight has the legislature check whether a set of 
//output commitments enjoys tight consensus or not. It takes the 
//set of output commitments as its parameter. If the set of output 
//commitments enjoys tight consensus, the function returns TRUE; 
//otherwise it returns FALSE. 
//The function is non-algorithmic: it is up to the legislature to 
//assess whether a set of output commitments enjoys tight consensus; 
//in general, this is a straightforward task. 
 
is_tight (ΣOUT') { 
 
 //this is where the legislature decides whether a set of output 
 //commitments enjoys tight consensus or not 
 
 return TRUE or return FALSE 
} 
 
 
 
//The function get_ ΣPOP' generates the set of popular commitments 
//held by the subset of the population subject to a given 
//legislature. It takes that legislature as its first parameter;  
//as its second parameter, it takes the popular commitments held 
//by the population subject to the legislature making the function 
//call (i.e., the population of which the desired population is a 
//subset). It returns the set of popular commitments held by the  
//members of the desired legislative jurisdiction. 
//The function is executed by the legislature, but is straightforward 
//given the set of popular commitments made available to it by the 
//function. 
 
get_ ΣPOP' (LS', ΣPOP) { 
 
 //this is where the legislature determines which popular 
 //commitments are held by the subset of the population subject  
//to the legislative jurisdiction of LS' 
 
 return ΣPOP' 
} 
 
 
 
//The function vote generates a set of endorsed output commitments 
//by having the legislature take a vote. The function takes a set of 
//proposed output commitments, in the form of intermediate 
//commitments, as its parameter and returns the set of endorsed 
//output commitments. Such a vote is taken where the recursive 
//function fails to find a tight consensus, or where the preliminary 
//law generated by the recursive function is deemed to be 
//unenforceable as a practical matter. 
//The function is non-algorithmic: the legislature uses the criterion 
//of practical enforceability to decide on the output commitments 
 207 
//it endorses. 
 
vote (ΣINT) { 
 
 //this is where the legislature endorses its output commitments 
 //by voting 
 
 return ΣOUT' 
} 
 
 
 
//The function is_enforceable has the legislature decide whether a 
//preliminary law generated by the recursive function 
//is enforceable or not. It takes the preliminary law 
//as its parameter. If the law is deemed enforceable, the function 
//returns TRUE; otherwise it returns FALSE. 
//The function is non-algorithmic: the legislature uses its skill 
//to assess whether a preliminary law is enforceable 
//as a practical matter or not. 
 
is_enforceable (LAW') { 
 
 //this is where the legislature decides whether a preliminary 
 //law is enforceable as a practical matter 
 
 return TRUE or return FALSE 
} 
 
 
 
//The function purge_ΣLAW purges laws from the set of existing laws 
//if they are incompatible with the newly generated law. The function 
//takes the new law and the set of existing laws as its parameters, 
//and it returns the purged set of laws. 
 
purge_ΣLAW (LAW, ΣLAW) { 
 
 ΣLAW' = ΣLAW 
 
for all LAW' ∈ ΣLAW' { 
 
 if (LAW / LAW') ΣLAW' = ΣLAW' - LAW' 
 
} 
 
return ΣLAW' 
} 
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